

## **Sellars on Method**

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I discuss the method inherent in Sellars' development of a vocabulary for reflecting the construction of philosophical theories. Since Sellars understands the ultimate aim of philosophy to be theory-building, philosophy has a self-reflective task: to reflect on the very credentials of how we build theories.

I argue that in Sellars' writings his method plays a more influential role for the development of his eventual philosophical commitments than do his fundamental assumptions, e.g. concerning naturalism. However, the attribution of a specific method heavily depends on assessing as to what it means for a method to be operative in a philosophical explanation.

In particular, I address this problem by asking: Does Sellars subscribe to a specific philosophical method? Then I reconstruct Sellars' understanding of philosophical methods as similar to coping strategies, which change the uptake of a content: Obstacles on your path depend for their status — as obstacles — on the coping-strategy you bring to your experience of them. I close by showing that for Sellars methods play a role on many levels. Which level we single out as relevant depends on the framework lending structure to the problem.