František STELLNER
Příčiny ruské neutrality během prusko-rakouské války v roce 1866 [The reasons of Russian neutrality during the Austro-Prussian war in 1866]..  /465–484/ The paper focuses on reasons leading to Russian neutrality in the Austro-Prussian war in 1866. It compares particular political, economic, diplomatic, and dynastic moments playing their role in the conflict and summarise the opinions concerning the alleged weakness of Russia in the related diplomatic affairs. The author concludes that Petersburg accepted the Prussian policy in 1866 mostly negatively regarding the „Austro-Prussian dispute” a pillar of its own strength in Europe. Petersburg liked to have the German Confederation in Europe - divided Germany was unable to disturb the Russian political plans in Europe and Austria and Prussia were too exhausted to be able to oppose them. Russian policy in 1866 was under the impact of Tsar’s sentiments about the principles of legitimism and guaranteed “sovereignty” of the German monarchs, his relatives. However, the arguments about the family relations between Tsar Alexandr I and the king of Prussia, his uncle, are not strong enough to explain all of the complexity of Russian foreign policy in 1866, and the same can be said about the Russian “gratitude” to Berlin because of the Prussian support during the Polish Uprising of 1863. Russian passive approaches to the German question were employed by Otto von Bismarck, who convinced Petersburg that the changes in Central Europe (unification of Germany under the Prussian auspices) will benefit Russia. According to Bismarck’s interpretation this was better solution than other two solutions, i.e. unification under Habsburgs or unification under the leadership of German liberal movement like in 1848.

Jan ŽUPANIČ
Renobilitace a renobilitační procesy v Rakousku [Re-ennoblement and re-ennoblement trials in Austria]..  /485–507/ When on 12 October 1840 the Austrian state chancellery issued the decree on re-ennoblement of the families, which were unable to consummate their titles because of the poverty and other reasons, this document did not have great echoes in the society. However, by the end of the 19th century hysteria arose around this document. There were a lot of persons from the old noble families (or persons convinced they were from the old noble families) who tried to prove their aristocratic descent, mostly in the Czech lands. The people, who were interested and working in the sphere of genealogy, embraced this boom and along with the officials from the ministry of interior enforced several ennoblements, unfortunately, some of the acts of ennoblement appeared to be false. The frauds were detected by the beginning of the 20th century creating the scandal all over Austria with repercussions in the parliament. Most of the employees of the ministry of interior were axed from the department for nobility and the people who made their fortunes on ennoblements were tried. The scandal had changed the whole atmosphere and when some other noble families tried to reach the recognition of their descent, they failed or their cause was significantly delayed.

Petr PROKŠ
Politické rozcestí válečného vývoje Rakousko-Uherska (prosinec 1916 – říjen 1917) [Austria-Hungary on political crossroads of the war (December 1916 – October 1917)]..  /509–530/ After the Entente powers had declared their war aims, Austro-Hungarian Empire sided with Germany and agreed with the “unlimited submarine war”, what alienated Entente and the neutral states from Vienna. This atmosphere could bring the ideas of total reconstruction resulting in its decline and fall. Vienna was trying to open the peace talks with the Entente, however, unsuccessfully. National liberation movements in the monarchy were rising, while the ruling circles were rejecting any changes in the state construction of Cisleithania and the universal suffrage in Hungary as well. From 1917 the whole situation was under the strong impact of a revolutionary development in Russia and when the United States entered the war, Germany and Austria-Hungary had to accommodate their plans to this new situation.

István JANEK
Pokus ministerského předsedy Miklóse Kállayho o zorganizování společného vystoupení z války s vůdci Slovenska v letech 1943–1944 [The prime minister Miklós Kállay´s attempt to organise the Hungarian-Slovak withdrawal from the Second World War (1943–1944)]..  /533–551/ Since the beginning of 1942 Hungary was trying to weaken its dependence on Germany and to withdraw from the war. In 1943 the government of Miklós Kállay was searching for official and unofficial contacts to western states and Slovakia, and in the beginning of 1944 the contacts with the officers of the Slovak army were created. However, because of the previous quarrels the Slovak representatives were not willing to deal with Hungarians, and thus the chance to achieve the common strategy failed.

Miroslav TEJCHMAN
Balkánská politika SSSR za druhé světové války [Soviet policy in the Balkans during the Second World War]..  /553–565/ Soviet approach to the Balkans during the Second World War followed the long-lasting traditions of Russian foreign policy. Already in the times of Peter I and Catherine II Russia was trying to control the Balkan area as the platform for its drive to the Straits. During the Second World War the Soviet policy had to eliminate the German armies to be able to penetrate the area. The decisive moment came with the victorious offensive near Iassy in August 1944, when the Soviet troops invaded the northern Balkans and the Soviet influence spread all over the peninsula (except of Greece), what resulted in the establishment of the Soviet-type regimes.

