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Contents

The British, the Americans,
and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943

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There is no doubt that the Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on 12 December 1943 in Moscow had, in its entire context and with respect to its consequences, a fundamental impact on the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia at the end of the war and in the years that followed. At the same time, the lengthy negotiations in 1943, which ultimately resulted in the Treaty, were one of the few moments during the war when Czechoslovakia became the object of an opinion clash between the Great Powers. As such, it has also been noticed by historical works dealing with broader issues of policies and the diplomacy of the Great Powers during the war.[1] Preparations for the Treaty and negotiations with the Soviet side have been systematically covered especially by Jan Němeček and Valentina Marjina.[2] The British attitude to the Treaty is outlined

1   See, for instance, BARKER, Elisabeth: *Churchill and Eden at War*. London, Macmillan 1978, pp. 265–268; MASTNY, Vojtech: *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945*. New York, Columbia University Press 1979, pp. 100–103, 133–144; KITCHEN, Martin: *British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War*. London, Macmillan 1986, pp. 186–188; HARBUTT, Fraser J.: *Yalta 1945. Europe and America at the Crossroads*. New York, Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 117–119, 137, 140–141, 144.

2   NĚMEČEK, Jan: Československá vláda, prezident a československo-sovětská smlouva z r. 1943 [The Czechoslovak Government, the President and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943]. In: NĚMEČEK, Jan et al.: *Československo-sovětská smlouva 1943* [The Czechoslovak-

in books by Detlef Brandes and Martin David Brown.[3] The effects of the Treaty on Czechoslovak-British relations at the end of the war were analysed years ago by Vilém Prečan, while Slavomír Michálek has thoroughly mapped the treatment of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty in the US press.[4] In the present study, which is based primarily on British and US documents (some of which have not been used before), I analyse in detail, first and foremost, the role of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty project in the policies of the two Western powers until the signing of the document. At the end, I am going to briefly assess the impact of the Treaty on Czechoslovakia's relations with the United Kingdom and the United States at the end of the war.

The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of alliance became the key project of Czechoslovak foreign policy at the turn of 1942 and 1943 – first in the framework of the intended but abortive trilateral alliance which was also to include Poland, and after March 1943 as an independent project.[5] The British Government was cautiously supporting the trilateral agreement; on the other hand, the purely bilateral Treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union made its way into British and US politics only in connection with President Beneš's trip to the United States and Canada from 12 May to 11 June 1943.

Soviet-related issues played an important role during the visit, with President Beneš repeatedly assuring US representatives about the possibility, and also necessity,

Soviet Treaty 1943]. Praha, Historický ústav 2014, pp. 9–48; IDEM: Edvard Beneš a Sovětský svaz 1939–1945 [Edvard Beneš and the Soviet Union 1939–1943]. In: *Slovanský přehled*, Vol. 87 (2001), No. 3, pp. 313–343; MARJINA, Valentina V.: E. Beneš: Vtoroy vizit v Moskvu (dekabr' 1943 g.) [E. Beneš: the Second Visit to Moscow (December 1943)]. In: *Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Aktuaľnye problemy. K 50-letiu Pobedy* [The Second World War. Topical Issues. On the 50th Anniversary of the Victory]. Moskva, Nauka 1995, pp. 151–165; IDEM: *Sovetskiy Soyuz i chekhoslovatskiy vopros vo vremya Vtoroy mirovoy voyny* [The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Question during the Second World War]. Vol. 2, *1941–1945 gg. (1941 – 1945)*. Moskva, INDRIK 2009, pp. 101–172.

3   BRANDES, Detlef: *Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Allierten 1939–1943. Die Regierungen Polens, der Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawiens im Londoner Exil vom Kriegsausbruch bis zur Konferenz von Teheran*. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1988, pp. 464–477 (the Czech version: *Exil v Londýně. Velká Británie a její spojenci Československo, Polsko a Jugoslávie mezi Mnichovem a Teheránem* [Exile in London. Great Britain and Her Allies Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia between Munich and Tehran]. Praha, Karolinum 2003, pp. 352–362); BROWN, Martin David: *Dealing with Democrats. The British Foreign Office and the Czechoslovak Émigrés in Great Britain, 1939 to 1945*. Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang 2006, pp. 195–207.

4   PREČAN, Vilém: Vztah Britů k Československu v letech 1944–45 [The Relation of the British to Czechoslovakia in 1944–45]. In: IDEM: *V kradeném čase. Výběr ze studií, článků a úvah z let 1973–1993* [In Stolen Time. A Selection of Studies, Articles, and Essays from the Years 1973–1993]. Brno, Doplněk 1994, pp. 38–59; MICHÁLEK, Slavomír: Československo-sovietska zmluva z roku 1943 v americkej tlači [The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943 in the US Press]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 1., No. 6 (1993/1994), pp. 847–859.

5   For details see HRBEK, Jaroslav – SMETANA, Vít et al.: *Draze zaplacená svoboda. Osvobození Československa 1944–1945* [Dearly Paid Freedom. The Liberation of Czechoslovakia 1944–1945]. Vol. I, Praha, Paseka 2009, pp. 51–53.

of permanent cooperation with the Soviet Union – both for the Great Powers and for Czechoslovakia – and of an ongoing democratisation of public life in the Soviet Union. He claimed the democratisation process there was irreversible; on the other hand, Moscow had allegedly no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and was willing to achieve an agreement with Poland as well. The latter assertion was quite surprising in light of the most recent development in Soviet-Polish relations, or rather their termination at the diplomatic level. When the Germans discovered the mass graves of Polish officers (murdered by NKVD troops acting upon a direct order from Stalin in the spring of 1940) and the Polish Government in London contacted the International Red Cross with a request to investigate the matter, the Soviet Government terminated diplomatic relations with its Polish counterpart in London. During his press conference in The Blair House on 13 May, the President also made the following comment on federations in Europe: "Such federations may be useful, but can be created only with the consent of the Great Powers."[6] It was an important signal since the project of confederation with Poland had been – at least outwardly – the flagship of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy in 1940–1942. Of course, this comment from Beneš mainly reflected the Soviet attitude. As far as the British Government was concerned the confederative arrangement represented an enthusiastically supported concept for the future stabilisation of the turbulent region of Central Europe, which also had general support in the United States, the Soviet Union had been rigidly opposing any confederations for almost a year, which the Czechoslovak side took heed of.[7] It is true that Edvard Beneš and his most effective collaborator in the field of foreign policy Hubert Ripka, during their talks with Soviet diplomats in London in the summer and autumn of 1942, kept trying to disprove the conviction in "Soviet circles" (*milieux soviétiques*) that the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation was – like all confederation plans in Central Europe – meant as a device against the Soviet Union. Although Beneš and Ripka defended and advocated the confederation plan,

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6   Cited according to: NĚMEČEK, Jan – NOVÁČKOVÁ, Helena – ŠŤOVÍČEK, Ivan (eds.): Edvard Beneš v USA v roce 1943. Dokumenty [Edvard Beneš in the United States in 1943. Documents]. In: *Sborník archivních prací* [Proceedings of Archival Work], Vol. 49, 1999, No. 2, p. 479.

7   For details on the policies of the Great Powers and the confederation project, see SMETANA, Vít: Konfederacja czechoslowacko-polska a polityka mocarstw. In: BLAŽEK, Petr – JAWORSKI , Pawel – KAMIŃSKI, Łukasz (ed.): *Miedzy przymusowa przyjaznia a prawdiwa solidarnoscia. Csesi – Polacy – Slowacy 1938/39–1945–1989*. Warszawa, Instytut Pamieci Narodowej 2007, pp. 120–131. A more cautious, but still positive attitude of the United States to Central European confederations is captured, for instance, in a March 1943 discussion between Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Anthony Eden: *Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1943, Vol. III, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office 1963 [hereafter *FRUS* – with the pertaining year and volume], pp. 19–24, Welles' transcript of the discussion with Eden and Ambassador Halifax, 16 March 1943.

the President repeatedly made it clear that, in the event of the Soviet Union's dis-
agreement, there simply would not be any confederation.[8]

Soon after Beneš's generally successful trip to the United States, discrepancies in
the interpretation of key issues discussed during the negotiations appeared, which
produced tension and, to some extent, also alienation in Czechoslovak-British rela-
tions. Beneš probably gave his British colleagues incorrect information about the
attitude of the United States (partly also of the Soviet Union) towards two of the
issues that had been discussed, and it was probably not accidental that he wished
a change in British policy in both. One was the attitude of the powers to the expul-
sion of Germans,[9] the other the intended Treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.
As a matter of fact, the British, reacting to the prospect of a Yugoslav-Soviet Treaty,
had made a preliminary agreement to a so-called *self-denying ordinance* with the
Soviets in mid-1942, according to which the Powers were not to enter into postwar
cooperation treaties with minor allies without prior mutual consultations and joint
consent.[10] British diplomacy viewed agreements and treaties with small allies as

8   NĚMEČEK, Jan – NOVÁČKOVÁ, Helena – ŠŤOVÍČEK, Ivan – TEJCHMAN, Miroslav (eds.):
     Československo-sovětské vztahy v diplomatických jednáních 1939–1945. Dokumenty [Czech-
     oslovak-Soviet Relations in Diplomatic Negotiations 1939–1945. Documents]. 2 Vols.,
     Praha, Státní ústřední archiv v Praze 1998–1999 [hereafter *ČSSVDJ*], Vol. 1, No. 182, pp.
     371–376, H. Ripka's transcript of his talks with A. J. Bogomolov, 27 July 1942, Nos. 183,
     187, 199, pp. 377–381, 389–390, 407–408, E. Beneš's transcripts of his talks with A. J. Bo-
     gomolov, 31 July, 27 August and 30 October 1942.
9   Beneš repeatedly sought the Soviet side's consent to the transfer, and he repeatedly received
     answers that it was an internal Czechoslovak matter. It was only on 5 June 1943 that the
     Soviet Government instructed the Soviet Ambassador to the Exile Governments in London,
     Alexander J. Bogomolov, to convey its agreement to the expulsion to the Czechoslovak Gov-
     ernment. One day later, Ripka wired it to Beneš who was in Washington. On 7 June, during
     his final meeting with Roosevelt, Beneš obtained the President's consent as well, whereup-
     on he told him that England and the Soviet Union also agreed with the transfer. Nine days
     later in London, however, Beneš told Eden, Ambassador Philip Nichols and Assistant State
     Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office that "the Soviets have not yet answered the question
     concerning the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, probably because they are waiting for
     the opinions of the United States and England regarding Germany," which he claimed he
     had also told Roosevelt. Needless to say, Beneš was seeking an unambiguous and public
     British agreement to the transfer. See VONDROVÁ, Jitka (ed.): *Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka
     1939–1945. Dokumenty* [The Czechs and the Sudeten German Question. Documents]. Pra-
     ha, Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1994, Document No. 120, Footnote No. 2, p. 245.
10   British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden submitted this proposal to his Soviet counterpart
     Vyacheslav M. Molotov on 9 June 1942, during the latter's visit to London. Early in July, the
     Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs instructed Soviet Ambassador Ivan M. Maisky
     to tell Eden that the Soviet side in principle agreed with the proposal and would welcome
     "specific English suggestions to this effect." *SSSR i germanskiy vopros 1941–1949: dokumen-
     ty iz archiva vneshney politiki*, tom 1: *22 iyunya 1941 g. – 8 maya 1945 g.* [The USSR and
     the German question 1941–1949: Documents from the Archives of Foreign policy, Tome 1:
     22 June 1941 – 8 May 1945], Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia 1996, Document
     No. 28, p. 165, Molotov's telegram to Maisky, 4 July 1942. However, the British did not
     present any detailed proposal and the Soviet side no longer felt bound by its preliminary
     consent. Beneš's record of his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador reads as follows:

posing a risk of division in Europe and of a potential race to sign as many of them as possible. The Foreign Office believed that, should the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty be signed, Poland could become isolated.

However, Beneš informed Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden during their first meeting after Beneš's return from the United States, which took place on 16 June, that he had obtained the full agreement of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State Secretary Cordell Hull, State Under-Secretary Sumner Welles and Assistant Under-Secretary Adolf Berle to the idea of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty.[11] This came as a great surprise for the British and Eden personally. Beneš's plan was a breakthrough in the tacit agreement (of whose existence, however, Beneš did not know), and British representatives received it with displeasure. Moreover, when directly asked by the British Ambassador to Washington Lord Halifax on 28 June, Welles denied having discussed the Treaty with Beneš at all, claiming that the President had only informed him about his goal of getting Stalin's understanding regarding Czechoslovakia's position in postwar Europe. Even the detailed minutes and transcripts of Beneš's meetings with Hull or Berle did not contain any mention of the Treaty.[12] Eden subsequently caused quite a few unpleasant moments over the matter for Beneš, whose hurried explanations did not sound very convincing.[13]

Anthony Eden also felt offended by the fact that Beneš delayed disclosing his intention concerning the bilateral Treaty with Moscow to his British hosts, having talked only about a trilateral pact involving Poland before his trip to the United States.[14] It is true that Beneš, while in the United States, talked about it at least

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"After all, the Soviet Government is a sovereign Government and it would not bind itself not to enter into agreements like this […]." *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 1, Documents No. 172, No. 177, No. 178, pp. 352–4, 362–6, Vol. 2, No. 18, pp. 49–50.

11 *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 1, No. 251, pp. 498–499, Ripka's transcript of a conversation between Beneš and Eden, 16 June 1943.

12 *The National Archives*, London [hereafter *TNA*], Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 371/34339, C 8317/525/G, Halifax's telegrams No. 2978, 29 June 1943, and No. 3029, 2 July 1943, to the Foreign Office; see also US transcripts of Beneš's meetings in the United States: *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. III, pp. 529–530, Hull's transcript of his meeting with Beneš, 18 May 1943; National Archives and Record Administration, Washington [hereafter *NARA*], RG 59, Department of State File 860F.00/1009 and European War 1939/28633 1/2, Welles' transcript of his meeting with Beneš, 17 May 1943, the transcript of Beneš's meeting with Berle, 31 May 1943. No records of Beneš's meetings with Roosevelt have been found, and they probably do not exist.

13 *TNA*, FO 371/34338, C 7493/2462/G, Eden's letter to Nichols, 30 June 1943; see also *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 1, No. 264, pp. 525–528, Beneš's record of his meeting with Eden, 30 June 1943. This document, together with three other documents from the Czechoslovak funds, has also been published in the mini-edition: ŠŤOVÍČEK, Ivan: Velká Británie a československo-sovětská smlouva z r. 1943 [Great Britain and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943], *Historie a vojenství*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1994), pp. 161–173.

14 Nevertheless, there exist both Czechoslovak and British records of the discussion of Hubert Ripka with the Foreign Office's Assistant Under-Secretary of State William Strang, which was held on 30 April 1943 and during which Ripka informed Strang about the Soviet Government's consent to "an alliance pact between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia,

with Hamilton Fish Armstrong who, as the Editor-in-Chief of *Foreign Affairs*, was in frequent contact with top representatives from the US administration, but the Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty was, in the President's words, the last and farthest side of the notional triangle. He himself had previously wanted to be a moderator of the Soviet-Polish reconciliation.[15] When talking to Eden, he indicated how far beyond the horizon that side was for him, saying that "after all the experience we have had so far with the Polish Government, I am afraid we will hardly achieve any positive decision with them before the end of the war."[16] On the other hand, it can be proven that Anthony Eden *had been* informed about Beneš's intention to come to Moscow in July and sign a treaty similar to the British-Soviet Treaty of May 1942 in advance. However, this was not by Beneš himself, with whom he met quite frequently, usually for lunch or dinner. The information came as early as 10 May 1943, from the British Ambassador to Moscow Archibald Clark Kerr to whom his Czechoslovak counterpart Zdeněk Fierlinger had disclosed it. The telegram, which can be found in the archives of the Foreign Office, contains Eden's succinct comment aptly characterising the substance of the reservations outlined below: "What about the Poles?"[17]

The British were verbally supporting Beneš's efforts for an understanding with the Soviet Union; they were willing to accept a trilateral treaty involving Poland, but were refusing a bilateral Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty. Eden kept convincing Beneš and Ripka that the Treaty would be accepted negatively both in Great Britain and

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modelled along the lines of the English-Soviet pact." At the same time, however, he also talked about the trilateral Russian-Polish-Czechoslovak alliance pact. This was perhaps why Strang's report failed to climb to the top of the Foreign Office's chain of command, i.e. to Foreign Secretary Eden. However, Ripka made the following note: "This message made Strang tremendously impressed." *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 1, No. 227, pp. 464–465, H. Ripka's transcript of the meeting with W. Strang, 30 April 1943; *TNA*, FO 371/34573, C 5004/258/55, Strang's record of the meeting with Ripka, dated 4 May 1943. However, Strang mentions that the conversation took place "a day or two ago" – while it should be "four days ago." Records of other meetings during which, according to Ripka's later statement, both he and President Beneš informed Ambassador Nichols of their intention to sign a bilateral Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty, have not been found in either Czechoslovak or British archives. *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 2, Document No. 39, pp. 84–87, H. Ripka's record of the meeting with P. B. Nichols, 18 October 1943. On the contrary, as late as 3 June 1943, when Nichols directly asked whether the Czechs intended to sign an agreement of any kind with the Soviet Union, Ripka answered very evasively, saying that the idea was being considered within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but not at Governmental level, and even less so with the President. Nothing was to be decided prior to the President's return from the United States. *TNA*, FO 371/34338, C 6407/525/12, Nichols' letter to Frank Roberts, 3 June 1943.

15   *Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library*, Princeton, N.J., Hamilton Fish Armstrong Collection, box 100, H. F. Armstrong's record of his conversation with Beneš in the Waldorf hotel in New York on 20 May 1943, made a day later. On 18 June 1943, Fish Armstrong gave a copy of the record to Sumner Welles.

16   *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 1, No. 251, pp. 498–499, Ripka's transcript of the meeting of Beneš and Eden, 16 June 1943.

17   *TNA*, FO 371/34330, C 5269/96/12, Kerr's telegram No. 386, 10 May 1943, Eden's undated comment (after 11 May 1943).

in the United States and that Czechoslovakia, in particular, would exchange its existing and very favourable position of an ally of all the three Great Powers for unilateral dependence on Moscow. He suggested to Beneš to sign a mere declaration.[18] Upon Eden's insistence, the British War Cabinet first passed a resolution according to which the British diplomacy was to attempt to dissuade the Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments from signing; on 5 July, Eden even decided to warn Molotov that Britain expected the Soviet Union to adhere to the agreement not to sign treaties with minor allies. Were the Soviet Government to remain adamant, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty was to be formulated as an initial step toward a trilateral treaty which Poland would accede to later. At the same time, it was to be the only exception from the *self-denying ordinance*.[19] In the meantime, Beneš was probing the possibility of a declaration or the signing of the Treaty only after his visit, initially scheduled for June or July, in Moscow. In such a case, however, the Soviet Government was not interested in his visit. When talking to the Soviet Ambassador to the exile Governments in London Alexander J. Bogomolov on 30 June, Beneš spoke up for the British, elaborating a parallel between the British antagonism toward the Treaty and the Soviet opposition against the confederation with Poland. At the same time, he "categorically stated" and, when asked by Bogomolov, repeated once again that England's opposition should not go beyond certain limits; if the British opposed the Treaty as such, he would "categorically refuse."[20]

Early in July, however, Beneš, leaned on by the Soviets, postponed his trip to Moscow until autumn.[21] The Soviet side started making the trip dependent upon the signing of the Treaty and, throughout the summer of 1943, Beneš was also under the pressure from Fierlinger and Bogomolov to go to Moscow and sign, the British disagreement notwithstanding.[22] However, he did not intend to do that – hoping that the Great Powers would ultimately achieve a compromise, naturally in favour of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty. In the meantime, Czechoslovak representatives were trying to convince the British diplomats to drop their reservations toward the Treaty and thus make an early trip of the President to Moscow possible.[23]

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18   The Archive of the Institute of T. G. Masaryk, Praha [hereafter *AÚTGM*], fund of Edvard Beneš – London [hereafter EB-L], Box No. 111, Ripka's record of the meeting of Beneš and Masaryk with Eden, Strang and Nichols, 24 June 1943; *TNA*, FO 371/34338, C 7363/2462/G, Eden's letter to Nichols, 25 June 1943.

19   *TNA*, FO 371/34338, W.M. (43) 89th Conclusions, Minute 5, 28 June 1943; W.M. (43) 93rd Conclusions, Minute 5, 5 June 1943.

20   *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 1, No. 263, pp. 523–525, Beneš's record of the conversation with Bogomolov, 30 June 1943.

21   *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, Document No. 3, pp. 22–26, Beneš's record of the conversation with A. Y. Bogomolov, 7 July 1943.

22   *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, Document No. 8, pp. 32–33, Fierlinger's telegraphed message to E. Beneš, 14 July 1943; Document No. 36, pp. 77–80, Beneš's telegraphed instruction to Z. Fierlinger, 13 October 1943 + notes.

23   *AÚTGM*, EB-L, Box No. 110, Beneš's record of the conversation with P. B. Nichols, 5 August 1943; *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 2, Document No. 23, pp. 56–57, J. Smutný's minutes of the meeting of J. Masaryk, I. M. Maisky and A. Eden, 8 September 1943, No. 29, pp. 65–66, excerpt

Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Orme Sargent perceived the information coming from Polish circles about the importance now assigned by the Czechoslovak President to the alliance with the Soviet Union as an indication of future problems with Beneš for which, however, the British could blame themselves, as they represented a belated punishment for the Munich Agreement. However, Eden countered with an objection that had been often emphasised by Churchill – namely that Beneš had decided not to fight at the time of Munich.[24] It seems that prominent opponents of the appeasement policy remained convinced that, had Czechoslovakia offered resistance at that time, the Government might have changed and everything might have turned out differently. In mid-September 1943, Eden at least successfully persuaded Masaryk that the President should postpone his trip until after a meeting of the foreign ministers of the three Great Powers scheduled to take place in Moscow in October.[25] Needless to say, however, the British Foreign Secretary had been, by that time, fed up with Czechoslovakia's insistence in the matter of the Treaty, as indicated by the following in-house record dated 16 September: "M. Benes is behaving like a petty intriguer and shows no signs of statesmanship. [...] We did not stop M. Benes going to Moscow. The Russians stopped him. He should be grateful to us for saving him from a position of an ignominious muscovite vassal."[26]

Expressions of British displeasure over the new priority in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy were also coming from other than diplomatic circles: On 21 September, Lieutenant Colonel Jan Kalla, Czechoslovakia's Military and Air Attaché with the British Government in London, had a conversation with an officer of the War Office whom he, according to his own words, had known "for many years. He knows Czechoslovakia well and he has been working for us for some years." The officer was probably Captain Francis Keary.[27] In any case, the officer, obviously acting in good faith, analysed the reasons why he had "recently seen a cooling in the attitude of the Foreign Office and the War Office toward Czechoslovakia." He named the exaggerated optimism of the Czechoslovaks, who believed that victory

from E. Beneš's record of the conversation with P. B. Nichols,, 29 September 1943; *TNA*, FO 371/34339, C 9512/525/12, Nichols' letter for Geoffrey Harrison, 5 August 1943, C 11400/525/12, Nichols' letter for Head of the Central Department of FO Frank Roberts, 29 September 1943.

24 *TNA*, FO 371/34339, C 10051/525/12, Sargent minute, 31 August 1943, Eden minute, 1 September 1943.

25 *AÚTGM*, EB-L, Box No. 111, Masaryk's record of the meeting with Eden, 17 September 1943. The idea of the postponement was born during a conversation between the Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office Frank Roberts and Ambassador Nichols. *TNA*, FO 371/34399, C 10733/525/12, Roberts minute, 15 September 1943, Harvey minute, 17 September 1943.

26 *TNA*, FO 371/34339, C 10733/525/12, Eden minute, 16 September 1943.

27 It follows from a handwritten note on another copy of the document, which can be found, rather surprisingly, in the archive of the Special Operations Executive. *TNA*, HS 4/60, LtC. Kalla for General S. Ingr, 21 September 1943 + a handwritten note without any signature or date.

was within reach, an attitude that was both in contradiction with Churchill's political line and made them focused on work on postwar plans rather than on activities contributing to bringing the war to an end. The attitude was also reflected in insufficient efforts to establish, as a minimum, a courier connection with the Protectorate and to organise sabotage there. The second reason was that the Czechoslovaks had recently "politically diverged from Great Britain and staked everything on their future friendship with the Soviet Union. We are increasingly leaning toward the Soviet Union." Contrary to oft-voiced Czechoslovak statements to the effect that the war was being won only by the Soviet Army, the officer of the War Office reminded the Czech attaché of the Soviet attitude in 1940 or later British naval losses sustained while delivering arms and food to the Soviet Union. "You are siding with the Soviets. It is often possible to hear from your ranks that we have not been doing enough in this war, you suspect Great Britain of not being open to you. Many of you forget the political assistance and hospitality that Great Britain has hitherto provided to you." Kalla's informant also believed the reason why so many British saw the Czechoslovaks as being in Soviet tow was their lack of knowledge of the fraternal attitude of the Czech to the Russian nation and, at the same time, inadequate contacts between Czechoslovak political representatives and people from the Foreign Office or MPs, which – if adequate – would have permitted Czechoslovak politicians to explain Czechoslovakia's position between Britain and the Soviet Union – i.e. "sensible and friendly relations" with the British and "an emotional relationship to the Soviet Union."[28]

Instead of such efforts, however, the Czechoslovak Government adopted a fairly sharply formulated note on the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty, which was drafted by Hubert Ripka who subsequently distributed it to representatives of the three Great Powers. It outlined the negotiations that had taken place so far from the Czechoslovak point of view, and reproached the British for not providing their partners with enough information about their own agreements with the Soviets regarding treaties with minor allies. The Czechoslovak Government argued that it had allegedly always been honest with its partners and had always informed them promptly. The note described the planned Treaty as a step "toward strengthening the collaboration between the eastern power and the western powers," and categorically demanded its signing.[29] "Let us hope it will make them act at last and that Eden will travel to Moscow for negotiations with the fundamental approval of

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28 *Military Central Archive – Military Historical Archive*, Praha, fund 37, 37–150–17, File No. 67/taj.43, LtC. J. for General S. Ingr, 21 September 1943, with an annex "A conversation with an officer of the War Office."

29 *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 2, Document No. 26, pp. 59–63, minutes of the meeting of the Czechoslovak Government prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 September 1943; *TNA*, FO 371/34340, C 11407/525/12, Nichols' report for Eden, No. 118, 1 October 1943, with an attached memorandum from the Czechoslovak Government.

the Treaty by the British cabinet in his pocket," was what the President's Secretary Eduard Táborský wrote in his diary after reading the note.[30]

Well, it did *not* make them act; on the contrary, Anthony Eden, in a conversation with Masaryk, vigorously protested against some inaccurate statements contained in the note, which had "made the Czechoslovak position in the cabinet rather nasty." He said it was unfair and tiresome if the Czechoslovak side reproached the British for everything and Russia for nothing. "Your Government has gone mad and all they have in their heads is the Treaty with Russia. But I don't have merely this trouble; also a few other matters to take care of!" was how Masaryk reproduced Eden's words to the President.[31] An official protest from the British Government followed in mid-October; it claimed that the statement according to which the British Government had allegedly given its approval to the Treaty in April and changed its opinion in June was not true. On the contrary – the document proved that the British Government had been informed about the Treaty only after the President's arrival from the United States and that Eden had notified President Beneš of the existence of the *self-denying ordinance* on the very same day. The British Government intended to maintain a reserved attitude to the proposed Treaty at least until the forthcoming meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow, who could be expected to discuss important related issues, because it – as opposed to the Czechoslovak Government – did not perceive it as a necessary tool for strengthening the cooperation of the Great Powers and their friendly relations with the small countries of Central Europe, or as the first step toward collaboration with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland – all of which were goals which it otherwise shared with the Czechoslovak Government.[32]

It seems, however, that Anthony Eden began to realise, sometime in October, that Britain could not block the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty forever. Any further refusals would definitely not contribute to the warming of British-Soviet relations, which he intended to promote during his planned meeting with Molotov. If, on the other hand, Beneš signed the document against Britain's will, it would only increase Czechoslovakia's dependence on the Soviet Union. In mid-October, Eden proposed a Czechoslovak-Soviet declaration containing the essential points of the Treaty and a postponement of the signing of the Treaty until after the war. However, Beneš doubted that Moscow would accept it – knowing that it could rely

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30	*Hoover Institution Archive*, Stanford, Cal. [hereafter *HIA*], Eduard Táborský Collection, box 1, Táborský's diary, an entry dated 25 September 1943.

31	OTÁHALOVÁ, Libuše – ČERVINKOVÁ, Milada (eds.): *Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939–1943* [Documents from the History of Czechoslovak Politics 1939–1943]. Vol. I, Praha, Academia 1966 [hereafter *DHČSP*], Document No. 317, pp. 387–388, Smutný's record, 8 October 1943; TNA, FO 371/34340, C 11655/525/12, Eden's report for Nichols, No. 222, 7 October 1943.

32	*ČSSVDJ*, díl 2, č. 38, s. 82–84, Memorandum of the British Government to the Czechoslovak Government on Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations on the Treaty of alliance, 16 October 1943; *TNA*, FO 371/34340, C 11655/525/12, Memorandum of the British Government, 16 October 1943.

on the support of many Czechoslovak politicians and the Government categorically demanding that the Treaty be signed.[33]

The atmosphere in the Czechoslovak camp was indeed increasingly pro-Soviet: Jan Masaryk repeatedly pointed out the prevailing fear ("brown-noseness") of Communists among the Czechoslovak representatives and frequent cases of grassing to Communists and the Soviet Embassy, both from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Council.[34] However, even Ministers Jaroslav Stránský and Sergej Ingr (whom Soviet diplomats labelled as the most reactionary Czechoslovak Minister, and one least inclined to the land of Soviets![35]), for instance, had earlier told him that "the Treaty of alliance must be signed, even if it should mean a complete break with Great Britain and the United States."[36] President Beneš too was embittered by most of his colleagues, including Hubert Ripka and of course Zdeněk Fierlinger,[37] whom, however, he never dared to dismiss from the key post of Ambassador to Moscow (not even when his Government later urged him to do so[38]) – being well aware of the high esteem that Moscow held for Fierlinger. On the other hand, the President deserves some credit for the very fact that, as late as October 1943, he ruled out any possibility of signing the Treaty without the prior consent of the Great Powers, in spite of all the urgings of his ministers to the contrary. When the Foreign Office officially notified Masaryk, through its Permanent Under-Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan, that Eden had departed to the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers with a decision not to sign the Treaty before the end of the war, Beneš was very angry. "But we all had the impression that the negotiations in Moscow will help cut the unpleasant Gordian knot of misunderstanding, and we almost started packing our bags," Eduard Táborský noted in his diary. However, the President did not change his opinion "even after this Job's message." The Treaty of alliance continued to be the objective, regardless of when it would be signed. However, "if no agreement was achieved in Moscow and the Soviet Union and Great Britain continued to stand their ground, he could not sign the Treaty. He does not want Czechoslovakia to become a bone of contention between the two great allies; he wants to bring them closer, not apart."[39] Eager and always pro-Soviet Zdeněk Fierlinger received a similar message: "[…] it is necessary for you to know quite

33 *DHČSP 1939–1943*, Document No. 324, pp. 393–396, Smutný's record, 16 October 1943.
34 Regarding the matter, see documents in Soviet archives, for instance in the Vyshinskiy's Secretariat fund in Moscow's *Archiv vneshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii* [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation] [hereafter *AVP RF*], copy 4, folder 31, work 43 and others; *Rossiiskiy gosudarstvennyi archiv sociaľno politicheskoi istorii* [Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History], fund 495, copy 74, work 548.
35 *AVP RF*, Vyshinskiy's Secretariat fund, copy 295, folder 31, work 295, Bogomolov's report on the dinner with Ingr, 4 June 1943 (received on 24 June 1943).
36 *DHČSP 1939–1943*, Document No. 317, pp. 387–388, Smutný's record, 8 October 1943.
37 *Ibid.*, Document No. 324, pp. 393–396, Smutný's record, 16 October 1943.
38 NĚMEČEK, J.: Edvard Beneš a Sovětský svaz 1939–1945, pp. 332–333.
39 *HIA*, Eduard Táborský Collection, box 1, Táborský's diary, an entry dated 19 October 1943.

clearly that *I cannot go to Russia to sign the Treaty there* at the expense of conflict with England."[40]

At the end of the day, the conference of Foreign Ministers Vyacheslav Molotov, Anthony Eden and Cordell Hull, which was held in Moscow between 19 and 30 October, succeeded in cutting the "unpleasant Gordian knot." The negotiations were generally conducted in an until then unheard of atmosphere of concord and cooperation, whose principal outcomes included the formation of the trilateral European Advisory Commission to deal with postwar arrangement issues which would be based in London, and also the universalistic Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, in which particularly the US delegation was interested and in which the three Great Powers plus China undertook to exercise joint efforts for the benefit of peace. Nevertheless, Anthony Eden arrived in the Soviet capital equipped, *inter alia,* with a Foreign Office memorandum, approved by the Cabinet, which stressed the desirability of a tripartite agreement between the U.S.S.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia and listed arguments for possible future British participation in a Four-Power Treaty. This would envisage an unprecedented British commitment in the vast territories far beyond the Rhine. "Unless we participate in some way, there is little chance of reaching a stable and satisfactory solution of this Eastern European question," the memorandum stated. At the same time, the British Foreign Secretary was expected to keep refusing the principle of bilateral agreements between the Great Powers and minor allies.[41]

Yet, everything turned out differently. When Molotov presented the proposed wording of the bilateral Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty to Eden, the latter was pleasantly surprised: "It has no reference to frontier and is directed solely against Germany." Eden was satisfied especially with the attached Protocol that allowed the accession of a third country fighting against Germany and bordering any of the parties of the Treaty – i.e. Poland: "If relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. could be renewed there would be no reason why Poland should not adhere to the treaty forthwith." In a telegram to London sent in the afternoon of 24 October, the Foreign Secretary stated it would be difficult, under the circumstances, to oppose its signing, and therefore "proposed" to agree with the text of the Treaty – on condition that it would be signed only after the conference and the Soviets approved the general principle of *self-denying ordinance*. He undertook to emphasise the importance of the Poles becoming parties to the Treaty, which meant that relations had first to be re-established between them and Moscow.[42]

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40 *ČSSVDJ*, Vol. 2, No. 39, pp. 87–89, Telegraphed instruction of E. Beneš to Z. Fierlinger in the matter of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, 18 October 1943. The text in italics is spaced in the transcript of the telegram.

41 *TNA*, CAB 66/41, W.P.(43)423, 28 September 1943; CAB 65/40, War Cabinet Conclusions, 5 October 1943.

42 *TNA*, FO 371/34340, C 12466/525/12, telegram of A. Clark Kerr No. 75 for the Foreign Office, with information from the State Secretary, 24 October 1943, sent at 15:29, received at 18:50 /? The time stated on the telegram is 6.5 p.m./.

Only a few hours later, Eden, acting on his own volition, expressed his consent to the Treaty, naturally without receiving any prior instructions from home and also without the Soviets committing themselves to anything specific. "It was clear to me that by the addition of the Protocol and by the general tenor of the Treaty the Soviet Government have made a serious attempt to meet the spirit of our requirements," Eden explained to London. He again emphasised the significance of the protocol attached to the Treaty which he now found "unobjectionable from general point of view."[43] An explanation of sorts is provided in the diary of Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and until recently Eden's personal secretary Oliver Harvey: "We cannot object to the terms themselves, although we do dislike the principle of such treaties between a Great Power and a small. But we have failed to prevent it and have incurred odium with the Soviets by doing so."[44]

The evasive attitude of US diplomacy certainly played a role as well. It is true that the State Department and later (from 1943 at the latest) Roosevelt himself had been promoting a security system based on the existence of a global organisation in which the Great Powers would play the key role, but with all countries being involved and in a transparent manner. The system of bilateral treaties between the big ones and the small ones was perceived as utterly obsolete and inadequate. In its memorandum of late August, the Division of European Affairs of the State Department even stated that they "could show no enthusiasm" even in the case of an alternative trilateral Russian-Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty.[45] The State Department was also worried about Soviet expansion in Europe, and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty could be one of the elements whereby the Soviet Union was trying to strengthen its dominant position on the continent, the contours of which started slowly taking shape after the impressive Soviet military victories in 1943.[46] Still, the British did not receive any support for their opposition to the Treaty from Washington during the summer and autumn of 1943. It was indicative of the disparate nature of US foreign policy during the war, when analyses of "partial problems" prepared by knowledgeable experts from the State Department were as often as not un-reflected in the implementation of that policy, which was mainly the business of

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43   *Ibid.*, C 12467/525/12, telegram from A. Clark Kerr No. 81 for the Foreign Office, with information from the State Secretary, 24 October 1943, sent at 19:18, received at 19:45. As to Eden's course of action during the conference, see BARKER, E.: *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 265–267; as to the relation between the outcome of the conference and Beneš's subsequent visit to Moscow, see MARJINA, V. V.: E. Beneš: Vtoroy vizit v Moskvu (dekabr' 1943 g.).

44   HARVEY, John (ed.): *The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1941–1945*. London, Collins 1978, p. 313, 25 October 1943.

45   *NARA*, RG 59, Department of State File FW 760F.1/108, Division of European Affairs Memorandum, 24 August 1943.

