

# The effect of shame in dictator games with information asymmetry

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## Abstract

This experimental study deals with the effect of shame on decisions of dictators in a dictator game when they have an opportunity to partially hide their actions before recipients. A size of the pie to be split by a dictator is fully known only to a dictator, and a recipient knows only the probability distribution of this amount. Threat of shame is induced by different disclosures of the dictator's decision and identity to a recipient or a third party observer. The idea of the experiment is based on the fact that the feeling of exposure after an "unfair" action can lead to a higher intensity of negative emotions. In order to prevent such situations, dictators may adjust their behavior. The experimental results suggest this is the case and dictators send significantly higher amounts to recipients in treatments with disclosure especially when the disclosure of the action is also connected with a certain breach of anonymity.

Keywords: shame, dictator game, anonymity

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