

Summary

Using a paraphrase of the last sentence of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as its basis, the book *Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must sing* aims to apply the standard analytical and linguistically oriented approach of philosophy to the problems of sapience and understanding in all the traditional realms of spirit – including art – with a particular focus on music. The thread running through all of the individual chapters is a critique of the correspondence theory of truth (in its role of being a paradigm of knowledge that was adopted by the positive sciences) and its replacement by a reflexive conception of truth exemplified by German idealism and its thesis that all knowledge is self-knowledge.

The book, dealing with the reflexivity of knowledge from the perspectives of different generality, consists of three parts. The first, methodological part provides the basic concepts for analysis of the reflexivity of knowledge, many of them originating in Hegel's science of logic (bad infinity) and the philosophy of Wittgenstein (perspicuous representation). The second part is devoted to reflexivity in music, sketching a theory of emotions that would provide a unified account for both the cognitive and affective parts of musical experience. The tension between the recent empirical approach, as represented particularly by Huron's ITPRA theory, and the transcendental fact that music as an instance of art is something one can understand and, moreover, can understand oneself through, is reconciled by focusing on the self-conscious structure of music and its embedment, along the lines of Meyer and Brandom, into the broader framework of the pragmatists' theories of meaning.

In the third, last part, the focus on music is taken further, to the phenomenon of singing and musical theatre that are both represented in the book's title. In the beginning, the proposal by the early-Wittgenstein that we shall avoid the antinomies of pure reason by excluding the tendency of our reason to talk about talk is discussed. Given that such a policy is in its very character controversial, the book considers the possibility as to whether antinomies of pure reason might not be better dealt with by a shift from the sphere of

epistemology to that of aesthetics. To this end, the principles of Wittgensteinian aesthetics are developed and reconsidered in connection with their roots in German idealism, particularly as given in Hegel's famous delimitation of beauty as a sensuous manifestation of truth. The joint treatment of the epistemic and aesthetic questions as related issues makes the book a unique contribution to the thesis about the unity of experience.