Tying by a Non-monopolist

Eugen Kovac

This paper explores tying in the situation where a multi-product firm without monopoly power competes against several single-product firms. I consider two markets: one for a horizontally differentiated good, the other for a homogeneous good. As opposed to the widely accepted opinion that tying may be profitable only in the case of monopoly power, I show that under reasonable assumptions tying is profitable for the multi-product firm and has a negative welfare effect.

Tento clanek analyzuje svazovani v situaci, kde velka firma vyrabejici vice produktu nema monopolni postaveni a na kazdem trhu souperi s nekolika specializovanymi firmami, ktere vyrabeji jenom jeden produkt. Uvazuji dva trhy: jeden pro horizontalne diferencovany produkt, druhy pro homogenni produkt. Naproti obecne akceptovanemu tvrzeni, ze svazovani je vyhodne jenom v pripade monopolniho postaveni, ukazuji, ze za rozumnych podminek je svazovan vyhodne pro velkou firmu, pricemz ma negativni efekt na socialni blahobyt.

Keywords: industrial organization, anti-trust policy, multi-product firm, tying, bundling

JEL classification: L13, L11, L41