46   Cf. LUNDESTAD, Geir: *The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe: 1943–1947*. Tromsö, Universitetsforlaget 1978, pp. 150–151.

the President, the Secretary of State, and a few close colleagues – who were fully focused on global problems.[47]

In Moscow, too, Cordell Hull left the discussion up to the Eden – Molotov duo. Hull did not make any specific comments regarding the British Foreign Secretary's proposal to the effect that the conference should appeal to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to create federations, which Molotov was naturally vehemently opposing; Hull only mentioned that he had arrived in Moscow to reach an agreement on general principles and that the details could be discussed at some other time. When Anthony Eden later proposed to ban treaties between the Great Powers and small allies, Hull's political advisor James Clement Dunn tried to find out what the proposal was actually about. Unfortunately, he did so in haste and he chose Ambassador Averell Harriman as his source of information, who was, for the time being – shortly after his arrival in Moscow and long before he would formulate his highly critical opinions of Soviet policy – influenced mainly by his admiration for the Soviet war effort and the personality of Stalin. In a few sentences he hastily scrawled and passed to Dunn, he recommended staying away from the British-Soviet dispute. Moreover, he disagreed with Eden's position, seeing a transparent Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty as a model for Soviet relations with the Poles and other Eastern European nations. Even Dunn did not quite understand Eden's objections and added on Harriman's paper a few words expressing understanding for Soviet concerns about the restoration of a *cordon sanitaire*.[48] When, during a later discussion, Cordell Hull stated that "he was not familiar with all the details of this lengthy correspondence,"[49] Eden reacted with a handwritten note – with an ironical comment addressed to his US counterpart: "I am sorry to take your time but behind all this is a big issue: two camps in Europe or one."[50] In the meantime, Molotov was reading a statement according to which subjecting agreements concerning the security of borders of individual states, for instance the Soviet Union

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47 Regarding the matter, see, in particular, the collection of brilliant essays: KIMBALL, Warren F.: *The Juggler. Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman*. Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press 1991. See also DALLEK, Robert: *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945*. Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press 1979. As to Czech publications, see WANNER, Jan: *Spojené státy a evropská válka 1939–1945* [The United States and the European War 1939–1945]. Vols. I–III, Praha, Dokořán 2001–2002; for a brief, but succinct account see DURMAN, Karel: *Popely ještě žhavé* [Ashes still glowing], Vol. I, *Válka a nukleární mír* [War and a Nuclear Peace]. Praha, Karolinum 2004, pp. 85–89.

48 Harriman wrote, *inter alia*, the following note for his US partners: "Eden told Benes if he went to Moscow he could stay there." *Library of Congress*, Washington, D.C., W. Averell Harriman Papers, Box 170, undated handwritten notes of W. A. Harriman and J. C. Dunn. See also HARRIMAN, W. Averell – ABEL, Elie: *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946*. London, Hutchinson 1976, pp. 244–246. Needless to say, no other sources confirm the above comment.

49 *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. I, s. 625–26, Bohlen's record of the 6th meeting of the trilateral conference, 24 October 1943.

50 *Library of Congress*, Washington, D.C., W. Averell Harriman Papers, box 170, an undated handwritten note of A. Eden.

and Czechoslovakia, to a prior British consent was out of the question. Under the circumstances, the British Foreign Secretary withdrew his proposal.[51]

The Soviets thus scored an important victory in one of the key rounds of the game for the future destiny of Central and Eastern Europe, where they wanted to play the leading role undisputed and unchallenged by anyone. American representatives helped them achieve this objective because of being – like in numerous other cases – inadequately prepared for the conference and because of not intending to risk a clash with the Soviets due to a matter the importance of which they did not regard as global. They willingly let the British to play the role of the "bad guy."[52] And the British finally seemed to have no option but to yield.

Nevertheless, Eden's consent came as a great surprise for the Foreign Office. Alexander Cadogan notified Prime Minister Churchill that the Foreign Secretary and Cadogan's immediate superior had acted in contravention of a previous decision of the War Cabinet. Churchill, however, certainly did not intend to dismiss his key Government minister at the turning point of the war, although he had ignored the Government's resolution. In a telegram to Eden approved by the Prime Minister, Cadogan admitted that the cause of Eden's change of opinion could have been "wider considerations arising out of the Moscow talks." He nevertheless suggested abandoning the *self-denying ordinance* principle in its entirety, as it was now, with the exclusive exemption in favour of the Soviet Union, tying the hands of the British. He also pointed at the fact that the supplementary protocol to the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty was hardly anything more than a step made to save face; first, the existing Treaty which Poland was supposed to accede to did not offer the Poles any benefits compared to those gained by Czechoslovakia; second, the Polish Government could not accede to it without first restoring Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. "We fear, therefore, that they will be placed in a very delicate position and that the result may be an increase of tension in Central and Eastern Europe rather than an important step towards a satisfactory settlement." The Foreign Secretary was therefore encouraged to keep trying and make the Soviet side restore diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London. And, last but not least, the wording of the protocol was extremely unfavourable for Britain, as it limited eligible potential future parties acceding to the Treaty to nations bordering with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia – i.e. ruled out British participation. In the opinion of Churchill and Cadogan, Eden was to strive for an amendment to the supplementary protocol allowing the bilateral Treaty to be transformed into a quadrilateral one, including Poland and Great Britain. Referring to the Government memorandum of 28 September, the British Prime Minister and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office continued to believe that, taking a longer view, "the best hope of a really satisfactory settlement lies in extending

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51   HARRIMAN, W. A. – ABEL, E.: *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946*, p. 246.
52   Cf. MAREŠ, Petr: Československo na sklonku 2. světové války [Czechoslovakia at the end of WW2]. In: *Národ se ubránil, 1939–1945* [And the Nation Resisted, 1939–1945]. Praha, Národní osvobození 1995, pp. 93–98, here p. 94.

the present Soviet-Czech arrangement into a 4-Power arrangement to include ourselves and Poland."[53] However, the British Foreign Secretary agreed only with this last of the submitted proposals.[54]

Unfortunately, his previous blessing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty had dramatically weakened Britain's negotiating position anyway, and Soviet diplomacy had no intention of changing the outcome of earlier negotiations, which it was fully satisfied with. The idea of the so-called *Pact of Four*, initially proposed by the Polish Government, was buried a month later in Tehran, when Churchill did not demand recognition of the pact by the Soviets, or even restoration of diplomatic relations between Moscow and the Polish Government in London, in exchange for his agreement with the Curzon Line as the eastern border of Poland.[55] Here, too, the reasons probably included "wider considerations arising out of the talks" and most likely also the generally positive atmosphere of obligingness and willingness to cooperate prevailing in Tehran.

Anthony Eden, who made one of the big mistakes of his diplomatic career in Moscow,[56] obviously was not happy with the outcome of the whole affair, wiring to London: "I trust we shall offer Benes no bouquets. His part in this business seems to have been to tell half-truths to either side, making as a result a good deal of unnecessary mischief."[57] While Eden had until then been one of the staunchest supporters of Czechoslovakia, his attitude toward Czechoslovak political efforts became much more reserved after the autumn of 1943.

At the same time, however, it cannot be said that the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty caused any dramatic long-term rift in Czechoslovak-British relations. After Eden's consent at the Moscow conference, London could no longer dissociate itself from the Treaty, which was why an instruction for the British Embassy in Washington shortly after the Treaty was signed, as well as the general propaganda directive issued by the Political Warfare Executive, stated that, prior to the agreements reached in Moscow, "this Treaty might have been regarded as tending to promote the division of Europe into two camps, but today this danger does not exist."[58] This

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53 *TNA*, FO 371/34340, C 12505/515/12, Cadogan's letter to Churchill, 25 October 1943, Churchill's memo to Cadogan, 26 October 1943, C 12520/515/12, telegram of the Foreign Office for Eden, No. 146, 26 October 1943.

54 *TNA*, FO 800/409, Eden's telegram for the Foreign Office, 29 October 1943.

55 See BRANDES, Detlef: *Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten 1939–1943*, p. 492–494.

56 David Carlton sees the outcome of the negotiations in Moscow as Eden's capitulation. Detlef Brandes, on the other hand, regards it as one of the three British decisions which meant the acceptance of the Soviet sphere of influence in Central and South-Eastern Europe. CARLTON, David: *Anthony Eden. A Biography*. London, Allen Lane 1981, p. 226; BRANDES, D.: *Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten 1939–1943*, pp. 552–553.

57 *TNA*, FO 371/34340, C 12497/515/12, Kerr's telegram for the Foreign Office, No. 86, 25 October 1943. See also PREČAN, V.: Vztah Britů k Československu v letech 1944–45, p. 43.

58 *TNA*, FO 371/34341, C 14338/525/12, Political Warfare Executive Central Directive, undated (9 December 1943?), Foreign Office's telegram to Washington, No. 8582, 13 December 1943.

assessment, however, was not accepted universally; a few days earlier, for instance, Orme Sargent had interpreted the behaviour of the Soviets during the Moscow conference as indicative of the ongoing formation of their "exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe." Anthony Eden of course disagreed with this opinion.[59] He nevertheless marked with his red pencil a more elaborate interpretation written by Frank Roberts, a sharp analyst and Head of the Foreign Office's Central Department, which was, however, based on the conclusions of Ambassador Nichols: "Mr. Nichols brings out very well the point that while the Czechs are still anxious for a system of balance between the West and the East they now look first to Russia and only in the second place to the Western democracies. This is, of course, a complete reversal of T.G. Masaryk's original policy." According to Roberts, this followed the fact that "the Czechs have not yet recovered from the psychological shock of Munich." Only time was to show how far-sighted the "new Czech realism, which seems to consist of an absolute faith in the support and good intentions of the U.S.S.R." would be.[60]

The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty was understandably also thoroughly analysed on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. According to a memorandum of the Research and Analytical Department of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), dated 1 January 1944, the "bipartite character of the treaty, the timing of its signature, and the omission of any reference to its relationship to the decisions reached at Moscow and Tehran" aroused "speculations as to its real significance." On the one hand, the Treaty was regarded as an anachronism; on the other hand, it had immediate significance both for the Czechs and for the Russians. As to the former, it provided a long-sought military and political patron and protector; as to the latter, it provided a limited security scheme which could be incorporated into a broader international organisation, or exclusively serve Russian interests, if efforts for the cooperation of the allies after the war failed. According to OSS analysts, the supplementary protocol allowed the Soviets to exert pressure on the Poles to follow the Czech example and, at the same time, dissuaded them from any plan for an Eastern European federation which the Soviet Union, in its almost paranoiac fear of encirclement, perceived only as the nucleus of a potential *cordon sanitaire*. Although it seemed that the Soviet Government had abandoned, at least for the time being, its policy of unrestrained pursuit of own interests, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty, which was to remain in force for two decades, was, in the opinion of OSS, a reminder that the Soviet Union could at any time resort to an independent policy, if plans for international cooperation failed.[61]

However, neither US nor British circles believed, at least during the first half of 1944, that such a development was likely. The Treaty was thus becoming

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59   Cited according to: BRANDES, D.: *Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten 1939–1943*, p. 552.
60   *TNA*, FO 371/34341, 15065/525/12, Roberts minute, 4 January 1944.
61   *NARA*, RG 226, OSS, Research and Analysis No. 1720: The Russo-Czechoslovak Alliance, 1 January 1944.

increasingly acceptable – particularly in contrast with the situation of the Polish Government, which showed no signs of improvement. After all, both Churchill and Eden hoped that President Beneš could be, shortly after his arrival from Moscow, "most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to the Russians, whose confidence he has long possessed."[62] Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" interpretation of the Treaty, according to which Czechoslovakia had become a part of the Soviet *security* sphere without losing anything of its freedom and sovereignty, was gradually gaining ground. During the early months of 1944, the Foreign Office predicted that the international position of Czechoslovakia after the war would not be too complicated; according to Frank Roberts, potential problems were more likely to occur inside the state.[63] For US diplomacy, Czechoslovakia became a litmus paper of Soviet goodwill, or a *test case* of the real intentions of the Soviets – as a matter of fact, it was rather difficult to be more accommodating to Soviet wishes than the Czechoslovak Government was trying to be.[64]

What to say by way of conclusion? It is of course possible to emphasise that the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty was ultimately signed with official British blessing.[65] However, relevant British documents provide unquestionable evidence showing that the consent was given literally with the gnashing of teeth, as the signing of the bilateral Treaty dramatically reduced any chance for a federative or confederative arrangement in the region of Central Europe, as well as hopes for a multilateral treaty of alliance ensuring security in this region. Similarly, a press statement from the State Department concluded, drily and without any enthusiasm, that the Treaty was "an agreement similar to the Anglo-Soviet Pact of 1942" and that it could not be perceived "as an act contravening the general framework of global security."[66] Another question is whether the Czechoslovak turn towards the Soviet Union was

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62 KIMBALL, W. F. (ed.): *Churchill and Roosevelt, the Complete Correspondence*, II, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press 1984, C-533, pp. 650–651, 6 January 1944. As to Eden's efforts to make use of Beneš in the pressure on the Polish Government to accept the new delineation of the Polish border roughly along the Curzon Line, with territorial compensations in Eastern Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania, see, for instance PREČAN, V.: Vztah Britů k Československu v letech 1944–45, pp. 38–59, here p. 41; see also BARKER, E.: *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 267–268.

63 *TNA*, FO 371/38931, C 1902/239/12, Roberts minute, 15 February 1944; C 4882/239/12, Roberts minute, 19 April 1944.

64 *AÚTGM*, EB – V, Box 153, Beneš's transcript of his conversation with Harriman, 27 May 1944; MAREŠ, Petr: Čekání na Godota. Americká politika a volby v Československu v květnu 1946 [Waiting for Godot. The US Policy and the Elections in Czechoslovakia in May 1946]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1997), pp. 7–25, here p. 8.

65 PREČAN, V.: Vztah Britů k Československu v letech 1944–45, pp. 44–45. In this respect, the author quite rightly refers to the identical words of Ambassador Philip Nichols of 20 July 1944.

66 Cited according to WANNER, J.: *Spojené státy a evropská válka 1939–1945*, Vol. II, *Amerika v boji* [America in Combat], p. 117.

in fact the result of the insensitive British attitude in the previous years of the war,[67] or whether "the pendulum of Czechoslovak policy was increasingly swinging to the east" only well after the signing of the Treaty of alliance with the Soviets and whether the British policy carried "a substantial part of responsibility for it," since "the Czechoslovak issue simply never was its priority."[68] That, of course, was not the case, but it is worth considering whether Britain's somewhat reserved reactions to specific Czechoslovak initiatives in 1944 did not follow – apart from the geographic factor (such as in the case of airdrops of weapons for the Czechoslovak resistance movement) – the very fact that Czechoslovakia had decided, in spite of all British reservations and warnings, to tie its policy with the Soviets to such an extent.

It is sometimes argued that the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile had to sign a bilateral Treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union because neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to make such an agreement with them. Indeed, both Western powers wanted the international security system to be based on foundations different from those which had so miserably failed during the previous three decades. Neither the United States nor Great Britain wished to have a tug-of-war for agreements with small allies, especially while the war was in progress. Edvard Beneš certainly could not have expected that he would have been able to force the British to agree to a similar arrangement by presenting them with the plan for the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty. After all, his timid probing of British representatives indicates that he was aware that his chances of success were minimal.[69] However, this was not an indication of Britain's lack of interest in Czechoslovakia, as we sometimes tend to think, even with a touch of hurt national pride. In this respect, British documents speak clearly; when Jan Masaryk in December 1943 – while in the United States – mentioned the possibility of a treaty with Britain in an interview for US media, key representatives of the Foreign Office reacted negatively, stating that they were looking for a way of not prolonging the bilateral Treaty with

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67   This is one of the principal arguments in the book by M. D. Brown: BROWN, M. D.: *Dealing with Democrats*.

68   DEJMEK, Jindřich: *Československo, jeho sousedé a velmoci ve XX. století (1918 až 1992): vybrané kapitoly z dějin československé zahraniční politiky* [Czechoslovakia, Its Neighbours, and the Great Powers in the 20th century (1918 to 1992): Selected Chapters from the History of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy]. Praha, Centrum pro ekonomiku a politiku 2002, Chapter "Sympathies versus Interests of the Great Powers: Czechoslovakia and Great Britain," pp. 231–262, here pp. 246–247.

69   FEIERABEND, Ladislav Karel: *Politické vzpomínky* [Political Memories]. Vol. III, Brno, Atlantis 1994, pp. 69–71; The first edition of Feierabend's memoirs (published at the author's expense in Washington, D.C., 1965–67) is referred to, for instance, by Josef Kalvoda – see KALVODA, Josef: *Role Československa v sovětské strategii* [The Role of Czechoslovakia in the Soviet Strategy]. Kladno, Dílo 1999, p. 157; and also Detlef Brandes – see BRANDES, D.: *Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Allierten 1939–1943*, p. 476. According to Ripka's transcript, when talking to Eden after his return from the United States, Beneš "said with a smile that he would immediately accept a similar agreement, if Eden offered it to him." However, the comment remained unanswered. *AÚTGM*, EB-L, k. 111, Ripka's record of a conversation between Beneš and Eden, 16 June 1943.

the Poles, which had been signed in 1939 for five years, and had rejected a similar earlier initiative from the Greeks.[70] At the same time, Greece is often given as an example of a country which the British Prime Minister succeeded in drawing into the British sphere of influence – during the well-known exchange of hand-written pieces of paper on percentages of influence with Stalin at the conference in Moscow. However, that happened a year later, in October 1944, when the Red Army was rolling across the Balkans, and Stalin was making it quite clear – both there and in Poland (mainly in connection with the Warsaw uprising) – how he saw the future arrangement of the regions.

The British Government was very hesitant to sign treaties of alliance even with countries which were, if for nothing else, then geographically, much more important than Czechoslovakia – such as France, Belgium, or the Netherlands; Paris had to wait until March 1947 for the conclusion of the "Dunkirk Treaty," and the Benelux countries signed the multilateral Brussels Pact only in March 1948, which was an immediate reaction to the communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

In the meantime, the role the Czechoslovak Republic played on the international stage for several years and which it chose of its own volition was that of living proof that it was, after all, possible to coexist with the Soviet Union in a harmonious fashion. This statement naturally does not call into question the concerns and misgivings which leading Czechoslovak representatives, including Edvard Beneš and Jan Masaryk, were, according to their recorded statements, harbouring already in the first half of 1944 – and which were gradually growing stronger.

This is an updated and expanded version of the chapter Britové, Američané a československo-sovětská smlouva*, which originally appeared in NĚMEČEK, Jan et al:* Československo-sovětská smlouva 1943 [The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty 1943]. *Praha, Historický ústav 2014, pp. 49–66. The Czech Journal of Contemporary History publishes this text with the kind permission of the editor of the aforementioned volume.*

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70   *TNA*, FO 371/34341, 15065/525/12, Roberts minute, 4 January 1944, Sargent minute, undated.

Renegades, Traitors, Murderers in White Coats

The Image of the "Jew" as the "Enemy" in the Propaganda of the Late Stalinist Period

Kateřina Šimová

Early in 1931, in his reply to the US Jewish Telegraph Agency, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin formulated the attitude of the Soviet state to anti-Semitism: "Anti-Semitism as an extreme form of racial chauvinism is the most dangerous relic of cannibalism. […] Anti-Semitism is as dangerous for workers as a false path that leads them astray and guides them into the jungle. […] According to Soviet laws, active anti-Semites are punishable by death."[1] One could hardly expect a different answer in a multi-national state built on the principle of Revolutionary Internationalism, which declared the right of all national and ethnic minorities to free development.

Yet, historians agree that the attitude of the Soviet regime to the Jewish minority took a radical turn between 1948 and 1953. The concept of Jews as assimilated and fully integrated Soviet citizens, which had been formulated at the beginning of the Soviet ethnic policy in relation to the Jewish minority, was replaced by a dramatic escalation of anti-Jewish actions. Specialised literature thus commonly refers to the period of late Stalinism as the period of "national tragedy," "dark years of the

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1   O antisemitismu: Odpovědi na otázky židovské agentury [On anti-Semitism: Replies to Questions of the Jewish Agency]. In: STALIN, J. V.: *Spisy* [Collected Works], Vol. 13: *Červenec 1930 – leden 1934* [July 1930 – January 1934]. Praha, Státní nakladatelství politické literatury 1953, p. 41.

Soviet Jewry," or even "the last page of the Holocaust."[2] The presented paper attempts to capture this radical change of the paradigm through an analysis of the image of the "Jew" in the propaganda of the period. The basic framework of the analysis is a concept of the "image of the enemy" as one of the cornerstones of the totalitarian ideological canon. The paper examines what elements were used to flesh out the image with notions related to the term "Jew." The methodological tool chosen as support of the approach is the semiotic text analysis which permits revealing the sign characteristics of the propaganda language.[3]

The Image of the Enemy

> *"The whole history of the Communist Movement is a series of plots,*
> *conspiracies and cases of high treason, of ferreting about*
> *for enemies, whether perceived or potential."*
>
> Paul Lendvai[4]

In his analysis of Cold War roots, Czech historian Vojtěch Mastný proceeds from the thesis that the Soviet Union has always harboured an intrinsic feeling of being threatened. The effort to ensure its own safety and security has therefore always been the prime mover of its domestic and foreign policies. The never-ending search for an inner feeling of security thus triggered off the spiral of the "endless self-supplying machine of terror," which became a symptomatic feature of Stalinism.[5]

In her study on the origins of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt shows that a so-called *objective enemy*, defined in purely ideological terms, is much more important

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2   See KOSTYRCHENKO, Gennady V.: *Taynaya politika Stalina: Vlast i antisemitizm* [Stalin's Secret Politics. Power and anti-Semitism]. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia 2003, p. 351; LEVIN, Nora: *The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917: Paradox of Survival*, Vol. 1. New York, New York University Press 1988, p. 512; VAKSBERG, Arkady I.: *Stalin proti Židům* [Stalin against the Jews]. Praha, Beta 2011, p. 148. Secondary sources tend to refer to the anti-Jewish policy of the late Stalinist period as the "state," or "official," or "Stalinist" anti-Semitism. Based on the analysis of the above terms in a study of Frank Grüner, I use the terms "Stalinist anti-Semitism" or "anti-Semitism of the period of late Stalinism" in the presented paper. (See GRÜNER, Frank: *Patrioten und Kosmopoliten: Juden im Sowjetstaat 1941–1953*. Köln/R. – Weimar – Wien, Böhlau 2007, pp. 412–414.)

3   The text is based on the use of semiotics as a key to structural studies of culture in line with the Estonian Tartu School. Methodological inspiration was also found in "semiotic essays" of Vladimír Macura, analysing the canons of socialist cultural discourse, in which he introduced the methodological principles of the Tartu School into the Czech context (refer also to MACURA, Vladimír: *Šťastný věk (a jiné studie o socialistické kultuře)* [The Age of Happiness (and Other Studies on Socialist Culture)]. Ed. Karel Kouba, Vít Schmarc and Petr Šámal. Praha, Academia 2008).

4   LENDVAI, Paul: *Antisemitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe*. Garden City (New York), Doubleday & Comp. 1971, p. 13.

5   MASTNÝ, Vojtěch: *Studená válka a sovětský pocit nejistoty: 1947–1953. Stalinova léta* [The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: 1947–1953. The Stalin Years]. Praha, Aurora 2001, p. 19.

for a totalitarian regime than different specific groups of enemies: "He is never a specific individual whose dangerous thoughts have to be […] provoked or whose past justifies suspicion, but a 'carrier of tendencies,' like a carrier of a disease."[6] The identity of "objective enemies" can vary depending on changing circumstances, a fact well illustrated by the crowds of prisoners swallowed up by the Gulag at different periods of Soviet history. The "permanent purge"[7] kept the terror machine as well as the regime itself, which drew its inner dynamics from and justified its existence by it, in motion.

According to Arendt, however, the selection of enemies was not random or accidental; for propaganda purposes, it had to be credible enough, or it might even be initiated by propaganda needs. As the search for an enemy holds a significant propaganda dimension for a totalitarian state, the "image" of the enemy was an integral part of the Soviet ideological canon. The image tends to be defined as a "conviction of a specific group that its security and fundamental values are imminently and seriously threatened by another group." The interpretation approach then determines whether its basis consists of biological, psychological, socio-psychological or political factors.[8] It occurs in two basic forms – an "internal enemy," coming from within the group, and an "external enemy," representing an outside threat for the group. However, it always stems from the basic dichotomy, *us* and *them*, *us* and *the others, the alien, the different*, with the nature of the "other" changing in relation to historical development and ruling ideologies.[9]

Arendt gives the "suddenly reawakened government anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union"[10] as an example. From the viewpoint of Stalinist propaganda, the Jews were a logical choice for the role of the "enemy." They were a "nation without a government, motherland or language,"[11] they were scattered all over the world, and they proved a high level of assimilation on the one hand and, on the other hand, growing national self-realisation and confidence as a result of the traumatic experience of the Holocaust and the new Jewish statehood. This was why they could be presented as "enemies" for many propagandistic, although often mutually contradicting reasons.

Strategies of constructing the image of the "Jew" in the conceptual framework of the "image of the enemy" are presented here against the backdrop of state

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6   ARENDT, Hannah: *Původ totalitarismu* [The Origins of Totalitarianism], Vol. 1–3. Praha, OIKOUMENH 1996, p. 574.

7   See BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew: *The Permanent Purge*. Cambridge (New Jersey), Cambridge University Press 1956.

8   LUOSTARINEN, Heikki: Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image. In: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 26, Issue No. 2 (May 1989), p. 125.

9   See LOEWENSTEIN, Bedřich: My a ti druzí [We and the Others]. In: IDEM: *My a ti druzí: Dějiny, psychologie, antropologie* [We and the Others: History, Psychology, Anthropology]. Brno, Doplněk 1997, pp. 59–80.

10 ARENDT, H.: *Původ totalitarismu,* p. 576. However, the explanation she gives (Soviet efforts to gain sympathies in European satellite countries through the anti-Jewish policy) is more than questionable.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 57.

propaganda. Propaganda is of key importance for a totalitarian regime. According to Arendt, it is propaganda – as a tool used to organise the society and to control its thinking – which is perhaps the most important communication tool of totalitarianism towards the non-totalitarian world. However, the content of totalitarian propaganda is "no longer an objective issue about which people may have opinions, but has become as a real and untouchable element in their lives as the rules of arithmetic."[12] As such, it creates its own model of reality. If we want to analyse such a model, the semiotic text analysis method seems to be the most appropriate tool to use, the more so in that the anti-Semitist attitudes of the Soviet regime, whatever reasons they may have been motivated by and however fatal their consequences may have been, were never voiced explicitly. They remained hidden in a broad scale of semiotic fields in the form of signs and connotations which can be revealed by the semiotic method.

   "Although the Black Years of Soviet Jewry have generally been framed by the period 1948 to 1953, the fury of the anti-Semitic agitation and suffering were felt most sharply at the beginning and the end of the period," says historian Nora Levin.[13] The semiotic analysis therefore examines the "texts" of two propaganda campaigns occupying the public space at those two crucial moments, namely the campaign against cosmopolitism early in 1949 and the campaign accompanying the so-called Doctors' Plot, which took place four years later.[14]

The Campaign against Cosmopolitism

The campaign against cosmopolitism burst out in January 1949 just at the time when the Soviet authorities started suppressing Jewish cultural and social life and arresting Jewish intelligentsia. The campaign thus served as a decoy diverting

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12   *Ibid.*, pp. 500 and 476.
13   LEVIN, N.: *The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917*, Vol. 1, p. 512.
14   The source base of the analysis consists of Soviet central periodicals which had the largest audience of readers, were the best mirror reflecting the atmosphere among the highest echelons of the Soviet power elite, and were not burdened with potential regional specifics. To this end, excerpts were made from the *Pravda* daily which, as the central press body/institution of the All-Union Communist Party (the Bolsheviks) and later of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, set the principal propaganda line, and the *Kultura i zhizn* fortnightly, the propaganda trend-setting press body of the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (the Bolsheviks)/Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In addition, key periodicals in the field of culture and arts, namely the *Sovetskoe iskusstvo* weekly and the *Literaturnaya gazeta* semi-weekly were excerpted for the purpose of analysing the campaign against cosmopolitism. Pictorial representations of the campaign are exemplified in the production of the satirical magazine *Krokodil*. The basic body of sources is selectively complemented by texts from some other central periodicals, e.g. *Izvestia* or *Komsomolskaya pravda*.

attention away from a repressive action which made its way into Soviet history as the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.[15]

The campaign was rooted in the conflict between two culture-bureaucratic structures – the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (the Bolsheviks), known as Agitprop, and the Union of Soviet Writers – over influence in the cultural policy. It was triggered by a dispute about dramatic art. The Agitprop, led by Dmitry Shepilov, provided protection and support to Moscow theatrical critics who thus had some degree of organisational and creative autonomy vis-à-vis the organisation of writers. On the other hand, the Union of Soviet Writers led by Alexander Fadeyev eluded, thanks to Stalin's favour, the Agitprop's direct control. From his position of power, Fadeyev supported Soviet playwrights whose poor-quality dramatic products were targets of caustic reviews by theatrical critics, whose high aesthetic requirements concerning the form and substance of plays were in sharp contrast with the art canon required at that time. Open conflict between the two groups broke out during the 12th Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in December 1948. While the Agitprop was preparing to accuse Fadeyev of a serious failure in the field of dramatic arts and to replace him by the more liberal Konstantin Simonov, the Chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers, shielded by the support of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Georgy Malenkov, and with the sympathy of Stalin himself, delivered a sharp speech targeting the alleged ideological subversive activities of theatrical critics. That set the campaign wheels in motion. Spreading in concentric circles, the campaign subsequently spread to other regions and disciplines, particularly in science and the arts. It targeted the ranks of humanistic intellectuals and thus followed the line set by the so-called *Zhdanovshchina* in an attempt to pacify more liberally oriented circles in the ideological machine and to strengthen the ideological monolithism of cultural and intellectual life. However, the campaign against cosmopolitism was the first-ever campaign of its kind with an anti-Semitist undertone and, although not primarily anti-Jewish, the broad public soon started perceiving the word "cosmopolitan" as a synonym for the word "Jew," as shown by a period adage: "If you do not want to be known as an anti-Semite, call the Jew a cosmopolitan."[16]

The whole campaign was launched by an article entitled "On One Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics" and published by the *Pravda* daily on 28 January 1949.

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15   Refer also, for example, to GRÜNER, F.: *Patrioten und Kosmopoliten* – see Footnote 2; KO-STYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Taynaya politika Stalina* – see Footnote 2; IDEM: *Stalin protiv "kosmo-politov": Vlast i evreyskaya intelligentsiya v SSSR* [Stalin against the "Cosmopolitans": Power and Jewish Intelligentsia in the USSR]. Moskva, Rosspen 2009; NADZHAFOV, Dzhakhan-gir Gusein – BELOUSOVA, Zinaida Sergeyevna (ed.): *Stalin i kosmopolitizm: Dokumenty Agitpropa CK KPSS 1945–1953* [Stalin and Cosmopolitism: Documents of Agitprop of the Central Committee of CPSU 1945–1953]. Moskva, Mezhdunarodny fond "Demokratiya" – Materik 2005.

16   "Chtob ne proslyt antisemitom, zovi zhida kosmopolitom." Quoted according to: KO-STYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Taynaya politika Stalina,* p. 310.

Its author was the paper's editor-in-chief Pyotr N. Pospelov. However, period tes-
timonies indicate that Stalin himself stepped in and emended the text, allegedly
also changing the title of the article: instead of the somewhat abstract "Lackeys of
Bourgeois Aestheticism" which, while hinting at a class aspect, did not step outside
the realm of disputes in the arts and sciences, Stalin inserted into the title a phrase
which made the seemingly trifle affair of alleged ideological subversion of a few
theatrical critics a nationwide affair – "the Anti-Patriotic Group."[17]

These very words contained the fundamental semiotic principles of the whole
future campaign. The term "group" denotes several individuals joined by a com-
mon characteristic feature which distinguishes them from the rest of society. An
extraneous and alien element thus appears in the seemingly monolithic Soviet
society, which disturbs its proclaimed homogeneity. At the same time, the element
is labelled "anti-patriotic," i.e. explicitly hostile. Moreover, the term "group" also
implies a certain degree of organisation. "The cosmopolitan critics congregated in
the anti-patriotic group and were supporting, praising and commending each other
in their hostile activities," wrote the *Literaturnaya gazeta*, pointing at close ties
among the actors.[18] The activities of the "cosmopolitans" thus were not perceived
as the errors and mistakes of individuals, but rather as a long-term opinion and
value system of a group of people which was not only alien, but downright hostile
and dangerous to the rest of society: "These are not just random and occasional
mistakes, but a system of anti-patriotic opinions which harm the development of our
literature and arts and must be crushed," proclaimed *Pravda*.[19] The Soviet propa-
ganda thus created a figure of the collective enemy, defined solely on the basis of
ideological criteria, i.e. a new form of the "objective enemy" as defined by Arendt.

Patriotism and Cosmopolitism
The term "anti-patriotic group" also indicated the content of the basic dichotomy
forming the image of the "enemy." The "*us/our*" side was represented by the "*nation/
people*" and all things *Soviet*. The first paragraph of the above mentioned *Pravda*
article only contains four instances of the "nation/people" noun and even 10 in-
stances of the "Soviet" adjective. The basic value of the model world outlined in the
article is built around these two notions, i.e. around *Soviet patriotism*. Its meaning
resonates with the love for, pride in, and dedication to the Soviet motherland and
its people. The term, considerably hypertrophied and made pathetic by the use of

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17   See KOSTYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Stalin protiv "kosmopolitov,"* p. 130.
18   Za patrioticheskuyu sovetskuyu dramaturgiyu: Na obshchemoskovskom sobranii drama-
     turgov i teatralnykh kritikov [For the Patriotic Soviet Dramatic Art: At the All-Moscow
     Meeting of Dramaturges and Theatrical Critics]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 17 (2504),
     26 February1949. The number in brackets denotes the issue, counted from the first num-
     ber; no volumes were given.
19   Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov [On One Anti-Patriotic Group of
     Theatrical Critics]. In: *Pravda*, 28 January 1949.

emotional vocabulary, was referred to as "holy/sacred" during the campaign, and the sacralisation made it utterly unquestionable.[20]

The second part of the dichotomy, the antithesis of Soviet patriotism, is represented by *cosmopolitism*. In the early Soviet period, the term had been occasionally used to describe a vision of the future world rid of state frontiers and ethnic differences in favour of a homogeneous human community, but it acquired its stable place in the Soviet ideological and propaganda canon only during the campaign.

However, "patriotism" and "cosmopolitism" are not perceived as two equal entities with opposite value signs. The semantic field of the latter is built solely by a reference to the absence of values carried by "patriotism." A "cosmopolitan" is characterised as an individual who has lost the "awareness of Soviet patriotism," as someone "who does not have the sense of national pride."[21] As cosmopolitism lacks the values typical of "patriotism," it is regarded as anti-patriotic, anti-popular, and even worse – renegade, i.e. deprived of the motherland. It thus represents a negation of "patriotism" rather than its opposite. "Patriotism" is therefore the fundamental, dominant value of which "cosmopolitism" is only a derivative. This is why it can relate to everything that is not patriotic (enough), regardless of the true state of the matter. The result is a considerably vague and potentially polysemous term which can be easily bent to suit current propaganda and ideological needs.

The Life-Giving Spring and the Deadly Poison

As convincingly demonstrated by Vladimír Macura, socialist myth production was concentrated around the Utopian vision of a future paradise. In this respect, the scientific socialism project with its conspicuous sacral and chiliastic features remained firmly rooted in the framework of Utopian socialism.[22] Death was not compatible with this paradise concept and was being forced out: "Death tended to be semiotically pushed out of the world of socialism and associated with the alien, hostile world beyond the boundaries of Eden."[23] Within the socialist world, death used to be connected with enemies of the society.

The opposition of "Soviet patriotism" and "cosmopolitism" was also absolutised in the form of an archetypal battle between the new (young) and the old, thus fulfilling the essential mythical scheme of life and death. The sign field of "Soviet patriotism" was built from a semantic series referring to youth, health, strength and fertility – "life-giving energy," "life-giving spring" which "fertilises and inspires"

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20   See SUROV, A.: Estetstvuyushchie klevetniki [Aestheticising Gossipers]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 19 (2506), 5 March 1949.

21   Ob odnoy antipatriticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov; GERASIMOV, A.: Za sovetskiy patriotizm v iskusstve [For Soviet Patriotism in Arts]. In: *Pravda*, 10 February 1949; GRIBACHEV, N.: Protiv kosmopolitizma i formalizma v poezii [Against Cosmopolitism and Formalism in Poetry]. In: *Ibid.*, 16 February 1949.

22   Ráj [The Paradise]. In: MACURA, V.: *Šťastný věk (a jiné studie o socialistické kultuře)*, pp. 14–35 – see Footnote 4.

23   Smrt vůdce [The Death of a Leader]. In: *Ibid.*, p. 121.

and which is the "source of all creative activities."[24] One of the fundamental features of "patriotism" is therefore its progressive nature, advancement, continuous movement forward to the future paradise. Its semiotic field is thus built around a sign field of life.

"Cosmopolitism," on the other hand, is firmly rooted in the past, and its very nature renders any progress impossible: it "attempts to trample down everything that is new and progressive"; "hampers the evolution"; and "inhibits the glorious advance."[25] Its sign field consists of a semantic series referring to sterility, ailments and death. "Cosmopolitism is not just anti-popular, but also sterile," wrote *Pravda* in the opening article of the campaign, thereby condemning it to a step-by-step extinction.[26] *Literaturnaya gazeta* even denied it the right to life entirely, proclaiming it a "stillborn concept."[27] The campaign often pictured "cosmopolitism" as a representative of death using images of decay, rot and decomposition. The "cosmopolitans" were bred on "putrefying yeast cells of bourgeois cosmopolitism, decadence and formalism," their articles "give off a putrid stench" and propagate "putrescent microbes of cosmopolitism."[28] This semantic series culminates in the image of the "cosmopolitan" as a "zombie": "The Soviet people call Altmans zombies. Let us purify the atmosphere of Soviet art from their foul stench."[29]

The substance of "cosmopolitism" is putrid and toxic; it is a "malignant" and "deadly" poison.[30] It is a contagious disease threatening the healthy world of

24 Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov; GERASIMOV, A.: Za sovetskiy patriotizm v iskusstve; Lyubov k rodine, nenavist k kosmopolitam [For Soviet Patriotism in Arts; Love for the Motherland, Hatred of Cosmopolitans]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 13 (2500), 12 February 1949.

25 Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov; SOFRONOV, A.: Protiv anti-patrioticheskoy kritiki [Against Anti-Patriotic Criticism]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 13 (2500), 12 February 1949; KOVALČUK, J.: Bezrodnye kosmopolity [Homeless Cosmopolitans]. In: *Ibid.*

26 Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov.

27 ELISTRATOVA, A.: Predateli narodov [Traitors of Nations]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 18 (2505), 2 March 1949.

28 Do konca razgromit antipatrioticheskuyu gruppu teatralnykh kritikov: Na partiynom so-branii Soyuza sovetskikh pisateley [Crush the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics for Good: At a Party Meeting of the Union of Soviet Writers]. In: *Kultura i zhizn*, No. 4 (96), 11 February 1949; Kosmopolity v kinokritike i ikh pokroviteli [Cosmopolitans among Cinema Critics and Their Sponsors]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 14 (2501), 16 February 1949; Do konca razoblachit kritikov kosmopolitov: Na sobranii leningradskikh dramaturgov i kritikov [Unmask the Cosmopolitan Critics in Full: At a Meeting of Leningrad Dramaturges and Critics]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 19 (2506), 5 March 1949; ELISTRATOVA, A.: Predateli narodov.

