Identity of non-self-evident nation: Czech national identity after the break-up of Czechoslovakia and before accession to the European Union*

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ABSTRACT. In this study the authors analyse Czech national identity after the break-up of Czechoslovakia and before accession to the European Union. National identity is understood here as a construct consisting of several elements, four of which the authors analyse: territorial identity (localism, regionalism, patriotism, and Europeanism), the image of the nation – the cultural nation (ethno-nation) and the political nation (state-nation), national pride (in general, and in cultural performance and in the performance of the state), and love for the nation – nationalism (or more precisely, chauvinism) and patriotism. To create a more complex picture of Czech national identity the authors compare it with national identities in eleven other European countries. To conclude, the authors analyse the attitudes of Czechs toward the European Union, and national identity is used as an important explanatory element of the support for EU governance.

KEY WORDS: Czech Republic; European Union; ISSP; national identity; national pride.

In today's world, where the nation-state is the basic cultural and political unit in which people live their lives, national identity is one of the most important types of group identity. National identity defines who we are – culturally and politically – and it is constructed in contrast to those whom we perceive as the others – the cultural and political entities to which we do not belong.

In modern history, Czech national identity was constructed both in contrast to those Germans with whom the Czechs shared a cultural,

geographical, political and economic space, and in constrast to Austria and Germany. From 1918 to 1992, Czech national identity was also formed in contrast to the Slovaks and Slovakia. And from 1945 to 1991 it was defined in contrast to the Russians and the Soviet Union. At the same time, there have been a number of important more recent events that have had an unquestionable influence on contemporary Czech national identity: the division of Czechoslovakia into two states at the end of 1992, the emergence of the Czech Republic as an independent state at the beginning of 1993, and the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union at the beginning of May 2004.

One significant element of national identity is a person's image of the nation and their perception of its characteristics. There are two models for types of nations (Haller 2003; Meinecke 1908; Weigert et al. 1986): (1) the ethnic or cultural nation (*ethnos*), according to which the people who are considered to be members of the nation are those who have been living for generations on a particular piece of territory and who have shared certain customs or habits and a specific culture since childhood (language, religion); and (2) the state nation (*demos*), according to which it is primarily political criteria that determine whether a person is a member of the nation, particularly citizenship and respect for the political institutions of the given state.[1] The model of the ethno-nation is regarded as traditional and conservative, while the model of the state-nation is considered modern and progressive. Individual nations differ according to the degree to which they contain elements from each of these models.[2]

Before Czechoslovakia was established as an independent state in 1918, the image of the Czech nation was constructed in ethnic-cultural terms. Since the time of the 'national awakening' in the nineteenth century, the Czech language and linguistics had been cultivated and developed, along with Czech historiography, ethnography, art, and literary criticism. But Czech national identity was at no time ever a purely cultural identity, as it always comprised an element of state identity tied to a specific territory, which in this case was the historical Lands of the Czech Crown – Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia (Hroch 2000). The Czechs had always understood the state to be the defender of a nation's vital interests and a guarantee of its existence as a cultural entity, and thus they had always striven for independent statehood. The secular nature of Czech national identity and the rejection of the Roman Catholic Church are connected with this. When the Czech nobility lost the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, the Lands of the Czech Crown were deprived of their state sovereignty by the victors, with whom the Catholic Church sided, and in the period that followed members of the Protestant population were forcibly re-Catholicised or driven into exile, and the property of the 'defeated' was confiscated. Consequently, in Czech national identity there is a symbolic link between foreign domination and Catholicism and between foreign domination and the confiscation of the property that was the Czech nation's in the Lands of the Czech Crown (Holý 2001; Kandert 2000). It is probably for this reason that when Czechoslovakia acquired statehood in 1918 the change was

combined with the confiscation of land, and it is also for this reason that after World War II the Germans and Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia who had accepted German and Hungarian citizenship during the war were expelled from 'Czech land'.

Czech national identity is tied to Czech territory. Only those people who live on Czech territory and speak Czech are considered to be Czechs. Conversely, compatriots living abroad, although they may speak Czech, are not regarded as fully-fledged Czechs (Holý 2001; Kandert 2000). This aspect of national identity reveals its cultural and political foundations – not language, but rather the full participation of an individual in the cultural and political life of the community known as the Czech nation is what makes a person Czech.

According to Holý (2001: 63) Czechs construe identity as something that is naturally derived, and not culturally constructed. He claims that when people speak about what it means to be a Czech, they mention three criteria: to be born in the Czech Lands, to have the Czech language as one's mother tongue, and to have Czech parents. Moreover, the 'cultural construction of the nation as a naturally constituted entity is confirmed by the fact . . . that a person feels oneself to be Czech' (Holý 2001: 163).

It was mentioned above that Czech national identity has always been connected with a specific *territory* and particular state formations. The bond with the nation-state, in the context of other possible geographical and governmental entities, is another important element of national identity (Haller 2003). People can feel ties to their neighbourhood, to their place of residence (village, town), the region in which they live, their country (state), and even to their continent. The highest entity to which a person feels ties is called the terminal identity (Deutsch 1966; Peters and Hunold 1999). The entity that a person's terminal identity refers to is usually the entity from which they are willing to accept the execution of governmental power. The concept of 'double allegiance' follows from this concept of 'terminal identity' (Van Kersbergen 2000). People can feel ties to two or more entities, and ties to one do not rule out ties to another – for example, having ties to the nation-state need not exclude the possibility of having ties to the European Union, too. Marks (1999) suggested that there are three types of territorial identity: multiple, exclusive, and none. These three types of identity combine to form a triangular space, within which the majority of people can be located – their territorial identity is mutually inclusive.

Since the time of the national awakening, Czech national identity has been formed and shaped by the multiplicity of territorial and governmental entities that the Czechs have lived in and under, partly by those of the Czech lands, and partly also by those that went beyond it – Austria, Austro-Hungary, and Czechoslovakia – the emergence, existence, and demise of which were significant for the formation of modern Czech national identity. The theory of 'Czechoslovakism', which referred to a single Czechoslovak nation, was behind the rise of the Czechoslovak state. It was an idea adopted more by the

Czechs than the Slovaks (e.g. Kandert 2000; Musil 1993), and the Czechs created for themselves a multiple – Czech and Czechoslovak – identity.

