Emil SOULEIMANOV
Velká kavkazská válka 1817–1859/1864 [The Great Caucasus War 1817–1859/1864]..  /1–22/
The Great Caucasus War played a significant role in the history of nationalities in the Northern Caucasus as well as Russia. It influenced the formation of modern nationalisms of the Chechens, Ingush, Avars, Circassians, and other Dagestani, and Adygean nationalities. The conflict resulted in the emergence of a large number of legends and myths, which have become part of the national narratives. Appealing to the tradition of the Caucasus War was not uncommon even in Soviet times despite the fact that there was a definite attempt by the authorities to tone down or to alter the ideology surrounding these tendencies. Even today, the period of the Great Caucasus War provides great opportunities for a number of nationalist-inspired organizations or groups that seek the strengthening of ethnic autonomy status for the Northern Caucasus. In extreme cases, such groups seek independence from Moscow. Such efforts are distinct in light of the conflict in Chechnya, whose scope has far surpassed the borders of Chechnya and expanded to neighboring regions. The (interpreted) relevance of events that occurred in the region more than 150 years ago is high even today. This study represents an attempt to analyze the origins of Russian expansion in the Northern Caucasus and demonstrates that a number of geopolitical and cultural factors played an important role in the colonization of the region and current resistance to this colonization. The customs of clan solidarity among mountaineers, supported by traditional customary law, including blood revenge, ensured a rapid escalation, whereas Islam, still in its embryonic phase in some areas of the region, served as the common ideology of resistance. Despite certain, albeit partial, successes of Sheik Ushurma Mansur who first managed to united the Adygean and Vaynakh tribes under the green flag of Islam as did the first two imams of Dagestan, it was Sheik Shamil who, in spite of intense pressure from the Russian Empire, managed in the 1840s to lead the mountaineers of the Northeastern Caucasus to stand up to growing Russian expansion and create a functioning state on the territory of today’s Dagestan and Chechnya for twenty-five years. The period of the existence of the caliphate of Chechnya and Dagestan, which is at present idealized, was not a golden age for mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus, not only as a consequence of clashes with Russian troops, but also due to the imam’s efforts to achieve integration through the imposition of Islamic law (sharia), something which most people of the Caucasus had no experience with. Even though the Great Caucasus War was from a long-term perspective a tragedy for a number of Northern Caucasian nationalities, one must not perceive the war period only from this point of view. Even during the fighting, a rich cultural exchange took place between the people of the Northern Caucasus and Russian and other colonists in the sphere of trade, etc. The feudal elite of the Adygean and Dagestani nationalities were basically inclined towards incorporation into the framework of the Russian state because they thought it would guarantee their hard-won privileges. They saw the borders of the conflict as being of a class nature rather than an ethnic one. In an effort to preserve or strengthen their own positions, certain groups or feudal estates changed their preferences. The Great Caucasus War represented a complicated phenomenon, which can hardly be judged according to present-day established clichés.

Kateřina BICANOVÁ
Problematika sarmatismu v polské historiografii [The Issue of Sarmatism in Polish Historiography]..  /23–34/
This study is devoted to the differing views offered by Polish historiography concerning the issue of Sarmatism, which represented a significant cultural element of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the early modern period. In the first half of the sixteenth century, humanists such as Maciej Miechowita, Konrád Celtis, Marcin Bielski and Marcin Kromer popularized the thesis that the ancestors of Poles and Lithuanians of noble birth were the warlike Sarmatians, who were already mentioned by Ptolemy in his cosmography. Following the expansion of this notion in the seventeenth century, the state apparatus of the Rzeczpospolita emphasized this national myth. The Rzeczpospolita subsequently entered a period of decline that resulted in the division of the Polish-Lithuanian state at the end of the eighteenth century. Sarmatism was later ridiculed as an idea which was part of the political philosophy that resulted in the collapse of the state. Only in 1889 would Bronislaw Chlebowski undertake the first objective analysis of sarmatism. The work of this scholar was followed up in the first half of the twentieth century by the art historian, Tadeusz Mańkowski and afterwards especially by Tadeusz Ulewicz, who, in his works clarified many aspects of the origins of this significant cultural and political stream of thought. From the 1960s, the issue of sarmatism was further scrutinized by Stanisław Cynarski, Maria Bogucka and a leading specialist on the culture of Eastern Europe in the early modern period, Janusz Tazbir. In connection with an interest in the history of mentalities, cultural history, and cultural anthropology, a number of conferences have been held during which attention to sarmatism was paid. Also, a number of foreign scholars have studied sarmatism. A book by Maria Vojttona Leskinen is worthy of mention as is the critical and probing contribution of David Althoen.