29 GURKO, G.: Burzhuazny nacionalist Altman [Bourgeois Nationalist Altman]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 8 (1148), 19 February 1949; MARKOV, S.: Zhivye trupy: Pismo chitatelya [The Living Dead: A Letter from Our Reader]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 13 (2500), 12 February 1949.

30 Do konca razoblachit kritikov kosmopolitov; Vyshe znamya sovetskogo patriotizma: Na partiynom sobranii Soyuza sovetskikh pisateley [Unmask the Cosmopolitan Critics in Full; The High Flag of Soviet Patriotism: At a Party Meeting of the Union of Soviet Writers]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 13 (2500), 12 February 1949.

"patriotism." As the carriers of the contagion, the "cosmopolitans" take on the appearance of various "worms gnawing on the healthy organism of Soviet literature and art," "parasites," "poisonous bacteria" or "toxic microbes attempting to poison the clear springs of Soviet literature."[31] They threaten especially the youth as the fundamental cornerstone of the Utopian future: "poison young people with their putrescent opinions," "trample down fresh and young offshoots of Soviet dramatic art," "poison young literary cadres with their deathly venom."[32] All this is just a short step from designating "cosmopolitism" a biological weapon "in the Cold War waged by international imperialist reactionary forces against the whole progressive humankind."[33]

The opposition of "Soviet patriotism" and "cosmopolitism" was thus being built using signs referring to biological discourse and also to the closely related medicinal discourse. It was through these discourses that "cosmopolitism" as a representative of ailments and death, was being forced outside the boundaries of the healthy world of "patriotism." In the above outlined sign system, the removal of "cosmopolitism" from the Soviet body is similar to removing a malignant tumour from an otherwise healthy organism. "We feel our chest straightening up and we ardently wish to work even better," was how the *Pravda* daily described the physiological symptoms of healing after exposure to "cosmopolitism."[34]

The Victorious Battle and the Crushing Defeat
The campaign against "cosmopolitism" was a part of the never-ending fight for the accomplishment of the socialist Utopian ideal, which was another cornerstone of socialist myth production. The very titles of propaganda articles were styled as slogans inviting to battle: "Crush the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics for Good"; "Sweep Cosmopolitism Off the Road."[35] The warlike discourse is also reflected in the language of the campaign which makes ample use of military terms. The "cosmopolitans" are presented as aggressors, "a subversive group on the ideological front," who "entrenched themselves in fusty commissions," "took positions from which they could comfortably start bombarding works of Soviet dramatic art," "are going to battle" against prominent works of Soviet literature and "attack them furiously."[36] As the campaign targeted especially the field of arts, the fighting took place mainly on the "cultural front" and the weapons used were aesthetic.

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31 Do konca razoblachit kritikov kosmopolitov: Na sobranii moskovskich dramaturgov i kritikov [Unmask the Cosmopolitan Critics in Full: At a Meeting of Moscow Dramaturges and Critics]. In: *Pravda*, 26–27 February 1949; Kosmopolity v kinokritike i ikh pokroviteli; ELISTRATOVA, A.: Predateli narodov.

32 Do konca razoblachit kritikov kosmopolitov; Vyshe znamya sovetskogo patriotizma.

33 ELISTRATOVA, A.: Predateli narodov.

34 Do konca razoblachit kosmopolitov-antipatriotov.

35 Do konca razgromit antipatrioticheskuyu gruppu teatralnykh kritikov.

36 LEONIDOV, Oleg: Vrag sovetskoy kultury Gurvich [Gurvich, the Enemy of Soviet Culture]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 9 (1149), 26 February 1949; Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov; Reshitelno pokonchit s politicheskoy bezotvetstvennostyu

The fight against "cosmopolitism" was being waged in the name of Soviet patriotic art, as indicated by article titles starting with the preposition "for" and a noun: "For the Patriotic Soviet Dramatic Art," "For the Native Soviet Art," etc.[37] However, only art complying with the canon of Socialist Realism, allegedly the only art style faithfully reflecting Soviet reality, was deemed patriotic. The perception of Socialist Realism as a reflection of Soviet reality is in sharp contrast to the concept of "cosmopolitism" as an art lacking any ideas, existing only for art itself, aestheticism and formalism, isolated from people and their interests. "Socialist Realism is indivisible from the live, keen and loving interest in life and activities of people, from the deep and noble patriotic feeling, while the bourgeois gung-ho cosmopolitism implies an indifferent and emotionless attitude to people and their creations, with a stolid, neutered and cold aestheticism and formalism."[38] The art of the "cosmopolitans" is thus anti-popular and anti-patriotic, and hence perceived as hostile. The art which is reproached for not being ideological and political thus becomes political. Consequently, the conflict taking place in the field of aesthetics acquires a significant political dimension. In this context, art criticism inevitably becomes a hostile activity undermining the foundations of the political system, an "ideological subversion" which all the society must be mobilised against. As early as 26 February, the *Sovetskoe iskusstvo* magazine reported that the victorious battle against the anti-patriotic group of theatrical critics was being waged by all Soviet people.[39] The "cosmopolitans" will be inevitably "uncovered," "crushed" and "liquidated." They will be treated like a war enemy: "Between two lines of trenches, they were crawling toward us like enemy spies and subversives. Shoot them – it is our patriotic duty!"[40] The battle waged by the "cosmopolitans" is thus futile, "doomed to a crushing defeat."[41] On the other hand, "patriotism" is predestined for victory, thus assuming its rightful place in the Pantheon of Soviet values.

The aestheticisation of the fight between "patriotism" and "cosmopolitism" was also reflected in the selection of weapons of war. The "cosmopolitans" fight with a pen and (poisoned) ink, their texts are viewed as a weapon. The cover page of the satirical magazine *Krokodil* of 20 March 1949 thus bore a caricature named "The Illegal Tramp."[42] The obese figure of a "cosmopolitan" with pronounced stereotypical Semitic facial features is leaning on a cane looking like a sharp ink

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v rabote VTO [To Decisively Deal with the Political Irresponsibility in the Work of VTO]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 6 (1146), 5 February 1949; Kritika vrazhdebnaya narodu: Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov [Hateful Criticism of the Nation: On One Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics]. In: *Ibid.*

37 Za patrioticheskuyu sovetskuyu dramaturgiyu – see Footnote 19; PIREV, A.: Za rodnoe sovetskoe iskusstvo [For the Native Soviet Art]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 18 (2505), 2 March 1949.

38 Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov – see Footnote 20.

39 Do konca razgromit antipatrioticheskuyu gruppu teatralnykh kritikov – see Footnote 29.

40 Lyubov k rodine, nenavist k kosmopolitam – see Footnote 25.

41 Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov.

42 ELISEEVA, K.: Bespachportny brodjaga [The Illegal Tramp]. In: *Krokodil*, No. 8, 20 March 1949.

pen; there is another pen hanging dagger-like at his belt together with bottles of poisoned ink. Papers titled "Slander," "Slandering of Soviet Culture," "Slandering of Soviet Art" stick out from his luggage. In the centre of the suitcase, which is symptomatically adorned with stickers bearing the names of Western writers, is the inscription "André Gide"; it must be noted that the Cyrillic transcription of the writer's name is the same as the derogatory term used to denote individuals of Jewish descent ("жид").[43] As a semiotic sign, the literary reference thus carries a significantly anti-Jewish undertone.

Semiotic Field of the Image of the "Cosmopolitan" as an "Enemy"
As shown above, the significance and meaning of "cosmopolitism" was derived directly from the semiotic field of "patriotism." The result was a fairly vague notion well serving as an all-purpose propaganda tool. The image of the "cosmopolitan" as an "enemy" thus could be built using signs referring to a variety of ideological, political and social deviations. A good example is a series of profiles of Moscow theatrical critics published in the *Sovetskoe iskusstvo* magazine. A simple shortcut assigns a serious ideological, political or social heresy to each of them: "Spineless Borshchagovsky," "Bourgeois Ideologue Boyadzhiev," "Bourgeois Nationalist Altman," "Gurvich, the Enemy of Soviet Culture," "Aestheticising Anti-Patriot Varshavsky," "Political Chameleon Kholodov (Meyerovich)."[44] The *Literaturnaya gazeta* magazine continued to uncover pseudonyms of the critics, noting that the original name of Yakovlev is Kholcman, that of Sanov – Smulson, that of Martich – Finkelshtein, that of Zhadnov – Lifshic, etc., and thus informing its readers about their Jewish origin.[45] However, the campaign not only claimed many Jewish victims,[46] but also

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43   The neutral Russian term denoting persons of Jewish descent or religion is "evrey" (еврей). The term "zhid" ("жид") is heavily symptomatic.

44   GLEBOV, A.: Dvurushnik Borshchagovsky [Spineless Borshchagovsky]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 6 (1146), 5 February 1949; KOVALCHUK, J.: Burzhuazny ideolog Boyadzhiev [Bourgeois Ideologue Boyadzhiev]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 7 (1147), 12 February 1949; GURKO, G.: Burzhuazny nacionalist Altman [Bourgeois Nationalist Altman]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 8 (1148), 19 February 1949; LEONIDOV, Oleg: Vrag sovetskoy kultury Gurvich [Gurvich, the Enemy of Soviet Culture]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 9 (1149), 26 February 1949; GROMOV, N.: Estetstvuyushchy antipatriot Varshavsky [Aestheticising Anti-Patriot Varshavsky]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 11 (1151), 12 March 1949; MARKOV, M.: Politichesky khameleon Cholodov (Meyerovich) [Political Chameleon Cholodov (Meyerovich)]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 12 (1152), 19 March 1949.

45   KOVALCHUK, J.: Bezrodnye kosmopolity [Homeless Cosmopolitans]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 13 (2500), 12 February 1949; SOFRONOV, A.: Protiv antipatrioticheskoy kritiki [Against Anti-Patriotic Criticism]. In: *Ibid.*; Do konca razoblachit kosmopolitov-antipatriotov: Na plenume pravleniya SSP Ukrainy [Unmask the Cosmopolitans-Anti-Patriots in Full: At the Plenary Meeting of the Leadership of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 20 (2507), 9 March 1949; Reshitelno razoblachit proiski burzhuaznykh estetov [Decisively Unmask the Scheming of Bourgeois Aestheticians]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 17 (2504), 26 February 1949; Raschistit dorogu peredovomu iskusstvu Ukrainy [Clear the Road for the Progressive Art of Ukraine]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 11 (1151), 12 March 1949.

46   According to Benjamin Pinkus, up to 71 percent of intellectuals accused of cosmopolitism were of Jewish descent (refer also to PINKUS, Benjamin: *The Soviet Government and*

intentionally accentuated their Jewish origin. The contrast between Russian artists and critics with non-Russian names is also amplified by references to the fact that the latter even were not Russians, do not identify themselves with Russia, and hate everything Russian. On 28 January, for example, the *Pravda* daily asked the rhetorical question what kind of idea Abram Gurvich could have about the national character of the Soviet Russian, while *Literaturnaya gazeta* added that he had "only ridiculed the history of the Russian nation, the character of the Russian man, Russia herself."[47] Ilya Altman, according to Soviet propaganda, "hates everything that is Russian," while Iosif Yuzovsky "does not want to know the Russian language, the Russian nation, Russian culture."[48] Moreover, they "even do not know how to write in Russian" and speak a language which "sounds barbaric and strange to the Russian reader."[49]

The image of the "cosmopolitan" thus soon started to be fleshed out with anti-Jewish content in order to augment its alien and hostile sign character. However, the anti-Jewish orientation is also detectable in other layers of the campaign's texts which revive some deeply ingrained traditional prejudices and stereotypes.

1. A Bunch of Literary Gangsters. Anti-Social Signs of the Image of a Cosmopolitan
One important semantic field used to build the image of the "cosmopolitan" as an "enemy" consists of anti-social characteristics. The propaganda assigned a number of negative qualities to the "cosmopolitans," using them to demonstrate their problematic human character. A "cosmopolitan" is an individual with the "black soul of a traitor," "with no character," "unscrupulous and insincere," "a perfidious slanderer."[50] Even his looks – "repugnant physiognomy of a spineless liar" – are as disgusting as his character.[51] The "cosmopolitan" is "giggling nauseatingly," "bragging," "hissing and sputtering," "shaking in a bout of helpless rage."[52] The "cosmopolitans"

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　　　the Jews: 1948–1967. A Documented Study*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1984, p. 160).

47　Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov – see Footnote 20; Za patrioticheskuyu sovetskuyu dramaturgiyu – see Footnote 19.

48　GURKO, G.: Burzhuazny nacionalist Altman; Do konca razoblachit kritikov kosmopolitov – see Footnote 29; PAPERNY, Z.: Sushchestvo bezdushnoye [A Heartless Creature]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 14 (2501), 16 February 1949.

49　Do konca razoblachit kritikov kosmopolitov.

50　GURKO, G.: Burzhuazny nacionalist Altman; MARKOV, M.: Politichesky khameleon Cholodov (Meyerovich); LEONIDOV, O.: Vrag sovetskoy kultury Gurvich.

51　Do konca razoblachit kosmopolitov-antipatriotov – see Footnote 32.

52　Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov; Lyubov k rodine, nenavist k kosmopolitam – see Footnote 25; GLEBOV, A.: Dvurushnik Borshchagovsky; DRUZIN, V.: Prikhvostni antipatrioticheskoy gruppy teatralnykh kritikov [Lackeys of the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 7 (1147), 12 February 1949; Kritika vrazhdebnaya narodu – see Footnote 37.

blackmail, threaten, intimidate and slander, they are a "bunch of literary gangsters."[53] The cosmopolitan's image is intentionally ridiculed and caricatured.

Their hypocritical mind-set is highlighted using the semiotic principle of masking and unmasking: "The yuzovskys, gurvichs, altmans and their lackeys are unmasked and they are standing in front of us, allowing us to see their repugnant faces in their entirety," trumpeted *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*.[54] "Cosmopolitans" are often labelled as "turncoats" or "chameleons," i.e. men of many faces which he changed frequently and easily, depending on the situation. The principle of unmasking is also applied in the language of the campaign– in uncovering the "hostile" meaning of seemingly innocent statements of critics who "can skillfully camouflage their hostile opinions in a deafening flow of demagogic clichés."[55]

The most significant of these anti-social signs connoting the anti-Jewish orientation of the campaign is cowardice. "People know what these Zalkinds and Libermans were doing in the rear and on the frontline," a certain L. Kraskova wrote to Andrei Zhdanov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the chief authority in the area of culture in August 1948, complaining about the prevalence of Jews in the editorial board and among contributors of the literary magazine *Novyi mir*.[56] She thus intentionally played the card of the deeply ingrained stereotype of Jews dodging active military service and hiding in the rear during WWII, a stereotype which was supported by the official downplaying of the merits of Jewish soldiers in combat operations of the Red Army or by the Soviet policy of "silence about the Holocaust." The above stereotype was still very much alive in Soviet society after the war, the more so in that the entire postwar Soviet ideological and propaganda discourse was built around the suffering and heroism of the Soviet people and their victory in the war. It is therefore hardly surprising that Soviet propaganda pulled it out of mothballs during the campaign against "cosmopolitism" and used it as one of the typical characteristics of the image of the "cosmopolitan," thus accentuating its anti-Jewish content. The campaign also alleges that the "cosmopolitans" distance themselves from war experiences, do not show enough understanding for the heroism of Soviet people, and ignore the sacrifices they made. The theatrical critic Abram S. Gurvich, for example, was labelled a man who "does not respect Soviet people and their valiant fight against the Hitlerites, our immortal heroes and the ideas of Bolshevism that kept workers

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53 Za patrioticheskuyu sovetskuyu dramaturgiu – see Footnote 19; ROMASHOV, B.: O kornyach kosmopolitizma i estetstva [On the Roots of Cosmopolitism and Aestheticism]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 18 (2505), 2 March 1949.

54 NIKOLAEV, V.: Razoblachenny klevetnik Malyugin [Unmasked Slanderer Malyugin]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 10 (1150), 5 March 1949.

55 MARKOV, M.: Politichesky khameleon Cholodov (Meyerovich).

56 Pismo L. Kraskovoy A. A. Zhdanovu: Protiv zasiya evreev v pechati [A Letter of L. Kraskova to A. A. Zhdanov: Against the Prevalence of Jews in the Press]. In: NADZHAFOV, D. G. – BELOUSOVA, Z. S. (ed.): *Stalin i kosmopolitizm*, p. 185 – see Footnote 16.

and soldiers of the Soviet Union alive during the cruel war years"[57] because of his criticism of dramatic works on war topics.

The anti-social sign system naturally included a class aspect. Theatrical critics were labelled "a group of aestheticising snobs with bourgeois opinions," "rotten bourgeois aestheticians," or "petty bourgeois formalists."[58] The propaganda described, in colourful terms, their alleged bourgeois background – large offices with heavy drapes, plush armchairs and tall wall clocks.[59] In political caricatures, the "cosmopolitans" were depicted with some typical attributes indicating their non-worker extraction, such as tailcoats, varnished shoes, top hats, pince-nez glasses or canes. It also activated yet another deeply rooted stereotype, that of Jews not working manually, but enriching themselves at the expense of others, a stereotype based on the traditional socio-economic role of Jews in "non-productive professions." At a Party meeting, Deputy Secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers Anatoly V. Sofronov referred to the group of theatrical critics in terms such as "hagglers" or "brazen brokers."[60] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, on the other hand, became inflamed over "hoarders," "cheats" and "layabouts" whose characteristics include the "mange of the past" and an "aversion to work."[61] The optics of this stereotype also indicate why the campaign against cosmopolitism was largely focused on critics and theoreticians, i.e. humanist intellectuals not producing their own creations, but analysing those of others.

2. Bootlickers and Spies. Anti-Western Signs of the Image of a Cosmopolitan

The campaign against "cosmopolitism" also had a significant and escalating anti-Western orientation. While the opening article in the *Pravda* daily did not mention any pro-Western opinions of the theatrical critics, *Literaturnaya gazeta* characterised "cosmopolitism" as a "lackeyish bowing to the bourgeois culture of the West" just one day later, pillorying, in particular, the critics' efforts to look for parallels between Russian and the global cultures: "Giggling maliciously, the cosmopolitan tries to 'uncover,' at all costs, a 'parallel,' any sign of similarity between the phenomena of Russian culture and that of the West, perfidiously attempting to prove

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57 LEONIDOV, O.: Vrag sovetskoy kultury Gurvich – see Footnote 45; POGODIN, N.: Ich metody [Their Methods]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 18 (2505), 2 March 1949.

58 Ob odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnykh kritikov – see Footnote 20; Reshitelno pokonchit s politicheskoy bezotvetstvennostyu v rabote VTO – see Footnote 37; GLEBOV, A.: Dvurushnik Borshchagovsky – see Footnote 45; Na chuzhdykh pozitsiyakh: O proiskakh antipatrioticheskoy gruppy teatralnykh kritikov [On Alien Positions: On the Scheming of the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics]. In: *Kultura i zhizn*, No. 3 (95), 30 January 1949.

59 LENČ, Leonid: Sluchai s kosmopolitom [An Incident with a Cosmopolitan]. In: *Krokodil*, No. 7, 10 March 1949; MASS, Vladimir – CHERVINSKY, Mikhail: Snob-kosmopolit [Snob-Cosmopolitan]. In: *Ibid*.

60 Na partiynom sobranii Soveta sovetskikh pisateley [At a Party Meeting of the Council of Soviet Writers]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 7 (1147), 12 February 1949.

61 PAPERNY, Z.: Sushchestvo bezdushnoye – see Footnote 49.

that the culture of the Russian nation has been 'taken over' from the West […]."[62] The obsequious nature of their deeds is expressed in the very term "bootlicking," which implies an unequal, subservient relationship. This aspect is accentuated by the choice of lexical means. The "cosmopolitans" are not only "lackeyishly bowing," "fawning" or "toadying" to the West, but slavishly "crawl on their bellies" and "licking off soured skims."[63]

The term "cosmopolitism" thus initially connoted a preference for Western art and it aesthetic standards and norms to Socialist Realism. The campaign against "cosmopolitism" therefore became a part of the long-term fight for the national character of art (i.e. the art national in its form and socialist in its content, as postulated by Stalin), recast into a tautology "our Russian literature is strong because of being Russian."[64] Step by step, however, the nature of "cosmopolitism" is moved from the subservient "bootlicking" in the area of aesthetics to the sphere of active political activities. The motif of "cosmopolitism" as a tool of "imperialist reaction" and its principal representative – the United States – starts being developed. "Cosmopolitism" becomes a "standard of the American imperialist reaction" and reflects the "aggressive whims of American imperialism."[65] Its alleged political objective is to enslave nations of People's Democracies and lay the groundwork for the global rule of American imperialism and its capital. It is an attempt to "deprive people of their national traditions and national dignity."[66] In this respect, culture and the arts, as building elements of national traditions, are perceived as a suitable means to implement the plan. "Cosmopolitism" thus becomes a tool of "intellectual disruption," striving for the "undercutting of national roots, as people whose roots are undercut are easier to move, easier to enslave by American imperialism."[67] Aestheticians and formalists become spies, saboteurs and agents of international reactionary forces.[68]

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62 Do konca razoblachit antipatrioticheskuyu gruppu teatralnykh kritikov [Unmask the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics in Full]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 9 (2496), 29 January 1949.

63 DEMENTEV, A. – CHIRSKOV, V. – SHUVALOVA, M.: Podgoloski estetstvuyushchikh kosmopolitov [Yes-Men among Aestheticising Cosmopolitans]. In: *Kultura i zhizn*, No. 4 (96), 11 February 1949; Lyubov k rodine, nenavist k kosmopolitam – see Footnote 25; GURKO, G.: Burzhuazny nacionalist Altman – see Footnote 45; SIMONOV, Konstantin: Teoria i praktika kosmopolitov v kinokritike [Theory and Practice in Cinema Criticism]. In: *Sovetskoye iskusstvo*, No. 10 (1150), 5 March 1949; Bezrodnye kosmopolity; Ob antipatrioticheskoy gruppe taatralnykh kritikov [On the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatrical Critics]. In: *Izvestia*, 10 February 1949; ROMASHOV, B.: O kornyakh kosmopolitizma i estetstva.

64 SIMONOV, K.: Teoria i praktika kosmopolitov v kinokritike.

65 Razgromit burzhuaznuyu agenturu v kinoiskusstve: Na sobranii aktiva tvorcheskikh rabotnikov sovetskoj kinematografii [To Destroy the Bourgeois Agency in Cinema Art: At a Meeting of Creative Workers of the Soviet Cinematography]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 10 (1150), 5 March 1949; SIMONOV, K.: Teoria i praktika kosmopolitov v kinokritike.

66 Za patrioticheskuyu sovetskuyu dramaturgiyu – see Footnote 19.

67 *Ibid*.

68 MITIN, M.: Protiv antimarksistskikh kosmopoliticheskikh "teoriy" v filosofii [Against Anti-Marxist Cosmopolitan "Theories" in Philosophy]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 20 (2507),

3. The Dwarfs and the Giants. The Visualisation of the Image of a Cosmopolitan
Insignificance of "cosmopolitans" is represented by the image of a "paltry dwarf" who "gets in the way," but can be easily "swept away."[69] A typical example is the "Dwarfs and Giants" caricature printed in the satirical magazine *Krokodil.* It depicts the attacks of "cosmopolitans" against various types of Russian and Soviet art.[70] Its iconic representations[71] (depicted in light colours and were disproportionally large, distant and inaccessible for ant-like, dark-coloured, caricatured figures of "cosmopolitans" attempting to attack them from somewhere below. The message the caricature conveys can be summarised as follows: "The reader knows how all this will turn out: the giants of Russian Soviet art will stay where they are and there will be just […] an empty space left after the spiteful dwarfs-cosmopolitans." As a matter of fact, this caricature combines all the semiotic fields of the campaign.

The fact that the "cosmopolitans" come from a different social class is connoted by their attire: tailcoats, white collars, striped trousers, varnished shoes. The symptomatic attire and accessories (spectacles) also point at their significant intellectualism, which is further enhanced by an aestheticisation of their fight against Soviet art; they use pens as weapons and poisoned ink as ammunition. There is also an obvious element indicating the pro-Western orientation of the "cosmopolitans." One of them is attacking Russian classical music by a saxophone-shaped club – an emblematic musical instrument symbolising "decadent Western culture." In the "cinema" part of the caricature, one of the "cosmopolitans" is waving a cowboy hat in front of the red camera, his other hand holding a signpost to Hollywood.

This caricature is also a good example of the anti-Jewish orientation of the campaign. Its "cosmopolitans" have prominent stereotypical Semitic features, such as aquiline noses, sharp chins, long thin necks, dense and bushy eyebrows, thin or thick black hair, rachitic or obese statures. Their Jewish extraction is indicated by some other attributes, e.g. small rounded spectacles or typical hats. The "cosmopolitan" in the right bottom corner of the "theatrical" segment of the caricature resemble Leo Trotsky. Trotsky as a semiotic sign suitably combines the significance of Jewishness and political and ideological enmity. Body features of some figures are enriched with non-human elements, such as devil's hooves or donkey's ears in the "musical" segment of the caricature, which accentuate their negative semiotic role.

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9 March 1949; SYSOEV, P. – VEYMARN, B.: Protiv kosmopolitizma v iskustvoznanii [Against Cosmopolitism in Sciences of Art]. In: *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, No. 10 (1150), 5 March 1949; Za novyj rastsvet kinoiskusstva: Na aktive tvorcheskikh rabotnikov v kinematografii [For a New Flourishing of Cinema Art: At a Meeting of Creative Workers of Cinematography]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 19 (2506), 5 March 1949; Razgromit burzhuaznuyu agenturu v kinoiskusstve.

69   Do konca razoblachit kosmopolitov-antipatriotov – see Footnote 32.

70   EFIMOVA, B.: Pigmei i giganty [Dwarfs and Giants]. In: *Krokodil*, No. 7, 10 March 1949.

71   Theatre is symbolised by a drawing of a Chekhovian seagull, music by portraits of Russian classical composers, literature by a visualisation of the period poem *A Flag above the Selsovet* by Alexander Nedogonov, cinema by a statuesque figure of a filmmaker with a red camera, and graphic art by the well-known worker-and-peasant-woman sculpture.

The last, "graphic art" part of the caricature reduces "cosmopolitans" to insect-like forms, cockroaches or worms, that have retained only hypertrophied stereotypical Semitic features. In this case, the semiotic field of the image of a "cosmopolitan" is reduced to that of a "Jew."

In the next period, the anti-Western and anti-Jewish motifs merged and were significantly enhanced. The caricature "Transoceanic Vulture" may be viewed as an example of the future development.[72] A large garbage bin next to a wall across the entire width of the picture and hermetically separating the "two camps" also contains Moscow theatrical critics and their texts. A vulture, a carrion bird, is lurking for his prey behind the wall, once again accentuating the connection between "cosmopolitism" and decay and death. A top hat with an American flag is sitting on the vulture's head with prominent Semitic facial features. Hiding in his feathers, however, a dangerous feline predator is lying in wait […] In just one sign, the significances of the West, richness, Jewishness are combined, including the danger arising therefrom, which will be – in the form of American Jewish financial tycoons – dominating the campaign of the late Stalinist period.

The Doctors' Plot

On 13 January 1953, all key Soviet dailies and Soviet radio published a report by the TASS Press Agency announcing the arrest of a group of physicians with mostly non-Russian names who, instructed by Western secret services and international Zionist organisations, had made an attempt on the lives of supreme officials of the country.[73] The so-called Doctors' Plot, which represents an apogee of sorts of the Stalinist anti-Semitism, had grown out of the trial against the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.[74] The testimony of its chairman Itzik Feffer led to the arrest

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72   GANFA, Yu.: Zaokeansky stervyatnik: Moimi peryami pisali… [Transoceanic Vulture: They Used My Feathers to Write…]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 8, 20 March 1949.

73   TASS: Arest gruppy vrachey-vrediteley [Arrest of a Group of Doctors-Saboteurs]. In: *Pravda*, 13 January 1953.

74   The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee [in Russian *Evreysky antifashistsky komitet* – EAK] was established early in 1942 as a part of the structure of the state information agency Sovinformbyro with the mission to establish contacts with Jewish organisations abroad and to obtain funds for war purposes. After the war, it tried to establish itself also at home, becoming a hub of Jewish cultural-social and political activities in the Soviet Union. At the end of 1948, its leadership was accused of espionage and incitement of Jewish nationalism. On 18 July 1952, 14 of its leaders were sentenced to death and executed shortly thereafter. The liquidation of the committee in concern was accompanied by a wave of arrests among Jewish cultural intelligentsia and a suppression of Jewish national culture and civic life. (Refer, for example, to REDLICH, Shimon – ALTMAN, Ilja: *War, Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documented Study of the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR*. Luxembourg, Harwood Academic Publishers 1995; NAUMOV, Vladimir P. (ed.): *Nepravednyi sud: Posledniy stalinskiy rasstrel. Stenograma sudebnogo protsessa nad chlenami Evreyskogo antifashistskogo komiteta* [The Wrongful Trial: The Last Execution by the Firing Squad of Stalin. The Stenograph

of Yakov Etinger, professor of the elite 2nd Moscow Medical Institute of I.V. Stalin, who, having been subjected to both physical and psychical pressure, "confessed" that his intentionally wrong treatment had caused the death of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Alexander Shcherbakov in 1945. He also labelled a number of prominent physicians of Jewish extraction as "Jewish nationalists." The forced confession permitted the expansion of the case of the alleged Zionist-motivated collaboration and espionage far beyond the narrow scope of Jewish intelligentsia, thus offering a much greater power-political and ideological-propagandistic potential than the affair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which was therefore swiftly and secretly closed. The actual power background of the so-called Doctors' Plot, which was instrumented at the topmost levels of Soviet politics at the time the question of Stalin's successor was becoming increasingly topical, as well as the case's role in the last days of Stalin's life and its abrupt termination during the period of power fighting following Stalin's death remain one of the least known chapters in the history of Stalinism.[75]

Human Beasts

The campaign unleashed after the TASS announcement and triggering almost an anti-Jewish mass psychosis among Soviet citizens produced a new collective "objective enemy." The propaganda speaks about a "group" ("terrorist group of physicians"), a "gang" ("heinous gang of hired assassins"), or a "band" ("band of physicians-poisoners").[76] The plural form, "physicians," is strictly used, with some eloquent attributes: "physicians-saboteurs," "physicians-criminals," and "physicians-murderers." Their activities are organised, premeditated and planned – they were acting "intentionally," "purposefully," according to "criminal plans."[77] The image of the new enemy is built using the semiotic field of the "crime" notion, both against the life of an individual ("murderers," "poisoners," "assassins") and against the

of the Trial of the Members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee]. Moskva, Nauka 1994; REDLICH, Shimon: *Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia: The Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR, 1941–1948*. Boulder (Colorado), East European Monographs 1982.)

75 Refer, for example, to KOSTYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Taynaya politika Stalina* – see Footnote 2; IDEM (ed.): *Gosudarstvenny antisemitizm v SSSR ot nachala do kulminatsii: 1938–1953* [State-Sponsored Anti-Semitism in the USSR from the Beginning till Its Culmination: 1938–1953]. Moskva, Mezhdunarodny fond "Demokratiya" – Materik 2005; MEDVEDEV, Zhores A.: *Stalin a židovský problém: Nová analýza* [Stalin and the Jewish Problem: A New Analysis]. Brno, Stilus Press 2006; VAKSBERG, Arkady I.: *Iz ada v raj i obratno: Evreysky vopros po Leninu, Stalinu i Solzhenitsynu* [From Hell to Paradise and Back: The Jewish Question after Lenin, Stalin and Solzhenitsyn]. Moskva, Olimp 2003.

76 TASS: Arest gruppy vrachey-vrediteley; Podlye shpiony i ubiytsy pod maskoy professorov-vrachey [Perfidious Spies and Murderers Masked as Professors-Physicians]. In: *Pravda*, 13 January 1953; Shpiony i ubiytsy poymany s polichnym [Spies and Murderers Caught Red-Handed]. In: *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 13 January 1953; GORKY, A. M.: Shpiony i ubiytsy razoblacheny [Spies and Murderers Unmasked]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 6 (3035), 13 January 1953.

77 TASS: Arest gruppy vrachey-vrediteley.

state ("spies," "agents," "terrorists," "traitors"). In this particular case, however, even a crime against an individual can be interpreted as a crime against the state as its victims were exclusively prominent Soviet political and military representatives. The propaganda also claimed the physicians had been guilty of a violation of abstract moral principles, "having tarnished the honour of scientists" and "the noble and highly appreciated M.D. degree."[78] These wrongdoings are, however, not less serious: "Apart from high treason, no crime is uglier than betraying a patient's trust, no criminal is more repulsive than a murderer hiding under a white doctor's coat," was how *Pravda* summarised the hierarchy of the crimes, and *Krokodil* added that "history does not know a moral fall so deep."[79] Compared to the previous period, the image of the "enemy" is escalating.

The main dynamic impetus of the new campaign was once again a process of unmasking and uncovering the allegedly concealed true face of the physicians: "Spies and Murderers Unmasked," announced *Literaturnaya gazeta*.[80] The *Krokodil* magazine printed a caricature titled "Traces of Crimes," which presented a succinct abbreviation of the ongoing campaign pictured as an unmasking of the enemy. A white coat with a red cross emblem, a doctor's cap and a mask with stereotypical Semitic features (round spectacles, long aquiline nose, long thin goatee) are falling off a figure humiliatingly held by the collar by a disproportionally large hand – either the long arm of the law, or a worker's fist. Crawling from under the costume of a Jewish physician is an obese American gangster wearing dark spectacles and a striped suit, his bloody fingers strewing dollar coins. His traces lead to a top hat with an inscription "US and British Intelligence Service, Joint" and a dollar sign, from which several secret agents disguised by hats, dark glasses and long coats are peeking out. "State security authorities have uncovered a terrorist group of doctors-saboteurs, agents of foreign intelligence services," reads the accompanying text.[81]

Money pouring from the hands of the unmasked "enemy" was not just a symbol of links to foreign intelligence services, but also a sign of the enemy's unscrupulous venality: "hired assassins," "mercenaries," who have sold themselves for dollars and pounds. As mentioned by the *Pravda* daily, "it has been proven that all members of the terrorist group of physicians have served foreign intelligence services, had sold them their bodies and souls, and have become their hired agents."[82] As people who have "sold them their bodies and souls," the doctors cease to be human beings, losing their right to be called "humans." They then became "outcasts of the human community," "beasts disguised as humans," "heinous monsters" that "have

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78 Podlye shpiony i ubiytsy pod maskoy professorov- vrachey; GORKY, A. M.: Shpiony i ubiytsy razoblacheny.

79 CHECHETKINA, Olga: Pochta Lidii Timashuk [Letter of Lidia Timashuk]. In: *Pravda*, 20 February 1953; GRIBACHEV, Nikolay: Oshchipanny "Dzhoint" [Pluck "Dzhoint"]. In: *Krokodil*, No. 5 (1331), 20 February 1953.

80 GORKY, A. M.: Shpiony i ubiytsy razoblacheny.

81 KUKRNIKSY: Sledy prestupleniy [Traces of Crimes]. In: *Krokodil*, No. 3 (1329), 30 January 1953.

82 Podlye shpiony i ubiytsy pod maskoy professorov-vrachey.

lost their human appearance."[83] Even magic spells can thus be used against such inhuman creatures, scientific socialism or not – "let them be damned forever," "let them be cursed three times," urges the Soviet propaganda.[84]

Semiotic Field of the Image of the "Enemy"
The TASS news article can be used to derive basic semiotic fields of the campaign. It says that "most of the members of the terrorist group [only physicians with non-Russian names are listed in the brackets – author's comment] were linked to the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organisation 'Joint,' which had been established by the US intelligence service." It thus opens an anti-Jewish field stretching from traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes (non-Russian names) to anti-Zionism ("Jewish organisation"), anti-Israel attacks ("Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organisation"), and an anti-Western field ("established by the US intelligence service").

1. Judas's Gang. Traditional Anti-Jewish Stereotypes
The anti-Jewish orientation of the campaign was once again first connoted by the names of the arrested doctors. Out of nine names mentioned in the TASS article, six were non-Russian and suggesting the Jewish descent of their bearers.[85] The Jewish conspiracy stereotype was induced by their alleged links to the international Jewish organisation "Joint" and an allegation that they had been receiving their instructions via (recently executed) representatives of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee – including its chairman Solomon Michoels, who was, for the first time since his violent death exactly five years earlier, publicly labelled a "well-known Jewish bourgeois nationalist" and included among enemies of the state.[86] The Soviet propaganda thus broke the silence accompanying the liquidation of Jewish intellectuals and the trial of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, in which death sentences had been served only six months earlier. At the same time, it also highlighted the links between the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the current case of the Kremlin doctors.

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83 TASS: Arest gruppy vrachey-vrediteley; Podlye shpiony i ubiytsy pod maskoy professorov-vrachey; Shpiony i ubiytsy pod lichinoy uchennych-vrachey [Arrest of a Group of Doctors-Saboteurs; Perfidious Spies and Murderers Masked as Professors-Physicians; Spies and Murderers Posing as Scientists-Doctors]. In: *Izvestia*, 13 January 1953.
84 MITIN, M.: Sionisticheskaya agentura amerikanskogo imperializma [Zionist Agency of American Imperialism]. In: *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 24 February 1953; CHECHETKINA, Olga: Pochta Lidii Timashuk.
85 M. S. Vovsi, M. B. Kogan, B. B. Kogan, A. I. Feldman, Ya. G. Etinger and A. M. Grinshtein.
86 TASS: Arest gruppy vrachey-vrediteley. Since 1929, the actor-cum-director Solomon Michoels (1890–1948, his real name was Shloime Vovsi) had been the director of the Moscow State Jewish Theatre, and was well-known as a prominent representative of Soviet Jewish culture both at home and abroad. He was the chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee from its establishment in 1942. He was killed in January 1948 in Minsk; upon the direct orders of Stalin, his death was staged as a tragic car accident. (Refer also to KOSTYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Stalin protiv "kosmopolitov,"* pp. 153–163 – see Footnote 16.)