However, Czechoslovak identity gradually weakened under the force of events. The formation of the Slovak state during World War II, the asymmetrical constitutional arrangement of Czechoslovakia after World War II, the establishment of a federation in 1968, disputes over the constitutional arrangement of Czecho-Slovakia after 1989, and the demise of a joint state of Czechs and Slovaks in 1992, forced the Czechs to redefine their national identity. This process was accompanied by a temporary strengthening of 'Moravianism', a suppression of expressions of Czech identity owing to fears of nationalism (Kučerová 2002), the search for a name for the new state (which continues today), a waning of the myth of the First Republic (though its continuity remains), a new perception of Slovakia as a fully fledged state in its own right, and the formation of a relationship to the European Union – the supranational entity that the Czech Republic joined in 2004, thus symbolically marking its return 'to Europe', back from under 'Eastern' domination.

The third fundamental element of national identity is the *national pride* and shame that a person feels towards their nation. These feelings arise from a nation's successes and failures. Pride in the successes of the national community and its members, like hope in the development of this community in the future, contributes to the formation of national identity (Musil 2000). Czechs have always seen themselves as a cultured and educated nation (Holý 2001; Míšková and Rak 2000) and they have tended to express a pride in their culture, but not, however, in the performance of the state. This is understandable – historically the state has often been a source of subjugation for the Czechs, while in the case of culture the opposite has been true.

Patriotism and nationalism are also a part of national identity. While patriotism signifies a sense of allegiance to and love for one's nation, feelings that are manifested as good will toward or the desire to do something positive for one's country, nationalism is defined as a sense of love for the nation that is combined with a negative attitude and often even with open hatred toward other nations (Heywood 2003). However, this definition is not quite accurate. In the modern state, nationalism refers more to a national ideology, the content of which is the idea of the nation's unique historical mission, the justification behind its emergence, its territorial anchoring, and its unrivalled cultural status. Haller (2003) warns against using the term nationalism in an exclusively negative sense to designate aggressive ideology, and even Gellner's references (1983) to nationalism are not as just a negative ideology, as in his view there are many kinds of nationalism. Rejai (1991) distinguishes between 'formative nationalism' aiming at the founding of new nations, 'prestige nationalism' trying to improve the power and status of existing nations, and 'expansive nationalism' or imperialism. Delanty (1998) and Rex (1996a, 1996b) make the distinction between 'old' and 'new' nationalism. Old nationalism flourishes from above and is connected to the nation-state project while new nationalism is not based on the unity of nation and state, but on

preserving cultural and social identities in opposition to immigration, or resisting the emergence of inter-state or supra-national entities. For this reason, national *chauvinism* – a contempt for other nations, national minorities, immigrants and a sense of superiority over them – is usually put forth as the opposite to patriotism.

Are the Czechs patriots or national chauvinists? In the period between 1918 and 1938, Czechs commonly expressed and gave vent to their feelings of patriotism. The foundation of Czechoslovakia was the culmination of the Czechs' efforts to gain independent statehood, and they were now able to clearly define their homeland. However, during the totalitarian periods, and even after 1989, such patriotic expression was not too abundant, and on the whole it is understandable that there was nothing more than a weak sense of patriotism under totalitarianism – the totalitarian state made it impossible for the people living within it to fully identify with it and consider it as their homeland. For the democratic state that emerged after 1989, however, the interpretation is more complicated. It is a telling fact that the date on which the Czech Republic was founded – 1 January – is not celebrated today by the Czechs. Nor do they particularly celebrate the state holiday, Czech Founding Day – the day on which the Czechoslovak state emerged, on 28 October 1918. An important factor in this regard is the 'non-self-evident' nature of the existence of the Czech state (cf. of the Czech nation, Klimek 2001) following the contingency of its foundation, while other influential factors include the weakness of national ideology and the influence of Euro-optimistic politicians, who have thrown concepts like the nation, national interests, national identity, and patriotism into the same bag as chauvinism and xenophobia, and during the period of European integration designated them all as undesirables (Kučerová 2002).

The educating of Czechs towards political correctness, Europeanism, and tolerance of other nationalities, nations and races, is reflected in the currently weak expression of patriotism, and also in the limited manifestations of intolerant or chauvinistic attitudes even since the times of the Hilsner affair[3] (Hroch 2000). Nonetheless, they do harbour a certain sense of superiority over the East (i.e. countries situated to the east of the Czech Republic including all other Slavic countries), and they show admiration for the West (i.e. countries situated to the west of the Czech Republic, such as Germany). They believe of themselves that they belong neither to the West nor the East (Holý 2001: 160), but they have bestow upon themselves the role of middleman between the two (Klimek 2001).

National identity and other identities

Holý (2001) believes that national identity is for Czechs probably their basic collective identity, and that it predominates over other identities. This is the first hypothesis that we tested in this study. The ethnic nation is generally

Table 1. *Order of importance of collective identities*

	Score	*Order of importance*
Current or previous occupation	1594	1
Race/ethnic background	346	8
Gender (man or woman)	1099	3
Age group (young, middle age, old)	844	4
Religion (or agnostic or atheist)	231	9
Preferred political party, group or movement	132	10
Nationality	775	5
Family or marital status	1474	2
Social class	422	7
Part of the Czech Republic you live in	580	6

Note: Score = 3 × frequency in 1st place + 2 × frequency in 2nd place + 1 × frequency in 3rd place
Source: ISSP 2003.

considered a community that provides the greatest room for the expression of the emotional ties of ordinary people. In many societies, however, loyalty to the nation must compete with weaker types of loyalty, such as loyalty to a territory, caste, race or religious subculture (Lind 2000). In this study we applied a comparative perspective and focused on four elements of national identity – the image of the Czech nation, territorial identity, national pride, and patriotism and nationalism (or chauvinism). The analyses were conducted on data drawn from the ISSP surveys on National Identity from 1995 and 2003, in which the Czech Republic participated. We are conscious that international comparative surveys are not well suited to providing an accurate insight into specific national identities (cf. Coakley 2007; Svallfors 1996). Attitudes are context-dependent, which means that certain questions can in practice not be neutrally phrased since they are going to be understood in different ways in different countries. However, there do not exist better data for the study of Czech national identity at the national level at present.

