Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief

Pořádá Oddělení logiky FLÚ AV ČR

Prof. Dr. Hans Rott, Universität Regensburg

Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism usually holds that humans (sometimes or usually) acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper intoduces negative doxastic voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: (i) humans (usually) acquire beliefs automatically and unreflectively, but (ii) they (usually) remove beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. I first present philosophical, empirical and logical arguments for negative doxastic voluntarism. Then I raise two objections against it. First, the apparent asymmetry may result from a confusion of belief with other doxastic attitudes like assumption, supposition, hypothesis or opinion. Second, the apparent asymmetry seems to vanish if we focus on belief states rather than just beliefs. Some possible rejoinders and their consequences for the concept of belief are sketched. I conclude by weighing the pros and cons of negative doxastic voluntarism.