This time, the anti-Jewish character of the new campaign was presented much more openly and in a much more explicit way than in the case of the campaign against cosmopolitism. At deeper levels of the campaign's "texts," some traditional, historically, socio-economically and culturally conditioned stereotypes could be found, which further augmented its anti-Jewish orientation. The most significant was the stereotype of the "Jew" as a carrier of death, growing out of the archetypal xenophobic image of a stranger and closely related to the traditional stereotype of ritual murder. The stereotypical notion of the "Jew" as a carrier of death fleshes out the image of the "murderers" and "poisoners" who, according to the propaganda, robbed several prominent Soviet officials of their lives, their aim being to subvert the country, weaken its defence and arrange its military defeat. The stereotype also appears in the image of Judas which is also present in the campaign's "texts." In its "Poisoners" article, the *Krokodil* magazine refers to the arrested physicians as "Judas's Gang" and to Michoels as "a comedian who has no respect for anything and who sold his soul for 30 pieces of silver to the 'Land of the Yellow Devil.'"[87] The figure of Judas once again brings up the issue of "venality" and "corruption." In addition to that, however, the biblical simile is super-accentuated by the fact (or rather the allegation of investigators) that the doctors attempted to kill the topmost Soviet leaders, including Stalin himself, who was, within the Soviet myth a secular deity of sorts. For Soviet society, the arrested physicians were carriers of both "physical" death (causing the military defeat of the Soviet Union) and "spiritual," or "cosmic," death (the death of the Soviet deity). The stereotype of the "Jew" as a carrier of death thus acquired a universal dimension.

2. Pretenders for World Rule. Anti-Zionist Signs of the Campaign
The so-called bourgeois nationalism was one of the pillars of hostile ideologies, as it posed a direct threat to the foundations which the Soviet Union had been built on. Moreover, Zionism, also labelled Jewish bourgeois nationalism, was contrary to the official Soviet policy promoting the assimilation and de-ethnisation of Soviet Jews. "Communists' and Zionists' opinions regarding the social ideal of Jewry, their place, role and the future of its historically established and traditional self-governing bodies and religious institutions, perspectives of their nation state or their language linking all Jews of the world were radically different," was how Gennady Kostyrchenko, a respected expert on the history of the Stalinist anti-Semitism, described the attitude of the Soviet regime to Zionism.[88] Organised Zionist groups operating in the territory of the Soviet Union had therefore been liquidated as early as during the 1920s. However, the question of Zionism became topical again after WWII, as a result of international political developments in the Middle East. "The uncovering of the gang of doctors-poisoners is a blow to the international Jewish Zionist organisation," stated the *Pravda* daily on 13 January in an article accompanying the TASS announcement, thus accentuating the anti-Zionist focus of

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87 Otraviteli [The Poisoners]. In: *Krokodil*, No. 3 (1329), 30 January 1953.
88 KOSTYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Taynaya politika Stalina*, p. 61.

the campaign.[89] The latter was based mainly on a revival of the traditional global Jewish conspiracy stereotype, which had been born in the 19th century and had materialised itself in the form of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.[90]

The image of international Jewish organisations with their "bloody tentacles" reaching out not only to the Soviet Union, but also to other countries, was one of the dominant features of the campaign.[91] According to Soviet propaganda, these organisations had got under the control of American imperialists after WWII. "This movement, broadly spread all over Europe, seemed to be a fitting tool for espionage, subversion and sabotage aimed at the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies for the new pretenders for world rule."[92] Within the global Jewish conspiracy stereotype, the anti-Jewish semiotic field is thus closely linked to the anti-Western semiotic field. According to Soviet propaganda, the activities of Zionist organisations are funded under the guise of charity by American Jewish businessmen and bankers, who thus exercise, through their financial influence, political influence as well. The Zionist organisations depicted by Soviet propaganda are therefore fully dependent on the United States and fulfil their "dirtiest and most revolting orders."[93] "There is no act contemptible or infamous enough that the Zionist agents would not do to curry favour with their masters," the *Izvestia* daily wrote. They are involved in terrorist and subversive activities, "heinous provocations and adventures against the bloc of the peace-loving People's Democracies," exemplified by the activities of the arrested doctors.[94]

The key position among the Zionist organisations belong to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (the so-called Joint), which, according to the Soviet press agency TASS, was created by the US intelligence service with the aim of "espionage, terrorist and other subversive activities."[95] In the eyes of Soviet propaganda, the organisation became "the centre of international espionage and subversion," whose cadres are "recruited among anti-social elements, Trotskyists, bourgeois nationalists and various renegade cosmopolitans selling their honour, nation and country for a handful of dollars."[96] The international Jewish organisations thus dropped from the position of pretenders for world rule, which had been assigned to them by the global Jewish conspiracy stereotype, to a mere tool in the hands of a new global rule pretender.

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89 Podlye shpiony i ubiytsy pod maskoy professorov- vrachey.
90 Refer also to LAQUEUR, Walter: *Měnící se tvář antisemitismu: Od starověku do dnešních dnů* [The Changing Face of Anti-Semitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day]. Praha, Lidové noviny Publishing House 2007, p. 85 n.
91 ZHUKOV, Yu.: Teroristichesky akt v Tel-Avive i falshivaya igra pravitelej Izrailya [The Terrorist Act in Tel Aviv and the Deceitful Game of the Rulers of Israel]. In: *Pravda*, 14 February 1953.
92 MITIN, M.: Sionisticheskaya agentura amerikanskogo imperializma.
93 *Ibid.*; GRIBACHEV, N.: Oshchipanny "Dzhoint" – see Footnote 79; Otraviteli.
94 VATOLINA, L.: Izrail v planakh amerikanskikh imperialistov [Israel in the Plans of American Imperialists]. In: *Izvestia*, 24 February 1953.
95 TASS: Arest gruppy vrachey-vrediteley.
96 VATOLINA, L.: Izrail v planakh amerikanskikh imperialistov.

3. The Pack of Rabid Dogs from Tel Aviv. Anti-Israel Signs of the Campaign

The Zionist issue in the Soviet Union became topical again particularly in connection with the birth of the State of Israel. After WWII, Soviet policy toward Israel underwent many radical changes, from patronage over the new-born Jewish statehood to irreconcilable hostility when Israel started becoming a part of the sphere of influence of the United States. The foreign policy about-face culminated early in 1953. The Soviet side used the bomb explosion at the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv on 9 February as a pretext to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. The unravelling, which had hung in the air for quite some time before the incident, had a significant impact on the semiotic form of the campaign. In its official reaction published on 12 February in the Soviet media, the Soviet Union accused the official representatives of Israel of a "systematic incitement to hatred and hostility toward the Soviet Union" and called their official excuse a "deceitful game the only purpose of which is to cover the traces of the crime and to shed any responsibility for it."[97] In the following days, the intensity of anti-Israel rhetoric in the Soviet media increased significantly.

Soviet propaganda claimed that the official representatives of the State of Israel had been conducting a long-term campaign of sedition against the Soviet Union, which became "particularly violent" at the time when the group of "white-coated murderers" was uncovered in the Soviet Union. The *Pravda* daily, for example, presented the Doctors' Plot as directly related to Israel's alleged subversive activities against the Soviet Union, writing that "the pack of rabid dogs from Tel Aviv is repulsive and disgusting in its bloodthirstiness."[98] However, Soviet propaganda took great pains to picture Israel as a mere tool in the hands of American imperialism. The *Komsomolskaya pravda* daily, for example, claimed that "the real owners of Israel are powerful American financial groups." The recognition of Israel by the United States had allegedly been preceded by an agreement between Dean Acheson, then Deputy Secretary of State, and Henry Morgenthau, ex-US Secretary of the Treasury and prominent American Jewish philanthropist, according to which Israel was to unconditionally serve "the aggressive plans of American imperialism."[99] It was, as a matter of fact, US Jewish capital which, according to Soviet propaganda, had transformed Israel into a "base of American imperialism in the Middle East," a "spy centre of the United States," or a "forward operating base organising military adventures against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies."[100] Israel and its top representatives were tagged as "lackeys of American imperialists" who "obey the instructions of Washington," "act according to US orders" and "perform

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97   Nota Sovetskogo pravitelstva o prekrashenii diplomaticheskikh otnosheniy s pravitelstvom Izrailya v svyazi s vzryvom bomby na teritorii sovetskoy missii v Izraile [The Note of the Soviet Government on the Interruption of Diplomatic Relations with the Government of Israel in Connection with the Bomb Explosion in the Territory of the Soviet Mission in Israel]. In: *Pravda*, 12 February 1953.

98   Teroristichesky akt v Tel-Avive i falshivaya igra pravitelej Izrailya.

99   MITIN, M.: Sionisticheskaya agentura amerikanskogo imperializma.

100   *Ibid.*; VATOLINA, L.: Izrail v planakh amerikanskikh imperialistov.

the most provocative tasks of warmongers."[101] From the viewpoint of Soviet propaganda, Israel lost its sovereignty, which the Soviet Union had promoted so much only a short time earlier, and became a mere puppet in the hands of American imperialism and American Jewish capital.

4. The Cannibals Hiding in the Caves of Wall Street. Anti-Western Signs of the Campaign

Compared to the campaign against "cosmopolitism," the anti-Western semiotic field had an overwhelmingly dominant role in the campaign accompanying the so-called Doctors' Plot. The anti-Western, and especially anti-American, semiotic field was built using mainly signs referring to a war discourse, with the United States posing as aggressors and architects of a new war conflict, as "predators committing heinous crimes, organising one provocation after another, and inciting war hysteria," as "warmongers" feverishly striving "to ignite the fire of a new world war," and therefore "step up the arms race, build new military bases, nailing together aggressive blocs."[102] Their objective is nothing less than the establishment of their rule over the whole world; American imperialism is "obsessed with deranged plans for the conquest of the world."[103] This plan, however, can only be implemented through the liquidation of the Soviet Bloc, "the camp of peace and democracy."[104] This is why the United States and its henchmen are organising subversive actions against these countries. "The tentacles of these hydras have often reached out across oceans and seas to our borders," is the dramatic metaphor used by the *Krokodil* magazine by way of description, while the *Pravda* daily somewhat more soberly stated that "threads of all conspiracies against the state uncovered in countries of the democratic camp in the last few years lead to the leaders of the US-British aggressive bloc."[105]

The propaganda thus ascribed the "Doctors' Plot" and some other "conspiracies against the state" uncovered in the Soviet Bloc countries to the direct subversive activities of the United States, referring in this respect to the enactment of the US federal Mutual Security Act of October 1951, which it interpreted as an allocation of funds for these purposes. "These funds were used to buy various traitors without conscience or honour, including the now unmasked group of white-coated

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101　MITIN, M.: Sionisticheskaya agentura amerikanskogo imperializma; VATOLINA, L.: Izrail v planakh amerikanskikh imperialistov.

102　*Ibid.*; Vyshe revolyutsionnuyu bditelnost: K 15-letiyu staťyi I. V. Stalina. Otvet t-shchu Ivanovu Ivanu Filipovichu [For Higher Revolutionary Vigilance: On the 15th Anniversary of the Article by I. V. Stalin. Reply to C-de Ivanov, Ivan Filipovich]. In: *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 12 February 1953.

103　GORKY, A. M.: Shpiony i ubiytsy razoblacheny – see Footnote 76.

104　MITIN, M.: Sionisticheskaya agentura amerikanskogo imperializma.

105　Otraviteli – see Footnote 87; Svobodnye narody povyshayut bditelnost [Free Nations Increase Their Vigilance]. In: *Pravda*, 27 February 1953.

murderers," wrote, for example, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, and other papers basically followed suit.[106]

However, how did the Soviet Union intend to defend itself against these subversive actions? A "high level of political vigilance" was deemed to be the only truly functional tool in the fight against the "enemy."[107] The campaign thus not only unmasked the "enemy," but, unlike the campaign against "cosmopolitism," also worked as a strong appeal: it mobilised the whole society to increasing its vigilance. The propaganda kept urging: "Komsomolets, Increase Your Revolutionary Vigilance," "For Higher Revolutionary Vigilance," or simply "Vigilance."[108] Physician Lidia Timashuk, who had notified the Ministry of State Security of her disagreement with the conclusions of other members of the team of doctors treating Andrey Zhdanov before his death, was extolled as an example of such revolutionary vigilance. The "Letter of Doctor Lidia Timashuk" was pulled out of the archives and became the most important piece of evidence in the "Doctors' Plot." The Soviet "Joan of Arc," who singlehandedly opposed the group of renowned professors of medicine, was labelled a "symbol of Soviet patriotism, high vigilance, irreconcilable and manly fight against the enemies of our motherland."[109] This is how Lidia Timashuk became a semiotic sign, connoting all supreme Soviet virtues. Her portrait thus deserves the "best place in every family album."[110]

However, it is interesting to see what and whom Soviet people were expected to be vigilant against. Understandably enough, Western imperialism, the "scheming warmongers and their agents."[111] Nevertheless, the propaganda urged citizens to focus their vigilance and alertness also on their own ranks: "Remnants of crushed capitalist classes, disguised lackeys of eradicated anti-Soviet groups, various decomposed elements, and pilferers of our collective property have survived even in some places of our country. Anachronisms of bourgeois ideology and psychology, of private ownership morals, or people harbouring bourgeois opinions and professing bourgeois morals can still be found here – living people, hidden enemies of our nation."[112] At that time, the Soviet press kept publishing various editorials and columns uncovering various cases of fraud, theft or machinations. Such articles had been quite common in the regional media since the late 1940s, but they started appearing in central nationwide papers only at the time of the campaign accompanying

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106 GORKY, A. M.: Shpiony i ubiytsy razoblacheny.

107 Komsomolets, povyshay revolyutsionnuyu bditelnost [Komsomolets, Increase Your Revolutionary Vigilance]. In: *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 1 February 1953; NEFEDOV, K.: Povyshat politicheskuyu bditelnost [To Increase Political Vigilance]. In: *Izvestia*, 18 February 1953.

108 *Ibid.*; Vyshe revolyutsionnuyu bditelnost; Bditelnost [Vigilance]. In: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 8 (3037), 17 January 1953.

109 CHECHETKINA, Olga: Pochta Lidii Timashuk – see Footnote 79.

110 *Ibid.*

111 Patriotizm sovetskogo cheloveka [Patriotism of the Soviet Man]. In: *Izvestia*, 31 January 1953.

112 NEFEDOV, K.: Povyshat politicheskuyu bditelnost.

the "Doctors' Plot."[113] Many actors in the articles typically had non-Russian names connoting the Jewish extraction of their bearers – impostor L. E. Rofman, black marketeer from the Kiev meat factory A. V. Emets, bogus scientist A. Shapiro, etc.[114] Their "jiggery-pokery" was made possible by a loss of vigilance on the part of Soviet citizens. In its article accompanying the original announcement of the TASS agency, the *Pravda* daily noted that, apart from the unmasked agents of Western intelligence services, the country had yet another enemy, the "inattention of our citizens," which is a "breeding ground for criminal subversion."[115] The campaign thus produces a new image, that of an "enemy within."

The unmasking of "enemies" and the emphasis on patriotism as the supreme virtue are expected to instil even more unity into Soviet ranks: "We will close our ranks even tighter around the Party and its leader, Comrade Stalin."[116] The whole Soviet Bloc is to be of a similarly monolithic nature, through strengthened friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. This will contribute not only to a deeper isolation of the "bloc of aggressive imperialism" from the "democratic bloc," but it will also substantially strengthen the latter: "Tightly united in a single and mighty socialist camp, free nations know the cause of socialism and democracy is invincible. They are marching confidently forward, regardless of provocations or intimidation."[117] The outcome of any future conflict between the two parties is thus preordained.

The Image of the "Jew" as a "Third Party"

The semiotic text analysis presented herein has helped prove the anti-Jewish orientation of the two campaigns, until now derived mainly from quantitative lists of repressive actions against specific individuals of Jewish descent. At the same time, it clearly shows that the anti-Jewish semiotic field was not the only field present in any of the two campaigns, which is why none of them could be regarded as purely anti-Semitic. As one of the elements of significance in the campaigns, anti-Jewish signs participated in the process of the formation of the image of the "enemy."

Insofar as the creation of the image of the "enemy" is concerned, the image of the "Jew" was a useful tool for Soviet propaganda. Seen through the traditional stereotypical prism, the image of the "Jew," just like that of the "enemy," carries

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113 See KOSTYRCHENKO, G. V.: *Stalin protiv "kosmopolitov,"* p. 267 n. – see Footnote 16.
114 NEFEDOV, K.: Povyshat politicheskuyu bditelnost; CHAPLYGIN, Yu.: Svetila i sputniki [Stars and Satellites]. In: *Pravda*, 6 January1953; BURENKOV, M. – TITARENKO, N.: Prostaki i prochodimec [The Fools and the Impostor]. In: *Ibid.*, 7 February 1953.
115 Podlye shpiony i ubiytsy pod maskoy professorov- vrachey – see Footnote 76. Refer also to the brilliant study of US historian Sheila Fitzpatrick: FITZPATRICK, Sheila: The Con Man as Jew. In: IDEM: *Tear Off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia*. Princeton – Oxford, Princeton University Press 2005, pp. 282–300.
116 CHECHETKINA, Olga: Pochta Lidii Timashuk.
117 Svobodnye narody povyshayut bditelnost – see Footnote 105.

signs connoting strangeness, exclusion or a feeling of being threatened; it does not fit the society as a whole and represents a negation of its values. At the same time, the image of the "Jew" combines, due to a multi-layered and multi-faceted nature of its sign characteristics, both basic forms of the image of the "enemy" – internal (e.g. "cosmopolitan renegades" or "bourgeois nationalists") and external (e.g. "international Zionism"). The position of "Jews" in Soviet propaganda was thus outside the "us" and "them" categories. They fall into a third category; they are both "us" and "them," thus personifying a negation of the difference between the two notions. According to Klaus Holz, who explains the issue of modern anti-Semitism in the context of nationalism, the position of the "Jew" as a "third party" constitutes the basis of the threat that modern anti-Semitism sees in the "Jew": "The Jew personifies a possibility of the collapse of the national order of the world. This is why he appears to be a threat to the world of nations while, on the other hand, he does not have any definite place in that world. In other words, he personifies 'non-identity.'"[118]

During the period under review, the image of the "Jew" was undergoing fairly dynamic changes, which reflected changes in the image of the "enemy" in the Soviet propaganda of those days. As to the campaign against "cosmopolitism," its semiotic field was built mainly of signs referring to the Jew's class status and intellectualism, in line with the campaign's purpose, which was focused mainly on intellectuals who had to be equalised in order to make the Soviet society ideologically homogeneous after a somewhat more liberal period during WWII. While the campaign perceived and presented "cosmopolitans" as harmful and extraneous elements, it still regarded them as a part of Soviet society, which fact was expressed by metaphors of an insidious disease attacking the organism, a parasite on healthy shots, a poison flowing through the body, etc. It thus produced the image of an "enemy within." The anti-Western element was mainly used to accentuate patriotism – in the context of the escalating Cold War, the condemnation of all things Western was expected to assist the radical political and ideological isolation from the hostile "Capitalist Bloc." In this respect, the campaign against "cosmopolitism" was following the line of extreme *Zhdanovshchina*, which was pursuing basically the same goal.

On the other hand, the anti-Western accentuation was an overwhelmingly dominant feature of the campaign accompanying the "Doctors' Plot." Consequently, its anti-Jewish focus was much more obvious. Due to the onset of the Cold War and its rhetoric of irreconcilable hostility between the two blocs, the principal "enemy" was American imperialism. At that time, the "enemy" was therefore being sought mainly outside Soviet society. As a result of the overall anti-Western orientation of the campaign, the image of the "Jew" is also significantly externalised, particularly

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118 HOLZ, Klaus: Die Antisemitische Konstruktion des "Dritten" und die nationale Ordnung der Welt: In: BRAUN, Christina von – ZIEGE, Eva-Marie (ed.): *Das "bewegliche" Vorurteil: Aspekte des internationalen Antisemitismus*. Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann 2004, pp. 43–63, here p. 45.

through the use of anti-Zionist and anti-Israel signs. Within the campaign, "Jews" become an "external enemy." However, they also remain the "enemy within," as various "saboteurs" and "subverts of Soviet morale." The shift in the ideological paradigm is only possible by the extensive semiotic field of the image of the "Jew" and Jewishness, which was, thanks to the multi-layered and multi-faceted nature of its sign characteristics, a good tool to build the image of the "enemy" and to use the image for the purpose of justifying the internal and external policies of the Soviet regime and its problems both at home and abroad. As such, it had a predominantly political character. And the reason why the specific form of anti-Semitism as a tool for creating the image of the "enemy" could survive even in post-Stalinist Soviet propaganda was exactly its political nature and its strong resonances within Soviet society.

Echoes of the Soviet Anti-Jewish Campaigns in Czechoslovakia

The surge of Stalinist anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union also resonated quite strongly in Czechoslovakia, particularly in the kangaroo trial of the "Anti-State Conspiracy Centre" that took place from 20 to 27 November 1952. Eleven top-ranking Communist politicians, including ex-Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Rudolf Slánský, were sentenced to death and executed on 3 December 1952 in the courtyard of the Pankrác prison. The three remaining defendants received life sentences.[119] The trial and the campaign accompanying it are good examples of the broad possibilities offered by the semiotic field of the image of the "Jew" and Jewishness.

Although the trial was a parallel to other political processes with leading Communists which had been taking place practically in every country of the Soviet Bloc since 1948, the usual "Titoism" or "bourgeois nationalism" were replaced by "Zionism" in the centre of its ideologico-political orientation.[120] The accusation of "Zionism" permeated throughout the text of the charge; combined with a significant anti-Israel focus, it gave the trial and the campaign accompanying it a strong anti-Jewish accent. Moreover, the charge named 11 of the 14 defendants as persons of Jewish extraction, which was something previously unheard of, and the fact was repeatedly pointed out by the propaganda campaign. The anti-Semitic orientation of the campaign produced strong anti-Jewish sentiments in the society. "Countless resolutions and telegrams flooded the Central Committee and the State Court between 20 November and 2 December," notes British historian Kevin McDermott in his study of public opinion during the Slánský trial, pointing to a mutual correlation between state-organised anti-Zionist campaigns and ingrained forms of

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119 Refer also to KAPLAN, Karel: *Zpráva o zavraždění generálního tajemníka* [Report on the Murder of the General Secretary]. Praha, Mladá fronta 1992.

120 *Ibid.*, p. 129; LENDVAI, P.: *Antisemitism without Jews*, p. 248 – see Footnote 5.

popular anti-Semitism rekindled by war experiences.[121] As mentioned by historian Pavlína Kourová who studied relevant archival sources, statements such as "Hitler was after the Jews, he wanted to exterminate all of them; pity he did not do it, look at what those who have remained are doing now!" "Hitler shot a lot of them, and it still was not enough." "Hitler should have annihilated all Jews, once he set his mind on the job." All of these and more were registered in connection with the trial. Some reports from regions to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia indicate that such statements surprised even the organisers of the campaign.[122] When the *Rudé právo* daily published a long article titled "Zionism – A Tool of American Imperialism" on 24 November, the sentiments grew even stronger.

At first sight, the sudden flare up of anti-Semitic displays by the state apparatus and anti-Jewish sentiments in postwar Czechoslovakia is difficult to understand. Its logic can be seen only in the context of events taking place in the Soviet Union. Historian Karel Kaplan therefore did not hesitate to designate the Slánský trial a "Soviet" trial.[123] The reason was not only the fact that it had been stage-managed from Moscow and conducted under the direction of Soviet advisors and according to the Soviet model; the trial also helped promote and implement substantial objectives of Stalin's internal and external politics.

The unexpected crusade against "Zionism" in the country which had provided significant military assistance to Israel was undoubtedly a true reflection of the Soviet policy toward the Jewish state at the time when Soviet plans concerning the Middle East region had proven to be rather illusory.[124] However, there were

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121 McDERMOTT, Kevin: A "Polyphony of Voices?" Czech Popular Opinion and the Slánský Affair. In: *Slavic Review*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter 2008), pp. 840–865, here p. 855.

122 KOUROVÁ, Pavlína: *Propagandistické kampaně v Československu v letech 1948–1953* [Propaganda Campaigns in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1953]. An Unpublished Dissertation Written at the Department of History and Didactics of History of the Faculty of Education of Charles University in Prague 2013, pp. 299–301.

123 KAPLAN, Karel: Politické procesy 50. let v Československu [Political Trials of the 1950s in Czechoslovakia]. In: PERNES, Jiří – FOITZIK, Jan (ed.): *Politické procesy v Československu po roce 1945 a "případ Slánský": Sborník příspěvků ze stejnojmenné konference, pořádané ve dnech 14.–16. dubna 2003 v Praze* [Political Trials in Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the "Slánský Case." Proceedings of the "Political Trials in Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the 'Slánský Case'" Conference Held in Prague from 14 to 16 April 2003]. Brno, Prius 1995, p. 112.

124 The Soviet Union supported the formation of an independent state of Israel using both diplomatic and military means. It was the first country that recognised *de iure*, and provided military assistance to Israel through its satellites. According to historian Zhores Medvedev, whose analysis broadly covers the "Doctors' Plot" and the fate of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Stalin's aim was to weaken the influence of the United Kingdom in the Middle East and also to improve its security: "By creating a zone of permanent conflicts between the Arabs and the Jews, which the United States and West European countries inevitably had to interfere in, Stalin ensured safe Southern borders of the Soviet Union. It was his distinctive reaction to the well-known Truman Doctrine proclaimed in March 1947 […]. (MEDVEDEV, Zhores A.: *Stalin a židovský problém*, p. 89 – see Footnote 75.)

internal policy considerations as well. Early in 1952, the Soviet Ministry of State Security reopened, after more than two years of inactivity, the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. The investigation, however, failed to prove any real anti-state activities by the arrested members of the Committee; the charges were thus based only on an old story concerning a 1944 plan for the Jewish colonisation of the Crimea.[125] This is why the case did not become a show trial, as the initial resolution of the Soviet Politburo had expected.[126] However, the future "Doctors' Plot" had already become more substantiated by that time, which provided an opportunity to expand the case of the allegedly Zionism-motivated espionage and collaboration far beyond a narrow community of Jewish intellectuals and offered much greater power-political and ideologico-propagandistic potential. However, that was only going to happen; this was why, as convincingly proven by historian Michal Reiman, the Slánský trial was so important for Stalin. Soviet papers were full of news from Prague and the high-strung atmosphere permitted the peak phase of Stalinist anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union to be launched.[127] The public exemplary trial with the General Secretary of Czechoslovak Communists and other top-ranking state and Party officials thus could be a "prototype" script for the finale of the "Doctors' Plot" case. One of the key accusations of the charges against Slánský was his alleged effort to deprive, using "physicians from a hostile environment and with a dark past," President Klement Gottwald of his life.[128] It is just one of many examples which prove that the "text" of the campaign and its semiotic base basically only copy what was to occupy the Soviet public space, i.e. the "Doctors' Plot" case, only a few weeks after the sentences in Prague.

At the same time, Czechoslovakia was also experiencing its own variety of the Soviet campaign against cosmopolitism. Its prime mover was the Party's ideologue Václav Kopecký, who set its basic course in his emblematic keynote speech "Against Cosmopolitism as the Ideology of American Imperialism" delivered at an ideological conference of university representatives held in Brno in February 1952, extensive

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125 Refer also to Obvinitelnoye zaklyuchenie po "delu YAK": 3 aprelya 1952 g [A Guilty Verdict in the "JAC Case"]. In: KOSTYRCHENKO, G. V. (ed.): *Gosudarstvenny antisemitizm v SSSR ot nachala do kulminatsii* pp. 182–200 – see Footnote 75.

126 Even the closed-door trial ended in a blunder which is difficult to believe. The charges were so much unfounded and so blatantly in contravention of any procedural standards and rules that A. A. Cheptsov, the lead judge of the trial, confronted with such a great number of discrepancies and contradictions, had decided to suspend the proceedings and made attempts to reopen the investigation, although undoubtedly having clear instructions as to the sentence. To no avail – on 18 July, 14 accused were sentenced to death and executed on 7 August. (Refer also to REDLICH, S. – ALTMAN, I.: *War, Holocaust and Stalinism* – see Footnote 74.)

127 REIMAN, Michal: Sovětská politika a sovětské vedení 1948–1953 [Soviet Politics and Soviet Leadership 1948–1953]. In: PERNES, J. – FOITZIK, J. (ed.): *Politické procesy v Československu po roce 1945 a "případ Slánský,"* p. 30 n.

128 Žaloba proti vedení protistátního spikleneckého centra v čele s Rudolfem Slánským [Charges Brought against the Leadership of the Anti-State Conspiracy Centre Headed by Rudolf Slánský]. In: *Rudé právo*, 20 November 1952, pp. 3–6.

excerpts of which were published in the *Rudé právo* daily.[129] Only a detailed comparative semiotic text analysis would reveal to what extent the semiotic fields of the Soviet and Czechoslovak campaigns were similar and in what respects they differed. The most conspicuous difference, however, is the marked anti-Western and particularly anti-American accent of the Czechoslovak campaign. As outlined above, the accent was naturally present in the Soviet campaign as well, but was not so dominant. The shift was undoubtedly caused by the fact that the period between the two campaigns saw the Cold War rise to a full swing. The emphasis on the anti-Western semiotic field of the Czechoslovak campaign against "cosmopolitism" thus seems to be closer to the language of the campaign accompanying the "Doctors' Plot" case.

The defendants in the "anti-state conspiracy centre" trial were indicted for "Zionism," i.e. "Jewish bourgeois nationalism." At the same time, "cosmopolitism" (on the grounds of proficiency in foreign languages or a long stay abroad), i.e. the intention or effort to renounce their national identity, was often an aggravating circumstance. In his salutation to Slánský's birthday in August 1951, Václav Kopecký spoke of Rudolf Slánský as of a personality who "imbibed full-blooded native Czech national identity from his childhood at home and at the elementary school."[130] Just a few months later, the same person was characterised as "uprooted from our country, not grown from the core of our people."[131] However, this paradoxical combination of both charges shows that the semiotic field was the same all the time, and was used to build a propaganda image of the "enemy" modelled on the Soviet example and utilising the multi-layered and multi-faceted nature of sign characteristics of the image of the "Jew." The "Jewish bourgeois nationalist" or "cosmopolitan" became synonyms for the word "Jew." This was also why the prosecution explicitly noted the Jewish descent of most of the defendants.[132]

The image of the "Jew" as an "enemy" constituted the foundation of the campaign accompanying the "Anti-State Conspiracy Centre" trial, fully in compliance with

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129 O kosmopolitismu, proletářském internacionalismu a socialistickém vlastenectví: Z projevu Václava Kopeckého na první ideologické konferenci v Brně [On Cosmopolitism, Proletarian Internationalism and Socialist Patriotism: From the Speech of Václav Kopecký at the First Ideological Conference in Brno]. In: *Rudé Právo*, 28 February 1952, pp. 1, 3 and 4. The full text of the speech was published as a book: KOPECKÝ, Václav: Proti kosmopolitismu jako ideologii amerického imperialismu [Against Cosmopolitism as the Ideology of American Imperialism]. In: *Marxisticko-leninskou ideovostí a stranickostí proti kosmopolitismu a objektivismu ve vědě: Sborník dokumentů 1. ideologické konference vysokoškolských vědeckých pracovníků v Brně 27. února – 1. března 1952* [Through Marxist-Leninist Ideas and Party Involvement against Cosmopolitism and Objectivism in Science: Collection of Documents of the 1st Ideological Conference of University Academia in Brno, 27 February to 1 March 1952]. Praha, Naše vojsko 1952, pp. 21–50.

130 KOPECKÝ, Václav: K 50. narozeninám soudruha Rudolfa Slánského [On the Occasion of the 50th Birthday of Comrade Rudolf Slánský]. In: *Rudé právo*, 31 July 1951, p. 3.

131 Síla socialistického vlastenectví [The Power of Socialist Patriotism]. In: *Ibid.*, 19 April 1952, p. 3.

132 Žaloba proti vedení protistátního spikleneckého centra v čele s Rudolfem Slánským.

the Soviet model it was derived from. As stated by Michal Reiman: "Antisemitism became a link connecting political repressions in the Soviet Union with repressions taking place in Soviet Bloc countries."[133] The *Komsomolskaya pravda* daily could thus put together the alleged conspiracy of doctors, the Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia and the explosion at the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv and label all of them as "links of a single chain."[134]

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133 REIMAN, M.: Sovětská politika a sovětské vedení 1948–1953, p. 32.
134 MITIN, M.: Sionisticheskaya agentura amerikanskogo imperializma – see Footnote 84.

The Tool of Power Legitimisation and Guardianship

Social Policy and Its Implementation in the Pension Systems of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (1970–1989)

Tomáš Vilímek

In a state socialism system, social policy represents a complex phenomenon a systematic analysis of which can significantly contribute to the understanding of the social context of the existence of the Czechoslovak and East German regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, it becomes evident that a description of fundamental aspects of the development of the social policy during the period in question cannot be based only on its interpretation as a mere "instrument of power" of the ruling establishment, or on its period presentation as "real socialist humanism." Both of them were not only permanently present in the social policy, but were also undergoing permanent modifications due to a deteriorating economic situation in both countries and a changing international situation. Especially during the late 1970s crisis of the West European welfare state concept,[1] the social

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1   In his book on Europe's social history, German historian Hartmut Kaelble notes that the Western European social state concept was struggling with three simultaneous crises – financial, performance and political – in the late 1970s. In his opinion, it is amazing that, crisis symptoms notwithstanding, there were no massive cuts into or elimination of social state attributes and the average share of social expenditure in West European countries was gradually increasing between 1974 and 1998. (See KAELBLE, Hartmut: *Sozialgeschichte Europas: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2007, pp. 342

protection of people based on social state principles still seemed to be an indispensable segment of the competition with the capitalist world, and in the case of the German Democratic Republic specifically with its West German neighbour.[2] After all, even the Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communists, Gustáv Husák, stated that "working people here have never before enjoyed such material welfare and social security as those provided to them by our socialist system" during an April 1975 meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, shortly before being elected President of Czechoslovakia; in his opinion, this was where the socialist system differed most from the capitalist one, the latter being unable to provide the same social security standard to all people of advanced age.[3]

While a necessary and often excited discussion on the need to redefine fundamental principles and future trends of the social state was taking place in the West, critical remarks addressing social state issues in Czechoslovakia and the GDR were only a topic of internal debate among a narrow group of party leaders whom the State Planning Commissions in both countries warned at the turn of 1979 and 1980, and particularly in the late 1980s, about the disproportion between increasing social expenditure and inadequate or absent resources for necessary planned investment projects. However, social policy was one of the key sources of legitimacy for both regimes, and, in particular, the Czechoslovak party leadership hoped the new socio-political measures taken in the early 1970s would help calm down the generally unsatisfactory social situation resulting from the suppression of the so-called renewal process and the re-awakened civic society.

It would thus be a mistake not to include the patent development of medical and social care or support of young families in the evaluation of social policy; it would also be a mistake not to mention the preferential treatment of certain social groups at the expense of others, the targeted application of social policy measures to generate "a limited system loyalty," or the wanton deprivation of members of Czechoslovak and East German opposition movements of some "socialist benefits." In the light of the events in 1989 and the subsequent transformation period, it becomes increasingly obvious that the socio-political measures of the Czechoslovak or East German "old regimes" cannot be evaluated from the end (i.e. from the moment of

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and 344–349; see also the review of the book by HAMPLOVÁ, Martina: Vyvážené sociální dějiny poválečné Evropy [A Balanced Social History of Postwar Europe]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 17, Issue 1–2 (2010), pp. 232–237.)

2 See SKYBA, Peter: "An sich müßten wir Pleite anmelden": Konfliktlinien in den Entscheidungen der SED-Spitze zur Sozialpolitik in den siebziger Jahren. In: *Horch und Guck*, Vol. 20, Issue 3, No. 73 (2011), pp. 8–13, here p. 8.

3 *Národní archiv*, Praha (hereafter *NA*) [The National Archive of the Czech Republic], Fund (f.) of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1971–1976 (1590 – initial fund designation AÚV KSČ 02/1), Volume (Vol.) 150, Archival Unit (AU) 155, Item 1, Draft of the Report of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Fulfillment of Conclusions of the 14th Party Congress in the Field of Social Policy, 15 April 1975.

their collapse) backward, but that broader historical consequences have to be taken into account. In this respect, German political scientist Stefan Bollinger noted that the East German social policy was a broadly conceived attempt to promote ideas of social security and fairness, with a high level of social solidarity. Referring to the above, he claimed the key task was to analyse the increasingly deeper discrepancy between intended socio-political goals and their actual fulfilment.[4]

Due to the extent of the study I have been permitted, I have decided to focus – after presenting general features of the social policies in Czechoslovakia and the GDR – on a more detailed comparison of the implementation of their respective socio-political goals in the demanding field of pension security schemes and benefits, which can be viewed, to quote historian Steffen Otte, as a "model example of the social policy of Real Socialism."[5] According to social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the author of an inspiring synthesis of the history of German society between 1949 and 1990, it was the inadequate pension security system that was the weakest link of the socio-political programme of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* – SED).[6]

The study relies on archival documents, German published sources and works of Czech authors who have been systematically dealing with social policy issues.[7] Period statistical data, which have been confronted with new information recalculated after 1989, have also been considered. While the pension system in the German Democratic Republic during the 1970s and 1980s has already been dealt with in many separate studies, the topic has hitherto been out of the limelight in Czech historiography, the situation of pensioners at that time being so far only hinted at against the backdrop of the broader consequences of the social transformations in Czechoslovakia during the so-called "normalisation" period. There has not yet been any comparison of pension systems in the two countries.

Social Policy Ambitions and Economic Policy Limits

In general, there were several social policy development stages both in Czechoslovakia and in the German Democratic Republic, which were, to some extent, defined by party congresses in 1971, 1976, 1981 and 1986 as milestones. The first half of the 1970s in particular saw multiple socio-political measures – an active childbirth policy, social aid to families with children, housing construction – through the implementation of which the Czechoslovak and East German party leaderships were

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4   BOLLINGER, Stefan: Sozialstaat DDR – nur Erinnerung oder auch Herausforderung? In: *Utopie kreativ*, Issue No. 180 (October 2005), pp. 876–884, here p. 878.

5   OTTE, Steffen: Das Rentensystem der DDR: Musterbeispiel realsozialistischer Sozialpolitik. In: *Horch und Guck*, Vol. 20, Issue 3, No. 73 (2011), pp. 14–19.

6   WEHLER, Hans-Ulrich: *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1949–1990*. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2009, p. 345.