In the ISSP 2003 survey[4] relative importance of national identity, i.e. relative to other identities, was measured. Respondents were presented with ten various identities – occupation, race/ethnicity, sex, age, religion, preferred political party, nationality, family status, social class, and the part of the country the respondent lives in. The respondents were asked to choose what in their view were the three most important identities and to rank them according to order of importance.

This selection was analysed on the basis of a construction of scores using the simple total of order-rankings accorded to each of the identities and using the total of multiple order-ranking and frequency for each of the identities. The analysis showed that in the Czech Republic, occupational identity ranks in first place, followed in second place by family identity, in third place by a gender-based identity, and in fourth place by age identity, with nationality

identity only in fifth place, therefore, ranking it outside those considered most important (see Table 1). These findings bring little or no support to the argument that national identity is fundamental or is an identity which dominates over all other identities. Moreover, this evidence draws attention to the possibility that sense of identity may rise and fall in accordance with external events such as international political conflicts, state secessions, wars, accession to international organisations or supra-national entities, victories achieved by national sports teams, or living outside one's country of birth (cf. Fenton 2007).

The image of the Czech nation

Do Czechs perceive the Czech nation as a cultural nation – an ethno-nation, in which case they consider as Czechs those people who speak Czech, have lived for generations on Czech territory, and have shared since childhood certain customs and a specific culture? Or do they perceive it as a state-nation – considering only Czech citizens and those who respect Czech political institutions and laws to be Czech? The concepts of the state-nation and the cultural nation were measured in the ISSP surveys in 1995 and 2003 with the aid of the following items (Haller 2003):

- State-nation – to have citizenship of the given country, to respect the political institutions and laws of that country,
- Cultural nation – to have been born in the given country, to have lived in that country for most of one's life, to be able to speak the language of the country, to be a Christian, to have ancestors (from that nation), to feel oneself (a member of that nation).

In European countries (Vlachová and Řeháková 2004) a member of a given nation is most often considered a person who respects the laws and institutions of that country, has citizenship of that country, speaks the language, and feels himself/herself to be a member of the given nation (cf. Haller 2003). In no country, however, is there an image of a purely state or a purely cultural nation. The populations of European countries draw on elements of both the cultural nation and the state-nation when defining the nations of the countries they live in.

Holý (2001: 63) notes that when people speak about what it means to be Czech, they mention three criteria: to have been born in the Czech lands, to have Czech as their mother tongue, and to have Czech parents, and their sense of Czechness reaffirms this cultural construction of the nation.

According to the ISSP surveys, in 1995 the most frequent definition of a true Czech was someone who was able to speak Czech, felt Czech, respected Czech political institutions and laws, and had Czech citizenship. In 2003 respondents defined someone as truly Czech who was able to speak Czech, felt Czech, had Czech citizenship, and had lived in the Czech Republic for most of their lives (see Table 2).

Table 2. *Elements in the image of the Czech nation*

|		*Very important*	*Fairly important*	*Total important*	*Mean*
To have been born in the CR	1995	40.2	30.8	71.0	1.98
	2003	36.8	41.6	78.4	1.75
To have Czech citizenship	1995	52.5	32.3	84.8	1.67
	2003	45.2	42.2	87.6	1.57
To have lived in the CR	1995	48.4	32.0	80.4	1.76
most of one's life	2003	41.4	41.4	82.9	1.69
To be able to speak Czech	1995	76.2	18.6	94.8	1.31
	2003	57.6	34.2	91.8	1.39
To be a Christian	1995	11.4	11.8	23.2	3.16
	2003	13.8	19.3	30.1	2.80
Respect Czech political	1995	44.5	40.5	85.0	1.76
institutions and laws	2003	31.0	49.1	80.1	1.84
To feel Czech	1995	71.0	21.5	92.5	1.39
	2003	47.3	40.7	88.0	1.55

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.
Note: Only results of 'very important' and 'fairly important' are presented.

Between 1995 and 2003, the percentage of respondents who considered the ability to speak Czech a very important precondition for being truly Czech notably decreased. Conversely, the percentage of respondents for whom this attribute appeared to be fairly important considerably increased. Although the percentage of respondents who considered the ability to speak Czech very important or fairly important for defining Czechness did not change overall, the difference in the averages was significant ($n_1 = 1101$, $n_2 = 1272$, $t = -2.601$, level of significance 0.009). However, between 1995 and 2003 the total percentage of respondents who considered it very important for Czech identity that a person feel Czech declined considerably, as did the total percentage of respondents who considered it important to respect the political institutions and laws of the Czech Republic.

On the other hand, between 1995 and 2003, there was an increase in the number of respondents who considered it important to have Czech citizenship and also of those who considered it important to have lived in the Czech Republic for most of one's life. The percentage of those who considered Czech citizenship as very important in defining a true Czech substantially decreased, while the percentage of those who considered it only fairly important substantially increased, so that the total importance of this element on the whole remained unchanged. The difference in averages was, however, significant ($n_1 = 1100$, $n_2 = 1273$, $t = 2.767$, level of significance 0.006). Similarly, there was a decrease in the percentage of respondents who considered it very important to have lived in the Czech Republic for most of one's life in order for a person to be a true Czech, and conversely there was an increase in the percentage of those

Figure 1. Cultural nation vs. state-nation – graph of distances.

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

who considered this element to be fairly important. The difference in averages was also significant ($n_1 = 1092$, $n_2 = 1268$, $t = 1.989$, level of significance 0.047).

There was also an increase in the number of those who considered having being born in the Czech Republic a very important or a fairly important precondition for being truly Czech. This resulted from the significant increase in the percentage of those who considered this element fairly important. The difference in averages was significant ($n_1 = 1077$, $n_2 = 1268$, $t = 5.371$, level of significance 0.000). There was a notable increase in the percentage of people who considered being a Christian an important element in defining a truly Czech person. This primarily resulted from the rise in the opinion that it is a fairly important requirement. The difference in averages was significant ($n_1 = 1045$, $n_2 = 1245$, $t = 7.642$, level of significance 0.000).