Jan ŽUPANIČ
Haličská šlechta a její začlenění mezi nobilitu Rakouského císařství [The Galician Aristocracy and Its Incorporation into the Austrian Empire]..  /35–41/
The historical and cultural development of countries, which the House of Habsburg united under its scepter, differed as did the elites of these provinces. The creation of the Danubian empire between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries did not, however, signify the creation of a common elite or a unifying idea of the state. In fact, no consensus on such an idea was ever reached up until the demise of the empire. The existence of a symmetrical structure of elites was thus crucial to ensure the functioning of the state. In addition, the government in Vienna was confronted with a complex and sensitive problem, whose solutions posed great risks. When the Austrian Empire was founded in 1804, only the aristocratic structures of the old Habsburg countries, namely Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, were mutually compatible. Upon the annexation of Galicia, it became essential to include the Polish nobility in this system. However, the Polish nobility differed quite significantly from the aristocracy of the Danubian Empire. Above all, the Polish nobility was (at least theoretically) united. Therefore the government in Vienna divided the Galician aristocracy into knightly and gentlemanly orders, whose members could request the titles of squire, count, and duke according to specified criteria. Despite initial difficulties, this plan was put into effect in a relatively short time. The rapid stabilization of the situation in Galicia was very important for further developments in Austria. The Galician elites did not cause any major problems for the government in Vienna. On the contrary, they were among the government’s closest collaborators and proved to be one of the monarchy’s pillars until the outbreak of the First World War.

Přemysl VINŠ
Obraz Albánců v české společnosti na přelomu 19. a 20. století [The Image of Albanians in Czech Society at the Turn of the Twentieth Century]..  /43–62/
The image of Albanians in Czech society was influenced by prejudices, which emerged on account of a lack of information about Albanians as well as only limited contacts between both groups. The Czech affinity for the Balkan Slavs, whose relations with Albanians tended to be negative, also played a role. Books and articles concerning Albanians produced between the second half of the nineteenth century and 1914, however, indicate that the Albanians’ isolation strongly influenced the negative image as did desperate economic and social conditions as well as the existence of certain phenomena (such as bloody revenge) that were completely unimaginable in Central Europe. Most surviving writings deal with descriptions of life in Albania. Albanian isolation was caused not only by unfavorable natural conditions in Albania and a non-existent infrastructure, but also ignorance of the Albanian language and religious factionalism in Albania. These phenomena, boosted by images of Albanian militancy and wildness, tended to be viewed negatively, but this was not always the case. The isolation of the country as well as Albanians themselves were also the source of images of a romantically beautiful, mysterious country and the pride, honor, and free-thinking spirit of the Albanians were likewise emphasized. The negative image of the Albanians was somewhat balanced by that of the glorious Albanian past a many authors saw Albanians as the first nation in Europe that stood up to the Turks. During the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), when the Albanians called for self-determination, more positive, sympathetic writings began appearing in the Czech Lands. The image of Albanians was thus not so negative and the authors instead tried to introduce the Albanians to readers.

Jan PELIKÁN
Jugoslávie a československá otázka v květnu a červnu 1968 [Yugoslavia and the Czechoslovak Issue in May–June 1968]..  /63–86/
From the end of April, developments in Czechoslovakia, due to their dynamic and the focus of reforms, differed ever more from the manner in which the oligarchy in Belgrade had, after many years, modified certain characteristics of the Stalinist regime. Josip Broz Tito began to fear that the Prague Spring could serve as a dangerous model for liberally-oriented circles in Yugoslav society who demanded true reforms. However, the Yugoslav leader did not wish for the reforms to be halted completely either. He would have liked to see reconciliation as well as a tangible curbing of the spontaneous mass movement in Czechoslovakia. Basically, Tito would have had no objections to halting or slowing down the revival process should the Czechoslovak Communist Party make such a move. For these reasons and in light of the fact that maintaining good relations with Moscow was in his interest, Tito did not react to Czechoslovak calls for an alliance treaty with Yugoslavia. The position of the most senior leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party towards Yugoslavia underwent marked amplitudes between January and August 1968. A big interest in a versatile development of cooperation with Yugoslavia expressed at the end of April 1968 gave way to hesitation, wariness, and a lack of interest. The Czechoslovak leadership did not express a real interest in realizing plans to establish more intense contacts between representatives of both countries, frequent consultations, and a coordination of positions. In May, the Yugoslav foreign minister M. Nikezić and a member of the Yugoslav party leadership visited Prague. However, no significant Czechoslovak party or government functionaries visited Yugoslavia. A visit by A. Dubček, initially scheduled to take place in March, was repeatedly postponed At this time, no fundamental changes occurred insofar as contacts between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were concerned. The power elites in both countries overtly did their best to ensure that events in Czechoslovakia would not hamper mutual cooperation. Yugoslavia did not protest escalating Soviet pressure on Dubček’s administration. The relatively very good relations were illustrated by a delegation of the Soviet Communist Party leadership to Yugoslavia in the second half of June. This was the first official visit by a Soviet Party delegation since the split of 1948.


