No. III.-IV.
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Valentina V. Maryna
From Trust to Suspicion:
Soviet and Czechoslovak Communists, 1945-48
Galina P. Murashko
From the Russian Archives:
The ‘Soviet Factor’ in the Czechoslovak Political Crisis of February 1948
Mikhail M. Narinsky
The Soviet Veto Revisited:
The Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan
Michal Burian
Economic Forecasters in the ‘Velvet Revolution’v
Materials
Jan Pešek
The ‘Treasonous Bishop’:
The Six-Year Effort to Exclude Ján Vojtaššák from Public Life, 1945-51
Horizon
Stanisław Ciesielski
The Secret Mission:
The Polish Socialist Party and Their Contribution to the ‘Bolshevization’ of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats in February 1948
Reviews
Oldřich Tůma
On a Typology of Communist Regimes
Michal Reiman
Eastern Europe in the Documents of the Russian Archives
Alžbeta Sedliaková
A Companion to Slovak History
Ivana Fialová
Istochnik:
A Notable Russian Journal – And Not Only About Contemporary History
Annotations
Bibliography
Monographs, Essay Volumes and Scholarly Articles Published Abroad, 1990-97
The Second Session of the Committee of Historians and Archivists oj the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation, which took place in Moscow, 28 and 29 April 1997, included a one-day symposium on ‘The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, February 1948’. Of the eleven papers delivered there by Czech and Russian historians we are publishing in Czech translation three that are based on larger studies of till recently unpublished documents from the Russian archives. Soudové dějiny wishes to thank the three authors, Valentina V. Maryna, Galina P. Murashko and Mikhail M. Narinsky, for their kind permission to publish these articles.
Vilém Prečan
Soviet and Czechoslovak Communists, 1945-48
Valentina V. Maryna
The Soviet leadership, till late 1946, declared the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries with which it had signed agreements during the war and which the Red Army had liberated. At the time, Stalin was counting on the East European countries undergoing a non-violent transition to socialism and their skipping the requisite stage of dictatorship of the proletariat. Consequently, the mutual relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) were established in this spirit, and the CPCz leadership could express itself in favour of its own, specific path to socialism, which would, none the less, consider the Soviet Union its model.
After Churchill’s ‘iron-curtain’ address in Fulton, Missouri, there followed an intensification of ideology. The CPSU’s Foreign Department, headed by Suslov, gathered information on the situation in countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, and was assigned the task of improving the propaganda sent abroad. In April 1946, Suslov then held talks on ‘assistance’ to Czechoslovakia. Though the volume of Soviet propaganda in Czechoslovakia increased significantly, it was no match for the better funded and organized Anglo-American propaganda.
CPCz propaganda within the National Front and the need for compromise with other partners evoked the suspicion of the Soviet leadership. The Soviets accused the Czechoslovak Communists of diminishing Communist influence, for instance, in the state bureaucracy and the armed forces. In June 1947, the head of the CPSU Foreign Department left for Czechoslovakia to ascertain for himself the extent of activization by ‘reactionary forces’. From his reports and from information provided by other institutions, which made their way to the Kremlin, it became clear that the CPCz’s weakness could lead to the victory of those ‘reactionary forces’. With the division of the world into spheres of influence, however, Stalin believed that the Soviet sphere should create a homogeneous bloc of states run by the Communists. Though after the founding of the Cominform and the setting of these aims the CPCz immediately obeyed the USSR and took over power with a coup in February 1948, at the second Cominform criticism of the CPCz’s entire post-war approach was, nevertheless, prepared.
From the Russian Archives:
The ‘Soviet Factor’ in the Czechoslovak Political Crisis of February 1948
Galina P. Murashko
This article discusses the Soviet leadership’s attitude to Czechoslovak politics from mid-1947 to March 1948. From the spring of 1947, Moscow clearly refused the idea of a national road to socialism by means of a coalition of democratic forces, which Stalin had actively been pushing for in the Communist movement from 1944 to 1946. From mid-1947 Soviet efforts were concentrated on accelerating the ‘process of revolution’, separating the Communist parties from their partners in the democratic bloc, and on obtaining a monopoly on power. The documents from two Russian archives demonstrate that information from Prague, which was travelling along diplomatic and party paths, was making Moscow increasingly uneasy.