Taking the percentages in the categories of variables measuring the image of the nation for the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2003 and the percentages for selected European countries that we worked with in other studies relating to national identity in Europe (Vlachová and Řeháková 2004),[5] we determined the Euclidean distances between countries, and using a scaling method (Proxscal, SPSS 11.0) we created a two-dimensional graph of distances that presents the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2003 along with and in comparison to the other European countries (see Figure 1). The first dimension (the

horizontal axis) ranks the countries on the scale according to the declining emphasis placed on the cultural elements of the nation (especially the items 'to have been born in the given country' and 'to be a Christian'[6]), and the second according to the declining emphasis on the constitutional elements of the nation (especially the item 'to respect the country's political institutions and laws').

If we compare the position of the Czech Republic on the graph of distances in 2003 and its position in 1995, it is possible to note a shift in the direction of those countries where in 1995 there was the largest proportion of inhabitants that felt being a Christian and having been born in the given country were important for considering a person a true member of their nation (Poland, Italy, Austria, and Spain, all of which are located in the lower left corner of the graph). However, it still maintains a considerable distance from them. It is surprising that in a secular country like the Czech Republic there was an increase in the emphasis on Christianity in the image of national identity. Although the Czech Republic continues to be an ethnically homogenous country, immigrants from non-European countries, in particular, and therefore also non-Christian countries, are beginning to add a new element of meaning to Czech identity.[7]

The Czechs and territorial identity

One fundamental component of national identity is identification with specific territory. People feel ties to various types of geographical territory – a neighbourhood, the place they reside in (village, town), the region they live in, their country (state), and even the continent they live on. But only identification with the territory of the nation-state is a component of national identity.

In 1995 and 2003, the majority of respondents identified with the Czech Republic, followed by those who identified with the town in which they lived, and the least number identified with the continent (Europe). The total percentage of people who identified with the Czech Republic did not change in the years in which the observations were made, but the intensity of this relationship did change significantly, and it became less strong, although the difference in averages was not significant (0.785). Nor did the total percentage of people who identified primarily with the town/village in which they lived change significantly. But there did occur a significant shift in the intensity of the relationship, as it became stronger (the difference in averages was significant, $n_1 = 896$, $n_2 = 1271$, $t = 6.581$, level of significance 0.000). The percentage of people who felt very close or close to Europe also changed, as the percentage of citizens who declared a very close relationship to Europe declined considerably. The difference in averages, though, was not significant (0.785) (see Table 3).

Taking the percentages in the categories of variables measuring territorial identity for the Czech Republic in 1995 and in 2003 and the percentages for selected European countries in 1995 we worked on other studies on national

Table 3. *Territorial identity*

|		*Very close*	*Close*	*Close total*	*Mean*
Relationship to one's town or city	1995	38.7	48.9	87.6	1.77
	2003	47.2	41.2	88.9	1.53
Relationship to the Czech Republic	1995	46.2	45.0	91.2	1.64
	2003	38.7	51.1	89.8	1.63
Relationship to Europe	1995	28.4	50.1	78.5	1.99
	2003	20.3	51.4	71.7	2.03

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

identity in Europe (Vlachová and Řeháková 2004), we determined the distances between countries, and using a scaling method we created a two-dimensional distance graph that presents the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2003 along with and in comparison to the other European countries (see Figure 2). The determining content of the first dimension is the relationship to Europe and to the state. The determining content of the second dimension is the relationship to the town or city.[8] The first dimension sets Hungary, which has the strongest relationship to Europe and to the state, opposite Great Britain, which has the weakest relationship to Europe and the state. The second dimension sets Norway, which has a weaker relationship to town or city, opposite countries like Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Spain.

With regard to territorial identity, the most current measure of the Czech Republic in 2003 shows the Czech Republic having moved away from its position in 1995 in the direction of countries in which a very close or close relationship to Europe was declared by sixty-eight to seventy per cent of the population (Slovenia, Austria, Italy, Poland), i.e. significantly less than in the Czech Republic in 1995, at which time the country was third after Hungary and Slovakia in the order of countries with the largest percentage of the population expressing a very close or close relationship to Europe.

National pride

National pride is a positive feeling that a person has toward their nation. The Czechs are among those nations of Central and Eastern Europe that express little national pride (see Table 4). But what leads to feelings of strong or weak national pride? For each nation, national pride is nourished by the nation's successes and sapped by its failures. In the ISSP 2003, national pride was not measured with the use of a general question but was instead observed as manifested in specific areas – the way democracy works in the country, the country's political influence in the world, its economic results, its social security system, its scientific and technological achievements, its achievements

Figure 2. Territorial identity – graph of distances.

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

in sports, art, and literature, its armed forces, its history, and its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society (see Table 5).

A comparison of data from 1995 and 2003 shows that there was a large decline in the percentage of respondents who stated that they were proud of the Czech Republic's political influence in the world (the difference in averages was significant, $n_1 = 961$, $n_2 = 1201$, $t = -5.179$, level of significance 0.000), and also a fall in the number of those who claimed to be proud of the country's economic achievements (the difference in averages was significant as well, $n_1 = 1008$, $n_2 = 1225$, $t = -6.996$, level of significance 0.000). The proportion of people who stated that they were proud of the country's history also declined. The difference in averages was again significant ($n_1 = 1047$, $n_2 = 1241$, $t = 2.846$, level of significance 0.004).

There was a slight decrease in the proportion of people who responded that they were proud of the way democracy works in the country, but the difference in averages was not significant (0.632). The difference in averages concerning pride in the country's achievements in art and literature was not significant (0.309) either.