MATERIÁLY A DOKUMENTY

Jiří FRIEDL
Internace Východní skupiny československé armády v SSSR ve světle sovětských dokumentů [The Internment of the Eastern Group of the Czechoslovak Army in the Soviet Union in Light of the Soviet Documents]..  /87–120/
The internment of Czechoslovak soldiers (former members of the Legion of Czechs and Slovaks in Poland) in the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941 has not yet been the subject of systematic research. This study aims to analyze this episode from the perspective of Soviet security organs on the basis of previously unknown documents stored at the Russian State Military Archive in Moscow. From the documents, it is possible to learn what sorts of problems accompanied the internment. In addition, one gets an idea about the relations between Czechoslovak soldiers and Soviet organs, which were not always idyllic. The soldiers could witness every day the difference between Soviet rhetoric describing the Soviet Union as “paradise on Earth” and the everyday reality of Russian life. Despite relatively intense pro-Soviet propaganda, efforts to alter the soldiers’ negative attitude towards the Soviet Union mostly failed. On the contrary, there is evidence of a number of anti-Soviet pronouncements, particularly from the officers. Despite this, there existed a group among the soldiers who admired the Soviet regime and planned to stay in the Soviet Union. The vast majority of them were not Communist Party members. Lieutenant-Colonel Svoboda and his officers believed that these opinions and the pro-Soviet soldiers’ refusal to fight for the liberation of Czechoslovakia constituted treason. Throughout the internment period, relations between the pro-Communist and anti-Communist groups remained tense. Several soldiers who were well-known critics of the Soviet regime had to spend several years in forced labor camps.


RECENZE, POZNÁMKY, ZPRÁVY
Jubilejní sborník k 75. narozeninám Richarda Pražáka. Zdravice vědci česko-maďarských vztahů.. (István Fried)  /123–126/

Jerzy BESTRY
Służba konsularna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w Czechosłowacji.. (Ivo Baran – Jiří Friedl)  /126–128/

Patrik GIRGLE
Kosovo.. (Tomáš Chrobák)  /129–130/

Barbara Alpern ENGEL
Women in Russia 1700–2000.. (Zbyněk Vydra)  /130–133/

Hienadź SAHANOVIČ – Zachar ŠYBIEKA
Dějiny Běloruska.. (Jitka Komendová)  /133–134/
Mezi historiografií a demagogií.. (Josef Šaur)  /135–136/

David M. GLANTZ
Charkov 1942. Anatomie vojenské porážky ze sovětského pohledu.. (Martin Čížek)  /136–137/

Jože PIRJEVEC – Gorazd BAJC – Borut KLABJAN
Vojna in mir na Primorskem. Od kapitulacije Italije leta 1943 do Londonskega memoranduma leta 1954.. (Ondřej Vojtěchovský)  /138–140/


KRONIKA

Jan NĚMEČEK – Emil VORÁČEK
Česko-ruské vztahy na prahu 3. tisíciletí. Týden konferencí v Historickém ústavu [The Czech-Russian Contacts on the Eve of the Third Millennium. The Week of Conferences in the Historical Institute]..  /143–146/

Bohdan ZILYNSKYJ
Odešel Vladimír Hostička (1929–2006) [Vladimír Hostička Passed Away]..  /147/

Mikuláš NEVRLÝ
Oslavy Ivana Franka v Bratislave [The Commemoration of Ivan Frank in Bratislava]..  /148/


LIDÉ A DOBA

Lubomíra HAVLÍKOVÁ
Osudy pražské byzantologie v době německé okupace Československa [The Fate of Byzantine Studies during the Nazi Occupation of Czechoslovakia]..  /149–160/
The occupation of Czechoslovakia, the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Second World War (1939–1945) negatively affected Slavic Studies institutions in Prague. The Slavic Institute in Prague also was a victim to Nazi repression. In fact, its activities were halted as soon as it was incorporated into the Reinhard Heydrich Foundation. Publication of the journal dealing with Byzantine-Slavic Studies Byzantinoslavica ceased and Czechoslovak Byzantine Studies ceased for a number of years. Until the Institute’s closure, German politicians and scientists affiliated with the German part of Charles University attempted to secure the position of editor-in-chief of Byzantinoslavica for F. Dölger, a German specialist in the field of Byzantine Studies from Munich. Dölger was also a candidate, along with German, Austrian, and Greek researchers like G. Stadtmüller, E. Weigand, H. Gerstinger, J. Sykutris, O. Demus, and O. Treitinger-for the open chair of Byzantine and Neo-Greek Studies at the German university. The archival documents indicate that two researchers were selected for the chairmanship of Byzantine Studies at the German university, namely G. Stadtmüller who never assumed the post and departed for Leipzig and E. Weigand who continued to work in Prague until 1945.