ABSTRACTS:

Staffan Carlshamre (Stockholm):
How Stories Mean
Ordinary readers and literary scholars take it for granted that stories have meaning. But what is the meaning of as story and exactly how does it come about? Using Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse as my main source of examples, I present an account of story-meaning involving the basic operations of generalisation, abstraction, universalisation and application. I also discuss questions about the motivation for using stories as vehicles of meaning, and about whose meaning story-meaning is. Does it belong to the author, the reader or to the story itself?

David Davies (Toronto):
Fictionality, Fictive Utterance, and the Assertive Author
I have elsewhere defended the claim, proposed by Currie in Nature of Fiction, that it is at least a necessary condition for the fictionality of a narrative that it be the product of an act of fictive utterance whereby the author intends the reader to make-believe rather than believe what is narrated.. I have also argued, against Currie, that a further necessary condition for the fictionality of a narrative is that the overriding constraint on its construction is not what I term the 'fidelity constraint'. In so arguing, I have also assumed that these conditions are jointly sufficient for fictionality although neither is individually sufficient. In this paper, I further elaborate and defend this view. I examine, first, the relationship between the two conditions, and consider whether either of them, suitably refined, might by itself be sufficient for fictionality. I then ask how a 'fictive utterance' account of fictionality can accommodate non-fictive utterances on the part of the author of a work of fiction - that is, assertive utterances the contents of which the reader is intended to believe rather than make-believe. In this connection, I also address the place, in the kind of 'fictive utterance' model of fictionality that I propose, of works of 'faction' in Clifford Geertz's sense - that is, narratives only partly governed by the 'fidelity constraint' that attempt to 'make out' the actual world rather than to 'make up' a fictional one.

Lubomír Doležel (Toronto/Praha):
Critical Issues in the Theory of Fiction: Possible Worlds, Fictional Worlds, Literary Texts

Bohumil Fořt (Brno):
Fictional Worlds between Philosophy, Semiotics and Linguistics
The contribution views fictional worlds against the background of its three essential sources: philosophy, semiotics and linguistics. Doing so it primarily examines the connection between fictional-worlds theory and theoretical suggestions which this theory adopted from logical calculus and action theory, from semantics and pragmatics, and from stylistics and structuralist linguistics and literary theory. It also shows the ways in which the fictional-worlds theory both uses and changes the terms and strategies it 'borrowed' from the three disciplines in question.

Leila Haaparanta (Tampere):
The Identification of Fictional Characters
One who is able to identify a person knows who the person is. The ability to identify a person presupposes knowledge of her identity. This paper asks what it means to claim that a reader is able to identify a fictional character in or after the process of reading a literary text. Even though the author's methods of introducing and constructing fictional characters will also be considered, the main focus will be at the reader's end; hence, on what she knows or believes about the characters. The paper will consider various methods of identifying individuals discussed in the philosophy of language, especially in the theory of possible worlds. It will argue that an analysis of attitudes de re inspired by Frege's concept of *Sinn*, where individuals are taken to be the subject's constructions, helps to understand what it is for a reader of a literary text to be able to identify fictional characters.

James R. Hamilton (Kansas):
Meeting Hedda Gabler
My paper will focus upon epistemic questions rather than ontological questions. I ask how we know we have recognized a particular character at later times within a performance, across performances within the same production, across productions, and across performances of different narratives. Spectators do seem to be able to do this, so the question that interests me is „how" they do it.

Tomáš Hříbek (Praha):
What Good Is Fiction?