In the opinion of the apparat of the Central Committee of CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the CPCz (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) was concentrating on winning a majority in parliament and was ‘not taking serious measures to crush the important positions of reactionaries in the state bureaucracy, the armed forces, the villages and the middle strata’ – in other words, was not following Moscow’s line.
Fears that the CPCz could cease to be the strongest party in the next elections and go the way of the Italian and French Communist parties increased Soviet efforts to decide the question of who would hold power in Czechoslovakia, prior even to the elections set for the spring of 1948. This view is supported by Pavel Sudoplatov, one of the persons who orchestrated the delivery of Molotov’s message to President Edvard Beneš in late 1947, which proposed Beneš’s resignation in favour of Klement Gottwald.
Regarding the actual events of February 1948, as well as the open conflict between the democratic coalition and the CPCz, scholars are still lacking important Russian documents that would enable a detailed study of the Soviet role in the outcome of the Czechoslovak political crisis. The missing link is material related to the Prague sojourn of the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Valerian A. Zorin. None the less, the material used in this article demonstrates clear pressure from Moscow for a takeover.
The Soviet Veto Revisited:
The Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan
Mikhail M. Narinsky
The economic and social situation in Europe in early 1947 forced the United States of America to work out a set of economic and political measures which came to be known as the Marshall Plan. The plan was intended to stabilize the social and political situation on the Continent. Moscow at first showed interest in the plan, and saw it as a chance to gain credits for its post-war reconstruction, but, later, most Soviet leaders began to be sceptical and suspected the USA of using the plan to gain economic and political influence in Europe. Having decided not to take part in the Marshall Plan, the Soviets tried to thwart it. Consequently, the Soviets sabotaged the Anglo-French initiative to organize a European economic conference; they recommended to the governments of the East European states that they participate, but reject that Anglo-French conception of a renewed Europe. Fears that the coalition governments of some countries might give in to the temptation of American economic assistance forced the Soviet leadership to modify their position and to suggest to the East Europeans that they decline to participate – which substantially complicated things. Some countries accepted the recommendation without reservation; in the case of Czechoslovakia, however, Moscow was forced to hold other talks to get the Czechoslovak government to change its position.
With this analysis of the Soviet attitude towards the Marshall Plan, it is safe to conclude that the priority of Moscow’s foreign policy was to establish and buttress its control over the countries of Eastern Europe. Stalin considered the Soviet sphere of influence the most important consequence of the war, and he had no intention of making any concessions to the West in this part of Europe; for the Soviet leadership at that time, control over their sphere of influence was important for geo-political, strategic and ideological reasons. The initiators of the Marshall Plan did not manage to win the countries of Eastern Europe over to their side, against the will of the USSR, and in this way to weaken their orientation towards the Soviet Union. The organization of the Marshall Plan and the extremely negative reaction of the Soviet leadership represented, in fact, the principle milestone on the road to the division of Europe.
Economic Forecasters in the ‘Velvet Revolution’
Michal Burian
The dominant role in the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’ was played by three economists at the Academy of Sciences’ Forecasting Institute, namely Václav Klaus, Vladimír Dlouhý and Valter Komárek. Later economists from the Forecasting Institute and the Economics Institute (also part of the Academy) formed a group, offered their expertise to the Civic Forum and pushed through their conception of the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy towards a market economy. Klaus and Dlouhý both joined the Civic Forum (Klaus co-authored the platform declaration Co chceme [What we want], and was a member of the expert and tactical committee as well as the expanded crisis team; Dlouhý acted as a link between the Civic Forum leadership and the group of Academy economists that proposed the future composition of federal ministries concerned with economic affairs). As for Komárek, it was not clear at first whether or not he was favourably disposed towards the Civic Forum; rather, he appeared to be anticipating a reform-Communist solution, and played his own game, clearly aiming to become federal prime minister, something Klaus was openly opposed to. None the less, all three men, with Civic Forum support, became ministers in the ‘Government of National Understanding’.
It must be emphasized that in this period there was no difference between the individual economists concerning their views on the method of economic transformation based on the latest background material (titled Dominanty) compiled by the Forecasting Institute. The beginnings of the ‘dispute’ over economic reform can be traced to mid-March 1990.