Jan PELIKÁN
Jugoslávie a počátek pražského jara (leden – březen 1968) [Yugoslavia and the beginnings of the Prague Spring (January – March 1968)]..  /567–590/ From the first half of the 1960s the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were improving and the “second split” between Beograd and Moscow from 1958 was a matter of the past. The specific model of relations between the two communist states stabilised when the Brezhnev´s group established itself in the Kremlins. Josip Broz Tito´s opinion was that the Soviet leadership continued the policy of distancing the Stalinist period and that the state of mutually accepted modus vivendi was reached. However, by the end of 1967 the bilateral relations were far from being idyllic, but Beograd still evaluated the situation as positive. In 1968 the domestic situation of Yugoslavia was rather unstable in society and economy and the ruling class as well, since the question of the heritage after aging Tito was urgent. In some areas of Yugoslavia national relations deteriorated and political stability was threatened by the transfer of the federal competencies to particular republics. Younger functionaries of the party (like Mika Tripalo, Marko Nikezić, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Krste Crvenkovski, Stane Kavčić, Latinka Perović, Slavko Miloslavlevski but also older Mijalko Todorović) occupying after 1966 the party and state posts were disappointed with the slow pace of reforms. Along with the people from lower levels of the system they were convinced about the necessity of the change, however, they wanted to avoid the fall of the socialist regime or the elimination of some of its significant attributes like federal construction or the leading role of the party. Although the official relations between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia did not change dramatically after the plenary meeting of Czechoslovak Communists in January 1968, and the Yugoslav Communists were even interested in the development in Prague. Younger functionaries mostly evaluated the Czechoslovak development as an example of socialist liberalisation which avoids the restoration of capitalism. Political and intellectual elites in Yugoslavia, read in Marxism, knew the thesis that socialism can be built only in a developed country. This knowledge was connected with traditional reflection of Czechoslovakia as a developed country with strong economy, democratic tradition and educated population. The Czechoslovak reforms started to serve as an example for the younger people in the state and party apparatus, who welcomed the Prague Spring also as an expression of similarities between the two regimes building the new and just society.


RECENZE, POZNÁMKY, ZPRÁVY

Jindřich DEJMEK – František KOLÁŘ (eds.)
Dokumenty československé zahraniční politiky A/3/1, 2 – Československá zahraniční politika a vznik Malé dohody 1920-1921.. (Petr Novák)  /591–594/

František ČAPKA – Lubomír SLEZÁK – Jaroslav VACULÍK
Nové osídlení pohraničí českých zemí po druhé světové válce.. (Roman Baron)  /594–596/

Slobodan ANTONIĆ
Zarobljena zemlja. Srbija za vlade Slobodana Miloševića.. (Patrik Eichler)  /596–601/

Sorin MIRU
National identity of Romanians in Transylvania.. (Nicolas Franckx)  /602–604/
Sborník prací Pedagogické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity, sv. 191, řada společenských věd č. 21.. (Pavel Krafl)  /604–605/


KRONIKA

Miroslav TEJCHMAN
PhDr. Pavel Hradečný, CSc. (* 30.10.1938 – † 17.6.2006) [Pavel Hradečný, M.A., Ph.D. (* 30. 10. 1938 – † 17. 6 2006)]..  /606–607/

Mikuláš NEVRLÝ
Jeho meno vošlo do dejín (K 75. narodeninám akad. I. Dzjubu) [His Name Entered the History (To the Seventy-Fifth Jubilee of Academician I. Dzjuba)]..  /607–608/


LIDÉ A DOBA

A. V. LIPATOV
Rusko. Univerzální a národní: dvojjedinost procesu formování etnických jazyků a kultur v evropském civilizačním prostoru [Russia. Universal and National: the Two-in-one Process of the Forming Ethnic Languages and Cultures in the Area of European Civilization]..  /609–623/ The paper analyzes the forming of ethnic languages and cultures in European civilisation reminding of cultural and historical context of the process of building of national self-consciousness and of the dichotomy of universal and national moment in the civilisation which is defined by identical axioms. Following the findings of Ernest Robert Curtius, who studied the relations between universal and national languages in the Germanic and Romance milieu, the author documents, how the national languages were facing the universal (foreign) language and how this dispute was affecting the creation of modern national languages. This is the reason why the paper dedicates so much of attention to the situation in which the local/national languages were replacing the universal language (it concerned Latin, and in the Slavonic areas also Slavic liturgical language). In some cases those national languages mediated universal culture for other nations - Czech language did it for Lusatian Serbs and Slovaks, Polish language for Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and also for Russia, mainly at the turn of the 17–18th centuries. Similar processes were taking place also in Western Europe, what was documented in the development of modern Italian, French, English, and German. Universal language, penetrating local milieu along with the coming Christianity, created the new civilisation and the related basis of formation of the ethnic group (and lately of the nation). The origins of ethnic languages and cultures were thus indivisibly interwoven with the rise of universal European civilisation.