Alice Jedličková (Praha):
In a Hole in the Ground There Lived a Hobbit; or, a Few Comments on Fictional Space of Narrative and Mental Imagery
While some fictional worlds´ theorists consider textual lacunas to be particular semiotic devices that are intended to guide the process of reader´s comprehension (such as Lubomír Doležel), others admit that narrative gaps are expected (or at least allowed) to be filled in, while employing reader´s extratextual experience and imagination (such as Marie-Laure Ryan). Moreover, while the former invite the readers to participate merely in the process of constituting the meaning of a *semiotic structure*, the latter allow them to *experience* fictional worlds. This kind of experience is referred to as *immersion*, a mental state of the reader induced during the process of reception of a fictional text (or lingering on after it), involving a variety of images and quasi-experiential sensations and emotions. The idea of the plurality of possible worlds makes the idea plausible from the ontological point of view. The literary theory conditions immersion by excluding metanarrative, or generally, anti-illusionist strategies from the text. The number one candidate for the immersive reading experience (also referred to as *aesthetic illusion* within literary theory) is realist writing based on a lively representation of the variety of aspects of reality. But we were told at school that literature is supposed to "develop our imagination", and Ingarden tells us that we are supposed to fill in the narrative gaps. Thus, it seems that it may be both the *narrative density* (or saturation), and the *uncertainty* of literary representation (or the tendency of a text to provide the reader with "blank space") that stimulate our imagination. As a result, the most exciting question from the point of view of a literary critic is what is the relation between mental imagery resulting from filling in the gaps, and mental immersion resulting from a "saturated" narrative. And whether these are two different processes, since they basically depend on the same structure, that is on verbal representation, what is (or is not) told. For example, there may be particular textual devices that act as ignitors of the whole process under generally different textual conditions (saturation vs. gaps). Let us observe some examples of fictional representations of space, particularly landscapes, in order to test the opposition, taking into account the fact that a literary critic may find it difficult to avoid the interaction of historically located cultural schemes.

Tomáš Koblížek (Praha):
The Theory of Fictional Wolds from the Perspective of Structural Analysis
The article can be divided into two parts closely bound together. The first part represents polemic with the Theory of Fictional Worlds (esp. with some of the key issues in Lubomír Doležel's monograph *Heterocosmica*), the second part is based on this polemic and it attempts to sketch out a structural theory of literary text. The polemic touches upon three groups of problems: The first group deals with the fact that the Theory of Fictional Worlds isolates one of the layers originally constituted inside the textual structure (the extensional layer of "fictional objects"). Following this type of questions the author defines the general concept of structure as a specific type of whole and articulates analytical principles connected to this key concept. The second set of problems deals with Lubomír Doležel's assertion that the role of the reader is to reconstruct the fictional world represented by literary text. In contrast to this conception the author brings up the concept of dynamic organization of structural whole and points to specific features of reading connected to literary structure. The last group of problems deals with the question of meaning of literary work. In the context of polemics with the Theory of Fictional Worlds the author attempts to demonstrate that the question of meaning is not

limited to deciphering of an intensional layer and reconstructing aesthetically neutral facts: The reader always reads the whole structure as a specific type of unity.

Petr Koťátko (Praha):
Who Is Who in the Fictional World
The paper defends a conservative account of worlds of narrative literary works. According to the author's view, they admit of being identical with the actual world - and if they are not, it is still possible for them to share entities with the actual world (as coexisting with fictional entities). The causal links in these worlds have a counterfactual dimension precisely like in the actual world. Typically, the fictional entities are just as complete as the inhabitants of the actual world. Things going on in the world of a narrative work cannot be reduced to those described in the text, implied by it or implicated by it.

Paolo Leonardi (Bologna):
Vacuous Sentences
Vacuous sentences – sentences in which occurs a designative phrase without designation – are deemed to be false or neither true nor false. Or, if one admits of (non-)existent objects à la Terry Parsons, true or false. I am slightly uneasy with either solution. Vacuous sentence, I will advocate, are a special case of ungrounded sentences (for the notion of groundedness, see Kripke 1975). They are sentences for which there are no grounds neither for telling them true nor for telling them false. Hence, at a first level, they are properly neither true nor false, and, at a higher level, reflecting on the case, they can be told either true or false, depending on whether one expands the domain or not.
S. Kripke 1975 "An Outline of a Theory of Truth" (The Journal of Philosophy 72: 690-716).