7   I would like to make use of this occasion to thank the late Associate Professor Lenka Kalinová for her valuable comments.

trying to reverse gloomy demographic forecasts and to resolve the problem of lack of labour. Another important motive was an open crisis of legitimacy as a result of the "Panzer August" and the officially declared participation of the East German Army in the suppression of the "Prague Spring contagion." Czechoslovak leadership was thus hoping the "normalisation" social policy would do away with the "Prague Spring corpse." In a way, the primary purpose of the socio-political measures taken during the first half of the 1970s was to make up for the loss of freedom.[8]

As a result of the so-called "East-West agreements" signed between 1970 and 1973, the permanently present "dialectical unity" of the two German states, which manifested itself both at the state policy level and at the social level, including social policies, became topical again. The proverbial Achilles' heel of the East German variety of socialism was the possibility of comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany, facilitated by almost unlimited opportunities to watch West German media, which in fact was substantially weakening the effects of East German propaganda efforts. The period between the 14th and 15th Congresses of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (and the 8th and 9th Congresses of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany), i.e. 1971 to 1976, was characterised by an emphasis on the intensive development of living standards and consumption. In both countries, a "consumer alternative of the social policy"[9] prevailed, its purpose being to blunt the critical potential in society, whose manifestations in the subsequent period included, in particular, various forms of indiscipline at work[10] and a growing number of individual complaints and submissions addressed to various state, party and trade union bodies and organisations.

In the second half of the 1970s, signs of an overheating of the socio-economic programme could be clearly seen both in Czechoslovakia and in the GDR, which were further compounded by dynamic international developments. Mass protests in Poland and the sobering experience of the "acceleration illusion" of the Polish economy in 1976 revived unpleasant memories of the year 1953 in East Germany, and the local leader, Erich Honecker, intensified the pressure on improving the standard of living literally at any cost. The second oil crisis of 1979 also had a negative impact on the economies of both Czechoslovakia and the GDR. However, contrary to his Czechoslovak counterparts, Honecker opposed the increase in price of selected products proposed by the State Planning Commission.

In the first half of the 1980s, the economic situation of both countries significantly deteriorated, and neither the Czechoslovak "Set of Measures to Improve the System

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8   See KALINOVÁ, Lenka: *Konec nadějí a nová očekávání: K dějinám české společnosti 1969–1993* [The End of Hopes and New Expectations: On the History of Czech Society 1969 – 1993]. Praha, Academia 2012, p. 89.

9   See SCHMIDT, Manfred G.: Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik in der DDR. In: KUHRT, Eberhard (ed.): *Die Endzeit der DDR-Wirtschaft: Analysen zur Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Umweltpolitik*. Opladen, Leske & Budrich 1999, pp. 273–322, here p. 284.

10   As to these issues, please refer to OTÁHAL, Milan: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989* [Opposition Trends in Czech Society 1969–1989]. Praha, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR [Institute for Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic] 2011, p. 61.

of Planned National Economic Management after 1980" of January 1980 nor the East German "Economic Strategy of the 1980s," which Erich Honecker presented at the 10th SED Congress in April 1981,[11] did much about it. A feature common to both sets of measures was an emphasis on increased labour productivity and reduced material requirements. Contrary to their actions in the previous decade, the Czech leaders were more modest about their social policy during the 1980s. The goal was no longer to steadily improve the living standard, but "to maintain and increase the quality of the high living standard the people had already achieved and their social security."[12] It was actually during the 1980s that East Germany was losing its ability to keep pace with the material standard of the Western "welfare states" – particularly West Germany – with social policy implementation expenditure being one of the decisive causes of its deteriorating economic performance.

In the second half of the 1980s, both regimes were, to some degree, willing to implement the necessary reforms that would at least partly harmonise the future social policy with the economic situation. Still, they were a long way from truly considering economic criteria. In the German Democratic Republic, the implementation of true reforms was blocked mainly by Erich Honecker, together with his comrades Günter Mittag and Erich Mielke, who together constituted a specific power triumvirate. The Czechoslovak leadership went significantly farther in that they admitted that the situation was serious; just like their East German counterparts, however, they were afraid that a substantial slump in living standards would produce a very critical reaction in the society the forms and extent of which were difficult to foresee.

"Any savings in the social field constitute a fraud of national assets and direct material and social damage for the society," Alexander Yakovlev, a close collaborator of Gorbachev, stated at a January 1987 meeting of the Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist Parties of the Soviet Bloc responsible for ideological and international issues, which was held in Warsaw.[13] Yet both he and many of his colleagues realised that the social consumption policy, the importance of which had been re-accentuated as early as at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the turn of March and April 1971, found itself in a deep discrepancy with economic efficiency. More than a year later, at a similar meeting held in Ulan Bator in March 1988, Yakovlev told his colleagues that "optimum ways of harmonising the economic reform and social protection of workers which

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11 See ROESLER, Jörg: *Ostdeutsche Wirtschaft im Umbruch: 1970–2000.* Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2003, p. 34 n.; PRŮCHA, Václav et al.: *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992* [Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia 1918–1992*)*, Vol. 2: *Období 1945–1992* [The 1945 to 1992 Period]. Brno, Amendment 2009, p. 698 n.

12 Act No. 122/1981 Coll. Quoted in PRŮCHA, V. et al.: *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992,* Vol. 2, p. 689.

13 *NA,* Fund of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1986–1989 (N 69 – initial fund designation AÚV KSČ 02/1), P 26/87, Item 7, Speech of A. N. Yakovlev at the Joint Meeting of Secretaries of Central Committees of Fraternal Parties in Warsaw, 22 January 1987.

would help do away with equalisation and achieve a dramatic economic advance while preventing any social injustice"[14] were being looked for in the Soviet Union in the framework of the reform process.

The Czechoslovak and East German party leaders were undoubtedly aware of the pitfalls of the "consumer ideology,"[15] but they were unable to harmonise various objectives of social policy – stability of prices, support of young families with children, housing policy, health care and pension plans, full employment policy and the "emancipation of women" – and to get rid of the specific "double compensation load" consisting of the need to substitute the absent democratic legitimacy and camouflage the inefficiency of the economy.[16] As to the GDR, which had always compared itself against the benchmark of the social policy measures of its West German neighbour, the situation was compounded by the absence of national identity.[17]

Many German authors noted the ambivalent nature and effects of the socialist social policy which, on the one hand, had been contributing to the stability of both regimes through its "material pacification strategy"[18] throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while, on the other hand, had been leading to a deeper "social corrosion"[19] and the formation of the "provision-making mentality,"[20] as a result of which new needs had emerged among people which neither of the regimes did not and could not fully meet because of the "quasi-consumer nature of the society."[21] Since the

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14 *Ibid.*, P 64/88, Item 9, Proceedings and Outcomes of the Meeting of the Ideological Secretaries of the Central Committees of Fraternal Parties Held in Ulan Bator, 17 March 1988, Speech of Comrade Alexander Nikolayevich Yakovlev, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

15 See SCHABOWSKI, Günter: *Das Politbüro: Ende eines Mythos. Eine Befragung*. Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt 1990, p. 15.

16 See HOCKERTS, Hans Günter (ed.): *Drei Wege deutscher Sozialstaatlichkeit: NS-Diktatur, Bundesrepublik und DDR im Vergleich*. München, R. Oldenbourg 1998, p. 22.

17 Commenting on the issue in his memoirs, Erich Honecker stated: "The Federal Republic was always a benchmark for the GDR, whether we liked it or not. It was an uneven race." (HONECKER, Erich: *Poslední zpověď svědka nedávné historie* [The Last Confession of a Witness of Recent History]. Praha, ETC 1994, p. 93.)

18 BOYER, Christoph: Sozialgeschichte der Arbeiterschaft und staatssozialistische Entwicklungspfade: Konzeptionelle Überlegungen und eine Erklärungsskizze. In: HÜBNER, Peter – KLEßMANN, Christoph –TENFELDE, Klaus (ed.): *Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus: Ideologischer Anspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit*. Köln/R. – Weimar – Wien, Böhlau 2005, pp. 71–86, here p. 79.

19 The term was coined by Mikhail Gorbachev to refer to manifestations of lack of labour and salary policy discipline, pilfering and bribes (compare KALINOVÁ, Lenka – SOVA, Václav: *Lidský potenciál v podmínkách přestavby* [Human Potential during Perestrojka]. Praha, Svoboda 1989, p. 230).

20 MARQUARDT, Bernhard (ed.): *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozeß der deutschen Einheit,"* Vol. III/1: *Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Umweltpolitik*. Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999, p. 283.

21 The term can be found in a Charter 77 document of May 1979 with an annex called "Principles of Consumption." Its authors – Vladimír Kadlec and Jaroslav Suk – claimed that there was a "discrepancy between the orientation of a substantial percentage of the population to intensive consumption and the inadequate economic means to support the consumption."

early 1970s, there had thus been a substantial danger that the orientation to an improved standard of living, which both East German and Czechoslovak leaders had hoped would bring political stability and subsequent growth in the national economy, would prevail over everything else. After all, documents containing information on the development of the Czechoslovak social and economic policy dating back to early July 1989 noted that the living standard had substantially improved, but the positive effects of the process had been weakened for a long time by the low efficiency of the national economy and an inability to keep pace with global developments. According to Ivan Knotek, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Government, the importance of the living standard as one of the key stimulation factors unifying the interests of individuals, collectives and social groups decreased, mainly due to the "shadow economy," with "social benefits being taken for granted and deficiencies making their way to the forefront and being interpreted as proof of the socialist system's incompetence."[22]

According to German historian Peter Skyba, the political stabilisation was in contradiction with the economic stability.[23] "Economic rationality had to bow to political reality" – this is the opinion of the authors of the final summary of one of the most extensive works on East German social policy,[24] thus confirming an earlier conclusion of historian Peter Hübner, who claims that "for political reasons, it was impossible for the SED to link the social policy and real economic growth."[25] According to Christoph Boyer, a fatal "reciprocal blockade"[26] occurred instead of the anticipated mutually positive effects of an improving living standard on labour productivity and vice versa. The late 1980s reform efforts, which went a bit farther in Czechoslovakia than in East Germany, did little to change this.

The State Planning Commissions, relevant ministries and, last but not least, state security elements of both countries repeatedly warned about the critical condition of the respective national economies, especially in the second half of the 1980s.

(CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, Blanka – PREČAN, Vilém (ed.): *Charta 77: Dokumenty 1977–1989* [Charter 77: Documents 1977–1989*)*, Vol. 1: *1977–1986*. Praha, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR 2007, Document No. 106, p. 251.)

22 *NA*, f. N 69, P 124/89, Point 8, Supporting Information on the Social and Economic Policy for the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 7 July 1989.

23 SKYBA, P.: "An sich müßten wir Pleite anmelden," p. 11 – see Footnote 2.

24 BOYER, Christoph – HENKE, Klaus-Dietmar – SKYBA, Peter: Gesamtbetrachtung: Die Sozial- und Konsumpolitik der Honeckerzeit. Eine Gesamtsicht. In: IDEM (ed.): *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, Vol. 10: *Deutsche Demokratische Republik 1971–1989. Bewegung in der Sozialpolitik, Erstarrung und Niedergang*. Baden-Baden, Nomos 2008, pp. 767–794, here p. 779.

25 HÜBNER, Peter: Arbeiterklasse als Inszenierung? Arbeiter und Gesellschaftspolitik in der SBZ/DDR. In: BESSEL, Richard – JESSEN, Ralph (ed.): *Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR*. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1996, pp. 199–223, here p. 215.

26 BOYER, Christoph: Politische Rahmenbedingungen 1981–1989. In: BOYER, Ch. – HENKE, K.-D. – SKYBA, P. (ed.): *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, Vol. 10, pp. 35–66, here p. 35.

In his speech on a draft report on the fulfilment of the social and economic development plan in 1988, the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of Czechoslovakia Ladislav Adamec also admitted that the party leadership was seriously worried about the living standard. He criticised the "fetishisation of the plan" which for many disregarding the social utility of their production was just a key opening the door to bonuses. "The unity of the economic and social policies, the principle that we can only consume as much as we produce, apply both to wages and to retail prices," he stated. Adamec saw a way out in increased production, combined with improved technical quality and reduced production costs.[27] However, he too was unable to force through such decisions that could have created conditions enabling an escape from the "vicious circle" of the centrally planned economy,[28] i.e. low productivity and efficiency and the widening gap between domestic technical development efforts and global trends. Instead he stressed the necessity to strengthen the social orientation of production and the top priority of making provision for the needs of the population. "The start of the reform process cannot mean a weakening of social benefits; on the contrary, they have to be strengthened," Adamec emphasised.[29] At the May 1989 meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED, Secretary Egon Krenz spoke along similar lines: "I do not even ask myself the question whether or not to carry on with the unity of our economic and social policies. We have to carry on, because this unity is, in fact, the socialism of the GDR."[30]

Issues related to social policy measures regularly appeared on the agenda at frequent meetings of representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The East German SED highlighted the housing policy and proposed closer cooperation in the exchange of consumer goods, which it hoped would improve the situation in supplying the domestic market. While the trade exchange volume between 1971 and 1975 had been approximately seven billion rubles a year, it was expected to rise to at least 15 billion between 1986 and 1990.[31]

27　*NA*, f. N 69, P 95/88, Point 1, Draft Report on the Fulfillment of the Social and Economic Development Plan in 1988, on the 1989 Plan and on the Progress of the Reform of the Economic Mechanism, Annex III, Speech of Ladislav Adamec, 28 November 1988.

28　KADLEC, Vladimír: Rostoucí inflační tlaky ve stagnující ekonomice [Growing Inflation Pressures in a Stagnating Economy]. In: *Ze zásuvky i z bloku* [From the Drawer and a Notepad], Issue No. 6 (November 1985), pp. 37–43, here p. 38 (samizdat).

29　See Footnote 27.

30　HOFFMANN, Dierk: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene: Sonderversorgungssysteme. In: BOYER, Ch. – HENKE, K.-D. – SKYBA, P. (ed.): *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, Vol. 10, p. 327–361, here p. 355.

31　For more information on mutual relations, refer to VILÍMEK, Tomáš: KSČ a SED: Vzájemné vztahy a kontakty v letech 1969 až 1989 [The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the SED: Mutual Relations and Contacts between 1969 and 1989]. In: KOCIAN, Jiří – PAŽOUT, Jaroslav – RÁKOSNÍK, Jakub (ed.): *Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu* [Bolshevism, Communism and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia], Vol. 8, Praha, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR – Dokořán 2011, pp. 208–248.

During his November 1981 visit to Prague, Erich Honecker briefed his Czechoslovak counterpart on the outcome of the 10th SED Congress and outlined plans for the robotisation of manufacturing processes in the German Democratic Republic, as a result of which the country's debt, owed to the West, was expected to drop by a half by 1985. The East German party leader stated the year 1981 had been exceptional, as the trade exchange between Czechoslovakia and the GDR had exceeded, for the first time ever, two billion rubles a year.[32] During the October 1982 meeting of Erich Honecker and Gustáv Husák in East Berlin, the host admitted that labour productivity in the Federal Republic might be up to 30 percent higher than in the German Democratic Republic. In his opinion, the economic problems that East Germany was struggling with at that time could not be resolved by social policy restrictions. Erich Honecker believed it would have been unwise to risk "saving ourselves to death," which situation would have happened if the consequences of the economic difficulties had been placed on workers' shoulders.[33] He spoke along similar lines in April 1985, during a meeting with the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, František Pitra, who had come to East Berlin to be briefed on preparations for the forthcoming 11th Congress of the SED. Honecker informed him about the decision to deal with the East German housing problem by 1990: "It will contribute to people saying that it is safer and more promising to live under the socialist rule rather than face unemployment and housing misery in the West." During the same meeting, he rejected speculation about the policy of subsidies, as "the political benefits of unchanging prices are much more important than the temporary advantages of an increase in retail prices."[34] Both countries'

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32 *NA*, f. Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1981–1986 (N 68 – initial fund designation AÚV KSČ 02/1), P 26/81, Item 1, Report on a Friendly Working Meeting of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Comrade G. Husák, with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic Comrade E. Honecker in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 3 December 1981.

33 *Ibid.*, f. Gustáv Husák, File GDR, Vol. 8, Report on a Friendly Working Meeting of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Comrade G. Husák with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic Comrade E. Honecker on 4 November 1982. (As yet an uninventorised and unorganised fund.)

34 *Ibid.*, f. N 68, P 132/85, Item 4, Report on the Working Trip of Comrade František Pitra to the GDR, 7 May 1985. As a matter of fact, Honecker had rejected the proposal of the State Planning Commission to increase the price of some basic food products and children's clothing as early as November 1979, stating that "if such steps were taken, the entire leadership could resign." It must be noted that, according to the State Planning Commission, the planned reduction of subsidies was expected to result in a decline of the real *per capita* income by as much as 10 percent. (SKYBA, Peter – BOYER, Christoph: Gesellschaftliche Strukturen und sozialpolitische Denk- und Handlungsfelder 1971–1981. In: BOYER, Ch. – HENKE, K.-D. – SKYBA, P. (ed.): *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, Vol. 10, pp. 67–143, here p. 113 – see Footnote 24.)

leaderships were convinced of the sensitivity of any restrictions in the social security area. However, it seems that the Czechoslovak leaders were more aware of the necessity of changes at the end of the 1980s; nevertheless, they were unable to properly grasp their potential impact on the practiced "negative consensus."[35]

"It was not the social policy in the narrow sense of the word, but the failed unity of the economic and social policies in a broader sense that threatened to transform the GDR into ruins," is the opinion of German economic historian, Werner Abelshauser.[36] At the end of the day, the socialist social policy was rather a specific type of "authoritative and paternalistic social care" and, according to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a well-known expert in social history, it can be termed a "failed provider of legitimacy" (*Legitimationsspender*).[37] Fundamental weaknesses of this social policy concept, which was basically a "living standard policy,"[38] included not only its class anchoring and relation to political objectives, but – first and foremost – the fact that it was perceived as a "super-policy"[39] of sorts, attempting to control and manage almost all the material needs of people without offering any room for public debate about alternative options.

Moreover, many social policy measures brought effects that differed from those initially expected by the power centre. In this respect, it is possible to say that the socialist social policy had its own dynamism, as a result of which new inequalities emerged, which not only were in contradiction with initial social equality ideals, but were also weakening the pivotal ideological principle of the social policy measures, namely that the benefits should be differentiated on the basis of the beneficiary's importance for production and reproduction and of the political importance of the target group.[40]

In their 1989 work, Lenka Kalinová and Václav Sova highlight the fact that it was high-income households, which had enough money to be able to obtain goods and services in short supply, that were making the most of subsidised prices. As early as 1980, for example, it had become apparent that cheaper public housing was used mainly by white-collar employees, while workers and young families had to

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35   The term was used by Milan Šimečka in his November 1988 text. He claims that people voiced their reservations about the situation without any scruples at home, but were reluctant to do so publicly. The party leadership knew about the growing discontent, but was afraid to resort to radical changes. "All have learned by now that prolonging the existing situation only deepens the crisis, but many of them, if not a majority of them, are not sure what radical change might bring to them," he stated at that time. (ŠIMEČKA, Milan: *Konec nehybnosti* [The End of Immobility]. Praha, Nakladatelství Lidové noviny 1990, p. 157.)

36   ABELSHAUSER, Werner: *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945*. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2004, p. 398.

37   WEHLER, H.-U.: *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1949–1990*, p. 342 – see Footnote 6.

38   SKYBA, P.: "An sich müßten wir Pleite anmelden," p. 8 – see Footnote 2.

39   HOFFMANN, Dierk – SCHWARTZ, Michael: *Sozialstaatlichkeit in der DDR: Sozialpolitische Entwicklungen im Spannungsfeld von Diktatur und Gesellschaft 1945/49*. München, R. Oldenbourg 2005, p. 2.

40   See SCHMIDT, M. G.: Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik in der DDR, p. 294 – see Footnote 9.

make use of more expensive cooperative housing schemes.[41] The result was, according to the authors, a situation that did not make any sense, with "the society subsidising, through social consumption funds, mostly population segments with an above-average income."[42] Until 1989, the Czechoslovak and East German regimes were unsuccessfully trying to solve – in particular through hidden inflation – the persistent problem of the continuously growing buying power of the population and the destabilisation of the internal market resulting therefrom. The remuneration policies in both countries, which, in addition, showed an increasing percentage of social consumption (for example, the amount of social consumption per each CZK 100 of wage was CZK 31 in 1976[43]; in 1980, it rose to CZK 36[44]), were not accomplishing what they were expected to accomplish, and appeals for "material incentives"[45] were falling on deaf ears.[46] According to repeated opinion surveys of satisfaction with one's own remuneration, the percentage of unsatisfied respondents rose from 32 to 58 between 1973 and 1989, with the level of criticism being higher in large cities and among workers.[47]

However, the crucial problem was not wages *per se*; after all, they had been growing continuously in both countries from 1970 till 1989. It was the situation criticised by Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec in his speech mentioned above. "No one wants to have low prices and to have to hunt for the goods he or she wishes to buy. On the other hand, no restrictions on desired consumption or devaluation

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41 While public (municipal) housing costs remained at the same level throughout the 1978–1985 period, those of cooperative housing rose by almost 24 percent over the same period. (Compare KALINOVÁ, L. – SOVA, V.: *Lidský potenciál v podmínkách přestavby,* p. 189 – see Footnote 19.)

42 *Ibid.*, p. 190.

43 It was a part of the non-productive consumption which was meeting some basic needs of people in the field of medical care, education or family care. It consisted, in fact, of social benefits – children's allowances, maternity allowances, etc. – which the beneficiary received regardless of the quantity and quality of his or her work.

44 See KALINOVÁ, Lenka: *K sociálním dějinám Československa v letech 1969–1989* [On the Social History of Czechoslovakia between 1969 and 1989]. Praha, Vysoká škola ekonomická [University of Economics] 1999, p. 47.

45 In general, the term denotes a system of material and moral incentives, methods and means to increase the involvement of people in the fulfillment of work tasks.

46 Christoph Boyer and Peter Skyba noted that the income from work accounted for 55 percent of the average remuneration in the German Democratic Republic in 1981; social consumption accounted for the balance. (SKYBA, P. – BOYER, Ch.: Gesellschaftliche Strukturen und sozialpolitische Denk- und Handlungsfelder 1981–1989, p. 132 – see Footnote 34.)

47 Praha, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, Centrum orální historie [The Oral History Centre] (hereafter COH), Collection of the Public Opinion Research Institute, Research No. 89/3, May 1989, Opinions of Citizens on Selected Living Standard Issues in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, p. 55. Research reports and complete data produced by public opinion polls conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute are available (subject to registration) on the website of the Český sociálněvědní datový archiv [Czech Data Archive of Social Sciences], Sociologický ústav AV ČR [Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic] (see *archiv.soc.cas.cz*).

of the deserved incomes of people can be accepted."[48] In light of the data we now have on the condition of the national economy in those days, however, one could reasonably doubt whether many of the above incomes were indeed deserved. German historian Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk made a fitting comment in this respect, stating that many people had already forgotten the reverse side of the all-embracing social policy of the socialist system; while it had provided secure jobs, it had made labour senseless, guaranteeing a relatively fair income for which one could buy less and less.[49]

An interesting example of the intrinsic dynamism of the socialist social policy with undesired effects was the effort of the Czechoslovak leadership to siphon off some of the population's buying power by the implementation of a pension scheme in 1968, which in many respects resembled the additional pension insurance system sharply criticised in 1964 as a "residue of differences among professions."[50] A report explaining the re-cancellation of the additional pension insurance scheme (the premiums of which were paid by enterprises and organisations) as of 1 January 1973, says that the additional insurance scheme was initially expected to be used by citizens who were also expected to pay the premiums themselves and thus have a specific form of long-term savings or "a nest egg" when they grew old. The powers-that-be hoped that the introduction of the additional pension insurance scheme paid by enterprises and organisations would help differentiate enterprises with good economic results from others and also provide the necessary stimuli or incentives needed to stabilise the workforce in some industries. By the time a ban on signing new additional pension insurance contracts was imposed in October 1970, only 45,000 people had opted for the individual scheme; however, the number of people whose insurance premiums were paid by enterprises and organisations had exceeded 1.5 million. Enterprises and organisations were thus able to influence the state's pension system; trying to attract new employees and to give some extra benefits to existing ones, they ignored and disregarded their real economic performance. As a result, the enterprises' contributions to the state pension scheme were reduced; moreover, the "extra insurance premiums" significantly differed

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48 *NA*, f. N 69, P 95/88, Item 1, Draft Report on the Fulfillment of the Social and Economic Development Plan in 1988, on the 1989 Plan and on the Progress of the Reform of the Economic Mechanism, Annex III, Speech of Ladislav Adamec, 28 November 1988.

49 KOWALCZUK, Ilko-Sascha: Unheilbar krank. In: *Horch und Guck*, Vol. 20, Issue 3, No. 73 (2011), pp. 20–25, here p. 21.

50 In June 1968, MP Palachová noted this discrepancy; she criticised the inadequate coordination of the state insurance company and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, saying that both institutions had to be aware of "[…] how people perceive the fact that what was cancelled four years ago by an act [Act No. 101/1964 Coll. – author's note], liquidating the savings of these old people without having to resort to a monetary reform, is being implemented again, and using public funds at that." *(Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna* [The Joint Czecho-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library], Národní shromáždění ČSSR [National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], Stenographic Protocols, 24th Meeting, 27 June 1968 – see *www.psp.cz/eknih/1964ns/ stenprot/024schuz/s024039.htm.)*

from enterprise to enterprise. While, for example, the state-owned enterprise *Automobilové závody* [Automobile Works] Mladá Boleslav paid a 100 crowns per employee per month, the extra benefit could be up to five times higher in other companies. A decision was ultimately taken that almost 70,000 people who had already been drawing the additional pension insurance benefits could keep them. State and party authorities were afraid, and not without reason, of the negative reactions of people. At the end of the day, they did not avoid them anyway, mainly from people who had signed the additional pension insurance contracts, but their state old age pensions had not been calculated by the time the additional pension insurance was cancelled (having one's state old age pension calculated was one of the conditions which the payment of the extra pension benefits was subject to). (The measure produced a lot of outrage mainly among employees of the Czechoslovak State Railways and other organisations falling under the Ministry of Transport, who accounted for most of the insurance scheme's clients.) "It is obvious that the state's approach to the pension insurance scheme must be uniform," was the conclusion drawn by the authors of the report of September 1972.[51]

The lack of coordination and threats to fundamental principles of the pension insurance scheme paid for by organisations and enterprises was also mentioned in the April 1987 resolution on the implementation of the conclusions on social security of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, according to which more than 260,000 individual insurance contracts had been signed as of 31 December 1985, under which 56,500 extra pensions averaging 160 crowns had been drawn as of the same date.[52] Although the individual pension insurance scheme was retained, Czechoslovak citizens were not much interested in it, compared to, for example, life or combined workers' insurance plans. Most of them opted for a conventional savings account at *Československá státní spořitelna* [Czechoslovak State Savings Bank], as they perceived the pension insurance scheme as "not profitable enough"[53] (as mentioned in another report on the development of life and pension insurance plans of January 1975). The introduction of special bonuses the amount of which depended on the elapsed time of the individual pension insurance contract did little to change the situation.

The paternalistic concept of the social policy did not consist only in "an improvement of the social situation of economically or socially weak population segments." It was also after "a comprehensive arrangement of mutual social relations of classes,

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51 *NA*, f. 1590, P 56/56, Item 3, Resolving the Situation in Pension Insurance of Employees, Annex III/1, Report on the Situation in the Pension Insurance of Employees, 25 September 1972.

52 *Ibid.*, f. N 69, P 33/87, Item 2, Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Presidium of the Central Council of Trade Unions and Presidium of the Central Committee of the Socialist Union of Youth on Measures Implementing the Conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Field of Social Security, Annex VII, Citizens-Paid Pension Insurance of Employees at State Insurance Companies, 6 April 1987.

53 *Ibid.*, Vol. 143, Archival Unit 147, Item 3, Further Development of Life and Pension Insurance Plans of the Population, 20 January 1975.

segments and social groups," against the backdrop of the dominant central state authorities and institutions and the absence of an independent judicial power.[54] Gerd Poppe, a representative of the East German opposition community, made a fitting comment to the effect that "the social security policy was a preventive tool for safeguarding the government, through providing or taking away small privileges."[55] "The police state of the SED (*SED-Staat*) had the social state of the GDR tightly in its hands," and the socialist social policy was thus an integral part of the dictatorship practice.[56] It was a continuous "concern about power,"[57] and thus had to be continued literally at all costs. The "nursing" social policy provided no room for one's own initiative and produced expectations in people that were hard to satisfy. At the end of the day, the socialist social policy proved to be an "evolutionary dead end,"[58] which not only failed to meet the initial expectations of the Czechoslovak and East German regimes, but also made a substantial contribution to the "normalisation paradox," as the weakening of the economic performance led to the weakening of the power itself.[59]

"All in all, we have to admit that the social policy was being implemented at the expense of the whole society," sociologist Rainer Lubk said during a hearing in the German Bundestag in March 1997 also noting that assessing the consequences of the social policy practiced in the 1970s and 1980s was very difficult, depending on whose perspective – corporate management's, trade unions', workers', farmers', women's or old age pensioners' – we look at it from.[60] When judging the social policies of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, we thus cannot avoid ambivalent feelings and contradicting conclusions, as they, contrary to the purely repressive practices of the State Security and the Stasi, likewise had a number of positive features. In spite of their natural bias, pre-1989 public opinion surveys in both countries proved that the populations had a very positive opinion of social benefits. However, a more detailed analysis shows that social policy measures were not only accepted and recognised, but also subjected to considerable criticism, which was aimed, in particular, at the most pressing social problems – lack of goods and services, unsatisfactory working environments, bribery and clientelism, deficiencies in medical care – without the

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54   See SCHROEDER, Klaus: *Der SED-Staat: Geschichte und Strukturen der DDR*. München, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit 1998, p. 514.
55   MARQUARDT, B. (ed.): *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozeß der deutschen Einheit,"* Vol. III/1, p. 310 – see Footnote 20.
56   KOWALCZUK, I.-S.: Unheilbar krank, p. 21 – see Footnote 49.
57   STEINER, André: *Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR*. München, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2004, p. 169.
58   BOYER, Ch. – HENKE, K.-D. – SKYBA, P.: Gesamtbetrachtung, p. 768 – see Footnote 24.
59   BOYER, Ch.: Sozialgeschichte der Arbeiterschaft und staatssozialistische Entwicklungspfade, p. 80 – see Footnote 18.
60   MARQUARDT, B. (ed.): *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozeß der deutschen Einheit,"* Vol. III/1, pp. 283 and 313.

critics often actually not realising that most of the above problems were a natural consequence of the practiced strategy of "social comfort."

Old-Age Pension Schemes in Czechoslovakia and the GDR between 1970 and 1989

Old-age pensioners were not among the preferred population segments either in Czechoslovakia or in the German Democratic Republic and many social policy measures were implemented at their expense. Current results of research indicate that the situation of old-age pensioners was particularly unsatisfactory in East Germany, especially if compared to that of their West German counterparts. In his inspiring work on the development of social structures in the two German states, sociologist Rainer Geißler refers to old-age pensioners as "stepchildren of the socialist social policy."[61] According to a 1990 survey, old-age pensions in the GDR in the late 1980s were at best just 40 percent of West German ones.[62] In Czechoslovakia too the social security of old-age pensioners was not without problems, a fact noted, *inter alia*, in the Charter 77 document of May 1980, according to which "taking care of old people is a fundamental principle of social policy in any developed society."[63]

Until 1989, taking care of their old citizens posed a major problem for both regimes and, repeated increases in minimum and other pensions notwithstanding, many old-age pensioners (particularly those living alone or of an advanced age) fell into a group of households whose consumption was significantly limited, and could thus be regarded, without any doubt, as a socially disadvantaged population segment. The situation was persistent, although the ruling parties in both countries were concerned about it, and to some extent also aware of it as the most pressing problem related to the old-age pension scheme and the living standard of pensioners. However, all attempted solutions were doomed to failure because of the deteriorating performance of both countries' economies and also due to the specific dualistic nature of the socialist social policy which, on the one hand, was based on efforts to authoritatively protect all citizens against market forces and

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61 According to his findings, old-age pensioners, and in particular female old-age pensioners, were a considerably marginalised segment of East German society. In 1970, 65 percent of households of East German old-age pensioners were on the brink of poverty; 10 years later, the number was still 50 percent, and later dropped to less than 45 percent in 1988. (GEIßLER, Rainer: *Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands*. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2002, p. 271.)

62 See HOFFMANN, Dierk: Rentenversicherung und SED-Rentenpolitik in den achtziger Jahren. In: KUHRT, E. (ed.): *Die Endzeit der DDR-Wirtschaft*, pp. 375–423, here p. 395 – see Footnote 9. At the same time, the author notes that a comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany is very difficult, as there were many subsidies in the GDR which also belonged to the social security system. The numbers mentioned above reflect the subsidies as well.

63 CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V.: *Charta 77,* Vol. 1, Document No. 143, p. 332 – see Footnote 21.

to offer them a grand welfare scheme while, on the other hand, preferring certain social groups in order to ensure enough labour.[64]

It should be noted that the social security policy was much more politicised in the German Democratic Republic, whose leaders were forced to take into account the specific "proximity of the West" and act accordingly. Special pension schemes had existed there since the early 1950s (pensions for the intelligentsia since 1951, for members of the State Security – Stasi – since 1953, for members of the *Volkspolizei* and the *Volksarmee* since 1954 and 1957, respectively), their purpose being to win the loyalty of key professional groups and to dissuade their members from the intention of emigrating to the Federal Republic. Officially, however, advantages and benefits of the unified social security system, which was supposed to offer the prospect of a decent life after retirement, were being lauded. The reality was somewhat different, as there were considerable differences in pension benefits from profession to profession. While in 1963, for example, 85 percent of East German pensioners had to put up with near-minimum pensions and the average pension to average salary ratio was just 28 percent, persons included in special and additional pension schemes were enjoying pensions equal to 70 to 90 percent of the average salary. In 1989, there were four special pension schemes in the GDR (for members of the Army, customs, the Ministry of the Interior and State Security), plus 27 additional/supplementary pension schemes! In 1990, about 350,000 pensioners were drawing benefits from them, and more than 1.5 million people (still employed) were waiting for them.[65] Active social involvement and membership in important party and state bodies brought not only appropriate privileges during the active age, but were also reflected in the beneficiary's living standard after his or her retirement. The practice of preferring certain social groups undoubtedly contributed to their loyalty to the East German regime.

In this respect, it should be noted that Czechoslovakia too had special arrangements, so-called personal pensions having been introduced in 1956. According to Milada Tomková, they were granted to distinguished members of the Communist Party, employees of the Party's institutions and – last but not least – long-standing officers of the People's Militias and people deemed to have contributed to the formation and development of the state. The principles governing their granting and amount were determined by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and – insofar as the period under study is concerned – also by two resolutions of the government adopted in 1970 and 1988. Their maximum

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64 In this respect, Manfred Schmidt sees the East German welfare state concept as a specific combination of a *welfare state* and a *workfare state* (SCHMIDT, M. G.: Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik in der DDR, p. 303 – see Footnote 9).

65 See HOFFMANN, D.: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene, p. 359 – see Footnote 30. According to Klaus Schroeder, only 200,000 pensioners drew a special or additional/supplementary pension in 1989. However, he also admits that there was a significant discrepancy between most East German pensioners, who rather scratched out a living, and a fairly numerous privileged group drawing substantially higher pensions. (See SCHROEDER, K.: *Der SED-Staat*, p. 522 – see Footnote 54.)

limits were set (in 1968, for example, 3,500 Czechoslovak Crowns) which, however, were to be waived in extraordinary cases.[66] The table below indicates a steep growth in the number of personal pensions granted at the end of the first half of the 1980s. The related costs were naturally growing as well, from 20 million Czechoslovak Crowns to 437 million Czechoslovak Crowns, i.e. almost 22 times, during the period under scrutiny.

Table 1: The number of personal pensions (in thousands) and paid benefits (in million Czechoslovak Crowns) in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic between 1970 and 1989[67]

Year	1970	1975	1980	1982	1984	1985	1988	1989
Number of personal pensions	1	1	3	5	8	12	14	19
Paid benefits	20	33	86	129	201	269	372	437

However, the main criterion used to differentiate pensions in Czechoslovakia was the nature of work. There were three categories differing in the retirement age and, in particular, the amount of the pension. Falling into the first category were demanding professions, such as underground miners, tunnellers, crewmembers of seagoing ships or pilots. The retirement age of these professions was two to five years earlier, but their pension (as shown in the table below) was also more than a half higher than that granted to retirees falling into the third category, which comprised the overwhelming majority of Czechoslovak employees. The category in between, which, according to the Social Security Act (Act No. 121/1975 Coll.), included professions which were performed "under particularly difficult working conditions," was entitled to a higher pension, but the retirement age remained unchanged.[68] However, it should be noted that the first category entitled to "preferential treatment" included a very low number of people who, moreover, often did not enjoy their high pensions for very long because of health problems and a lower life expectancy.

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66 See TOMKOVÁ, Milada: Sociální zabezpečení [Social Security]. In: BOBEK, Michal – MOLEK, Pavel – ŠIMÍČEK, Vojtěch (ed.): *Komunistické právo v Československu: Kapitoly z dějin bezpráví* [Communist Law in Czechoslovakia: Chapters from the History of Injustice]. Brno, Masarykova univerzita [Masaryk University] 2009, pp. 670–723, here p. 712.

67 See *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980* [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. Praha, SNTL 1980, p. 614; *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1985*. Praha, SNTL 1985, p. 620; *Statistická ročenka ČSFR 1991* [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic]. Praha, SEVT 1991, p. 608.