Other economists at the Forecasting Institute, apart from Václav Valeš whose name does not appear in the literature or sources for this period, did not directly take part in the events that began on the first day of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ (17 November) and continued till the final composition of the new government (10 December).
Vojtaššák from Public Life, 1945-51
Jan Pešek
Ján Vojtaššák (1877–1965) was a Roman Catholic bishop politically orientated towards the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party and identified with the very existence of the Slovak State, the Nazi German client-state that existed from 1939 to 1945. After the war, Vojtaššák came into conflict with the new régime, which endeavoured to exclude him from public life and, in particular, remove him as bishop. To this end, it conducted an investigation that aimed to bring Vojtaššák to trial. At first, in the years immediately after the war, the régime used not only domestic but also international means: it tried to get the Vatican to remove Vojtaššák from the bishopric, a ploy that initially seemed promising; later, however, from early 1947, this was no longer a relevant issue, especially in light of the worsening relations between East and West.
After the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, there was increased aversion to Vojtaššák, who was coming out hard against the totalitarian régime and its anti-Church policy. At the time, the régime was still constrained by international and internal factors (particularly in its talks with the Roman Catholic Church), though it considered Vojtaššák among its greatest political opponents in Slovakia. The situation was favourable for the régime to carry out its merciless reckoning with Vojtaššák in mid-1950. The priest was arrested and, in early 1951, sentenced to twenty-four years in prison ‘for crimes against the state, military treason, high treason and espionage’
The Secret Mission:
The Polish Socialist Party and Their Contribution to the ‘Bolshevization’ of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats in February 1948
Stanisław Ciesielski
The normalization of Polish-Czechoslovak relations after World War II created the conditions for more intensive collaboration between the Socialist parties of the two countries. The Polish Socialists started from the fact that both countries were linked by a joint foreign policy based on an alliance with the Soviet Union, a similarly structured state system and a united front of workers’ parties. It was from this point of view that the Polish Socialist Party (PSP) was looking at events that had taken place in the Czechoslovak Social Democrat Party (CSDP) in late 1947, when at the Social Democrat Congress in Brno, the existing policy of a united front was replaced with the concept of ‘the third force’, and in early 1948. After the eruption of the Czechoslovak government crisis in February, the PSP leadership sent a delegation to Prague. Its task was to inform the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) about PSP positions and to support ‘left-wing socialist policy’. It was in this atmosphere that the talks took place between the Polish delegation, the official leadership of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, and representatives of the various factions in the party, as well as briefings with CPCz leaders. The resolute attitude and the orientation of the Polish Socialists’ work could not but have an influence on the CSDP; for its members it was a symptom of the lack of support for the concept of ‘the third force’ in other Central and East European socialist parties. Through its support for the policy of a united front, the Polish Socialists tried to work for the benefit of the left-wing of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats. Afterwards, when the centre-right front of the CSDP became isolated and the CPCz’s proposal for a platform was accepted, the Polish Socialists considered their mission completed. At the request of Gottwald, however, part of the delegation remained in Prague and helped broker between the fractious groups of Social Democrats. The report prepared by the delegation after its return to Poland contains a detailed description and evaluation of the visit and work done in Prague.
On a Typology of Communist Regimes
Oldřich Tůma
This article provides information on the large study Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore and London, 1996), by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, particularly on the part constituting a typology of non-democratic régimes (authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanic). All these variants are explained using the examples of various Communist countries of East Central Europe. The situation in Czechoslovakia after 1969, for instance, is analyzed in a fair amount of detail based on the concept of post-totalitarianism.
Eastern Europe in the Documents of the Russian Archives
Michal Reiman
This is a review of the first volume of T. V. Volokitina, T. M Islamov, G. P. Murashkova et al (eds), Vostochnaja Yevropa v dokumentach rossijskich arkhivov 1944–1953 gg. Vol. 1, 1944-48 (Moscow and Novosibirsk, 1997). This volume is devoted to Soviet politics in East Central and South-East Europe, namely, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania, from 1944 to 1953. It includes 308 documents from 1944 to 1948, the majority of which originated in Soviet diplomacy, the international department of the CPSU and other Soviet organs as well as from the records of talks between diplomats and politicians from various countries, reports on state visits, situation reports on countries visited, and on Soviet interventions in individual countries. These documents represent a clear contribution to our understanding of the politics of this period. Unfortunately, however, the publication is marred by current Russian archival practice, namely, insufficient accessibility to certain record groups; this has resulted in the absence of a number of key documents, and it is not clear whether they even exist.
