

# Interpretability in Set Theories

Robert M. Solovay

A letter to Petr Hájek, August 17, 1976

## Annotation

A copy, created in October 2007, of a letter in Petr Hájek's personal archive. The letter itself was written as a reaction on P. Hájek's problem whether there exists a set sentence  $\varphi$  such that  $GB, \varphi$  is interpretable in  $GB$ , but  $ZF, \varphi$  is not interpretable in  $ZF$ .

## R. M. Solovay's postscript note, Oct. 10, 2007

It seems to me that the formulation of the notion of "satisfactory" in section 3 is not quite right. I would rewrite part 3 as follows:

If  $\varphi$  is one of the following sorts of sentence then  $s(\varphi) = 1$ :

- (a) The closure of one of the axioms of  $ZF + V=L$ ;
- (b) The closure of a logical or equality axiom;
- (c) One of the special axioms about the  $c_j$ 's.

--Bob Solovay

Aug. 17, 1976

Dear Professor Hajek,

I can now settle another question raised in your paper on interpretations of theories. There is a  $\Pi_1^0$  sentence,  $\Phi$ , such that

- 1)  $ZF + \Phi$  is not interpretable in  $ZF$ .
- 2)  $GB + \Phi$  is interpretable in  $GB$ .

$\Phi$  will be a variant of the Rosser sentence for  $GB$ . However, for my proof to work, I need a "non-standard formalization of predicate logic"

(roughly that given by Herbrand's theorem.) I also have to be a bit more careful about the Gödel numbering used than is usually

~~ness~~ necessary.

1. Let me begin with the formal language  $\mathcal{L}$ . Well-formed formulas of  $\mathcal{L}$  will consist of certain of the strings on the finite alphabet  $\Sigma$ :

$$\Sigma = \{ \overset{1}{\&}, \overset{2}{\neg}, \overset{3}{\forall}, \overset{4}{\exists}, \overset{5}{(}, \overset{6}{)}, \overset{7}{c}, \overset{8}{\varepsilon}, \overset{9}{=}, \overset{10}{\perp}, \overset{11}{1}, \overset{12}{0} \}$$

To each string on  $\Sigma$  we correlate a number base 12

in ~~decimal~~ notation via  $\& \sim 1, \forall \sim 3, \text{ etc.}$

This number is the Gödel number of the symbol

We have in our language an infinite stock

of variables  $v_0, v_1, v_2, \dots$ , and an infinite string

of constants  $c_0, c_1, c_2, \dots$

For example  $c_5$  will be the string

$$\overset{7}{c} \overset{5}{(} \overset{6}{\varepsilon} \overset{11}{1} \overset{12}{0} \overset{11}{1} \overset{12}{0}$$

$$c(101).$$

2. I next wish to introduce a theory,  $\mathcal{T}$ , in the language  $\mathcal{L}$ . Basically,  $\mathcal{T}$  is the theory  $ZFC + V=L$ . However, to each ~~e~~ formula  $\neq$  sentence  $\psi$  of the form

$$(\exists x) \psi(x)$$

with Gödel number,  $e$ , we assign the following

axioms:

$$1) (\exists x) \psi(x) \rightarrow \psi(c_e)$$

$$2) \neg (\exists x) \psi(x) \rightarrow c_e = 0$$

$$3) (\forall y) [y <_L c_e \rightarrow \neg \psi(y)]$$

4)  $c_e = 0$ . (if  $e$  is not a Gödel no of the stated form.)

Thus  $c_e$  is the least  $x$  such that  $\psi(x)$

in the canonical well-ordering of  $L$ , ~~otherwise~~ if such

an  $x$  exists; otherwise  $c_e = 0$ .

Note that  $\mathcal{Q}$  may well contain some  $c_j$ 's, though since  $\# \mathcal{Q} = e$ ,  $c_e$  does not appear in  $\mathcal{Q}$ .

Our Gödel numbering  $\#$  has been arranged so that:

Let  $\mathcal{Q}(x)$  be a formula. Suppose

$$\log_{12} \# \mathcal{Q}(x) \leq z,$$

$$\log e \leq z. \quad (\text{Here } \# \mathcal{Q} \text{ is the Gödel number of } \mathcal{Q}.)$$

Then  $\log \# \mathcal{Q}(c_e) \leq P(z)$ , for some explicit

polynomial  $P$ .  $P(z) = z(z+4)$

3. Let  $s$  be a sequence of zeros and ones.

$s: m \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ , say.  $s$  is satisfactory if

$$1) \quad s(\# \neg \mathcal{Q}) = \neg s(\# \mathcal{Q})$$

$$2) \quad s(\# \mathcal{Q} \& \mathcal{R}) = s(\# \mathcal{Q}) \& s(\# \mathcal{R})$$

3) If  $\mathcal{Q}$  is an axiom of  $ZFC + V=L$  or

*plus weak  $\mathcal{Q}$*

*no model present*

*no ax. logic*

one of the special axioms about the  $c_j$ 's, then

$$s(\# \mathcal{Q}) = 1.$$

Of course these conditions only apply for places where  $s$  is defined.

