

## Embodied appraisals and non-emotional mental states

Up until relatively recently, perceptual theories of emotions has not been particularly popular, mostly because of their apparent lack to explain propositional and normative character of emotions. However, the group of theories has received a new impetus with the publication of Prinz (2004). By conjoining a specific perceptual account with a particular theory of intentionality, Prinz is able to show how bodily states and their perceptions can carry intentional content that transcends these very states. He also emphasizes the role of valence in emotions, which he takes to be an internal command to either sustain or abandon the immanent bodily perturbations.

We offer a novel argument against Prinz's account. Unlike authors who deny various premises in his arguments (see Colombetti 2007, Slaby 2008, and Pugmire 2006), we take his main assumptions for granted and show that they lead to undesirable consequences. Prinz argues that emotions are perceived perturbations in the body, correlated with one's well-being in the environment, and they are also characterized by a hedonic tone, represented by valence markers. We intend to show that such identifications are not exclusive of emotions. There are non-emotional mental states that satisfy Prinz's criteria. Drawing upon examples from Darwin's work (1872) on emotion expression, we argue that several non-emotional mental states comply with Prinz's schema.

Apparent confusion in Darwin's work, where he freely mixes emotion types with non-emotional mental states, serves as a springboard for our criticism of Prinz's approach. Given that Darwin conflates emotions with their expressive components, and thereby judges any state that have perceptual qualities to count among emotions, we ask whether our awareness of some of non-emotional mental states could also rest on analogical perception.

Darwin argues that mental states of determination, loss of thoughts, increased effort and puzzlement are all characterized by stereotypical bodily expression. Frowning in moments of difficulties, pursing the lips during determination or blank stare when one loses her chain of thoughts are some examples of type specific behavioral expressions that have little to do with emotions. We claim that the option is open to identify at least some of these non-emotional states with perceptions of their corresponding bodily changes. If we learn to be in a given mental state via the perception of our own bodily perturbations, we come up with non-emotional states that fulfil Prinz's requirements. Just like Prinz's emotions, the above-mentioned states could consists of perceptions of particular visceral changes, though their functional role can be seemingly independent of such origins.

Furthermore, visceral changes under discussion are indicative of state of affairs beyond themselves, thereby fulfilling Prinz's semantic requirements that cannot be met by some perceptible bodily states, such as hunger or fatigue. Thus if we can learn of a loss of thoughts from a prolonged pause of our ocular movement, characteristic of a blank stare, we arrive at a counterexample to Prinz's account. Importantly, states in question also possess the required feature of valence. They command one to sustain or overcome the given bodily condition: determination should continue, loss of thoughts has to be terminated.

We conclude by arguing that Prinz's account either declares some non-emotional states to be in fact emotional or loses its demarcating power. With first option clearly breaches common sense usage of emotion categories and therefore the conclusion seem to be that emotions cannot be understood in perceptual terms.

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