Summary

The book deals primarily with Kant's and Husserl's theory of experience, two prominent concepts of transcendentalism in Western philosophy. It introduces the main topics of both of these concepts respectively, sketching several comparisons and finally dealing with Husserl's interpretation of Kant. It starts with an overview and critical estimation of several important books and papers that have been published on this topic so far and shows that most of these comparative studies suffer from a lack of precision and depth when presenting Kant's views. It also shows that most of these commentators too readily accept Husserl's own opinions on their mutual relationship and thus buy into Husserl's interpretation of Kant without ever subjecting it to a proper examination. One of the important goals set for the book is thus an elaborate analysis of Kant's theory of experience based directly on a thorough analysis of the text of *Critique of Pure Reason*. Only afterwards can Husserl's reading of Kant be critically evaluated to open the way for a new, unbiased comparison.

(I) The first main section goes through the most important parts of Kant's theory of experience in the *Critique of Pure reason*, focusing primarily on its first edition from 1781 – a version of Kant's text that was pivotal for Husserl. It analyses Kant's argument in the chapter *On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding* and shows that it is the "constitution of an object" that is the key topic for Kant: by showing that the pure concepts of understanding are a necessary condition for this constitution, Kant aims to prove their objective validity *a priori*. Kant's argument, however, runs parallel on two different levels. On one level, Kant describes the empirical (or intentional) constitution of an object which results in a grasp of such object under an empirical concept. This level of objective constitution renders a thing its empirical meaning – in other words, in such an act of constitution we understand *what* a thing is. On the second level, Kant describes the transcendental (or ontological) constitution which results in a grasp of an object simply as an object – this level of constitution renders objective validity to our presentations. In such

a constitution we understand *that* a thing is (that it exists, objectively, i.e. independently from our presentations that mediate it to us). What Kant struggles with the most in this chapter is the question of the mutual connection of these two argumentative lines, or more precisely, the dependency of the empirical side of the constitution on the transcendental constitution. In fact, Kant ends up by demonstrating this dependency only indirectly, namely by anchoring both levels of constitution to one and the same transcendental principle of the unity of consciousness.

In the chapter *On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding,* Kant preserves these two lines of argumentation, which is, however, very much obscured by the fact that he talks about "transcendental schema" in connection with both levels of objective constitution (i.e. with the transcendental as well as with the empirical). The problem of a subsumption of an intuition under a particular concept, something the schema should, in Kant's view, provide for by schematising the concept, pertains exclusively to the empirical/intentional side. It is when Kant speaks about the schema as being the schematizing function of the time itself that he touches on the transcendental level of constitution. By transcendentally schematizing time as a pure form of experience, the schema forces time to bear a content (of whatever kind) and thus opens it to the possibility of being a time of our experience. If Kant had discerned between the empirical and the transcendental schema, he could have bound the two lines of objective constitution together more tightly by arguing that the transcendental schema is a necessary condition of the empirical schema, and thus the transcendental constitution of an object as existing is a necessary condition of the empirical constitution of an object as being this or that.

In the *Analogies of Experience,* Kant once again returns to the problem of the transcendental constitution of an object by analysing the necessary conditions for our belief that our presentations bear objective validity; instead of talking about transcendental object = X, however, he now talks about the object as a substance (in the first analogy of experience). It turns out, though, that the permanence – the

mode of time with which the substance is essentially connected – is not a satisfactory level of description, and that a deeper clarification of the same topic is needed by taking the succession into account as well. This leads Kant to the problem of causation in the second analogy of experience, where he shows that an object can be conceived as existing only if there is a necessary bond between our presentations in their successive flux. It is only through the pure concept of relation that we can understand some presentations as necessarily preceding and others as necessarily following, and thus thinking of them in reference to an independently existing object. This pure concept of understanding thus brings about not only the object, but at the very same time it renders to our presentations the meaning of being truly *presentations*, since it is only by their reference to an existing object that they are established as such. In sum, it is only by means of our understanding that we think of presentations and object as two distinct yet mutually connected sides of our experience, the object being a *cause* of these presentations.