We say a sentence  $\Theta$  is proved at level  $n$

1)  $n > \# \Theta$  and

if every  $s: n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$  which is satisfactory has

$$s(\# \Theta) = 1. \quad \text{It is not hard to show the}$$

following are equivalent (for  $\Theta$  a sentence

containing no  $c_j$ 's):

*prov  $\mathbb{Z}$*

*1)  $\mathbb{Z}$  is satisf.  $\mathbb{Z}$ ;  $\vdash \Theta$   
 2)  $\mathbb{Z} + V=L \vdash \Theta$   
 3)  $\mathbb{Z} + V=L \vdash \Theta$*

$$1) \quad ZFC + V=L \vdash \Theta$$

2) For some  $n$ ,  $\Theta$  is proved at level  $n$ .

Also note that the relation: " $\Theta$  is proved at

level  $n$ " is primitive recursive, and in fact is

Kalmar elementary.

4. We can now define our variant of the

Rosser sentence,  $\Phi$ :  $\Phi$  says "If I am

proved at level  $n$ , then my negation is proved

at some level  $j \leq n$ ."

$\Phi$  has the usual properties of the

Rosser sentence. In particular:

1)  $\Phi$  is  $\Pi_1^0$ .

2)  $\Phi$  is undecidable in  $ZFC + V=L$ .

3)  $\vdash \text{Con}(GB) \rightarrow \Phi$ . (The proof can

be carried out in Peano arithmetic.)

It follows from 1) and 2) that  $\Phi$  is  $ZF + \Phi$

is not interpretable in  $ZF$ . We shall show that

$GB + \Phi$  is interpretable in  $GB$ . For that

it suffices to show  $GB + \Phi$  is interpretable

in  $GB + \neg \Phi + V=L$ . We work from now on in the theory  $GB + \neg \Phi + V=L$ .

5. Since  $\neg \Phi$  is true,  $\Phi$  must have been

proved at some level  $n$ . Let  $n_0$  be the least

level at which  $\Phi$  is proved. (Note that for any

standard integer  $k$ ,  $n_0 > k$ , thus this can only

be formulated as a scheme.)

6. An important role in our proof is played

by the notion of partial ~~truth~~ satisfaction relation.

We begin with some preliminary definitions.

Let  $j$  be an integer. If  $j$  is the Gödel

number of a well-formed formula,  $\mathcal{Q}$ , then

$A_j$  is the set of free variables of  $\mathcal{Q}$ . Otherwise

$A_j = \emptyset$ . Let  $D_j$  be the class of all ordered

pairs  $\langle k, u \rangle$  such that

1)  $k < j$

2)  $k$  is the Gödel number of a well-formed

formula.

3)  $u$  is a set.

4)  $u$  is a function with domain  $A_k$

The following can easily be formalized in

GB:  $Z$  is a ~~prop~~ class and is a function

and mapping all constants  $c$  ( $\#c < j$ ) into  $V$ .

mapping  $D_j$  into  $\{0, 1\}$ . We interpret  $Z(\langle k, u \rangle) = \varepsilon$

as meaning: if the free variables of  $\mathcal{Q}$  are interpreted

according to  $u$ , then  $\mathcal{Q}(u)$  has truth value  $\varepsilon$ .

(Here  $\#\mathcal{Q} = k$ .) Finally  $Z$  satisfies the

usual Tarski inductive definition of truth in so

far as they make sense (i.e. in so far as  $Z(\langle k, u \rangle)$

is defined.) (in the structure  $\langle V, \varepsilon \rangle$ ,  $V$  the class of all sets.)

Let  $\text{Tr}(j, Z)$  be the formula of

GB expressing all this. Then the following are

easy to establish:

1)  $\text{Tr}(j, Z) \rightarrow (\forall j)(\forall Z)(\exists Z') \text{Tr}(j, Z) \&$

$\text{Tr}(j, Z') \rightarrow Z = Z'$ .

2)  $(\forall j)(\forall Z)(\forall k) [ \text{Tr}(j, Z) \& k < j. \rightarrow$

$(\exists Z') \text{Tr}(k, Z') ]$ .

3)  $(\forall j)(\forall Z) [ \text{Tr}(j, Z) \rightarrow (\exists Z') ( \text{Tr}(j+1, Z') ) ]$

7. Let  $I_0 = \{j: (\exists Z) Tr(j, Z)\}$ . Our next goal is to show  $2^{\frac{n_0}{2}} \notin I_0$ . The reason for  $2^{\frac{n_0}{2}}$  rather than  $n_0$  is that we intend to use the following lemma.

Let  $\mathcal{Q}$  be a ~~formula~~ sentence of  $\mathcal{L}$  containing the constants  $c_1, \dots, c_k$ . Let  $v_1, \dots, v_k$  be the ~~first~~ distinct variables not appearing in  $\mathcal{Q}$ . Let  $\mathcal{Q}'$  be the formula obtained by replacing  $c_k$  by  $v_k$  in  $\mathcal{Q}$ . Then if  $\#\mathcal{Q} < n_0$ ,  $\#\mathcal{Q}' < \frac{n_0}{2}$ .