68 Act on Social Security, No. 121/1975 Coll., Section 12, Subparagraph b).

Table 2: Average newly granted old-age pensions by the profession category in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic between 1970 and 1989 (Czechoslovak Crowns/month)[69]

Year	1970	1975	1980	1985	1989
Category I	1623	1849	2353	2621	3223
Category II	1440	1519	1876	2030	2515
Category III	950	1057	1363	1541	1883

As indicated by a number of submissions and complaints in the field of social policy, which party and trade union bodies had to deal with, the boundaries between the categories (especially Category I and Category II) were the subject matter of a number of disputes. The complainants were, as a rule, people who had belonged to more than one category during their professional career and who demanded that this fact be taken into account. At the April 1987 meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which discussed the proposed implementation of the conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party in the field of social security, a list of current problems was presented which also included, for example, the need to deal with the "inadequate reflection of working merits in the pensions of employees who have worked for a number of years in a Category I or Category II job, but not long enough to be granted a Category I or Category II pension."[70]

Priorities and Maladies of the Pension Systems in Czechoslovakia and the GDR

One of the key problems of the pension systems in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic that officials were struggling with was the unfavourable ratio between the average salary and the average old-age pension. Increases in minimum pensions and in fact all granted pensions (in particular those granted some time earlier) were not high enough to cover the rising cost of living which, moreover, was being increasingly affected by the adverse consequences of widespread corruption. While the Federal Republic of Germany had introduced a pension indexation system as early as 1957, East German leaders relied on a newly-introduced and repeatedly modified voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme (*freiwillige*

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69 See *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1971*. Praha, SNTL 1971; *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980*, p. 615; *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1981*. Praha, SNTL 1981, p. 617. *Statistická ročenka ČSFR 1991*, p. 609.

70 *NA*, f. N 69, P 32/87, Item 1, Proposed Implementation of Conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party in the Field of Social Security, 30 March 1987.

Zusatzrentenversicherung – FZR).[71] Czechoslovak leaders revisited the subject only in connection with considerations concerning further modifications of the pension scheme at the turn of 1986 and 1987 although a mention of the positive effects of an "indexation of sorts" of existing pensions can be found much earlier – in the document called "A Proposal of the Principal Directions of the Living Standard Development during the 7th Five-Year Plan Period" of February 1980.[72] However, the powers-that-be finally concluded that "the economic situation permitting, pensions could be adjusted to reflect the development of wages" no earlier than 1990.[73]

As shown in the table below, the ratio between the average salary and the average old-age pension was significantly worse in East Germany than in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the average old-age pension had increased by a record 124 percent (from 199 to 446 Marks) between 1970 and 1989, while the average salary rose by only 72 percent.[74] Even so, the average salary in 1989 was almost three times as high as the average old-age pension without the voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme. In Czechoslovakia too retirement meant a significant deterioration in the standard of living, which was worsening over time, and soon became even more significant than the authors of the abovementioned Charter 77 document of 1980 had thought.[75] While the average Czechoslovak old-age pension had increased by 76 percent during the period mentioned above, the average gross salary rose by 61 percent. Still, the average salary in 1989 was almost twice as high as the average old-age pension. The significantly worse average salary/average old-age pension ratio in the German Democratic Republic was, first and foremost, a result of the significantly higher average salary in the national economy, which old-age pensions could not keep pace with.

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71 Contemporary Czechoslovak documents also contain a translation "voluntary supplementary insurance of social pensions." (*Ibid.*, f. 1590, Vol. 143, Archival Unit 147, Item 3, Further Development of Life and Pension Insurance of the Population, Annex IV, Insurance of the Population in Socialist Countries, 20 January 1975.)

72 *Ibid.*, f. Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1976–1981 (1596 – initial fund designation AÚV KSČ 02/1), P 130/80, Item 2, A Proposal of Principal Directions of the Living Standard Development during the 7th Five-Year Plan Period, 5 February 1980.

73 *Ibid.*, f. N 69, P 69/88, Item 1, Government Draft of the Social Security Act, 2 May 1988.

74 The overall increase was significantly affected by the last rise in June 1989, the average amount of which was 66 Marks. Compared to 1988, the average old-age pension (not including FZR) rose by 17.4 percent. (See *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1989 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. Berlin, Staatsverlag 1989, p. 351; *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. Berlin, Rudolf Haufe 1990, p. 384; STEINER, André: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, Vol. *SBZ/DDR*. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2006, p. 130.)

75 See CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (ed.): *Charta 77,* Vol. 1, Document No. 106 – see Footnote 21. The authors state that the income of people who retired in 1978 dropped by roughly 43 percent. According to official statistical data, however, the average decrease was 56 percent.

Table 3: The ratio of the average old-age pension to the average salary of workers and employees in the national economies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the GDR (in percentage terms, apart from Collective Agricultural Cooperatives and LPGs), including the share of people subscribing to the voluntary supplementary pension scheme in the GDR (in percentage terms) between 1970 and 1989[76]

Year	CSSR	GDR	GDR – pension with FZR	GDR – share of FZR clients
1970	44.5	26.1		
1973	41.5	30.2		
1975	41.3	28.8		
1976	45.6	32.4		
1977	44.8	31.7	44.9	9.8
1978	44.0	30.9	44.4	11.2
1979	44.9	33.8	44.4	13.4
1980	44.7	33.3	43.5	15.6
1982	46.1	31.9	41.2	19.8
1983	46.8	31.5	40.6	21.7
1984	45.3	32.3	41.0	27.4
1985	45.9	33.1	41.4	29.4
1986	45.8	32.1	40.4	32.3
1987	45.5	30.1	38.3	34.7
1988	44.5	29.8	37.6	37.6
1989	48.6	34.1[*]	42.4	40.6

In the early 1970s, the East German leadership knew all too well that the situation of pensioners was indeed critical. The reform of pensions, announced as early as 1957, was belated, and in 1968 the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED, Walter Ulbricht, thus decided to resolve it by introducing the supplementary insurance scheme mentioned above which, however, East German citizens

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[76] LPGs (*Landwirtschaftproduktionsgesellschaft*) were the East German counterparts of the Czechoslovak Collective Agricultural Cooperatives. There is no data available on pensions falling under the voluntary supplementary pension scheme for the 1970–1976 period. The table is based on the *Statistická ročenka ČSSR* and *Statistische Jahrbücher der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (available at *http://www.digizeitschriften.de*). Furthermore, the following publications were taken into account: STEINER, A.: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, p. 130; SCHROEDER, K.: *Der SED-Staat*, p. 521 – see Footnote 54; HOFFMANN, D.: Rentenversicherung und SED-Rentenpolitik in den achtziger Jahren, p. 393 – see Footnote 62; PRŮCHA, V. et al.: *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992,* Vol. 2, p. 917 – see Footnote 11.

[*] This was after the increase in pensions in June 1989 (although it was initially planned for December 1989).

were initially not very much interested in. There had been a negligible increase in minimum pensions even before Erich Honecker came into power in May 1971, but it was impossible to stop the ever-widening gap between old and newly granted pensions. In mid-1972, the new leader of the Party actively joined the discussion on pensions, intending to combine an improvement of the situation of pensioners with other social security measures – support of mothers and young families, housing improvements – by which he attempted, just like his Czechoslovak counterparts, to react to adverse demographic forecasts and to deal with the problem of an insufficient labour force. The well-known "social security package," which is how the "Joint Position Paper of the Central Committee of the SED, Presidium of the FDGB[77] and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic on Social Policy Measures Taken to Implement Essential Tasks of the Five-Year Plan" of 28 April 1972 became known and on whose basic features Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chňoupek[78] was briefed in detail during his visit to the GDR in April 1972, did not differ very much from measures taken by the new "normalisation" leadership in Czechoslovakia.[79]

Both ruling parties hoped that the measures would have a significant political effect, which was another characteristic feature of the socialist social policy. In this respect, it was particularly Erich Honecker who benefitted from it. It was he who played a crucial role in the orientation of East German social security policy between 1971 and 1989, repeatedly rejecting all warnings from the State Planning Commission against overloading the national economy. The "party dictatorship was transformed into a dictatorship of the Secretary General,"[80] and not only in this field of East German politics, although Honecker repeatedly denies it in his memoirs.[81] As for Czechoslovakia, the social security measures were rather the outcome of the collective efforts of the party leaders.

The April 1972 Joint Position Paper, which increased the social benefits of almost 3.5 million East German citizens, resulted in an increase in pensions from between 40 to 70 East German Marks, depending on the number of years spent at work.[82] It also contained a provision whereby pensions granted before 1 July 1968

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77 FDGB (*Freie deutsche Gewerkschaftsbunde*) – Free German Trade Union Federation of the GDR.

78 *NA*, f. 1590, Vol. 40, Archival Unit 42, on Information 5, Information on the Visit of Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Comrade Bohuslav Chňoupek, to the German Democratic Republic from 4 to 7 April 1972.

79 A complete translation of the position paper of the supreme bodies of the GDR was also available to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (see *Ibid.* on Information 11).

80 SKYBA, P. – BOYER, Ch.: Gesellschaftliche Strukturen und sozialpolitische Denk- und Handlungsfelder 1981–1989, p. 118 – see Footnote 34.

81 ANDERT, Reinhold – HERZBERG, Wolfgang – HONECKER, Erich: *Der Sturz: Erich Honecker im Kreuzverhör*. Berlin – Weimar, Aufbau 1990, p. 274.

82 Employees with less than 24 years spent at work were entitled to the lowest increase; on the other hand, those with more than 45 years at work received the highest increase. The new minimum pension limits thus rose to 200 or 240 East German Marks. (See *NA*, f. 1590,

were recalculated and increased. Of the sum of 1.8 billion East German Marks allocated to pensions, the lion's share went to pensioners drawing the lowest pensions, while increases in medium and high pensions were negligible.[83] At the same time, the Joint Position Paper redefined the terms and conditions of the voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme, for the third time since 1968.[84]

Following the introduction of the new rules, the East German policy holder was surrendering 10 percent of his or her salary up to 600 East German Marks to the state-paid part of his/her pension, and if desired, an additional 20 percent of his/her salary between 600 and 1,200 East German Marks as a voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme premium[85]; however, half of the latter contribution was surrendered by the enterprise/company employing him/her. The participation in the voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme also increased the policy holder's sickness benefits, a feature which it was anticipated would attract mainly young people. Although the number of people involved in the pension scheme was growing rapidly (62 percent in 1975, 80 percent in 1985, almost 84 percent in 1988),[86] the voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme was just a partial solution of the situation of East German pensioners. As shown in Table 3, there was indeed a significant improvement in the average pension versus the average salary ratio, which almost equaled that of Czechoslovakia and was even slightly better in 1977 and 1978. While the Czech system of state-paid pension benefits, however, guaranteed a ratio exceeding 40 percent of the average salary, East German pensioners had to put up with an average ratio that was less than 10 percent lower, as the number of those enjoying both state-paid and voluntary pension scheme benefits was relatively low until the second half of the 1980s. Until 1982, therefore, some 80 percent of East German pensioners had to live on the basic state-paid pension; it was only in the second half of the 1980s that the number of pensioners drawing both types of pension benefits exceeded 30 percent. In 1989,

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Vol. 40, Archival Unit 42, on Information 5, Information on the Visit of Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic…)

83 See HOFFMANN, D.: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene, Sonderversorgungssysteme, p. 339 – see Footnote 30.

84 The substance of the improvement was that the calculation basis of the supplementary pensions of men and women older than 59 and 45 years, respectively, as of 1 March 1971 now included the years and months by which they exceeded the above age limits as of 1 March, 1971. Moreover, the five-year FZR insurance duration as one of the conditions for the inclusion of the FZR insurance duration in the calculation basis of disability pensions was cancelled. However, the FZR application had to be submitted not later than the end of 1972 and the applicant's gross income as of March 1971 had to exceed 600 East German Marks. (See. *NA*, f. 1590, Vol. 40, Archival Unit 42, on Information 5, Information on the visit of Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic…)

85 Since 1976, it was also possible to surrender some of the salary's portion above 1,200 East German Marks. (Compare HOFFMANN, D.: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene, Sonderversorgungssysteme, p. 341.)

86 STEINER, A.: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, p. 172 – see Footnote 74.

it even exceeded 40 percent. Even a major adjustment of pensions made shortly before the 30th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic in 1979, as a result of which minimum and other pensions were increased by 40 East German Marks, did little to change the situation, as indicated, for example, by a 1981 report of the Trade Unions and Social Policy Department of the Central Committee of the SED, which warned against the low living standard of pensioners many of whom (those who had worked less than 34 years or whose salary was less than 460 East German Marks/month) could not even reach the minimum pension limit in effect at that time, which was 270 East German Marks.[87]

Since the late 1970s, the SED leadership thus showed a certain absence of concepts in social policy, and the next decade therefore saw just minor changes in minimum pensions and the pensions of women, the average pension of whom in 1989 was roughly a hundred East German Marks lower than that of men, in spite of the changes.[88] As a matter of fact, one of the reasons of the not very favourable pension to salary ratio in the GDR was undoubtedly the fact that the share of women in the East German population was significantly higher than in Czechoslovakia, which was, after all, consistent with demographic developments in each country.

Table 4: Differences between the numbers of women and men in the Czechoslovak and East German populations between 1950 and 1989 (in 1,000)[89]

Year	1950	1960	1970	1980	1987	1989
CSSR	356	331	368	399	403	404
GDR	2060	1698	1338	1026	791	687

The share of women in the total number of East German old-age pensioners was growing steadily, from 69.5 percent in 1975 to 73.4 percent in 1989.[90] However, the main problems of the East German pension system were the absence of dynamics[91] and the retention of the 600 Mark limit for contributions to the pension

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87 See HOFFMANN, D.: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene, Sonderversorgungssysteme, p. 351.

88 See SCHULZ, Günther: Soziale Sicherung von Frauen und Familie. In: HOCKERTS, H. G. (ed.): *Drei Wege deutscher Sozialstaatlichkeit*, pp. 117–150, here p. 132 – see Footnote 16. According to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the average pension of East German women was roughly a quarter lower than that of men. (WEHLER, H.-U.: *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1949–1990*, p. 345 – see Footnote 6.)

89 Calculated according to the following sources: *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980,* p. 91; *Statistická ročenka ČSFR 1991,* p. 102; STEINER, A.: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, p. 1.

90 Calculated according to data published in: HOFFMANN, D: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene, Sonderversorgungssysteme, p. 352.

91 While gross incomes grew by 24.3 percent between 1980 and 1988, the growth rate of pensions during the same period was just 11.2 percent. (See *Ibid.*: Rentenversicherung und

system, which was a long way from being consistent with the development of the average salary as early as the beginning of the 1970s. Although East German leaders of the SED discussed the possibility of an increased limit for contributions to the mandatory social security system (which the State Planning Commission believed would strengthen the financial sustainability of the whole system and increase the overall level of pensions granted) in the early 1970s, Erich Honecker was afraid of negative reactions to a net salary reduction that would have resulted therefrom and the 600 Mark limit was therefore retained until 1989.[92] Any person thus contributed only up to 60 East German Marks a month to the social security system, and could opt for a voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme, or make use of his or her net salary to build up a retirement financial reserve. The last increase in pensions by 30 to 100 East German Marks was supposed to take place early in December 1989, but the party leadership decided to speed it up and implement it in June, in order to be able to demonstrate the growing living standard of old age pensioners on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic.[93]

Table 5: Average gross salary of employees in the national economy in the GDR (in East German Marks) and Czechoslovakia (in Czechoslovak Crowns) between 1970 and 1989[94]

Year	1970	1975	1980	1985	1989
Average salary in the GDR	762	897	1030	1140	1311
Average salary in the CSSR	1937	2304	2637	2883	3123

Just like their Czechoslovak counterparts, many pensioners in East Germany were forced to work even after reaching their retirement age (65 years for men, 60 years for women)[95] to improve their living standard. As a matter of fact, various renditions of the same joke were appearing in both countries – one should adjust one's

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SED-Rentenpolitik in den achtziger Jahren, p. 386 – see Footnote 62.)

92 See DIEL, Udo: Renten. In: EPPELMANN, Rainer – MÖLLER, Horst – NOOKE, Günter – WILMS, Dorothee (ed.): *Lexikon des DDR-Sozialismus: Das Staats- und Gesellschaftssystem der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. Paderborn, Schöningh 1996, p. 493.

93 See HOFFMANN, D.: Rentenversicherung und SED-Rentenpolitik in den achtziger Jahren, p. 417.

94 See STEINER, A.: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, p. 130. The East German to Czechoslovak Crown exchange rate between 1970 and 1988 was DDM 100 = CZK 301.56. (See *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1989*. Praha, SNTL 1989, p. 189; *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980,* p. 195; *Statistická ročenka ČSFR 1991,* p. 199.)

95 The Presidium of the Central Committee of the SED discussed the possibility of reducing the relatively high retirement age, particularly in connection with the adjustment of pensions in 1979. However, the party leadership was ultimately dissuaded from the idea by the high costs, estimated at DDM 2.6 billion in 1980 alone. (See HOFFMANN, D.: Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene, Sonderversorgungssysteme, p. 350.)

working efforts to save enough strength for work after reaching retirement age. In the early 1970s, more than 22 percent of old-age East German pensioners were working; however, the percentage dropped to 18 in the early 1980s, and even to 10.5 in 1989.[96] According to Lenka Kalinová, the number of working old-age pensioners in Czechoslovakia was also far from negligible; in the 1970s and 1980s, they accounted for nine to 11 percent of the total workforce.[97] Moreover, intellectual or white-collar employees were making use of the opportunity to postpone their retirement and have their pensions increased by seven percent for every extra year of work (50,000 people in 1987), or drawing a pension and working at the same time, with the income from work being limited to CZK 22,000 a year (85,000 people). However, the annual income limit did not apply to blue-collar professions; according to April 1987 data, there were about 600,000 people drawing a pension and working in such professions at the same time.[98]

Both Czechoslovak and East German old-age pensioners claimed that they were working to improve their living standard, to be able to afford something extra, or to help their children. Old-age pensioners falling into more advanced age groups – generally 69 or more years – generally did not work, mainly because of health reasons.[99] A December 1983 public poll on opinions of citizens on social security benefits in Czechoslovakia concluded that the continued work of old-age pensioners was a topical, but also a sensitive issue; while old-age pensioners were able to earn some money and felt that the society still needed them, they held jobs that would otherwise have been occupied by younger people, not to speak of their need to rest.[100]

The approach of the Czechoslovak leadership in the field of pensions was very much like that of their East German counterparts. The top priority was to increase the pensions of old-age pensioners, to gradually increase minimum pensions, and

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96   See CONRAD, Christoph: Alterssicherung. In: HOCKERTS, H. G. (ed.): *Drei Wege deutscher Sozialstaatlichkeit*, pp. 101–116, here p. 109 – see Footnote 16. The percentage of working male pensioners was higher than that of women (29 percent as opposed to 15 percent). (See OTTE, S.: Das Rentensystem der DDR, p. 18 – see Footnote 5.)

97   KALINOVÁ, L.: *Konec nadějí a nová očekávání*, p. 114 – see Footnote 5. According to other data, post-productive age people accounted for 8.8 to 9.8 percent of the total workforce. Their number had been gradually dropping until 1975, but then started rising again and peaked in 1987, when the number of working old-age pensioners reached almost 750,000. (Compare PRŮCHA, V. et al.: *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992*, p. 713 – see Footnote 11.)

98   *NA*, f. N 69, P 32/87, Item 1, Proposed Implementation of Conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party in the Field of Social Security, 30 March 1987.

99   In a survey conducted in East Germany, health reasons were mentioned as a cause of discontinued work by 71.3 percent of old-age pensioners (see CONRAD, Ch.: Alterssicherung, p. 113). According to two similar surveys carried out in Czechoslovakia, the corresponding figures were 57 percent in 1974 and 66 percent in 1983 (Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, COH, Collection of the Public Opinion Research Institute, Research No. 83/5, December 1983, Opinions of Czechoslovak Citizens Concerning Social Benefits, p. 35).

100 *Ibid.*, p. 27.

to improve the average pension to average salary ratio. Although social security expenditure was growing (according to a 1973 comprehensive report on the development of Czechoslovakia and its economy, social security costs had increased nine fold since February 1948),[101] the Czechoslovak social security system was suffering from the same maladies as the East German one. Although the average old-age pension had increased by 138 percent between 1950 and 1972, retirement still meant a substantial decline in one's living standard.[102] The disadvantaged included people with low incomes and, in particular, so-called "old-age pensioners." The term denoted old-age pensioners whose pensions had been calculated according to earlier rules, which meant they were drawing lower pensions than those they would have been entitled to according to new rules (more specifically, Czechoslovak "old-age pensioners" of the 1970s were drawing pensions calculated according to rules in effect before 1957, those of the 1980s were paid pensions calculated prior to 1971). Here we encounter yet another key problem of the pension systems of both countries; in contemporary documents, it was referred to as a "breach of the principle of merit." The breach of the principle was actually manifested in two ways. First, the average pension to average salary ratio was continuously deteriorating; second, the pension to salary ratio was significantly worse in the case of employees with higher incomes (such as skilled workers) who were not granted the advantage of participating in any of the supplementary schemes (in East Germany) or a personal or Category I (in Czechoslovakia).

The root of the first discrepancy was, paradoxically enough, the growth of newly granted pensions which reflected continuously rising average salaries in Czechoslovakia and the GDR (as shown in Table 5). Both Czechoslovak and East German leaders were confronted with the fact that people who had already been in retirement for some time were getting significantly less money than "fresh" old-age pensioners, although they had been doing the same job or performing the same profession while in productive age. It is true that both countries increased the pensions of "old-age pensioners" several times (in 1971, for example, Czechoslovakia spent a billion Czechoslovak Crowns to do so), but the situation repeated itself anyway after some time. "The fundamental problem of the pension system is the lagging of pensions calculated and granted some time ago behind the growth rate of the living standard," concluded the author of a May 1970 report. In his opinion, the situation was unsolvable by half-baked measures, but required a profound reform of the pension system which was supposed to be implemented by 1975.[103]

101　*NA*, f. 1590, Vol. 69, Archival Unit 67, Item 8, Draft Written Report for Members and Candidates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia "The Development of Czechoslovakia and Its Economy since February 1948," 2 February 1973.

102　According to another document, the average old-age pension had increased more than four times between 1948 and 1985 (*NA*, f. N 69, P 54/88, Item 6, Principles of the Social Security Act, Annex I, Basic Indicators of the Development of the Pension Scheme in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 7 December 1987).

103　*Ibid.*, f. Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1966–1971 (1591 – initial fund designation AÚV KSČ 02/1), Vol. 129, Archival Unit 205, Item 5, Issues of Princi-

Joining the discussion on the above-mentioned draft of the new social security act of 1975, as a result of which the taxation of pensions, in effect since 1964, was abolished and the pension system unified as of 1 January 1976 to provide identical benefits to both employees and cooperative farmers (which never happened in East Germany), Gustav Husák too emphasised the need to adjust pensions calculated between 1957 to 1965. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia intended to allocate CZK 3.3 billion to these changes starting in 1976.[104] As indicated in the minutes of meetings dating back to the late 1980s and discussions on the new pension system, the problem of "old-age pensioners" had remained topical. Documents for the April 1987 meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia warned about the static nature of the pension system, as a result of which the average pension to average salary ratio continued to deteriorate. The structure of pensions thus produced considerable differences depending on the time when the pension had been calculated and granted, as illustrated by the table below.

Table 6: Average calculated old-age pension in Czechoslovakia by the year it was granted for the 1966 to 1989 period (in Czechoslovak Crowns)[105]

Year of retirement	1966–70	1971–75	1976–79	1980–81	1982–85	1986–89
Average old-age pension	1199	1302	1375	1486	1573	1733

On the other hand, the disadvantaging of people with higher incomes was a result of the relatively low gross salary used as a basis for the pension, which amounted to CZK 2,000 in Czechoslovakia and DDM 600 in the German Democratic Republic. It should be noted that the CZK 2,000 limit applying to Czechoslovak pensions was increased by CZK 500 as late as 1988. While the reduction of the pension calculation basis to CZK 2,000 had not posed much of a problem at the turn of the 1950s, as roughly 90 percent of employees had been earning less than CZK 2,000, by 1975 almost two thirds of employees had exceeded the CZK 2,000 limit, with one fifth

pal Relations in the Development of the Living Standard during the 5th Five-Year Plan, 28 May 1970.

104 *Ibid.*, f. 1590, Vol. 150, Archival Unit 155, Item 1, Draft of the Report of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Fulfillment of the Conclusions of the 14th Party Congress in the Field of Social Policy, 15 April 1975.

105 See *Ibid.*, f. N 69, P 54/88, Item 6, Principles of the Social Security Act: A Political and Economic Analysis of Proposed Principles Aimed to Improve the Social Security System, 7 December 1987; *Ibid.*, P 32/87, Item 1, Proposed Implementation of the Conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party in the Field of Social Security, 30 March 1987. The 1986–1989 data is recalculated in accordance with the *Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1988* (p. 625), the *Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1989* (p. 629) and the *Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic 1991* (p. 609).

even earning more than CZK 3,000. In 1987, more than 80 percent of employees were earning more than CZK 2,000, which meant that the limit simply had to be increased, particularly with respect to highly skilled workers and managers with salaries over CZK 4,000, who accounted for almost 20 percent of the total workforce in 1985.[106] The adjustment increased the limit to CZK 2,500 and also modified the salary differential in which one third of the salary was included in the base used to calculate the pension (between CZK 2,500 and 6,000) and introduced a new salary differential in which one tenth of the salary was included in the base (CZK 6,000 to 10,000). Until then, only salaries up to CZK 5,000 had been included in the pension calculation base.[107] The aim of the change was to achieve an average pension to average salary ratio of 60 percent.[108]

From the second half of the 1980s, many documents of the Czechoslovak and East German leadership kept mentioning, with increasing frequency, that the growth of costs of social benefits, while improving the living standard and strengthening the social security of citizens, also meant a heavier burden for the national economy.[109] "The purpose of all economic developments is to provide for people's needs in every respect and to strengthen their social security. […] We have not been fulfilling the social and economic development objectives," said Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Miloš Jakeš, in a speech delivered at a nationwide meeting of Regional and District Party Secretaries in the summer of 1988. He also briefed the audience on social security system changes that were supposed to take effect on 1 October 1988, and whose purpose was to strengthen the principle of merit and reinforce the system of social security. In his opinion, the sum of CZK 15 billion was needed to improve the pension to salary ratio and the situation of "old-age pensioners," which, however, "would have to be generated first."[110]

In both countries, measures taken in the area of the pension system reflected the "general direction" formulated at party congresses or on the occasion of important anniversaries, or reflected the regime's effort to compensate increased costs of living

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106 In 1970 and 1985, there were just two percent and 10 percent of them, respectively. (*NA*, P 69/88, Item 1, Government Draft of the Social Security Act, 2 May 1988.)

107 *Ibid.*, P 54/88, Item 6, Principles of the Social Security Act: A Political and Economic Analysis on Proposed Principles Aimed at Improving the Social Security System, 7 December 1987.

108 The aim of the East German leadership was to achieve the average pension to the average salary ratio of 47.5 percent by 1990 and 72.5 percent by 2000. (See HOFFMANN, D.: Rentenversicherung und SED-Rentenpolitik in den achtziger Jahren, p. 408 – see Footnote 62.)

109 Because of the low level of contributions to the social security system, the sum the East German regime had to bankroll the pension system had risen from two billion East German Marks in 1950 to 17 billion in 1988. (See OTTE, S.: Das Rentensystem der DDR, p. 18 – see Footnote 5.)

110 *NA*, f. N 69, P 74/88, Item 1, Draft of the Speech to be Delivered at the Nationwide Meeting of Secretaries of Regional (Municipal) and District Party Committees, Annex III, Speech of Miloš Jakeš, 15 June 1988.

for a selected population segment.[111] It is true that the costs of welfare and social benefits were growing continuously throughout the 1970s, reaching CZK 68 billion in Czechoslovakia and DDM 25 billion in the German Democratic Republic. The trend continued well into the 1980s, with social and welfare expenditure being CZK 74 billion in Czechoslovakia and DDM 28 billion in GDR in 1985.[112] According to key social security criteria in effect between 1980 and 1990, which the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia discussed in April 1987, it was expected that social security costs would exceed CZK 92 billion in 1990, with pensions accounting for 65 percent of the sum.[113] At the same time, pension-related costs accounted for approximately 60 percent of total social security costs throughout the "normalisation" period. According to recent data, social security costs in the German Democratic Republic amounted to almost DDM 33 billion in 1989.[114]

Although the social security system was not criticised as often as the housing programme and, in particular, the supply situation in the domestic market, neither Czechoslovak nor East German state and party leaders found a solution to the problem of the dropping living standard of old-age pensioners. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had to repeatedly react to the very critical letters of "old-age pensioners" and long-standing party members who complained, with "a feeling of injustice," that the pensions they had been granted were not commensurate with their share in the building of the socialist state of Czechoslovakia. A document describing the processing of letters and complaints in 1983 refers to criminal proceedings brought against the manager of a nursing centre for seniors in Praha-Bohnice, who together with her husband (a cook) endangered the health of her clients by unsafe food products, "buying meat earmarked for animals of Prague's ZOO and using it to prepare meals for the clients of the nursing home."[115] Various submissions and requests addressed to different

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111 The increases in pensions by CZK 30 in 1979 and 1982 were classic examples of compensation due to increased prices.

112 See STEINER, A.: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, p. 163 – see Footnote 74.

113 *NA*, f. N 69, P 33/87, Item 2, Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Presidium of the Central Council of Trade Unions and Presidium of the Central Committee of the Socialist Union of Youth on Measures Implementing the Conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Field of Social Security, Annex I, Key Social Security Indicators, 6 April 1987.

114 See STEINER, A.: *Statistische Übersichten zur Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, p. 164. However, other calculations indicate that social security expenditures may have been as high as DDM 36.2 billion in 1988. (See SCHROEDER, K.: *Der SED-Staat*, p. 525 – see Footnote 54.)

115 *NA*, f. Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1981–1986 (N 4), 114/84, on Information 2, Information on the Processing of Letters and Complaints of Employees Sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1983.

Czechoslovak state institutions and authorities clearly show that the dissatisfaction of citizens with the pension system was growing, particularly in the second half of the 1980s, and the last changes before the fall of the regime in 1989 did little about it.[116] According to an April 1989 survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute of the Federal Bureau of Statistics, whose data, however, should be used with a pinch of salt,[117] the number of those dissatisfied with the living standard of pensioners had grown. While 39 percent of the responding pensioners believed the living standard had worsened between 1980 and 1985, the percentage of the respondents sharing this opinion rose to almost 47 with respect to the 1985–1989 period. Almost a third of the respondents believed there had not been any living standard change between 1980 and 1989. More than half of the respondents stated they were rather or wholly dissatisfied with their old-age pensions; moreover, 38 percent of them also stated they anticipated their living standard to worsen even further in the next period.[118] The dissatisfaction was (quite logically) indirectly proportional to the amount of pension drawn; those satisfied prevailed only in the range above CZK 1,700 a month. As to those getting up to CZK 1,000 a month, the dissatisfied accounted for 77 percent among them in 1985 and 80 percent in 1989.[119] According to a June 1985 survey, more than half of pensioners claimed that their pensions were not high enough to meet their basic cost of living and 62 percent of them were not satisfied with their pensions.[120] Just like in the GDR, Czechoslovak pensioners too did not hesitate to directly address the Secretary General of the Communist Party to voice their dissatisfaction with their pensions, confusion about new legislation, or increasing rates at nursing homes and centres, as shown, for

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116 Between 1982 and 1986, an average of 3,665 complaints, reports and proposals in the field of social security were addressed and delivered to the state authorities every year. However, the first place belonged to complaints about supply and trade problems, averaging nearly 30,000 per year during the same period. (See *NA*, f. N 69, P 42/87, Item 8, Analysis of Lessons Learned in the Processing of Complaints, Reports and Proposals Submitted by Citizens to State and Economic Bodies and Organisations in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1986, Annex IV, An Overview of the Number of Complaints, Reports and Proposals Dealt with in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic between 1982 and 1986, 17 August 1987.)

117 For more information on the issue, see VILÍMEK, Tomáš: K otázce vztahu a vzájemné reflexi opozice a společnosti v Československu po roce 1968 [On the Issue of the Relations between and Mutual Reflections of the Opposition and Society in Czechoslovakia since 1968]. In: TŮMA, Oldřich – VILÍMEK, Tomáš (ed.): *Opozice a společnost po roce 1948* [The Opposition and Society since 1948]. Praha, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR 2009, pp. 176–220, here p. 181.

118 Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, COH, Collection of the Public Opinion Research Institute, Research No. 84/6, June 1985, Opinions of Czechoslovak Citizens Concerning Selected Living Standard Issues in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, pp. 69 n and 86.

119 *Ibid.*, Research No. 89/3, April 1989, Opinions of Czechoslovak Citizens Concerning Selected Living Standard Issues in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, p. 49 n.

120 *Ibid.*, Research No. 84/6, June 1985, Opinions of Czechoslovak Citizens Concerning Selected Living Standard Issues in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, pp. 69 n. and 86.

instance, in a letter of the cell of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of the nursing home in Praha-Malešice.[121]

Conclusion

The Czechoslovak and East German regimes were more similar than it might seem at first sight. Social policy measures in both countries were based on previous developments reaching back to the 19th century. The period after 1948 in Czechoslovakia and after 1949 in the GDR unquestionably distorted the concept of social policy or welfare as a power tool; nevertheless, the tradition of the Hapsburg Empire's state interventionism and the social legislation of the First Republic had never been completely erased in Czechoslovakia, and the same applies to the times of Bismarck or the Weimar Republic in the case of the GDR.[122] In the case of the East German paternalistic social security policy, one can also find some parallels with the social and welfare policy of the Nazi regime.[123] In socialist Czechoslovakia, there was the clear influence of the development of the welfare state after WWII, which was based on Keynes's theory and "social safety" programmes in the United Kingdom and other European countries. It was in keeping with these ideas and practices that the important National Insurance Act adopted shortly after the war was modeled, whose influence did not peter out even after its transformation into "social security" in the early 1950s. The "1953 effect" was present in both countries, albeit with different intensities, which forced the communist regimes to make use of subsequent social policy measures to weaken the protest potential in the society.

Just like Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic too "rediscovered social policy" in the 1960s, which its party and state leaders were putting high hopes into. In both countries, social policy was expected to soothe the population through consumption and so-called soft repressions; in this respect, both ruling parties were relying on concepts formulated by social scientists in the second half of the 1960s, whose position was systematically marginalised in both countries in the following period. Both the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany were drawing on the economic reforms of the previous

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121 *NA*, f. N 69, P 92/88, on Information 3, Information on the Contents of Letters Delivered to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Comrade M. Jakeš, between 1 and 31 October 1988.

122 In this respect, Jakub Rákosník noted that the year 1945 was definitely not a "Year Zero" in the process of building a welfare state in Czechoslovakia. In his opinion, many social security measures "which are often and without any reflection attributed to the post-February 1948 regime were implemented during WWII or the Third Republic period." (RÁKOSNÍK, Jakub: *Sovětizace sociálního státu: Lidově demokratický režim a sociální práva občanů v Československu 1945–1960* [Sovietization of the Welfare State: the People's Democratic Regime and Social Rights of Citizens in Czechoslovakia 1945–1960]. Praha, Filozofická fakulta, Univerzita Karlova [Faculty of Arts, Charles University], p. 17.)

123 See HOCKERTS, H. G. (ed.): *Drei Wege deutscher Sozialstaatlichkeit*.

period. "Parallels between the 'Real Socialism' in the GDR and the Czechoslovak 'normalisation regime' are obvious. […] They are corresponding phenomena, which may not be fully identical, but are members of the same family," is a conclusion offered by the authors of a final summary of the development of the socialist social policy in the GDR from 1971 to 1989.[124] It is also for this reason that comparisons of the development of social policy measures and systems in Eastern Bloc countries are an important area for research and deserve high attention.

The Czechoslovak and East German regimes devoted a lot of attention to their respective pension systems. The ruling Communist Parties were, first and foremost, attempting to react to the ever-increasing criticism of the situation of so-called "old-age pensioners" and violations of the principles of merit and social equality of pension beneficiaries. However, the changes they were making were responses to the most pressing problems rather than a well-thought-out effort to find a structural solution to pension-related issues and problems. In both countries, therefore, the trend of average pensions lagging behind average salaries continued, and households of pensioners were suffering from a blatant inequality in what they could afford consumption-wise, which was in contradiction with the official statements and declarations of their respective power establishments. Taking into account existing results of research, however, it is possible to say that Czechoslovakia's leaders were more active in their efforts to deal with the problems of pensions and the living standard of pensioners. On the other hand, the East German leadership, apart from offering a voluntary supplementary pension insurance scheme, hoped, at least to some extent, that the least satisfied pensioners would leave the country and spend the rest of their lives in the Federal Republic of Germany. This is, after all, illustrated by the lenient approach of the East German authorities to the trips of East German old-age pensioners to their West German neighbours. It was obviously more important for the ruling SED and its leader Erich Honecker to implement and meet the goals of the ambitious housing programme, carry on with massive subsidies of retail prices and, last but not least, continue to prefer the growth of work-related incomes and the welfare benefits of working citizens. Although Czechoslovak Communist representatives also emphasised housing programmes, pro-population measures, stability in retail prices together with a gradual increase in incomes, and were attempting, just like their East German counterparts, to shift a considerable portion of welfare onto the shoulders of companies and enterprises, they showed more interest in the situation of pensioners, whose number, unlike in the GDR, was continuously growing in Czechoslovakia.

However, the pension plans of both countries continued to be part of the system which did not permit genuine social debate about its shortfalls and deficiencies. The existing social security systems were undoubtedly giving most Czechoslovak and East German citizens a feeling of social security, which was, moreover, strengthened by unilaterally biased information about uncertainties and insecurity in capitalist countries presented in the media. However, the system also led to a significant

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124 BOYER, Ch. – HENKE, K.-D. – SKYBA, P.: Gesamtbetrachtung, p. 786 – see Footnote 24.

decrease in awareness of one's own responsibility for one's post-retirement life and strengthened many expectations which were difficult to meet. Looking back, the effects of social security and welfare measures in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic appear to be fairly ambivalent. On the one hand, they were unquestionably contributing to living standard and health care improvements; on the other hand, they were producing new inequalities, deepening economic inefficiency and ultimately creating a number of negative habits which survived long after 1989. An East German old-age pensioner provided the following comment shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall: "The social net of East Germany is undoubtedly good. What is bad about it, however, is that people do not want to think about their future and actually do not even have to."[125]

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125 BOHLEY, Bärbel: *40 Jahre DDR. …und die Bürger melden sich zu Wort.* Berlin, Carl Hanser 1989, p. 34.