On the other hand, there was a slight increase in the number of people who were proud of fair and equal treatment of all groups in society (the difference

Table 4. *National pride in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (means)*

Albania	1.34
Slovenia	1.43
Romania	1.52
Poland	1.58
Hungary	1.64
Estonia	1.79
Russia	1.84
Slovakia	1.88
Czech Republic	1.92
Bulgaria	2.02
eastern Germany	2.22

Statement: 'I'm proud that I'm [nationality]'. Category of responses: Definitely agree = 1, Definitely disagree = 5.
Countries are arranged in order of declining levels of national pride.
Source: 'Attitudes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe', a study by the Frankfurter Institut für Transformationsstudien, Europa Universität Viadrina/INRA.

in averages was significant, $n_1 = 972$, $n_2 = 1193$, $t = 5.158$, level of significance 0.000). There was also a slight increase in the number of people who were proud of the country's social security system (the differences in averages were significant, $n_1 = 1041$, $n_2 = 1247$, $t = 5.783$, level of significance 0.000) and a slight increase in those proud of its achievements in science and technology. The differences in averages were significant ($n_1 = 851$, $n_2 = 1166$, $t = 6.314$, level of significance 0.000).

However, what is interesting is that there was a notable increase in the number of people who declared that they were proud of the Czech Republic's achievements in sport[9] and proud of the Czech armed forces. In 2003 almost twenty per cent more people felt proud of the country's sports achievements than in 1995, and almost twice as many people were proud of the armed forces in 2003 as in 1995. Here, too, the differences in averages were significant (proud of sports achievements: $n_1 = 988$, $n_2 = 1251$, $t = 13.522$, level of significance 0.000, proud of armed forces: $n_1 = 892$, $n_2 = 1206$, $t = 10.912$, level of significance 0.000).[10]

Generally, pride in a country's cultural performance or sports achievements in particular are indicative of identification with the ethnic community more than the political community. Culturally oriented identity conceals within itself the risk of transformation into chauvinistic to xenophobic attitudes, but it also has within it the potential to be transformed into attitudes that express a positive evaluation of the civil state (Musil 2000).

A factor analysis of the items on pride conducted for both the year 1995 (Nedomová and Kostelecký 1997) and the year 2003 showed that in the Czech Republic there are two different types of pride: pride in cultural performance (pride in achievements in science and technology, sports, art and literature,

Table 5. *National pride – specific areas*

		Very proud	Somewhat proud	Proud total	Mean
The way democracy works	1995	4.9	29.1	34.0	2.81
	2003	2.6	26.5	29.1	2.83
Political influence in the world	1995	6.0	44.2	50.2	2.56
	2003	2.6	28.1	30.6	2.76
Economic achievements	1995	6.6	35.1	41.7	2.71
	2003	2.5	15.7	18.2	3.01
Social security system	1995	2.9	15.3	18.2	3.20
	2003	3.1	19.4	22.5	2.97
Scientific and technological achievements	1995	10.6	49.3	59.9	2.40
	2003	11.4	56.8	68.2	2.13
Achievements in sports	1995	19.8	52.1	71.9	2.12
	2003	40.2	48.3	88.5	1.66
Achievements in the arts and literature	1995	32.5	52.1	84.6	1.86
	2003	27.8	54.5	82.3	1.82
Armed forces	1995	3.9	14.4	18.3	3.16
	2003	6.1	29.0	35.1	2.70
History	1995	48.9	42.0	90.9	1.61
	2003	36.4	47.0	83.4	1.71
Fair and equal treatment of all groups in society	1995	2.5	17.7	20.2	3.10
	2003	2.6	20.4	23.0	2.89

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

and pride in the history of the Czech Republic) and pride in the performance of the state (pride in the way democracy works, the country's political influence in the world, economic achievements, the system of social security, the armed forces, and the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society) (see Table 6).

It is not, however, the rule that in every country the cultural dimension of the nation and its state dimension must be strictly divided in this way. Taking the percentages in the categories of variables measuring pride in cultural performance and pride in the performance of the state for the Czech Republic in the years 1995 and 2003 and the percentages for selected European countries, we determined the distances between the countries, and using a scaling method (Proxscal, SPSS 11.0) we created a two-dimensional graph of distances that presents the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2003 along with and in comparison to the other European countries (see Figure 3). The horizontal dimension scales the countries from pride in cultural performance to pride in the performance of the state – leaving out the armed forces – and the vertical axis scales the countries according to the degree of pride in the armed forces.[11] The graph shows that since 1995 the Czech Republic has shifted in the direction toward Slovakia and Italy in 1995. It moved further away from

Table 6. *Types of national pride – factor scores*

	1995		2003	
	Factor 1 Pride in the performance of the state	*Factor 2 Pride in cultural performance*	*Factor 1 Pride in the performance of the state*	*Factor 2 Pride in cultural performance*
The way democracy works	0.794	0.030	0.702	0.107
Political influence in the world	0.736	0.184	0.743	0.096
Economic achievements	0.802	0.067	0.779	-0.064
Social security system	0.733	0.137	0.748	0.031
Scientific and technological achievements	0.268	0.637	0.258	0.681
Achievements in sports	0.122	0.703	-0.037	0.768
Achievements in the arts and literature	0.126	0.721	0.116	0.786
Armed forces	0.459	0.300	0.465	0.188
History	0.000	0.628	0.039	0.717
Fair and equal treatment of all groups	0.677	0.137	0.634	0.098
% of explained variance	31.3	19.8	29.1	22.5

Source: ISSP 2003.
Note: extraction method – Principal component analysis, rotation method – Varimax, Kaiser normalisation.

countries in which citizens express more pride in the performance of the state and toward countries that express more pride in cultural performance. In 2003, the Czech Republic, together with eastern Germany, moved away from the other former socialist countries, in comparison with which it was more proud of the way its democracy works, its political influence in the world, and its economic achievements. However, considering the period in which the data were collected in the Czech Republic, this outcome may have been influenced by the myth of the successful transformation, which lasted in Czech society up until the end of 1996.

Czech patriots and national chauvinists

The ISSP surveys measured patriotism and nationalism with the use of a six-item battery. Three items measured nationalism:[12]

- The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Czechs.

Figure 3. National pride in relation to specific areas – graph of distances.

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

- Generally speaking, the Czech Republic is a better country than most other countries.
- People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.

  The other three items measured patriotism:

- I would rather be a citizen of the Czech Republic than of any other country in the world.
- When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Czech.
- There are some things about the Czech Republic today that make me ashamed of it.

