

The Minority Game with Heterogenous Agents

10th International PhD Workshop,
Hluboká nad Vltavou

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Outline

- Motivation for the Minority Game: traffic jams
- Local view, model of a driver
- Global view, traffic imbalance
- Introduction of heterogenous vehicles


Life in the city = drive in the city




How to select an optimal road?




Not only length does matter!




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
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
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
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Example of predictors, $M = 1$





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
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
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
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
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
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

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and for **driver's loss function** we get

$$z_i \equiv \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T a_i(t) \Delta(t)$$

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
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Principal **frustration**: $\bar{z} = \frac{\sigma^2}{N} > 0$

The majority of drivers takes a bad decision.

How do these selfish drivers perform in global view?

The average traffic imbalance depends only on $\alpha = \frac{2^M}{N}$



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Now, **average traffic imbalance** differs from the loss of an **average driver**!

Examples of heterogenous vehicles

Personal transporter, $L = 0.6m$



Examples of heterogenous vehicles

Scooter, $L = 1.8m$



Examples of heterogenous vehicles

Smart car, $L = 2.5m$







Examples of heterogenous vehicles





Road train, $L = 50m$



Results for various ratios ($\alpha = 0.4$)

0.6m 	1.8m 	2.5m 	50m 	\bar{z}	$\frac{\sigma^2}{N}$
0%	0%	100%	0%	0.13	0.13
0%	20%	80%	0%	0.13	0.14
0%	20%	78%	2%	-0.2	3.16
66%	20%	12%	2%	-0.9	9.55

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Under some circumstances, the majority of drivers has bypassed traffic jam!

Thank you for being at tension.

Any questions?