Anders Pettersson (Umeå):
The Embeddedness of Fictional Characters
Fictional characters depend for their existence on the representations in which they are embedded. This does not mean that the characters must be thought of as aspects of those representations (bundles of properties or suchlike). According to common usage, fictional characters are to be imagined as persons, up to a point. I will try to give some concreteness to the ideas of being "imagined as persons" and of being thus imagined "up to a point". My main contention, however, will be that the nature and function of the representations in which the fictional characters are embedded largely determine the properties that we can justifiably ascribe to the characters. I will use that idea in a discussion of the classical problem of what is true in a fictional world (that is, the problem of what the exact content of a given fiction is). Three excerpts from texts will be introduced by way of examples: one from a work of fiction, one from a biography, and one from a philosophical work.

Mikael Pettersson (Stockholm):
Perceiving Pictured Possibilities. Seeing-in, Seeing-that, and Imagination
Looking at pictures typically involves seeing things in them. Now, such seeing is not "ordinary," or /real/seeing. For one thing, we see fictional things in pictures, and whatever other capacities fictional creatures may have, being seen (by us) is not among them; non-existent as they are, they are causally impotent, which in turn makes them invisible. Sure, many fictional things and scenes are /possible/, and can be seen by inhabitants of other possible worlds, but we, in the actual world, cannot see what is /merely/possible. Still, looking at pictures of the merely possible allows us to have visual experiences /as of/their subjects. Again, as we say, we "see" them "in" the pictures. What is it to see, in this sense, the merely possible? In philosophical aesthetics, the notion of seeing-in is due to Richard Wollheim, who took seeing-in to be what explains both pictorial experience and depiction itself. This notion has been rather lively debated over the last couple of decades, and the entries in the debate have typically been attempts to say more about seeing-in, which one often thinks Wollheim leaves underexplained. This paper argues that these accounts often neglect one key feature of seeing-in -- namely that seeing-in allows for /seeing that/-- and that they therefore cannot be seen as /full/accounts of seeing-in. In order to accommodate this feature of seeing-in, it is argued, seeing-in should in part (at least) be accounted for in terms of imagination, despite Wollheim's longstanding insistence that this is not so.

Martin Pokorný (Praha):
Fictionality as Density
The paper will test the following hypothesis: A text is exactly as fictional as it is long.

Göran Rossholm (Stockholm):
Fictionality and Information
I will present a concept of fiction rooted in the concept of factual information and try to spell out the major differences between these concepts information and information (or information taken figuratively and literally). I will confine myself to narrative fiction, and I will comment about fictionality from a readers perspective only.

Marcelo Sabatés:
Characters at Work
The paper defends a version of a fairly traditional type/ token account of literary works by addressing some objections regarding the variability and creatability of texts, by comparing the view with recent alternatives and by arguing that it offers the best framework for a plausible view about fictional characters.

Ondřej Sládek (Brno)
Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History

Fredrik Stjernberg (Linköping):
Truth is stronger than fiction. On alethic pluralism and truth in fiction
According to alethic pluralism, truth can be many things, and they need not have one thing in common. Truth need not be explicated by for instance correspondence or coherence. Correspondence may be fine when we are talking about tables and cats on mats, but is perhaps not the best when we are dealing with truth in mathematics, conceptual truths, the truth of conditionals, moral discourse and fiction, to name a few examples. Perhaps truth is something entirely different in these areas. In that case, we are perhaps free to say that fictional discourse is true, yet not be compelled to resort to Meinongian entities to explain these truths.
This leads to a particular problem for the pluralist: Is there a principled way for the alethic pluralist to hold on to the idea that some areas of discourse still are not suitable to be described in terms of truth? Take fiction as an example. If truth can be many things, would it not then simply be perfectly in order to add that fictional statements, for instance about Sherlock Holmes, can be true as well? But we can imagine an alethic pluralist who still thinks that fictional discourse is not truth-apt. My question is whether there is anything the pluralist can appeal to if she wants to draw the line somewhere. The monist about truth has it much easier: the monist can simply say that for instance fictional discourse is not truth-apt, since there are no fictional facts corresponding with the fictional statements, and that fictional discourse therefore fails to present truths. Is the alethic pluralist automatically forced to become very liberal, accepting that anything anyone calls "truth-apt" is in fact truth-apt, or is there some way to say that there are limits to truth-aptness without reverting to a monist position (perhaps being a "closet monist")?