Between 1995 and 2003 the number of positive responses to the items measuring chauvinism grew significantly in the Czech Republic. With regard to the statement, 'Generally speaking, the Czech Republic is a better country than most other countries', the total percentage of responses in agreement increased, thanks to the considerable increase in the number of responses 'agree' (as opposed to 'strongly agree'). The difference in averages was also significant ($n_1 = 1045$, $n_2 = 1239$, $t = 8.452$, level of significance 0.000). The

Table 7. *Patriotism and nationalism (chauvinism)*

		Strongly agree	*Agree*	*Agree total*	*Mean*
I would rather be a citizen of	1995	47.7	25.5	73.2	1.93
the Czech Republic than of any	2003	29.3	39.7	69.0	1.95
other country in the world					
There are some things about	1995	34.4	35.3	69.7	2.12
the Czech Republic today that	2003	30.5	40.7	71.2	1.99
make me ashamed of it					
The world would be a better	1995	5.1	11.2	16.3	3.42
place if people from other	2003	5.6	21.0	26.6	2.92
countries were more like the					
Czechs					
Generally speaking, the Czech	1995	8.2	15.2	23.4	3.24
Republic is a better country	2003	5.9	24.6	30.5	2.83
than most other countries					
People should support their	1995	11.7	24.2	35.9	3.11
country even if the country is in	2003	10.9	33.5	44.4	2.57
the wrong					
When my country does well in	1995	56.2	30.0	86.2	1.61
international sports, it makes	2003	51.4	34.1	85.5	1.55
me proud to be Czech					

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

number of responses that agreed with the statement, 'The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Czechs', considerably increased, as the percentage of 'agree' responses grew considerably. The difference in averages was also significant ($n_1 = 1030$, $n_2 = 1217$, $t = 8.932$, level of significance 0.000). In addition, during the period under observation, the total percentage of responses that agreed with the statement, 'People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong', also grew. Again, here it was the 'agree' rather than the 'strongly agree' response that registered an increase in numbers, and the difference in averages was significant ($n_1 = 1046$, $n_2 = 1231$, $t = 9.951$, level of significance 0.000) (see Table 7).

The level of patriotism in the Czech Republic did not, however, significantly change in the years under observation. The number of responses that agreed with the statement, 'I would rather be a citizen of the Czech Republic than of any other country in the world', did slightly decline. But a fundamental change occurred with regard to the intensity of agreement – the proportion of unqualified agreement fell and more cautious agreement grew. The difference in averages was not, however, significant (0.666). Attitudes to the statement, 'When my country does well in international sports it makes me proud to be a Czech', did not change significantly. The difference in averages was not significant (0.101). There was a slight decrease in the number of responses that agreed with the negatively formulated statement, 'There are

Figure 4. Patriotism vs. nationalism (chauvinism) – graph of distances.

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

some things about the Czech Republic today that make me ashamed of it', and the difference in averages was significant (0.003).

Taking the percentages in the categories of the first five variables measuring patriotism and nationalism (chauvinism)[13] for the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2003 and the percentages for selected European countries, we determined the distances between the countries and using a scaling method we created a two-dimensional graph of distances that presents the Czech Republic in 1995 and 2003 along with and in comparison to the other European countries in 1995 (see Figure 4). The content of the first dimension is defined by the three items on patriotism and the content of the second dimension by the items on nationalism (chauvinism). The first dimension sets western Germany, as an example of the least patriotic country, opposite Hungary, as an example of the most patriotic country. The second dimension sets Austria (close to which are both Norway[14] and Great Britain) as an example of the most chauvinistic country, opposite western Germany (the most similar to which are Slovakia and the Czech Republic) as an example of the least chauvinistic country.[15]

The graph confirms that between the years 1995 and 2003 the Czech Republic moved in the direction of the chauvinist countries. The Czech Republic is however one of the countries in which this attitude is very weakly represented. It generally ranks among those countries in which patriotism and

chauvinism are weak, as in Germany. In this case it is a question of to what degree the Czech and German nations are ones with weak national identities, or to what degree they are actually ashamed to express their national identities, as they are still coming to terms with their respective pasts (Kučera 2000; Musil 2000).

Kučera (2000) has pointed out for example that one of the results of the German nation's efforts to come to terms with its past has been its de-nationalisation, to the extent that in the future it may no longer be possible to refer to a German nation but rather to the inhabitants of the multi-cultural Federal Republic, who will characterised as wearing Italian clothes, eating Italian food, and speaking English, and who will be so politically correct as to preclude the development of independent opinions, and who will do anything to make sure they avoid offending their neighbour nations. What lies behind the de-nationalisation of the Czech nation is thought to be the fact that during President Havel's term in office emphasis was placed on the civic principle, and the national principle was repudiated as incompatible with the civic principle (Kučerová 2002). It was thought inappropriate to speak of the Czech nation, and the reference was instead to the people of this country.

The Czechs' identification with the Czech Republic and their relationship to the European Union

National identity is an important element also in explaining attitudes towards the European Union. Numerous studies have shown that in EU member states stronger national identity coincides with weaker support for the European Union and vice versa (Carey 2002). The source of this relationship between national identity and support for the European Union is usually a sovereignty conflict. The European Union has taken on numerous attributes that historically were reserved for the nation-state – a currency, a bank of issue, a parliament, a flag, an anthem, and a legal code that prevails over those of the nation-states. Exceptions in this relationship are usually made up of those who espouse a negative assessment of the political system in their nation-state and perceive European integration as a means of redressing the domestic situation.

Czech national identity has always been linked to a specific territory and an actual state form. The Czech state and the European Union are at present the most significant entities that the identity of the Czech nation is or will be tied to. But which of these entities will be the terminal identity for the Czechs (Deutsch 1966; Peters and Hunold 1999)? From which entity will they prefer to accept the execution of government power?

In order to test this hypothesis we used only data from the ISSP 2003, as only in that year were respondents presented with questions on attitudes to the European Union, including questions on whether the Czech Republic should accept and adhere to decisions made by the EU even in cases where it

disagrees with them, what kind of power the European Union should have in contrast to the nation-states, and whether in the future the European Union should be founded on open cooperation among member states (the cooperation model) or on a union of member states within a single super-state (the model of federalisation). Identification with the nation-state was measured in the ISSP research (in 1995 and in 2003) by asking respondents to what extent they feel a close relationship to the Czech Republic. Questions on the powers of the European Union read as follows:

- The Czech Republic should follow European Union decisions, even if it does not agree with them.
- Generally, do you think that the European Union should have much more, more, as much, less, or much less power than the national governments of its member states?
- In your view, what should the European Union be like in the future? It should be founded on open cooperation among the member states more than being unified as a single state (1). It should be founded on being unified as a single state more than on open cooperation between member states (2).

