

## **Wittgenstein on Objectivity Revisited: Why it Matters**

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A great deal of ink has been spilt on the question of the implications of Wittgenstein's later philosophy for how we conceive of objectivity. Whereas most readers take Wittgenstein to favor some form of skepticism about objectivity, an outspoken minority represent him as attempting to transform the way we construe the concept of objectivity so that, instead of being composed exclusively of things that can be adequately characterized independently of reference to anything subjective, the objective realm also includes some things with necessary references to subjectivity. In this talk, I revisit the case for saying that Wittgenstein thus transforms our conception of objectivity, arguing that we fail to do justice to the strength of this case if we fail to register how he combats sources of resistance to it that derive from rationalist as well as empiricist modes of thought. With an eye to illustrating why the transformation matters, I discuss how the resulting conception of objectivity obliges us to radically rethink the shape of familiar debates in philosophy of mind.