Karel Thein (Praha):
Stoic Fictions: The Prehistory of Analysis
The paper conceives of several possible definitions of fictionality with a particular focus on the relations between fiction, modal reasoning and imagination. Choosing some examples from the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy alike, it submits that these relations are the basic element of both our propositional self-awareness and our access to other minds.

Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin, Italy)
Probably the Charterhouse of Parma does not exist, and possibly not even (*that*) Parma
If one is a realist on fictional entities, true negative existentials apparently involving one such entity are more straightforwardly accounted for than in antirealist approach to such entities. In particular, a sentence like "The Charterhouse of Parma does not exist" does not say that in the overall domain of

what there is there is no such a thing as Parma's Charterhouse, as antirealists would hold, but it rather is taken to be about one of the most relevant fictional characters of Stendhal's novel in order to truthfully predicate of it its non-existence, a certain first-order nonuniversal property. Comparative existentials such as "Unlike the Charterhouse of Pavia, the Charterhouse of Parma does not exist" support the realist option. Curiously enough, this treatment suggests itself not only as far as *native* characters, like Parma's Charterhouse, are concerned, but also as far as purportedly *immigrant* characters, like Stendhal's Parma, are concerned; appearances notwithstanding, not only Parma's Charterhouse, but also (that) Parma, does not exist. Put in ontological rather than semantical terms, entities like Stendhal's Parma are full-fledged fictional characters rather than concrete individuals. There indeed is a specifically ontological reason to defend such an idea. If an object is a concrete individual, it is a complete entity. Yet purportedly immigrant characters, like Stendhal's Parma, are not complete. Hence, they are not concrete individuals; they rather are genuine *ficta* as well.

Marián Zouhar (Bratislava):
Frege on Fiction
Frege scarcely suggested any positive theory of fictional discourse; his notes about it are primarily designed to highlight certain features of factual discourse rather than to contribute to a theory of fictional discourse *per se*. I gather the fragmentary pieces scattered here and there in some of Frege's papers and try to outline a possible Fregean picture of the fictional discourse semantics.

The fundamental feature of the sentences occurring in fictional discourse is, according to Frege, that the thoughts (*Gedanken*) expressed by such sentences are neither true nor false. Sometimes Frege speaks about such thoughts as fictitious. I show (i) that being fictitious cannot be interpreted as having a third truth-value and (ii) that this holds for all thoughts expressed by the sentences occurring in fictional discourse, contrary to what Frege seems to imply in certain unclear passages. Given these conclusions, it is shown that sentences in fictional discourse are about nothing; i.e., the Principle of Subject-Matter (*cf*. Carnap) breaks down in such contexts. For all sentences in fictional discourse it holds that neither proper names nor concept-words appearing in them have meanings (*Bedeutungen*). Thus, the Sherlock Holmes stories, for example, are not about Sherlock Holmes or anyone else. Analogously, fairy-tales cannot be about fairies or witches or unicorns because there is no concept (*Begriff*) of a fairy (etc.).

Finally, I shall qualify certain Frege's remarks which appear to point to a somewhat odd theory of language used in fictional discourse. Frege seems to imply that the language as used in factual discourse differs from the language as used in fictional discourse. This *double* language hypothesis explains, rather neatly, a great majority of Frege's remarks on fiction. However, I do not wish to claim that this is something Frege was after in his paper. On the basis of one Frege's note, I outline a competing *single* language hypothesis. Anyway, both hypotheses are consistent with prevailing number of Frege's remarks on fiction. I try to explain why Frege sometimes speaks as if preferring one hypothesis and sometimes as if preferring the other one.