Zdeněk Mlynář and the Search for Socialist Opposition

From an Active Politician to a Dissident to Editorial Work in Exile

Alessandro Catalano

Samizdat was not only a tool enabling the development of a substantial segment of Czech culture during the two decades after the suppression of the Prague Spring. It was also a predecessor of the media revolution, which has been so much talked about recently.[1] Bringing the extreme cases of the "samizdat archipelago" to wider attention thus means contributing to the reconstruction of an extraordinary editorial phenomenon. In the case of editorial activities coordinated by Zdeněk Mlynář (1930–1997),[2] the tool was specifically adapted for the purpose

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[1] The present study's original language is Italian (CATALANO, Alessandro: Il samizdat tra dialogo e monologo: Le attività editoriali di Zdeněk Mlynář e la scelta degli interlocutori. In: *eSamizdat*, 2010–2011, pp. 261–280). It was published in the proceedings of the "Samizdat between Memory and Utopia: Independent Culture in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century" conference held in Padua on 30 May to 1 June 2011. The proceedings were published as a double issue of the *eSamizdat: Rivista di culture dei paesi slavi* electronic magazine and are freely available at *http://www.esamizdat. it/rivista/2010-2011/index.htm*. They were the final output of a research project dedicated to samizdat in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which the author, together with Simon Guagnelli, coordinated at the University of Padua (*http://www.maldura.unipd.it/samizdat/*). The Italian version of the study was translated into Czech by Alice Flemrová; the final product, however, is a result of a substantial expansion and reworking of the whole text.

[2] The presented study is based on unpublished documents located in the personal archive of Zdeněk Mlynář, which was handed over to the National Archives in Prague and only recently made available to researchers without any restrictions. At the time of the preparation

of disseminating texts among the European audiences. Although only a sub-variant of the phenomenon, it represented an integral part of the extensive system of private editorial production characterising Czech culture in the 1970s and 1980s.

After 1989, the Czech dissident movement was often reprehended for not being able to overcome the phase of an anarchistic organisation dating back to its time underground and to create a concept of traditional and also realistic politics. If we accept the statement of Václav Benda in his renowned May 1978 text, namely that the circulation of samizdat texts should inspire the whole "parallel polis"[3] being formed at the time, at face value, it is undoubtedly worth trying to verify, whether the environment of samizdat and independent publishing houses left, or on the contrary did not leave, deep marks in the structure of forms of political activities of those who were opposing the official "normalisation" culture.[4]

There are certainly many examples of the form of samizdat influencing the way in which both cultural and political initiatives were developing,[5] but the transition from critical reflections and archiving of documents to dissemination of information (in this case particularly to partners abroad) to organising an association in the form of a permanent political forum is probably most obvious in projects coordinated by Zdeněk Mlynář in the 1980s. After a fashion and, to some extent, a long way from what was happening in Czechoslovakia in the last weeks of 1989, it was a transition similar to that from the "wild" samizdat to the organised protest

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and publication of the in the Italian version of the paper, it was only partly accessible. The fund of Zdeněk has not yet been arranged and organised; its separate documents will therefore always be quoted as follows: *Národní archiv* (*National Archives – NA*), Fund of Zdeněk Mlynář, Prof., JUDr., CSc. (f. Zdeněk Mlynář), part of the fund, cardboard box number (k.), document title.

3   "The second culture is, for the time being, the most developed and most dynamic parallel structure. It should also be used as a model for other spheres and, at the same time, supported by all available means, particularly in areas which have hitherto been neglected […]." In another place, Benda says: "The parallel cultural structure is now an undeniable and significantly positive factor, and in some spheres (literature, but to some extent also in popular music and graphic arts) it fully dominates over inanimate official structures." (BENDA, Václav: Paralelní polis [Parallel Polis]. In: IDEM: *Noční kádrový dotazník a jiné boje: Texty z let 1977–1989* [The Night-Time Cadre Questionnaire and Other Fights: Texts from the Years 1977–1989]. Ed. Patrik Benda. Praha, Agite/Fra 2009, pp. 56–66, here pp. 61 and 60. The essay was first published in: HAVEL, Václav (ed.): *O svobodě a moci* [On Freedom and Power], Vol. 1. Cologne – Rome, Index – Listy 1980, pp. 101–110.)

4   For comprehensive information on Czech samizdat culture, see BOLTON, Jonathan: *Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, The Plastic People of the Universe, and Czech Culture under Communism*. Cambridge (Massachusetts) – London, Harvard University Press 2012.

5   Zdeněk Vašíček, for instance, highlighted, as early as in 1980, the reasons why the genre of *feuilletons* prevailed over academic analyses in Czech samizdat literature of the 1970s. (VAŠÍČEK, Zdeněk: Co psala Karkulka ve vlkově břiše [What Little Red Riding Hood Wrote in the Wolf's Belly]. In: *Kritický sborník*, Issue No. 20 (2000–2001), pp. 225–234; also in: VAŠÍČEK, Zdeněk – MAYER, Françoise: *Minulost a současnost, paměť a dějiny* [The Past and the Present, Memory and History]. Praha, Triáda 2008, pp. 7–18.)

of Charter 77 and ultimately to the Civic Forum which ruled the country in the first months after the so-called Velvet Revolution.

All that has remained now is just vague awareness. One of the reasons why this is the case is that many studies on recent Czechoslovak past intentionally simplify the complex social stratification of the opposition during the two decades after the suppression of the Prague Spring. Moreover, the quick social and political changes after the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe made many characters, who had taken part in the long struggle against the system which had been increasingly perceived as totalitarian, disappear in the waste bin of history.

The last years of Zdeněk Mlynář's life are particularly symptomatic in this respect: in the early 1990s, the controversial intellectual, politician and political scientist underwent, in a relatively short time, a change from an organiser of major events in support of the legacy of the Prague Spring, which were taking place all over Europe,[6] to a party in a political trial, accused of high treason for allegedly playing a double game in 1968 and taking part in the talks about the formation of a pro-Soviet "workers' and peasants' government with Moscow's Ambassador after the tanks had rolled into Czechoslovakia." Mlynář's case was amply covered and commented on in both the Czech and foreign media, but the polemic had already started earlier. Chess Grandmaster Luděk Pachman, for instance, had spoken very critically about his participation at the meeting of the "pro-Moscow faction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [or the KSČ]" on several occasions. First in exile[7] and then he did so again in Czechoslovakia shortly after November 1989.[8] Somewhat later, on 12 February 1991, Mlynář was summoned to provide testimony on the alleged authors of the well-known "Letter of Invitation" dating back to the summer of 1968 in an investigation under the Act on the Threatening of Peace, on the basis of which he himself was indicted for high treason. As the 20-year period of limitation had already elapsed, the prosecution was suspended.[9] But the Office for the Documentation and the Investigation of

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6   See the anthology of his texts dating back to the 1970s and 1980s (however, often published in an abridged form): MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Socialistou na volné noze* [The Freelance Socialist]. Praha, Prospektum 1992.

7   For the first time in an article in the German daily *Die Welt*, later in a published circular (PACHMAN, Luděk: Wer machte was im Hotel "Praha." In: *Die Welt*, 19 August 1981, p. 6; MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Ich hatte die Pistolen der Sowjets im Genick. In: *Ibid.*, 8 September 1981; *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 3, Circular of Luděk Pachman, 10 November 1981).

8   Zdeněk Mlynář reacted to Pachman's article Radí nám dobře? [Does He Advise Us Well?] published in *Lidová demokracie* on 29 April 1990, p. 6, by a letter addressed to the Attorney General (while the article was signed by Pachman's full name in the Brno edition of the daily, it was initialled just by a *re* mark in the Prague edition). The letter in question contained a "criminal charge and a request to initiate criminal proceedings in the matter" (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Minutes of Testimony, 25 July 1990).

9   See *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 1, A Copy of the Ruling of the Directorate of Investigation of the Federal Police Corps – Prague Office of 11 February 1992. However, it was Public Prosecutor Vladimír Nechanický who gave the ruling so much publicity, as he saw Mlynář's case as an opportunity not to include the years spent abroad in the period

the Crimes of Communism reopened the case in the summer of 1995, when it started investigating events related to 21 August 1968.[10] As a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning that Mlynář had been talking at length about his participation in the negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko in one of his autobiographic texts written in 1977 and 1978. The information in itself thus was not exactly a big piece of news.[11]

In Austria, Mlynář worked at the Austrian Institute for International Policy (*Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik*) in Laxenburg, outside Vienna, from 1982 till 1989 and, in addition, his lecturing at Innsbruck University from 1989 to 1993 is likewise still remembered.[12] In Italy, on the other hand, he attracted attention

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of limitation (see the interviews with Nechanický and Mlynář, *Původně šlo o mír* [It Was Initially About Peace] and *Dokažte mi vlastizradu* [Prove I Committed High Treason], respectively, published in the *Mladá fronta* daily on 17 February 1992, p. 1 n.), together with Martin Fendrych, then the Spokesman of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (see, for instance, the article *Vnitro označilo 18 osob za vlastizrádce* [The Ministry of the Interior Labelled 18 People Traitors] published in the *Rudé právo* daily on 14 February 1992, p. 1 n.). Supported by his friends among reformist Communists, who confirmed that his presence in the Soviet Ambassador's residence had been pre-arranged, Mlynář protested against the indictment by an open letter to Marián Čalfa (*Otevřený dopis Zdeňka Mlynáře předsedovi federální vlády* [An Open Letter of Zdeněk Mlynář to the Federal Prime Minister]. In: *Rudé právo*, 22 February 1992, p. 3). His resignation to all his posts on the night of 21/22 August 1968 was published as well. (*Proč údajný "vlastizrádce" oznámil, že skládá funkce* [Why Did the Alleged "Traitor" Announce He Was Resigning His Posts]. In: *Ibid.*, 17 February 1992, p. 1 n.)

10   See the interview with Vladimír Nechanický, *Na usnesení o spáchání vlastizrady trvám* [I Insist on the High Treason Ruling], published in the *Rudé právo* daily on 31 July 1995. Mlynář subsequently explained his refusal to provide new testimony by his lack of trust in so-called "Benda's Office." (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 10, Mlynář's Letter to the Office for the Documentation and the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism, 22 September 1995.)

11   See MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Mráz přichází z Kremlu* [published in English as *Night Frost in Prague*]. Praha, Mladá fronta 1990, pp. 208–218. Refer also to other documents: *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 10, Minutes [of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Z. Mlynář] of the Meeting of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Prague on 22 August 1968, 22 September 1968, and Notes Taken during the Meeting of Members of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with Soviet Ambassador Comrade Chervonenko on Thursday 22 August 1968 at the Soviet Embassy; VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace (srpen–listopad 1968)* [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: Capitulation (August–November 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IX/3) [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IX/3). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR [Institute for Contemporary History Of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic] – Supplement 2001, pp. 37–39, Documents No. 152 and No. 153 – Minutes of Negotiations of Leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with Ambassador Chervonenko and President Ludvík Svoboda on 22 August 1968.

12   Mlynář was appointed Extraordinary University Professor (*ausserordentlicher Universitätsprofessor*) on 1 October 1989 by a decree dated 25 August 1989 (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář,

by a series of articles dedicated to the Soviet Perestroika and his personal friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev, which were published in the *Rinascita* weekly at the end of 1986 (later also as a comprehensive volume) and produced a widespread international response.[13] However, in today's Czech Republic there may be just a few who remember his controversial attempt to assert himself, at the time of the "Velvet Revolution," as a go-between in negotiations between the KSČ authorities and reformist Communists who had been ousted from the Party after 1968 and established the *Obroda – Klub za demikratický socialismus* [Renaissance – Club for Democratic Socialism]. As late as 7 January 1990, Havel warned his co-workers that it would be necessary to "watch Zdeněk Mlynář, who might be heading for the post of leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."[14] However, Mlynář got his most significant political role only a short time before his death in 1996, when he was elected Honorary Chairman of the Left Bloc. The party in question, nevertheless, got just 1.4 percent of votes in the election and, in fact, did not make it to the House of Deputies.

Back then, it was especially Mlynář's somewhat surprising TV appearances in the so-called "Dialogue" programme on 1 and 7 December 1989, which were much discussed and criticised.[15] The first of them was a discussion with Czechoslovak TV General Director Miroslav Pavel, an opportunity Mlynář had specifically asked for. Indeed, it contained some quite astonishing formulations: "[…] the importance of purely political changes is overrated," "we should not underrate what has been achieved," "no witch-hunt," "I am worried about what I have already experienced before, namely that there is hope, that there is something promising a fundamental change, all seem to believe they have won, but everything ultimately leads to a very bad end."[16] It was, however, the second TV debate, initially planned as the first-ever dialogue between the Civic Forum and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,

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Part 2, k. 10, Appointment Decree; also see *Ibid.*, k. 9, Pension-Related Documents).

13   The publication, which other authors contributed to as well, was published under the title *Il progetto Gorbaciov* as a supplement to the *Rinascita* magazine in Rome in 1987. Czech originals were published in Mlynář's book *Problémy politického systému: Texty o roce 1968, normalizaci a současné reformě v SSSR* [Problems of the Political System: Texts about the Year 1968, Normalisation and the Current Reform in the USSR]. Rome – Stockholm – Cologne, Listy – Foundation of Charter 77 – Index 1987, pp. 85–109 (also deposited in Mlynář's *NA* fund, Part 2, k. 32). On the topic in question, see also GORBACHEV, Mikhail – MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Reformátoři nebývají šťastni: Dialog o "perestrojce," Pražském jaru a socialismu* [Reformers Usually Are Not Happy: A Dialogue about the "Perestroika," the Prague Spring and Socialism]. Praha, Victoria 1995.

14   KAISER, Daniel: *Prezident: Václav Havel 1990–2003* [The President: Václav Havel 1990–2003]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka 2014, p. 27.

15   In recent times, the testimony of the last head of the Czech secret police, Vilém Václavek, was published. According to the testimony in question, the initiative would match Mlynář in the same way as notified by the Embassy in Vienna to Prague, where the secret police would immediately organise his arrival, with the purpose to make it appear on television. See ŠEVELA, Vladimír: *Poslouchá nás Gottwald*? *Uřízněme mu hlavu* [Is Gottwald Listening? Cut His Head Off]. *In: Tydeník Echo,* Issue No. *47 (2015), available online.*

16   Archives of Czech TV, "Dialogue" Programme, APV0970.

which really caused a lot of stir. Vasil Mohorita failed to turn up, and it was therefore mainly Mlynář who crossed swords with Petr Pithart on 7 December.[17] He claimed, *inter alia*, that the situation had developed into a crisis, that "there are errors on both sides," or that a demonstration "is not a dialogue, but an ultimatum." He likewise advocated the importance of roundtable discussions with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, claiming that "the situation is not all that rosy, it is the other way round" and "has not been developing all too well since the last week when I was here." Pithart was speaking mainly about the danger of disintegration in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, adding "I think it is quite symptomatic that Zdeněk Mlynář from Innsbruck or Vienna is speaking here on behalf of the Communist Party."[18] The programme even resulted in a protest of the Executive Committee of *Obroda*: "There have been protests against the emotional, unilateral and not sufficiently informed appearance of Z. Mlynář. Z. Mlynář is not a member of the club in question and it is not known to us by whom and why he was invited to take part in the debate."[19] On 14 December, Mlynář admitted in *Rudé*

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17   Taking part in the debate were Josef Bartončík, Josef Blahož, Waltr Komárek, Josef Kotrč, Stanislav Křeček, Zdeněk Mlynář, Šimon Pánek and Petr Pithart, the moderator was Miroslav Pavel*,* Archives of Czech TV, "Dialogue" Programme, APV0982.

18   As to subsequent polemics, see, for instance, the outraged letter of dissident Pavel Bergmann of 8 December 1989 (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 4; other indignant letters of spectators are to be found *Ibid.*, k. 5); also see HÁJEK, Miloš: *Paměť české levice* [The Memory of the Czech Left]. Praha, ÚDS AV ČR 2011, p. 306 n.; PITHART, Petr: *Devětaosmdesátý: Vzpomínky a přemýšlení. Krédo* [1989: Recollections and Musings. The Creed]. Praha, Academia 2009, pp. 120–122. When referring to this episode during a discussion within the Civic Forum, Václav Havel talked about the struggle "against unbelievable Mafia" (SUK, Jiří: *Občanské fórum: Listopad–prosinec 1989* [Civic Forum: November–December 1989], Vol. 1. Brno, Supplement 1997, p. 138; Vol. 2. Brno, Supplement 1998, pp. 137–143) and a "part of a big consipiracy" (SUK, Jiří: *Labyrintem revoluce. Aktéři, zápletky a křižovatky jedné politické krize (od listopadu 1989 do června 1990)* [Through the Labyrinth of Revolution. Actors, Plots and Crossroads of One Political Crisis (from November 1989 to June 1990)]. Praha, Prostor 2009, pp. 210–211.

19   KOKOŠKOVÁ, Zdeňka – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav (ed.): *Obroda: Dokumenty* [The Renaissance: Documents]. Praha, Maxdorf 1996, p. 185, Document No. 92 – The Renaissance Club on the Government Crisis, 8 December 1989. The often critised TV appearance of Zdeněk Mlynář, which he himself later apologetically commented on in the media on several different occasions, was explained by Karel Urbánek, the last General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in an interview with Karel Sýs by a purely personal reason: "He suddenly appeared in my office without any prior notice. He came to ask me to order the release of his son from prison. [...] After a short exchange of opinions, I made him an offer: his TV appearance in defence of democracy in exchange for my assistance in the case of his son. Very surprised, he reacted: 'You want me, after everything what has happened, to appear on TV and defend the Communists?' 'I really cannot want you to do that, but you can speak against the media campaign directed against people who are not guilty of anything, except of having a different opinion on the social arrangement of the state and on the period of socialism.' 'Mister General Secretary, you are a bargainer, but I would do anything for my son – I will appear on TV.' Zdeněk Mlynář made a very informed appearance on TV and his son was released. Unfortunately, the release did not do him much good in the years to come." (SÝS, Karel – SPÁČIL, Dušan (ed.): *Záhady 17. listopadu: Devátý, Hegenbart,*

právo daily that he "was – particularly at the beginning of the TV debate on 7 December 1989 – nervous to irritated" and "tired," so it could really look like he was presenting as "an advocate of the Communists." At the same time, however, he said that he was not ashamed of that, as "honest people in the Communist Party (and also elsewhere) now need an advocate, as they have found themselves sitting in a political dock. In 1977, one of the reasons why I was one of the initiators of Charter 77 was that I shared the belief that every person charged needed a defence lawyer. In the absence of the above, there cannot be an objective assessment of guilt; this is something that a state of law and order cannot dispense with, which is what I think now as well."[20]

The Prague Spring

Zdeněk Mlynář was born in 1930 in Vysoké Mýto, into the family of army officer Hubert Müller (according to his son, he fought in the Czechoslovak Legions in Italy during the Great War) and Vlasta Sobotková. Because of his father's profession, he spent a part of his childhood in a small house in a garrison town in Slovakia, in an environment he himself labelled a "ghetto of petty bourgeois wives of officers, which was oozing pretence and indifference; basically a Czech ghetto in a Slovak environment."[21] In May 1945, Mlynář's father joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and had his surname changed, in line with the then campaign of "Czechi-sation" of names.[22] At the end of 1946, he was transferred from the Army

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Jičínský, Nevařil, Ruml, Sedlák, Uhl, Urbánek. Svědectví po 21 letech [Mysteries of 17 November: Devátý, Hegenbart, Jičínský, Nevařil, Ruml, Sedlák, Uhl, Urbánek. Testimonies after 21 Years]. Praha, BVD 2010, pp. 167–190, here p. 174.) See also documents about Jakub Dubský in Mlynář's Fund (Part 2, k. 9 and 31).

20 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Tak takhle tedy také ne [Not Way This Way Either]. In: *Rudé právo*, 14 December 1989, p. 1. Mlynář also expressed his "concerns about the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in his first interview for the Czech press after the coup (Srpen 1968–Listopad 1989: Exkluzivní interview pro MF a MS s profesorem Zdeňkem Mlynářem [August 1968–November 1989: An Exclusive Interview for MF and MS with Professor Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: *Mladá fronta,* 5 December 1989, p. 3). As for Mlynář's first trip from exile to Czechoslovakia, see also KAISER, Daniel: *Disident: Václav Havel 1936–1989* [Dissident: Václav Havel 1936–1989]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka 2009, pp. 230–232; PLACÁK, Petr: Čekání na socialismus Zdeňka Mlynáře [Waiting for Zdeněk Mlynář's Socialism]. In: *Necenzurované noviny*, Vol. 2, Issue No. 11 (1992), p. 16.

21 The quotation is taken from a private untitled text dated 1983, which is deposited in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 3). It is described in more detail further.

22 See *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Permission of the Provincial National Committee in Prague, 31 July 1945. In this respect, Mlynář published an open letter in the exile *Listy* journal in 1975. In it, he protested against being accused of Zionism. (Letter of Dr. Z. Mlynář. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, Issue No. 6 (December 1975), p. 43 n.)

to the National Security Corps and later appointed the NSC Provincial Commander in Brno. He died in a car crash in October 1948.[23]

Zdeněk Mlynář became a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1946, i.e. at the age of 16. After graduating from secondary school, he became a functionary of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth. In the first half of the 1950s, he spent five years in Moscow, studying at the Faculty of Law of Lomonosov University (and befriending his schoolmate Mikhail Gorbachev).[24] He subsequently advanced rapidly in the area of law. As early as 1956, he joined the Institute of State and Law of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In 1961, he was appointed Head of the Department of General State and Law Theory at the same institution.[25] On 27 April 1960, he defended his dissertation on the political theory of Niccolo Macchiavelli.[26] A year later, he habilitated at the Faculty of Law of Charles University and was appointed Associate Professor of General Theory of State and Law in 1964. In the same year, he also took the position of Secretary of the Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.[27] In spite of undergoing his first and relatively serious life crisis, these were the years of Mlynář's intensive publication activities, initially in the field of law,[28] later likewise increasingly often in the field of culture.[29]

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23   See *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to the Minister of the Interior Jaromír Obzina, 26 January 1977.

24   When in Moscow, Mlynář married for the first time, but his marriage with Eva Dušánková was divorced as early as 1954. Two years later, he married Rita Budínová (later Klímová), daughter of well-known journalist Stanislav Budín. They were married until 1967. His third wife was philosopher Irena Dubská, whom he married in 1973, after seven years of living together. Different documents concerning Mlynář's marital unions have been preserved in his *NA* fund located in Prague (Part 2, k. 3 and 8).

25   Regarding his ideological attitudes in the late 1950s, when he was an active opponent of so-called "revisionism," see KOPEČEK, Michal: *Hledání ztraceného smyslu revoluce: Zrod a počátky marxistického revizionismu ve střední Evropě 1953–1960* [Seeking the Revolution's Lost Meaning: The Birth and Development of Marxist Revisionism in Central Europe 1953–1960). Praha, Argo 2009, pp. 299 n., 312–314 and 335–337. Mlynář later explained his attitudes in those days as follows: "I have already mentioned here how I fought against revisionism back in 1959, although I actually believed many of the opinions of the Yugoslav Communists were correct. However, if I had said so then, I would have rendered my political role in 1968 impossible." (GORBACHEV, M. – MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Reformátoři nebývají šťastni*, p. 34 – see Footnote 13.)

26   A copy of the dissertation is kept in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 3).

27   See documents in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 4, k. 17).

28   See at least two monographs: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *K teorii socialistické demokracie* [On the Theory of Socialist Democracy]. Praha, Státní nakladatelství politické literatury 1961; IDEM: *Stát a člověk: Úvahy o politickém řízení za socialismu* [The State and the Individual: Contemplations on Political Management under Socialist Rule]. Praha, Svobodné slovo 1964.

29   He published, for instance, in journals such as *Literární noviny*, *Kultura*, *Plamen*, *Kulturní tvorba*, *Divadelní noviny*, as indicated by numerous *curricula vitae* and bibliographies preserved in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 1, k. 2; Part 2, k. 3).

In 1966, he was appointed manager of an important interdisciplinary research project named "The Development of Democracy and the Political System in Socialist Society." In the atmosphere of a rapidly advancing ideological détente in the 1960s, the establishment of four interdisciplinary teams between 1963 and 1966 was supposed to mark an important phase of the re-evaluation of the foundations which Czechoslovak socialist society was based on.[30] The team of Ota Šik focused on economic reform issues; Machonin concentrated on sociological research while the objective of the team led by Radovan Richta, who was the best known both at home and abroad, was to investigate the social and human consequences of the scientific and technological revolution. Mlynář's team – whose research programme was, by the way, similar to projects he later managed abroad – produced within just one year ("there were altogether nine thematic discussion meetings between March 1967 and March 1968) almost 50 expert studies which could not have been published because of an intervention from above.[31] Mlynář himself prepared an opening theoretical analysis (Study Document No. 1, *Náměty k teoretické koncepci výzkumu rozvoje politického systému* [Topics Concerning the Theoretical Concept of Research of the Political System)],[32] which was later regarded as one of the fundamental texts of so-called "right-wing opportunism."[33] According to his own words, the conclusions of the team's research were to be "the starting point for the team's own long-term (approximately five years) research project on the one hand, and also one of the documents to be used in preparations for the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, scheduled to take place in 1970."[34] At the end of 1967, however, the team's activities were regarded as "politically suspicious," and both top leaders of the Communist Party and the Attorney General's

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30 DEVÁTÁ, Markéta: *Marxismus jako projekt nové společnosti. Dvě studie ke společenským vědám (1945–1969)* [Marxism as a Project of a New Society. Two studies on Social Sciences (1945–1969)]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR 2011, pp. 37–41.

31 Zdeněk Mlynář presented their list in his publication *Československý pokus o reformu 1968: Analýza jeho teorie a praxe* [The Czechoslovak Attempt at Reform 1968: Analysis of Its Theory and Practice] (Cologne – Rome, Index – Listy 1975, pp. 100–103), in which he also outlined the focus of the research (pp. 91–107). A copy of these works, including Mlynář's notes, handwritten minutes of discussions taking place during the team's meetings, and official reports are kept in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 4, k. 13–16). See also BROKL, Lubomír: Prof. Dr. Zdeněk Mlynář, CSc. (1930–1997): Mlynářův tým a jeho místo v české politické vědě [Prof. Dr. Zdeněk Mlynář, CSc. (1930–1997): Mlynář's Team and Its Place in Czech Political Science]. In: *Politologická revue*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997), pp. 164–175. See also DEVÁTÁ, M.: *Marxismus jako projekt nové společnosti.* pp. 48–51 – see Footnote 29.

32 The first part of the text was published in two articles: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Některé problémy charakteru politiky a státu v socialistické společnosti [Some Issues of the Nature of Politics and the State in the Socialist Society]. In: *Právník*, Vol. 107, No. 10 (1967), pp. 928–942; IDEM: Poznámky o vztahu socialistické politiky a vědeckotechnické revoluce [Comments on the Relationship between Socialist Politics and the Scientific and Technical Revolution]. In: *Ibid.*, Vol. 108, No. 2 (1968), pp. 81–89.

33 See the analysis of this issue in Mlynář's book *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*, pp. 13–107.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Office were viewing Mlynář's team with an increasingly suspicious eye, primarily because of the influence he seemed to have on the young generation of lawyers.[35]

After the turn in political power in January 1968,[36] Mlynář quickly became one of the prominent reformers, the author of several political reforms and also of a substantial part of the *Action Programme* of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In June 1968, he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a position which enabled him to participate in the creation of many texts formulating the programme of the Prague Spring.[37] However, he became a member of the Presidium only after the invasion, on the last day of August 1968. The words he said about his attitudes during a roundtable

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35 See KAPLAN, Karel: *Kronika komunistického Československa: Kořeny reformy 1956–1968. Společnost a moc* [Chronicle of Communist Czechoslovakia: Roots of the Reform 1956–1968. Society and the Power]. Brno, Společnost pro odbornou literaturu – Barrister & Principal 2008, pp. 679 n. and 759. Mlynář's name was also allegedly included on "the list of functionaries of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who were to be watched and potentially interned in the event of 'an extraordinary political situation posing a threat to interests of the state.'" (*NA,* f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 1, and "Supplement to 'Information on the case of Josef Hodic.'") A copy of this important text is also kept in the Rome-located fund of Jiří Pelikán, which is a part of the Historical Archives of the House of Deputies in Rome (*Archivio Storico della Camera dei Deputati* (hereinafter *ASCD*), Fondo (f.) Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, Busta (cardboard box – k.) 14).

36 Petr Pithart claims that when he and Mlynář were talking about Dubček having been elected the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 5 January 1968, Mlynář told him: "Just do not be too elated. With my Russian, I will always have a job, I will interpret for the commander of Soviet occupation forces, but knowing your poor Russian, I really do not know what is going to happen to you." (PITHART, P.: *Devětaosmdesátý*, p. 121 – see Footnote 14.)

37 As to the editing of the answer of Czechoslovak KSČ leaders to the "Warsaw Letter" of the so-called "fraternal parties," whose authors were Zdeněk Mlynář and Čestmír Císař, see VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Konsolidace (květen–srpen 1968)* [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: Consolidation (May–August 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IX/2) [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IX/2). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2000, pp. 197 n. and 211 n., Document No. 105 – A Stenographic Record of the Discussion on the Letters of the Five Communist Parties Addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the 83rd Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 8 July 1968; *Ibid.*, p. 139 n., Document No. 108 – Stenographic Record of the Discussion Regarding the Letters of the Five Communist Parties Addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Proposed Position Document of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the 85th Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 12 July 1968; see also CÍSAŘ, Čestmír: *Paměti: Nejen o zákulisí pražského jara* [Memoirs: Not Just about the Background of the Prague Spring]. Praha, SinCon 2005, p. 889 n. According to Císař, Mlynář, who was then returning from a meeting of leading politicians of socialist countries in Bratislava, referred to Brezhnev and other CP secretaries as "senile old men" unable to understand problems of modern times (*Ibid.*, p. 939). Various handwritten comments and notes of Mlynář dating back to the Prague Spring era (hitherto unused) are found in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 1, k. 1).

discussion the record of which was published in the *Reportér* magazine early in March 1968 were quite symptomatic: "We have built a firmly rooted system which has so far made it possible to enforce central directives and prevented making any democratic decisions. It is a dictatorship of a single interest, and that single interest can of course be anything which finds its way to the centre of the power structure. [...] In my opinion, the only realistic way to democratic guarantees in our country is, for the time being, to provide opportunities for a confrontation of opinions within the Communist Party, which has identified itself with the power mechanism – this is a problem of intra-party democracy; using this as a starting point, the Party must abandon the position of a monopolistic political subject."[38]

In his famous book *Night Frost in Prague*, which has been translated into many languages (the first Czech edition was published in Cologne in 1978), Mlynář was one of just a few to have decisively dealt with his own Stalinist past.[39] Indeed, he likewise analysed his political career and position in the turbulent months of 1968 with an extraordinary fineness:

"I was usually included among the centrists. I did not mind; I knew why this was the case: I defended the state's right to interfere with the freedom of the press in cases where the interests of the state demanded so, clearly defined by law and with restrictions being imposed by courts.

[...] At that time, I was – and, for that matter, I still am – sorry that the Czechs had so little understanding for politics as the art of the possible in moments like that, when it might have been possible to change many important things, but when it was not possible to turn our national backyard, littered for so many years, into a 'paradise on earth' overnight. I was and still am sorry how many intelligent, honest and selfless Czech people keep striving for unfeasible utopias until they lose the chance to improve what may have been improved."[40]

38　Hovoříme o demokracii v politice [We Are Talking about Democracy in Politics]. In: *Reportér*, Vol. 3, No. 10 (1968), pp. I–VIII, here p. VII. Refer also to two articles of Mlynář published in the *Rudé právo* daily: Naše politická soustava a dělba moci [Our Political System and the Division of Power] (13 February 1968, p. 3) and Co dál s naší demokracií [What to Do Next about Our Democracy] (26 March 1968, p. 3). Both articles have been reprinted in the following anthology: HOPPE, Jiří (ed.): *Pražské jaro v médiích: Výběr z dobové publicistiky* [The Prague Spring in the Media: A Selection from Period Journalism]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. XI [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. XI]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2004, pp. 44–48 and 99–103. Regarding these articles, Mlynář later wrote that "at the time, I had not yet been co-opted as a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia or its Plenum, and I was trying to assert my influence through CP media." (MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Československý pokus o reformu 1968* – see Footnote 27.)

39　MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremlu*, pp. 11–87 – see Footnote 11.

40　*Ibid.*, p. 89. See also Mlynář's keynote speeches at meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 4 April 1968 and 31 May 1968 (VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír – MORAVEC, Jan (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Pokus o reformu (říjen 1967–květen 1968)* [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: The Attempted Reform (October 1967–May 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IX/1 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970,

Mlynář's "tactical" interventions during the Prague Spring were indeed numerous, both with respect to restrictions of press liberties and as regards his obstructive attitudes to the renovation of different "opposition" platforms.[41] Mlynář himself later wrote that "seen from this angle, a spontaneous social movement striving for a remedy of deformations will look like a factor that should and must be regulated by politics, if such politics intends to achieve its objectives (and also maintain the whole process within the limits it itself regards as optimal). In this broad sense of the word, politics is always a manipulation, no matter how democratic it may be."[42] It is thus no coincidence that various protagonists of the Prague Spring, for

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Vol. IX/1], Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1999, pp. 278–282, Document No. 40 – Record of Zdeněk Mlynář's Speech during the April Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 4 April 1968; VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Konsolidace*, pp. 65–69, Document No. 81 – Record of Zdeněk Mlynář's Speech during the May Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 31 May 1968.)

41 Mlynář's numerous opinions voicing his resolute support for a decisive government supervision over everything that may endanger "essential interests of the republic, particularly in the field of foreign policy" are listed in Jiří Hoppe's monograph *Opozice '68: Sociální demokracie, KAN a K 231 v období pražského jara* [Opposition '68: Social Democracy, KAN and K 231 during the Prague Spring]. Praha, Prostor 2009, p. 114; also pp. 76 n., 94, 102–106, 112–115, 118, 128–130, 144 n., 159–161, 169–171, 183 n., 188–197, 241–243, 291 n., 295 and 309. After the publication of the manifesto "Two Thousand Words" at the end of June 1968, Mlynář speaking at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia opined that the reaction had to be extraordinarily unyielding (see VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Konsolidace*, pp. 153 n. and 158 n., Document No. 100 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 81st Meeting of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Manifesto "Two Thousand Words," 27 June 1968). At meetings of the Party Presidium during the last month before the invasion, he demanded "a legal norm […] in the event of an emergency" and the reintroduction of censorship (*Ibid.*, p. 290, Document No. 120 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 89th Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Draft of Legal Measures of the Presidium of the National Assembly on Extraordinary Measures of the State, 22 July 1968), his motive being particularly the "shocking experience" of the meeting with the Soviets in Bratislava and the mood of the general public (*Ibid.*, p. 320, Document No. 130 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 91st meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on Politico-Organisational Measures Subsequent to Conclusions of the Meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Čierna nad Tisou and Bratislava; also see *Ibid.*, pp. 303–305, 313, 384 n., 429 n., 443 n. and 451).

42 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*, p. 114. In another place, he adds: "In a normally functioning democratic pluralistic system, the media could never be just a tool used to transfer directives and opinions of political leaders. However – and especially if the media are in the hands of the state (radio, TV) – political information and positions they disseminate must be subjected (albeit by democratic methods) to political interests and policies of the state, so that they are in line with sometimes fairly complex requirements of these domestic and international policies." (*Ibid.*, p. 128.)

instance historian Michal Reiman not so long ago, more or less explicitly criticised Mlynář for his "manipulative" political manners or talked about his not always positive influence on Alexander Dubček.[43] After all, Mlynář later characterised his political belief in those days by the words "I was a reformist Communist, not a non-communist democrat."[44]

Mlynář's acts during the critical days of August 1968 might look outwardly controversial. As soon as the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia learned about the invasion of foreign troops at its night meeting, Mlynář and Čestmír Císař started drafting a protest statement.[45] The episode of the meeting with Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko has already been mentioned above. However, it may also be worthwhile to mention two unknown texts in which Mlynář recalled the moment in question and explained his internal motives.

The first one contains Mlynář's comments concerning a draft screenplay of the film documentary titled *Invasion* and based on his book *Night Frost in Prague*, which he sent to script writer and producer Eva Kolouchová in the summer of 1979 and in which he emphatically demanded a correction in connection with his absence at what is known today as the Extraordinary Communist Party Congress held in Vysočany. In the first version, he wrote: "It is *absolutely necessary* to add to my monologue a few sentences explaining why I am not going to Vysočany and why I am heading for the Central Committee building instead. This is important for understanding my role. As it is, the spectator *may think* I am simply trying to find out which way things will turn – and then join the side offering a safer perspective. [...] However, this is an *essential* issue for me. [...] At that time, I and several other comrades came to the conclusion that I should go to the Central Committee building; all who matter will be in Vysočany, but there will be no one in the Central Committee building, except maybe for Biľak, Indra, Kolder, Jakeš, and the whole clique that wants to cooperate with the Russians. I was not very pleased with the

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43   See REIMAN, Michal: *Rusko jako téma a realita doma a v exilu: Vzpomínky na léta 1968–1990* [Russia as a Theme and Reality at Home and in Exile: Recollections of the Years 1968–1990]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR, 2008, pp. 75, 80, 89–91, 99–101, 168, 184–188, 235–240, 244–252 and 289 n. Historian Miloš Hájek wrote in his memoirs, for instance, he remembered the disagreement with the invitation of Zdeněk Mlynář to a meeting of the "reformers" before the April 1968 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as "he participated in the liquidation of *Literární noviny*" (HÁJEK, Miloš: *Paměť české levice,* p. 207 – see Footnote 17).