( $2^{\frac{n_0}{2}}$  could be replaced by  $n_0^{\log_2 n_0}$ , if we desired.)

Let then  $Tr(2^{\frac{n_0}{2}}, Z)$ . Using  $Z$  we can compute the correct value of  $c_i$  (call it  $\tilde{c}_i$ ) for  $i < n_0$ .

We can then determine the map  $s: n_0 \rightarrow 2$  that  $s$  represents the "true" state of affairs (true according to  $Z$ ), interpreting  $c_i$  as  $\tilde{c}_i$ . This  $s$  will be satisfactory and since  $\Phi$  is false (we are working in  $\mathfrak{B} GB + \neg \Phi + V=L!$ ),  $s(\# \Phi) = 0$ . But this contradicts  $\Phi$  being proved at level  $n_0$ .

8. Our next goal is to define a ~~set~~ <sup>collection</sup>  $I$  of integers with the following properties:

1) ~~Let~~ ~~Let~~  $\forall x \in I$

2) Let  $z \in I$ . Let

$$\log_2 x \leq (\log_2 z)^2$$

Then  $x \in I$ . 3)  $n_0 \notin I$ .

( $I$  is, like  $I_0$ , a definable collection of integers but not a set.) It follows from 1), 2) that  $I$  contains all the standard integers and is closed under  $+$ ,  $\cdot$ , is an initial segment of the integers. Finally,  $x \in I$  implies  $x^{\log_2 x} \in I$ .)

Let  $I_1 = \{m : (\forall n \in I_0) (m+n \in I_0)\}$ .

Then  $I_1 \subseteq I$ , and  $I_1$  is an initial segment of the integers closed under  $+$ .

Let  $I_2 = \{m : 2^m \in I_1\}$ .

Then  $I_2$  is closed under  $+$ , is an initial segment of  $I_0$  and does not contain  $n_0$ .

Repeat the process by which  $I_1$  was obtained from  $I_0$  three times, getting  $I_3$  such that  $I_3$  is an initial seg of

$\omega$ , closed under  $+$ , and such that

$$x \in I_3 \rightarrow 2^{2^x} \in I_3.$$

Let  $I = \{z : (\exists x \in I_3) z \leq 2^{2^x}\}$ . Then

$I$  has the stated properties.

Now since  $n_0 \notin I$ ,  $n_0 - 1 \notin I$ . Let

$s$  be the least satisfactory map of  $n_0 - 1$  into 2

such that  $s(\# \Phi) = 1$ . ( $s$  exists, since

otherwise  $\neg \Phi$  would be proved at level  $n_0 - 1$ ,

and  $\Phi$  would be true. (We are using that

$\# \neg \Phi < \# n_0$  since  $\# \neg \Phi$  is standard.) We

are going to use  $s$  to define an interpretation of  $GB + \Phi$ .

It will be tacitly assumed that all the sentences



we form have Gödel numbers in  $I$ . This may be proved using the closure properties of  $I$ .

We first define an equivalence relation  $\sim$  on  $I$ .

$c \sim_j$  iff  $s(c_i = c_j) = 1$ . Each  $\sim$ -class

has a least member (since  $S$  is a set!). Let

$$M = \{x \in I : (\forall y \in I) (y \sim x \rightarrow x \leq y)\}.$$

We put an  $\varepsilon$ -relation on  $M$  by putting

$$x \varepsilon_M y \text{ iff } s(c_x \varepsilon c_y) = 1.$$

Then for  $\varphi$  of standard length  $s(\varphi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_n})) =$

iff  $\langle M, \varepsilon_M \rangle \models \varphi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_n})$ . In particular

$$\langle M, \varepsilon_M \rangle \models ZF + V=L + \Phi.$$

We make  $M$  into a model of  $ZGB$  as

follows. Let  $S = \{e \in I : e \text{ is the Gödel no. of a formula}$

having only  $x_0$  free. We define an equivalence relation  $\sim_1$  on  $S$  by putting  $e_1 \sim_1 e_2$  if

$$s((\forall v_0) [\varphi_{e_1}(v_0) \leftrightarrow \varphi_{e_2}(v_0)]) = 1.$$

As before each  $\sim_1$  equivalence class has a least element. Let  $S^*$  be the set of these  $\sim_1$ -minimal elements. Define the membership relation between  $S^*$

and  $M$  via  ~~$e_j \varepsilon e$~~  iff

$$j \varepsilon e \text{ iff } s(\varphi_e(c_j)) = 1.$$

Of course  $S^* \cap M$  need not be empty. This

is handled by replacing  $S^*$  by  $\{1\} \times S^*$ ,

$M$  by  $\{0\} \times M$ . We now have a model of  $ZB + \Phi$

except each set has a copy among the classes.

But this minor defect is handled in a well-known

way. The upshot is we have interpreted

$$GB + \Phi \quad \text{in} \quad GB + \neg \Phi + V = L$$

I hope (presuming this is new work) to

write up a paper containing this result as well as

the one in my earlier letter. When I do, I

shall, of course, send you a preprint.

Sincerely yours,

Bob Solovay