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Kybernetika 32(5):483-490, 1996.

Coalitional Stability and Rationality in Cooperative Games

Anton Stefanescu


Abstract:

We propose a new solution concept which characterizes stable agreements in cooperative games. Although it is a refinement of an earlier solution concept introduced by McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer [6], there are some similitudes with other solutions of cooperative games. The new concept may be defined both for transferable and non-transferable utility games and it is shown that it exists for very large classes of games.


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BIB TeX

@article{kyb:1996:5:483-490,

author = {Stefanescu, Anton},

title = {Coalitional Stability and Rationality in Cooperative Games},

journal = {Kybernetika},

volume = {32},

year = {1996},

number = {5},

pages = {483-490}

publisher = {{\'U}TIA, AV {\v C}R, Prague },

}


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