Out of the total population of respondents, five per cent strongly agreed with the statement 'the Czech Republic should follow European Union decisions, even if it does not agree with them', while twenty-one per cent agreed, twenty-five per cent neither agreed nor disagreed, thirty-one per cent disagreed, and eighteen per cent strongly disagreed. The analyses showed that there is a statistically significant relationship between identification with the Czech Republic and identifying with the opinion that the Czech Republic should follow EU decisions, even if it does not agree with them (see Table 8, Pearson chi-square = 0.013, Likelihood Ratio = 0.011). But it is not the type of relationship that we assumed there would be based on other studies in the EU member states. We have no evidence to support the hypothesis that people who identify weakly with the Czech Republic more often agree with the view that the Czech Republic should follow European Union decisions

Table 8. *'The Czech Republic should follow European Union decisions, even if it does not agree with them' (%)*

Relationship to the Czech Republic	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Very close	5.6	22.8	21.7	30.2	19.7
Close	4.5	17.7	28.1	33.9	15.8
Not very close	5.3	28.4	26.3	21.1	25.0
Not close at all	10.0	40.0	15.0	10.0	25.0

Source: ISSP 2003.

Table 9. *'Generally, do you think that the European Union should have much more, more, as much, less, or much less power than the national governments of its member states?' (%)*

Relationship to the Czech Republic	EU much more power	EU more power	As much power	EU less power	EU much less power
Very close	2.5	16.3	47.0	23.0	11.3
Close	2.3	13.9	48.7	26.8	8.3
Not very close	3.3	16.5	57.8	22.0	5.5
Not close at all	5.3	26.3	31.6	10.5	26.3

Source: ISSP 2003.

Table 10. *Opinion on what the European Union should be like in the future (%)*

Relationship to the Czech Republic	Open cooperation among member states	Union of member states in a single state
Very close	85.9	14.1
Close	79.5	20.5
Not very close	65.1	34.9
Not close at all	59.1	40.9

Source: ISSP 2003.

even if it does not agree with them, as the coefficient of ordinal association (the level of significance of Somers' *d* is 0.381) is not significant. Even the log-linear model postulating an ordinal association must be rejected.

With regard to opinion on the ratio of power between the national governments and the EU, out of the total population of respondents, three per cent of them felt that the EU should have much more power than the national governments, fifteen per cent believed that that it should have more power, forty-eight per cent indicated that it should have as much power, twenty-five per cent would permit it less power, and nine per cent much less power (see Table 9). The analyses showed that there is no relationship between the degree of identification with the Czech Republic and the opinion on the power ratio between the national governments and the European Union.

However, we did find a statistically significant relationship between the degree of identification with the Czech Republic and the opinion on what future shape the European Union should take, specifically on whether the cooperation model or the federalisation model should predominate (see Table 10; the level of significance of the Somers' coefficient *d* is 0.000). Out of the total population of respondents, eighty per cent preferred the model of the European Union based on open cooperation among member states, and twenty per cent preferred the model based on the formation of a single state. The closer the relationship respondents had to the Czech Republic, the more

they preferred the model of cooperation. And conversely, the more distant their relationship to the Czech Republic the more they preferred to see the European Union as a single state.

Conclusion

Our analyses show that Czech national identity weakened in many areas between the years 1995 and 2003. While in 1995 the nation-state was the most important territory that Czechs identified with, in 2003 it became the second most important territory Czechs identify with, after place of residence, and nationality identity is for Czechs only the fifth most important collective identity.

If in 1995 the image of the Czech nation was more constitutional – people considered someone Czech if they could speak Czech, if they felt Czech, and if they respected Czech political institutions and laws and had Czech citizenship – in 2003 it had a more ethno-cultural basis – respondents considered a true Czech someone who could speak Czech, felt Czech, had Czech citizenship and had lived in the Czech Republic most of their lives. The weakening of the constitutional component in the image of the nation is compounded further by the observation that in 2003 what was already a weak level of pride among Czechs in the performance of the state in 1995 weakened further, and pride in the country's cultural performance slightly gained in strength. The overall image of weak national identity is completed by the weak sense of patriotism.

That national identity, and in particular the component of national identity that is tied to the state, is weak is a consequence of territorial and governmental discontinuity (cf. Musil 2000). In the modern age the Czechs have experienced the founding and dissolution of their own state, shifting borders, and changes in forms of government so repeatedly that they have lost the ability to identify with the state and experience a sense of patriotism. In 1993 they then found themselves unwittingly, though according to some through their own fault, in their own ethnically homogenous state, where they had not yet had enough time to redefine their national identity before they became citizens of the European Union, which in turn will also have a further influence on the definition of national identity.

The 1990s were not a propitious time for defining Czech national identity. Czech national identity was confronted by Slovak national identity, and after the split into two states (Slovak/Czech) many intellectuals accused the Czechs of nationalism, which had resulted in their being unable to maintain a unified state. Afterwards, the commentary and rhetoric of many intellectuals in the Czech Republic frequently contained the ideological notion that the civic and national principles are irreconcilable (cf. Kučerová 2002), and that all that really matters is the Czech Republic's accession to the European Union.

As the ISSP data show, strong national identity, even in the Czech Republic, is not well suited to accepting government from a supranational

entity like the European Union. People with a stronger sense of national identity more often disagree with the idea that the Czech Republic should follow the decisions of the European Union, even if it does not agree with them. Strong identification with the Czech Republic is even very significantly connected with the opinion on what the European Union should be like in the future, preferring the model of cooperation over federalisation.