Alžbeta Sedliaková
The Bibliografia k dejinám Slovenska was compiled in the late 1960s, but the Communist régime, as part of its ‘normalization’ programme banned its publication, and so this bibliography did not come out till 1997 (both as a book and a CD ROM). The work under review contains entries on historical literature published in Czechoslovakia and abroad (though with great shortcomings in the latter) up to 1965; its 18,274 entries include monographs, essay volumes, volumes of documents, memoirs, bibliographies, lexicons, companions, scholarly articles. The Bibliografia comprises a general section and a specialized, chronological section as well as an index of people, places and subjects.
Istochnik:
A Notable Russian Journal – And Not Only About Contemporary History
Ivana Fialová
The first issue of the journal Istochnik [Source] appeared in Russia in 1993, with the subtitle, Dokumenty russkoj istorii. In 1995, it was expanded with the addition of a supplement, Vestnik Archiva Prezidenta Rossijskoj federacii. Istochnik aims to provide new, previously unknown records discovered and declassified in, among other places, the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation, the Centre for the Preservation of Historical Documents, and the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents on Contemporary History.
The documents published by Istochnik relate chiefly to Soviet history but also to Russian eighteenth and nineteenth-century history; Vestnik, however, is concerned exclusively with Soviet history. The present review discusses the background leading to the journal’s emergence and provides a brief description of the annotated documents published there from 1993 to 1996, and in Vestnik from 1995 to 1996.
Contributors
Michal Burian (1972) is reading history and philosophy at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, specializing in contemporary Czech history.
Stanisław Ciesielski (1954) is a professor of history and Assistant Director of the Historical Institute, Wrocław University. He is concerned with the history of the Polish socialist movement, Polish political though, the history of Poland after WW II, and the fate of the Poles after 1939. His published work includes Niepodległość i socjalizm: Tradycja w myśli politycznej polskiego ruchu socjalistycznego w latach 1939–1948 (Warsaw, 1986) and Polacy w Kazachstanie w latach 1940–1946: Zesłańcy lat wojny (Wrocław, 1991).
Ivana Fialová (1951) took a degree from the Arts Faculty of Charlas University, Prague. She is now a librarian in the Institute of Contemporary History, Prague.
Valentina V. Maryna (1929) is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation, Moscow. Her main area of interest is twentieth-century East European and Czechoslovak history.
Galina P. Murashko (1932) took her doctorate in history and is now Head Researcher in the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies. She is concerned with the post-WW II history of Czechoslovak and former countries of the Soviet bloc. She has published four monographs.
Mikhail N. Narinsky (1942) is a senior historian in the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, at the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation. He specializes in twentieth-century international relations and the history of the Comintern. He has recently published on the Comintern and World War Two (Perugia, 1996).
Jan Pešek (1949) is a researcher at the Historical Institute, the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, and is concerned prilarily with Slovak history after 1945. He is the author of Štátna bezpečnosť na Slovensku 1948–1953 [The secret police in Slovakia, 1948-53] (1996), and co-author of 150 rokov družstevníctva na Slovensku: Víťazstvo a prehry [150 years of farm collectives in Slovakia: Victories and defeats] (1995) and Štátna moc a církvi na Slovensku 1948–1953 [The Church and State in Slovakia, 1948-53] (1997).
Michal Reiman (1930) is Professor emeritus of Political Science and Modern East European History, at the Freie Universität Berlin; he now lectures in the Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague.
Alžbeta Sedliaková (1952) is currently a bibliographer at the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava. She previously worked with the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences compiling the Bibliografie dějin Československa. In 1995 she compiled the bibliography Historiografia na Slovensku 1990–1994.
Oldřich Tůma (1950) is senior researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, Academy of Sciences, Prague. His area is contemporary Czech history, particularly from 1969-89. His most recent publications are Zítra zase tady: Protirežimní demonstrace v předlistopadové Praze [Same place tomorrow: Anti-régime demonstrations in pre-November 1989 Prague] (Prague, 1994) and Srpen ‘69 [August 1969] (Prague, 1996).