(II) The second main section turns to Husserl and his theory of experience, starting with an introduction of some of the important topics from the *Logical Investigations* in their first edition (1900/01): Husserl's idea of pure logic, his theory of meaning, his early concept of intentionality, and the related theory of knowledge. The exposition of all these topics is framed by methodological questions concerning Husserl's then starting point in descriptive psychology and his parallel polemics against psychologism. This part is concluded with a cursory comparison between Husserl's and Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding (for both, understanding being connected with the categorical level of experience). In this comparison there are, obviously, some additional remarks on Husserl's theory of categorical intuition included as well.

The section on Husserl then moves forward with an introduction to his concept of time and time-consciousness in its early version as developed in *Lectures on the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness*, originally given in 1904/05 but later partly reworked and published in 1928. The focus is here on Husserl's suspension of objective time

and his decision to investigate into the inner time-consciousness, which here is analysed as the basic structure of the very appearance for all "immanent time objects" such as tones or melodies. It seeks to disentangle Husserl's dense thoughts on the various meanings of "present" and "past" differing according to context, and it sums up all the aspects that Husserl himself highlights while discerning between primary and secondary recollection. The exposition then switches to the topic of two basic types of intentionality which Husserl discerns: cross-intentionality and the along-intentionality. The first one, according to Husserl, pertains to the act of perception itself with its inherent immediate past-components (primary recollections, i.e. retentions) and is then analogically re-produced in the secondary recollection. The other is then exclusively bound to the secondary recollection, connecting the then-present of one's reproductive recollection with the actual-present of his lived remembering. Although the along-intentionality of the secondary recollection is grounded in the time-structure of the originally presenting cross-intentionality, it turns out to have a very important function of its own, being a necessary condition of our awareness of time-consciousness itself, since it binds the various presents and pasts into one ordered whole. As the exposition goes on, the focus is moved to the problem of primary anticipations (protentions) and to the fact that Husserl mentions them only occasionally as the future-analogues of primary recollections. Under careful scrutiny it turns out, however, that retentions and protentions are structurally very different and that it is rather misleading to consider them as analogous. The chapter is again concluded by a brief comparison with Kant's conception of time as developed not only in *Transcendental Aesthetic*, but partly also in *Axioms of Intuition*, in *Anticipations of Perception,* and in the exposition of transcendental deduction. Seen from this broader perspective, Kant's notion of time seems to be in many respects very close to Husserl's.

The third part concerning Husserl's theory of experience deals with his *Ideas I*, published in 1913. Here the emphasis lays on Husserl's attempt to clearly distinguish his newly established transcendental phenomenology from psychology by presenting it as being focused

on essences (against psychology as being oriented on facts) and its peculiar understanding all phenomena as "irreal" (against psychology as considering them as realities). The first topic is developed by following Husserl's exposition on the relationship between facts and essences, facts pertaining to the realm of what exists only arbitrarily in space and time, whereas essences involving timeless necessity, governing the realm of facts by its *a priori* structures. After distinguishing between formal and material essences, Husserl designates (in explicit allusion to Kant) the sphere of material essences as being the true and genuine source of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. The second topic addresses phenomenological *epoché* as the methodological means by which the irreality of phenomena is achieved and the realm of pure consciousness is revealed. On this ground, the chapter proceeds to describe the amendments of Husserl's concept of intentionality with particular regard to the – newly developed – concept of noetic-noematic correlation and then switches to his conception of phenomenological constitution. In its final parts, this chapter highlights the salient features of Husserl's distinction between the psychological and transcendental approach to consciousness.

(III) The third main section of the book addresses the most important points of Husserl's critique of Kant's theory of knowledge. It shows that Kant's general definition of intuition in *Transcendental Aesthetic* contains a certain ambivalence which leaves the possibility open to interpret pure intuition (as Husserl does) as being a result of the process of ideation – and that such a possible interpretation, however, is not quite coherent with other related aspects of Kant's theory of intuition. It also describes some problematic features of Kant's doctrine of sensibility and understanding as being radically distinct (one of Husserl's reproaches) and shows some less obvious parts of Kant's theory by which this separation is surmounted, or more precisely, gets quite another meaning. It finally moves to the problem of the thing in itself and to other aspects of Kant's theory which provoke Husserl to charge him of psychologism – and reveals that most of these accusations are based on misconceptions, to a large extent caused by Husserl's overly phenomenological reading of Kant. In its

very final section, the book sketches the most important differences between Kant's and Husserl's theory of experience, trying to present them as not quite mutually compatible. As a consequence, Husserl's approach to Kant as to a phenomenologist *ante verbum* is refused as illegitimate and rather misleading.