At present, the primary goals of Czech foreign policy may be summarised as defence of national interests, active membership in NATO and the European Union, and maintaining good relations with neighbouring countries. As regards the European Union, Czech foreign policy supports all reforms that are geared toward more transparency and flexibility, less bureaucracy, and more competitive economy. As the Czech government prepares for the EU presidency in 2009, it seems that the key priorities will be projection of Czech national interests and pursuit of specific EU issues such as budgetary and finace reforms within the EU, reform of the common agricultural policy, evaluation of the Lisbon process, finalisation of the second phase of the transition period for free movement of persons, and attainment of the four basic freedoms. In short, a successful Czech presidency may strengthen both national identity and popular acceptance of the power of the European Union.

Although weak national identity is more open to accepting the power of the European Union, from the perspective of the nation-state it is not considered to be a positive feature. According to some (e.g. Kučerová 2002; Kuzio 2001), a weak national identity leads to a weak civil society and weak social solidarity. National identity is for most modern states the principle from which they derive their legitimacy (Lind 2000). The national and civic principles are complementary, mutually conditional, and compatible.

It is possible to speak of a free citizen only when a part of his freedom is the ability to identify with that group of people he is joined to by language, a shared history, work, customs, traditions, folklore, and shared expectations for the future. The consciousness of the nation gives each individual not only the ability to experience solidarity with others like him, but also the responsibility for the common civic and social ideals in domestic and foreign policy (Kučerová 2002: 220).

Notes

1 Also corresponding to these models is the division into the European and the American model of the nation (in Europe many nations base their existence on the cultural dimension, and they long had to seek their independent state, while in America states arose without the cultural dimension), the German and the French model of the nation (Germany is a linguistic and cultural entity and it emerged out of the Napoleonic wars; France is a political entity, crystallised as a unified and indivisible collective during the French Revolution when class, religious, regional and ethnic differences were overcome), the Eastern and the Western model of the nation (the Eastern is organic, grounded in community-based ethnic principles, the Western is a community of people living on a shared territory under a single government and with laws in common; the Western

model is the model of the middle classes, the Eastern model is the model of intellectuals) (Haller 2003; Csepeli 1992; Smith 1991; Kohn 1955).

2 Demos is considered to be an expression of ethnos – politics is the expression of the ethical life of the citizens that form a cultural community (Delanty 1998).

3 A series of judicial trials of the Jew Leopold Hilsner, who was accused of killing Anežka Hrůzová in a ritual murder. The trials were accompanied by an anti-Semitic media campaign and Czech–German conflicts. They had an effect on Czech and by extension Austro-Hungarian society at the turn of the twentieth century. One of the few to come out in defence of Hilsner was Professor Tomáš G. Masaryk, who later became President of independent Czechoslovakia. Masaryk described ritual murder as a superstition and the background of the trial as anti-Semitic.

4 Population 18+. Three-stage stratified probability sample (first stage: sample of electoral districts, second stage: sample of households, third stage: sample of individuals by a Kish grid); 1,276 respondents.

5 For the purposes of this study, from the large international set of countries in the research the authors selected for the analysis eleven European countries in which it was possible to assume that they would differ from one another from the perspective of the image of the nation, territorial identity, national pride, and the level of patriotism and nationalism, as they exhibit varying degrees of homogeneity and heterogeneity with regard to nationality composition, and vary in terms of geographical location, territorial stability, and administrative continuity:

- EU member countries – Italy, western Germany, eastern Germany, Austria, Spain, and Great Britain. Italy, Germany, and Austria are relatively homogeneous with regard to nationality composition, while Spain and Great Britain are not homogeneous. Spain is divided into nineteen autonomous communities. It contains a significant Catalonian minority, and also Galician and Basque minorities. These minorities live in their own autonomous communities. Catalonians and Basques are striving to secede from Spain. Great Britain is also a country with strong regional divisions, which are based on nationality – England, Wales, and Scotland. Germany was divided into two states in 1949 and was reunited in 1990.

- The countries that became members of the EU in 2004 – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. While the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are relatively homogeneous countries in terms of nationality, in Slovakia there is a large Hungarian minority, and in Slovenia there are both Serbian and Croatian minorities. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were the two countries in federative Czechoslovakia, which split in 1992. In 1991 Slovenia broke away from federative Yugoslavia.

- The country that rejected EU membership – Norway, which is a considerably homogeneous country in terms of nationality.

6 Multidimensional scaling is useful for determining perceptual relationships. Using proximities and independent variables we can determine which variables are important for national pride for example. In our case, it were above mentioned items. For example: 'to have been born in the given country' is important for eighty-two per cent of Poles and for fifty-one per cent of western Germans only, 'to be a Christian' is important for 52 per cent of Poles and for twenty-two per cent of western Germans only. Matrix of selected marginals of analysed variables was published in Vlachová and Řeháková (2004).

7 Immigrants to the Czech Republic predominantly come from Ukraine (over 100,000), Slovakia (just under 60,000), Vietnam (over 40,000), Russia (just under 20,000) and Poland (just under 20,000).

8 Matrix of selected marginals of analysed variables was published in Vlachová and Řeháková (2004).

9 In this area an important role in the Czech Republic was played by popular sports – especially hockey, but also football. The Czech hockey team won the World Championship title in 1996, 1999, 2000 and 2001 and was third in 1997 and 1998. In 1998 the team also won the Gold Medal at the Olympic games in Nagano.

10 The Czech relationship with the armed forces was long influenced by the country's notion of itself as a small nation, which has little chance of withstanding military confrontation with its

stronger neighbours, and also influenced by the feeling that it is not possible to feel proud of its army, which was not able to defend the country on those occasions when it found itself under military threat (after Munich, and again in August 1968). When the country joined NATO, the Czech armed forces became involved in peace missions to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Czech public's view of their armed forces changed.

11 Matrix of selected marginals of analysed variables was published in Vlachová and Řeháková (2004).

12 Haller (1997) does not consider these items to be indicators of nationalism but rather indicators of national chauvinism – contempt for other nations.

13 The sixth item, 'There are some things about (the respondent's country) today that make me ashamed of it', was omitted from the analysis because of its negative formulation and because respondents did not always understand it correctly. This item was also omitted in the research by Smith and Jarkko (2001).

14 On Norwegian chauvinism, see Knudsen (1997).

15 Matrix of selected marginals of analysed variables was published in Vlachová and Řeháková (2004).

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