44   MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremlu,* p. 94.

45   See DUBČEK, Alexander: *Naděje umírá poslední: Vlastní životopis Alexandra Dubčeka* [Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubček]. Ed. Jiří Hochman. Praha, Svoboda 1993, p. 191 n. There are also other memoirs mentioning Mlynář's activities in those days, including: DIENSTBIER, Jiří – LÁNSKÝ, Karel – ŠILHÁN, Věněk – ŠIMON, Bohumil: *Srpen 1968* [August 1968]. Praha, Práce 1990, pp. 52 n., 142–144 and 183–187; *Paměti Vasila Biľaka: Unikátní svědectví ze zákulisí KSČ* [Memoirs of Vasil Biľak: A Unique Testimony from the Backstage of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], Vol. 2. Praha, Agentura Cesty 1991, pp. 104–145. Compared to the players mentioned above, Biľak was very critical of Mlynář's activities.

prospect; it was a very ungrateful role, and not a very safe one, but I agreed with the arguments that I had to accept it." In another, March 1980 version of his comments, he demanded some changes "to be respected unconditionally," the changes including, *inter alia*, "the fact that I, too, was a delegate of the Extraordinary Congress. But after a meeting with its organisers, I did not go there. I went to a meeting of the remnants of the Party Presidium."[46]

On the other hand, the second text is utterly private and is mentioned here only because it was partly published not so long ago.[47] It is a very interesting attempt at a psychological self-analysis, which Mlynář wrote in 1983, probably for his psychiatrist. When describing the part of his personality which seeks logical conclusions, Mlynář also analysed his own behaviour during the difficult months of the Prague Spring and after the Soviet occupation: "Thanks to Individual D, I am able to act in a way consistent with the logic of my opinions, for instance in a political situation when such acts result in my downfall and are not in line with the calculation (whose alternative is supplied by Individual C basically without any error, but I do not follow the advice); an example of the above is, for example, my political acts in 1968, particularly in August and later, my resignation, etc."[48]

In any case, Mlynář subsequently travelled to Moscow together with the delegation of President Ludvík Svoboda and also as a representative of the participants of the Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held in

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46   *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 6, Mlynář's Comments on the Draft Screenplay of the Documentary Movie *Invasion* of Summer 1979 and March 1980 (the fund in question also contains many other documents dealing with this issue).

47   I intentionally do not make use of any family correspondence in this work, which is why even this text should be left aside – primarily because it was written in a difficult situation in life, and it is not quite clear to what extent it reflects Mlynář's previous and subsequent health condition. Nevertheless, I came across the latest work of Vladimír Čermák, which quotes and summarises the text, which the author himself named "Soul Searching," in its annexes, shortly before submitting this work (ČERMÁK, Vladimír: *Operace Listopad 1989: O putování české společnosti odnikud nikam a zpět a o jejím hledání cesty jinudy a jinam* [Operation November 1989: On Travels of Czech Society from Nowhere to Nowhere and Its Searching of a Way Elsewhere and to Another Place]. Praha, Naše vojsko 2012, pp. 322–328). The author attempts to point out, very unconvincingly, Zdeněk Mlynář's allegedly crucial role in the creation of the Soviet Perestroika; his argumentation follows lines similar to those appearing in his previous book, in which he was trying to prove Mlynář's key role in August 1968 (see IDEM: *Operace Srpen 1968: O 'psyopu' české společnosti, problémech sovětského vládnutí a o mnoha dalších faktorech událostí* [Operation August 1968: On the 'Psyops' of Czech Society, Problems of Soviet Rule and Many Other Factors of the Events]. Praha, Naše vojsko 2011).

48   The text does not have a title. It starts with the following words: "I. Childhood, relationship to father and mother." It has 57 pages and was repeatedly corrected (see different versions in Mlynář's *NA* fund, Part 2, k. 3).

Vysočany,[49] with the task to deliver letters to imprisoned Czechoslovak leaders.[50] As is well known, even Mlynář later added his signature to the notorious Moscow Protocol,[51] and disputes subsequently broke out around what many saw as a "conciliatory" attitude.[52] During the weeks that followed, he repeatedly stood

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49 One opinion voiced during the Vysočany Congress was that "the person of Comrade Mlynář, although he has been acting bravely now, is not quite clear in the course of time. People who have known him for years, fellow members of his local CP cell, claim he often changed his opinions." (VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace,* p. 75, Document No. 159 – Stenographic Record of the 1st Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Elected by the Extraordinary 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 23 August 1968; see also pp. 52, 62 and 74.) In addition, refer also, in particular, to *14. mimořádný sjezd KSČ: Protokol a dokumenty* [14th Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]. Vienna – Rome, Salemi 1970. The introduction and conclusion were written by Jiří Pelikán (regarding the election of Mlynář to the new Central Committee of the Party, see p. 86 n.). On 23 August 1968, Leonid Brezhnev stated that, according to his information, Mlynář had refused to take part in the the so-called Extraordinary Congress, claiming that "if the line-up elected by the congress is allowed to rule the country, Czechoslovakia will immediately become a bourgeois country." (VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Červenec–srpen 1968* [The International Context of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970: July–August 1968]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IV/2 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IV/2]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1996, p. 240, Document No. 156 – Soviet Stenographic Record of the Discussion between Soviet Representatives Led by L. Brezhnev and by A. Dubček and O. Černík, 23 August 1968; see also p. 245; the exact words uttered by Mlynář in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador are cited *Ibid.*, p. 249 – see Footnote 11.)

50 See IDEM. (ed.): *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Září 1968–květen 1970* [The International Context of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970: September 1968–May 1970]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IV/3 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IV/3]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1997, pp. 82–88, in particular p. 83, Document No. 190 – A Soviet Stenographic Record of the Meeting of Leading Representatives of "The Five" in Moscow Discussing the Situation in Czechoslovakia and Measures for Its Full Normalisation, 27 September 1968; MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremlu*, pp. 228–230; DUBČEK, A.: *Naděje umírá poslední*, p. 204; Rozhovor Ondřeje Pitra s Josefem Smrkovským: Nedokončený rozhovor [An Interview with Josef Smrkovský by Ondřej Pitr: An Unfinished Interview]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March 1975), p. 20 (the name Ondřej Pitr was an alias/pen name of Jiří Dienstbier). According to Miloš Jakeš, who picked up Mlynář in Hloubětín before the departure for Moscow, Mlynář "was somewhat afraid, hiding behind litter bins and observing what is going to happen from there" (JAKEŠ, Miloš: *Dva roky generálním tajemníkem* [Two Years as the General Secretary]. Praha, Regulus 1996, p. 48).

51 Mlynář writes about the tough decision to sign the Moscow Protocol in his book *Mráz přichází z Kremlu* (pp. 249–263). Mlynář later also informed the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic about its contents (see CIGÁNEK, František – FELCMAN, Oldřich (ed.): *Národní shromáždění: Srpen 1968–leden 1969* [National Assembly: August 1968–January 1969]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. III/3 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. III/3]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2009, pp. 65–80).

52 For instance, many sources mention the exasperation of František Kriegel, as Mlynář did not allegedly pass the messages from Vysočany to him. (See REIMAN, M.: *Rusko jako téma*

in defence of at least some parts of the reform policy which had started in January 1968, although he never forgot to add a warning that "there is no time to play with fire."[53] As early as the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held on 31 August 1968, however, he asked "to be relieved of my duties because in these few days I have found out I am not up to them." In a situation that did not offer any chance of carrying on with the policy formulation in the *Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*, Mlynář clearly sensed how immensely difficult it would be to manoeuvre between the Scylla of excessive compromises and the Charybdis of unswerving principles: "If we relent, some of our people will rise against us tomorrow. […] or we face the situation with defiance and bring it to bankruptcy."[54]

   At the end of September 1968, Leonid Brezhnev's opinion of Mlynář took a rapid turn for the worse. Brezhnev now regarded Mlynář not only as a ubiquitous "cunning man," who was a long way from being an honest friend of the Soviet Union and lacked a "firm ideological orientation," but also as an individual creating "a legal

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   a realita doma a v exilu, p. 168 – see Footnote 42; HAVEL, Václav – JANOUCH, František: *Korespondence 1978–2001* [Correspondence 1978–2001]. Praha, Akropolis 2007, p. 234, Janouch's March 1986 Letter to Havel.) As early as in March 1979, František Janouch wrote to Jiří Pelikán that "Franta [Kriegel] is indeed outraged by Zdeněk's book and asks us to do something about it. His main argument is that Zdeněk speaks about the negotiations of the delegation in Moscow and thus in fact legalises the occupation." (JANOUCH, František – PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Korespondence* [Correspondence]. Praha, Novela bohemica 2015, p. 136.)

53 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Zákonnost a právní jistota občanů – podmínky normalizace našich poměrů [Rule of Law and Legal Certainty of Citizens – Conditions of Normalisation of Our Situation]. In: *Rudé právo*, 10 September 1968, p. 3. The ambiguity of accents also characterised his TV and radio speech in September 1968: "However, you are fully entitled to require more from us now," admitted Mlynář, conceding that "the most important question of today is hidden under the term 'normalisation of the situation in Czechoslovakia.'" On the other hand, he expressed regret over activities of "irresponsible demagogues," highlighting that "it is detrimental to look for a way other than strict compliance with the Moscow accords." He prophetically concluded that "provoking a faction fight within the Communist Party would be tantamount to playing into the hand of those who underestimated the unity of people from the Party, who thought that the situation would open a way to times prior to January 1968 and perhaps even further back." (Všichni spoluodpovídáme za další vývoj naší politiky: Z televizního a rozhlasového projevu člena předsednictva a tajemníka ÚV KSČ doc. Zdeňka Mlynáře [We Are All Responsible for the Future Development of Our Policy: An Excerpt from the TV and Radio Speech of Member of the Presidium and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Associate Professor Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: *Ibid.*, 15 September 1968, p. 5.) He also voiced similar thoughts in an interview for the *Mladá fronta* daily (O mládeži se Zdeňkem Mlynářem [About the Youth with Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: *Mladá fronta*, 28 September 1968, p. 1 n.).

54 VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace,* pp. 203–211, here pp. 203 and 206, Document No. 177 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 98th Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on Personal Changes in the Leadership of the Party, 31 August 1968.

base for a hostile line of mass information media" among Czechoslovak leaders.[55] During Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations in Moscow on 3 and 4 October 1968, the Soviet leader openly demanded Mlynář's dismissal.[56] A request he repeated during a telephone conversation he later had with Alexander Dubček.[57] As Mlynář was increasingly convinced that the reformist political line no longer stood any chance, he repeatedly tried to explain to Dubček and other Party leaders that, under such circumstances, a more honest option was to resign,[58] but no one gave him an ear.[59] On 16 November 1968, the Central Committee finally accepted his request and Mlynář, by that time without a pinch of illusions, resigned his membership in the Presidium and position of Secretary of the Central Committee.[60] In September 1969, he was dismissed from the Central Committee and in March 1970 also from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia itself.[61]

55　IDEM (ed.): *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Září 1968–květen 1970,* pp. 77–110, here pp. 82 and 87, Document No. 190 – see Footnote 49.

56　The negotiations are summarised *Ibid.*, pp. 116–150, Documents No. 196.1–196.3. The matter of the harsh criticism was Mlynář's alleged "wasteful use of hackneyed phrases" and "absence of a clear political line" (*Ibid.*, p. 126, Document No. 196.1 – Record of the Negotiations between the Delegation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the Leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on "Issues of Mutual Interest," Held in Moscow on 3 and 4 October and 8 October 1968; see also p. 145 n.).

57　The record of the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček on 5 November 1968 expressly mentions "the solution of Comrade Mlynář's problem" and "cadre issues that have been agreed to" (*Ibid.*, pp. 168 and 170, Note 4, Document No. 208).

58　Mlynář clearly expressed his embarrassment during the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held on 8 October 1968, when he refused to carry on with the "ostrich policy" and "to stick his head into sand," because new requirements of Moscow were a "qualitatively new fact" and signalled that the reformist line had already been defeated: "I refuse to be involved in illusionist politics. [...] Let us admit to ourselves that politics means that one can lose from time to time, but it does not mean we should pull people's legs. [...] I can no longer lie to people. [...] Let us tell them the truth!" (VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace,* pp. 343–351, here pp. 344 and 349, Document No. 203 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 102nd Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Negotiations of the Delegations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Held in Moscow on 3 and 4 October and 8 October 1968.)

59　MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremlu*, pp. 269–273.

60　Refer to Mlynář's un-presented contribution (VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace,* pp. 616–619, Document No. 249 – Un-Presented Contribution of Zdeněk Mlynář, Prepared for the November Meeting of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 17 November 1968).

61　Canadian historian Harold Gordon Skilling mentions the opinion of Petr Pithart of 1969 to the effect that Mlynář had, by that time, already accepted the idea of political pluralism (GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Československo – můj druhý domov: Paměti Kanaďana* [Czechoslovakia – My Second Home: Memoirs of a Canadian]. Praha, Prostor 2001, p. 405). See also PITHART, P.: *Devětaosmdesátý*, p. 122 – see Footnote 17.

In his report dated 11 December 1968, the commentator of Radio Free Europe Fred Eidlin evaluated Mlynář's resignation as a clear signal of the failure of the "manoeuvring tops" policy:

"Although Zdeněk Mlynář's resignation of all his posts in the Party was not unexpected, it was one of the most ominous moments of the November Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

[…]

Nevertheless, after the visit of the delegation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to Moscow early in October, Mlynář's public appearances were increasingly rarer, although he had been one of the principal speakers of the Czechoslovak leadership before the visit.

[…]

During the weeks after the August congress, Mlynář was generally considered to be one of the fastest-rising men among Communist Party leaders. His speeches often created an impression that he belonged to those most willing to implement Soviet requirements in order to win the Soviets' trust. In this respect, he was frequently compared to Husák.

On the other hand, Mlynář was the principal author of the progressive *Action Programme of the Party* and was also closely associated with post-January 1968 reforms. Seen from today's perspective, it looks like the harshness of some of Mlynář's speeches may have been a tactical move. Although he was trying to pursue a 'realistic' line, this was probably where his willingness for a compromise ended.

It is quite likely that Mlynář came to the decision that, under the circumstances, he would not have been able to implement his ideas. If he had stayed in the leadership of the Party, he would have been regarded as co-responsible for the unpopular measures which had been adopted and which might have tarnished his reputation and threatened the chance he, aged 38, had – namely to return among the leaders of the Communist Party later and under more favourable circumstances."[62]

"The Normalisation"

In the years that followed, Mlynář avoided political life entirely, working in the Entomological Department of the National Museum in Prague.[63] It was only later that he took over from Josef Smrkovský as head of former reformist Communists

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62   EIDLIN, Fred: The November Plenum, 11 December 1968, p. 11 n. The text is available at *http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/19-3-151.shtml* (downloaded on 13 November 2011).

63   In the self-analytical text quoted above, he described his decision as an attempt "at a solution in the form of a 'thick line' after his recent role" (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 3). Mlynář's *NA* fund also contains a copy of his employment contract with the National Museum, dated 12 February 1969 (Part 3, k. 2), as well as copies of Mlynář's entomological publications (Part 2, k. 14) and entomological correspondence (Part 2, k. 7).

opposing the policy of Gustáv Husák.[64] Even in those days, he certainly had information from the horse's mouth, as indicated by a warning from Irena Dubská to historian Miloš Hájek in the late summer of 1971 to the effect that the State Security were monitoring his "group."[65] The secret police indeed noticed the increasing importance of his role and it was certainly no coincidence that they confiscated Mlynář's passport in the summer of 1973 (moreover, in 1970, he had not received a permission to take part in an entomological expedition to Iran).[66] At the end of 1973, he discovered a bug in his apartment. He immediately tried to contact the Federal Minister of the Interior Jaromír Obzina (and also sent a copy of his letter to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustáv Husák), and later also to Zdeněk Hrazdíra, Chairman of the Czech Bar Association, with a request for "a personal meeting": "It would deal, in my opinion, with politically important issues concerning the use of security and repressive methods against former functionaries and members of the Party," Mlynář wrote. As a "man with long years of political experience," he purported to be able "to bring some fairly specific opinions and suggestions which might, with a bit of goodwill, help resolve some existing and future internal political problems."[67]

As is well known, the establishment of a numerically strong group of Communists stripped of all offices and posts in the Party (and usually also of the membership) represented one of the principal centres of resistance against the policy of "normalisation."[68] As also indicated by the decision to send demoted Czechoslovak

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64 He repeatedly described the situation as follows: "After the death of Josef Smrkovský [...] I, together with a few other members of the reformist leadership of the Party, took over the baton. Before his death, Smrkovský also wished that I, Jiří Hájek and Václav Slavík went on with his political opposition activities." (MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 9 – see Footnote 6.)

65 HÁJEK, M.: *Paměť české levice,* p. 241 – see Footnote 17.

66 See Mlynář's appeal against the decision (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2). Another attempt of the State Security to compromise him in his private life is indicated by Mlynář's untitled text quoted above (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 3).

67 See *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Jaromír Obzina, 21 December 1973, and Mlynář's Letter to Zdeněk Hrazdíra, 30 January 1974; *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 2, Protocol of the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior. The case involving a bug in Mlynář's apartment was used in the *Akce Krajan a Bříza* [Operations "Countryman" and "Birch"] episode of the *Tajné akce StB* [Secret Operations of the State Security] TV series (see *http://www. ceskatelevize.cz/porady/10209991308-tajne-akce-stb/409235100221021-akce-krajan-a-briza/?from=2050*, downloaded on 16 April 2013).

68 As for the consolidation of the socialist opposition and the harsh reaction of the communist government, see at least PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Qui Praga: Cinque anni dopo la primavera. L'opposizione socialista parla*. Rome, Coines edizioni 1973; CUHRA, Jaroslav: *Trestní represe odpůrců režimu v letech 1969–1979* [Criminal Repression of Opponents of the Regime between 1969 and 1979]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR 1997; OTÁHAL, Milan: *Opozice, moc, společnost 1969–1989: Příspěvek k dějinám "normalizace"* [The Opposition, Power, Society 1969–1989: A Contribution to the History of the "Normalisation"]. Praha, Maxdorf 1994, pp. 11–48; and also a newer publication by IDEM: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989* [Opposition Currents in the Czech Society 1969–1989]. (Česká společnost po roce 1945 [Czech Society after 1945]), Vol. 7. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR 2011, pp. 15–123.

TV Director Jiří Pelikán to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Rome, the group was trying to keep international attention paid to Czechoslovakia alive and, in particular, to develop "a parallel diplomacy" focusing primarily on contacts with the Communist Party of Italy, which had expressed its "profound disagreement with and condemnation of" the Soviet invasion.[69] Although the tactics brought fewer benefits than the ex-Communist opponents in Prague had expected, letters and requests were appearing one by one, especially on the pages of the Italian CP press (perhaps the best-known of these acts was the publication of an interview with Josef Smrkovský in the *Giorni – Vie nuove* weekly in 1971).[70] After a decline caused by Czechoslovak political trials in 1971 and 1972[71] and the failure of contacts which Soviet authorities had established with Smrkovský (Smrkovský's July 1973 letter to Leonid Brezhnev was allegedly attributable to these contacts),[72] the initiatives of the group of the former reformist Communists were particularly intensive in 1974 and 1975 when its regular meetings became a "political salon" of sorts.[73]

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69 CACCAMO, Francesco: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století* [Jiří Pelikán and His Journey through the Socialism of the 20th Century]. Brno – Praha, Supplement 2008, pp. 66–69. In his unpublished autobiographic notes, Luciano Antonetti, one of the key characters of relations between Czech and Italian Communists, confirms that it was mainly Pelikán who made documents of the Czechoslovak dissent available to Italian media. (ANTONETTI, Luciano: *Vivere all'ombra (della Cecoslovacchia, e non solo): Materiali per un'autobiografia*, p. 157; the unpublished manuscript was kindly provided by the author.)

70 Smrkovský ci parla del socialismo in Cecoslovacchia e invita alla pacificazione. In: *Giorni – Vie nuove*, Vol. 5, No. 22 (1971), pp. 13–19; the Czech translation of the interview was published in September 1971 under the title Mluví Josef Smrkovský [Josef Smrkovský Speaking] as a special edition of the *Listy* journal in Rome. The topic was also covered by Milan Otáhal in his book *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989*, pp. 24–26.

71 The changed tactics of the opposition was also known to the State Security (see *Ibid.*, pp. 74–76).

72 See *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 2. Jan Šling (the son of executed KSČ functionary Otto Šling) wrote about Smrkovský's strategy to Pelikán in September 1970; according to the letter, "Smrkovský sends a message to the effect that there could be a possibility of influencing the leaderships of western parties toward a so-called honourable settlement between us and Moscow." In another letter, he added: "In my opinion, [Smrkovský] is aware of the situation and asks only for moral action. As to the request for an interview with Zanfrognini, I will pass the message and let you know." (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 15, Correspondence 0015, Šling's Letters to Pelikán, 2 and 8 September 1970.) The letters indicate that the interview with Smrkovský could be covered by Giancarlo Zanfrognini, then a journalist working for the *Il resto del Carlino* daily. For a summary of the opposition tactics, see OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989*, pp. 90–93.

73 See HÁJEK, M.: *Paměť české levice*, p. 245 – see Footnote 14. In this respect, Jiří Hájek mentioned several groups that were providing information to one another. One of them was concentrated "around Zdeněk Mlynář – it included some of the people who had attended the Vysočany Congress, including Jiřina Zelenková, Vladimír Kabrna, Jiří Judl, Miloš Hájek, Rudolf Slánský, and Zdeněk Jičínský. They were younger people, competent and educated." (HÁJEK, Jiří: *Paměti* [Memoirs]. Praha, Ústav mezinárodních vztahů [Institute of International Relations] 1997, p. 313; see also OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989,* pp. 82–90.)

Roughly at the same time, deposed reformist Communists sent a fairly high number of letters of protest both to the Czechoslovak authorities and to western Communist Parties,[74] starting with Smrkovský's "memoirs."[75] Alexander Dubček also joined the "campaign" by an open letter dated 28 December 1974 and addressed to the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council,[76] and another letter dated 29 March 1975 and addressed to leaders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Polish United Workers' Party, and also the Communist Party of Italy.[77] However, in the Italian case the fate of the letter is somewhat shrouded in mystery; the central daily of the Italian Communists publicly denied that the leadership of the Party had received any such letter from Dubček.[78] Other sources, on

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74 For a summary, see OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989,* p. 93–111.

75 Le memorie di Smrkovský dettate prima di morire. In: *Giorni – Vie nuove*, Vol. 5, Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 (1975), unpaged; for the Czech text, see Rozhovor Ondřeje Pitra s Josefem Smrkovským: Nedokončený rozhovor, pp. 4–25. As to Smrkovský's role in the early 1970s, see also VRABEC, Václav: *Vybočil z řady: Medailón Josefa Smrkovského a doby, v níž žil* [He Did Not Toe the Line: A Portrait of Josef Smrkovský and His Times]. Praha, Naše vojsko 1991, pp. 164–174; as to relations between reformist Communists and Italy, see LOMELLINI, Valentine: *L'appuntamento mancato: La sinistra italiana e il Dissenso nei regimi comunisti 1968–1989.* Firenze, Le Monnier 2010, pp. 98–101.

76 Dubček žaluje [Dubček Accuses]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, No. 3 – Special Edition (April 1975); the text of Alexander Dubček's letter to the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council (pp. 4–16) was placed after an editorial (pp. 1–3). Refer also to the abridged Italian version published in the *l'Espresso weekly*: Alexander Dubcek accusa: Perché avete tradito. In: *l'Espresso*, Vol. 21, No. 16 (1975), pp. 46–53 (the unabridged letter was published in the Italian version of the *Listy* journal in June 1975, pp. 1–17). A customary reference to relations between Dubček and Italy is the article by Luciano Antonetti Dubček e l'Italia. In: DUBČEK, Alexander: *Il socialismo dal volto umano: Autobiografia di un rivoluzionario*. Roma, Riuniti 1996, pp. 329–350.

77 See BENČÍK, Antonín: *Utajovaná pravda o Alexandru Dubčekovi: Drama muže, který předběhl svou dobu* [The Secret Truth about Alexander Dubček: The Drama of a Man Who Outran His Times]. Praha, Ostrov 2001, pp. 78–80 (the text of the letter is published in: DUBČEK, Alexander: *Od totality k demokracii: Prejavy, články a rozhovory, výber 1963–1992* [From Totalitarianism to Democracy: Speeches, Articles and Interviews, Selection 1963–1992]. Ed. Jozef Žatkuliak – Ivan Laluha. Bratislava, Veda 2002, pp. 247–253). As to Dubček's numerous letters of protest, see also UHER, Ján: Dubčekovy pookupačné protestné listy proti moci a jej zneužívaniu v rokoch 1969–1989 [Dubček's Post-Occupation Letters of Protest against Power and Its Misuse between 1969 and 1989]. In: *Cesty k novembru 1989: Aktivity Alexandra Dubčeka. Zborník zo seminára pri príležitosti 10. výročia novembra 1989* [The Roads to November 1989: Activities of Alexander Dubček. A Collection of Presentations Delivered at the Seminar Organised on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of November 1989]. Bratislava, Nová práca 2000, pp. 51–86 (printed text of the letter on pp. 145–152).

78 "Regarding the information printed in several newspapers and concerning a letter of Alexander Dubček to MP Enrico Berlinguer and a lengthy document on the situation in Czechoslovakia written by Zdeněk Mlynář, the Press Office of the Communist Party of Italy states that the documents have not been delivered to any member of the leadership of the Party." (Sulle notizie relative a una lettera di Dubcek. In: *l'Unità*, 7 June 1975, p. 13.) The term "lengthy document by Zdeněk Mlynář" refers to Mlynář's *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*.

the contrary, confirm they in fact had.[79] Although there was also an alleged Soviet attempt "to establish contacts in the same way as with Josef Smrkovský in 1973,"[80] the response of the official Czechoslovak authorities was adamant. They regarded these initiatives as efforts to denigrate the image of the already calm and placid situation in Czechoslovakia which Husák's propaganda was serving to international audiences. In his May 1975 comments on the situation in Czechoslovakia intended for the Secretariat and the Foreign Department of the Communist Party of Italy, Luciano Antonetti aptly characterised the absurdness of the allegations: "Since mid-April, the attacks were aimed directly at Dubček and other opponents, all lumped together, by the way [...] alternately accused of being 'right-wing opportunists,' 'revisionists,' 'deniers,' 'traitors,' 'fascists' or almost fascists, 'anti-Soviets,' and thus 'anti-Communists.'"[81]

   The dismissed members of the Communist Party were trying to include the "'Czechoslovak issue' in the agenda of the planned conference of European Communist Parties, which was to take place in 1975, but was finally held in June 1976 in Berlin."[82] It is in this context that Zdeněk Mlynář's attempt to offer, in the form of a structured memorandum (dated January to February 1975), an extensive analysis of the situation in Czechoslovakia, written "with the knowledge of and in consultations with A. Dubček and other dismissed members of the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia." The purpose was to initiate a discussion within the global Communist Movement (the document "was distributed to leaders of Communist Parties which were to attend the conference").[83] The book titled *Československý pokus o reformu 1968: Analýza jeho teorie a praxe* [The Czechoslovak Attempt at Reform 1968: Analysis of its Theory and Practice] was published

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79 In his unpublished autobiographic memoirs, Luciano Antonetti writes that Italian Communists indeed received the letter and that it was Dubček who did not want it published (ANTONETTI, L.: *Vivere all'ombra (della Cecoslovacchia, e non solo)*, pp. 93 and 140 – see Footnote 68). According to information then aired by Radio Free Europe, it was also confirmed by Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain Santiago Carrillo: "In an interview for *Le Nouvel Observateur* of 23 to 29 June, he believed that Dubček had indeed sent letters to Berlinguer and Honecker, and considered it 'a correct step,' adding: 'During the conference, we will defend Comrade Dubček's right to express his opinions freely in Prague.'" (DEVLIN, Kevin: The International Communist Movement: A Tale of Two Conferences, 18 July 1975, p. 11. The article is available at *http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/ text/115-4-115.shtml*, downloaded on 13 November 2011.)

80 According to Mlynář, "the whole matter kept dragging on until the autumn of 1975" (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the case of Josef Hodic," p. 4).

81 *Biblioteca Roberto Ruffilli*, Forlì (herefeter *BRR*), f. Luciano Antonetti, 1. 4. Relazioni PCI–ČSR [Relations between the Communist Party of Italy and Czechoslovakia], 001, Comments on the situation in Czechoslovakia, 6 May 1975. See also Mlynář's informative text of 1975 titled "Komunisté bez legitimace v Československu" [Communists without a Membership Card in Czechoslovakia], the Czech original of which is deposited in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 1, k. 3), and Antonetti's translation into Italian in the fund of Luciano Antonetti in Forlì (1. 4. Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 002, MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk).

82 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the case of Josef Hodic," p. 3.

83 *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

immediately after the meeting by the exile Index Publishing House[84] in Cologne, and its subsequent Italian edition (probably translated by Luciano Antonetti), under a changed title translated as "Prague – An Open Issue," and with a foreword by renowned mathematician and member of the leadership of the Communist Party of Italy Lucio Lombardo Radice. It can be ranked among Czechoslovak attempts aimed at influencing the attitudes of Euro-Communism.[85]

After the adoption of the resolution on the "Anti-Party Actions of Dubček and Other Persons"[86] by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 18 April 1975, adopted as a direct consequence of the manuscript in question having been sent to the Central Committee, the editorial board of the *Tvorba* journal and Orbis Publishing House,[87] the State Security searched Mlynář's apartment. They did so five days later, on 23 April.[88] The "Statement on Documents Written by Alexander Dubček, Václav Havel and Zdeněk Mlynář," which was prepared by the Ministry of the Interior and the Office of the Attorney General,[89] bears the same date. At the end of 1975, the State Security also organised a larger operation the purpose of which was to uncover the so-called Mlynář's group in the region of Varnsdorf, where Mlynář, thanks to contacts with his former secondary schoolmate Jan Pospíšil, was allegedly disseminating "harmful literature." A proposal for a further course of action of February 1976 says that Mlynář "has initiated a recent intensification of publication activities of remaining right-wing opportunists in order to create the impression of a broad

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84 As to circumstances accompanying the creation of the text, see also CACCAMO, F.: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, pp. 52–55 – see Footnote 68. However, some people in Czechoslovakia viewed Mlynář's memorandum very negatively, as a "plea of a 'loyal Communist' to Brezhnev" (GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Československo – můj druhý domov*, p. 422 – see Footnote 60).

85 The Italian translation was published without the opening part: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Praga – questione aperta: Il '68 cecoslovacco fra giudizio storico e prospettive future*. Bari, De Donato 1976. Regarding the Italian edition, see also documents deposited in Antonetti's fund, for instance Mlynář's contract with the publishing house or his letters.

86 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 18 April 1975.

87 Copies of Mlynář's accompanying letters to these institutions are deposited in the very same place.

88 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, and Part 3, k. 2, "House Search Protocol" and "House Search Evaluation." Some confiscated documents were returned to Mlynář on 29 October 1976 (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, "Ruling").

89 According to the statement, Mlynář was expressing himself "more cautiously," which was why "it is not yet possible to conclude with certainty […] that the contents of the documents constitute a criminal act" (Stanovisko orgánů politické moci [Position Statement of Political Power Authorities]). In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 18 n. – see Footnote 6). See also Mlynář's lengthy letter to the Minister of the Interior Jaromír Obzina of February 1976, with a rejection of summons to Bartolomějská Street No. 7 "for the purpose of official proceedings" (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Mlynář's Letter to Obzina dated 15 February 1976).

opposition."[90] However, Mlynář also received sympathetic support from several Czech intellectuals who founded Charter 77 soon thereafter – in March 1976, an appeal signed, for instance, by Václav Havel, Karel Kosík, Jan Patočka and Ludvík Vaculík was released. It demanded public discussion on the principles and propositions contained in Mlynář's confiscated book in Czechoslovakia.[91] Mlynář's open letter of February 1976 to European Communist Parties,[92] the purpose of which was to influence the abovementioned international conference in Berlin,[93] also fits into this framework.

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90   A copy of the file that the State Security kept on Zdeněk Mlynář, codenamed "Countryman" and dating back to 1975, can be found in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 3, k. 2).

91   The text dated 24 March 1976 was later published by Mlynář himself (Výzva opozičních intelektuálů z 24. března 1976 [An Appeal of Opposition Intellectuals of 24 March 1976]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 19 n.); a copy can be found in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 3, k. 2). Numerous dissent initiatives in those months were also watched with interest by the exile community, as indicated by *Kniha Charty* [The Charter Book] compiled by Vilém Prečan: see, for instance, Výzva čtrnácti bývalých členů ÚV KSČ – Propustit politické vězně, 20. 1. 1976 [Appeal of 14 Ex-Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: Release Political Prisoners, 20 January 1976]. In: PREČAN, Vilém (ed.): *Kniha Charty: Hlasy z domova 1976/77* [The Charter Book: Voices from Home 1976/77]. Cologne – Rome, Index – Listy 1977, p. 30 n.; Dopis sedmi bývalých členů ÚV KSČ konferenci komunistických a dělnických stran Evropy v Berlíně, 25. 6. 1976 [Letter of Seven Ex-Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Berlin, 25 June 1976]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 40–42; Otevřený dopis Zdeňka Mlynáře politickým činitelům odpovědným za zákonnost v ČSSR, 8. 9. 1976 [Open Letter of Zdeněk Mlynář to Political Authorities Responsible for Law and Order in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 8 September 1976]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 50–56; Otevřený dopis deseti právních odborníků ústavním orgánům ČSSR ve věci mladých hudebníků odsouzených v Plzni a v Praze pro údajné výtržnictví k odnětí svobody, 6. 11. 1976 [Open Letter of 10 Legal Experts to Constitutional Bodies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Regarding the Case of Young Musicians Sentenced to Prison in Prague and Plzeň for Alleged Disorderly Conduct, 6 November 1976]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 78–86; Prohlášení čtyř bývalých členů ÚV KSČ k propuštění některých politických vězňů v Československu, 14. 12. 1976 [Statement of Four Ex-Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Release of Some Political Prisoners in Czechoslovakia). In: *Ibid.*, pp. 87 n.

92   Una lettera di Zdenek Mlynar a PC a PS d'Europa occidentale. In: *l'Unità*, 11 April 1976, p. 19. A less abridged version was also reprinted by *La città futura*, the weekly of the Italian Communist Youth Federation. The original Czech text was published in *Listy* (MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Otevřený dopis komunistům a socialistům Evropy [Open Letter to Communists and Socialists of Europe]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (June 1976), pp. 41–45). In addition, the archives of Luciano Antonetti contain a translation of Mlynář's previous open letter dated 17 September 1975 and "delivered by a young Czechoslovak who introduced himself as a 'messenger of common friends'" (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 001, Antonetti's Letter to Giuseppe Damo of 13 October 1975).

93   See also the open letter of seven ex-members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (including Mlynář) who were active during the Prague Spring, dated 25 June 1976: Ex-dirigenti del PC cecoslovacco scrivono alla conferenza di Berlino. In: *l'Unità*, 30 June 1976, p. 14. Regarding the context of the participation of Italian Communists in the conference, see PONS, Silvio: *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*. Torino,

Also probable is Mlynář's participation in an important attempt to create a com-
mon platform of communist outcasts, namely a document titled "Notes on the Situ-
ation and Outlooks of the Opposition in 1975," which analysed "certain tendencies
the future development of which should be rationally considered and evaluated both
at home and abroad." The authors wanted the document to "break through the wall
of fear"; they admitted that "since 1970, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
has been a qualitatively new organism, more than any other time before," and
concluded that domestic and international factors had allowed, "for the first time
ever, the existence of an opposition against the regime in the form of a numerically
strong and politically experienced group of Communists." In their opinion, the op-
position was to focus – also by pointing at discrepancies between common political
practices and "generally democratic and officially recognised principles (e.g. the
principles of Helsinki)" – on current tendencies of Communist Parties of Western
Europe and to accept a "democratic Marxist programme." It was also supposed to
resolutely advance "from the 'policy of shouts' to a policy of creating and submitting
realistic alternatives of solutions of various domestic policy issues." Just as there
were two literatures and two cultures, the authors of the document believed there
ought to be "also two social sciences and analytical socio-political productions.
Publication options would also be analogous (samizdat or abroad)." However, the
platform needed substantial help from West European Communists and political
émigrés to become "political opposition."[94]

The appeal elicited a broad discussion among the Czechoslovak socialist op-
position abroad; some authors commented on it and the *Listy*[95] group prepared
a "Response to 'Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition,'" which
was sent to Prague a few months later, when Mlynář's book *Československý pokus
o reformu 1968* and other opposition documents had already become known. The
"Response" interpreted the "Notes" as a "significant step forward in the search
for a realistic opposition base in current circumstances." The authors of the *Listy*
group noted the development of the "parallel political culture" and "new quality" of
activities of the political opposition, based on "democratic socialism." In addition,
they appreciated the fact that "the possibilities offered by the Helsinki Declaration

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Einaudi 2006, pp. 84–89. Similar letters of former Prague Spring leaders to Italian Com-
munists enjoyed a lot of publicity in Italy; see Lettera al PCI di esponenti del "nuovo corso"
cecoslovacco. In: *l'Unità*, 18 June 1976, p. 15; LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*,
p. 101 – see Footnote 74.

94 *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 4, "Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition
in 1975."

95 As to the *Listy* group, see RAŠKA, Francis D.: *The Long Road to Victory: A History of Czecho-
slovak Exile Organizations after 1968*. New York, Columbia University Press 2012; CACCA-
MO, Francesco: Mezi exilem, domácí opozicí a mezinárodním veřejným míněním. Exilový
časopis *Listy* [Among the Exile, Domestic Opposition, and International Public Opinion.
The Exile Journal *Listy*]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013), pp. 345–378.

as a tool for criticising the regime and as a means of an immunisation of sorts from the criticism have been recognised at home."[96]

It is indeed a text which presages different aspects of the future development of opposition activities in Czechoslovakia. As seen from letters sent by Zdeněk Hejzlar, Director of Czechoslovak Radio in 1968, from his exile in Sweden to Jiří Pelikán, the birth of the "comprehensive response" referred to the above was a long and difficult process and, moreover, there was general expectation of a "repressive strike" that was supposed to ensure that "Social Democratic governments will make an offer of asylum to those affected by it" (which indeed happened a year later).[97] According to information he received from home, another lengthy (and untitled) text of Mlynář[98] "contains the outcome of a certain reconciliation of moderate (Mlynář, etc.) and more radical (F. Kriegel, etc.) opinions."[99] As indicated by efforts to establish new communication links with home, part of the group of political émigrés concentrated around the *Listy* journal pinned a lot of hope on the formation of the new platform, which remains almost unnoticed by historical research into opposition activities taking place in those times.

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96 *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 4, "Response to 'Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition.'" The fund also contains other related documents, including "Draft Response to 'Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition.'" Expert opinions on different aspects of the "Notes": see, for instance, "Comments on the Issue of Czechoslovakia in 1975" by an unnamed author, who emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1976 and whose text openly criticised the optimism of Mlynář and people around him who "know about Russian pressure on part of the leadership aiming at eliminating the most blatant consequences of the 'normalisation'" (*Ibid.*), or "Comments on the Prague Notes" by Vladimír Horský (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 14); see also CACCAMO, F.: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století,* p. 53 n. – see Footnote 65, and Pelikán's letter to Havlíček dated 4 April 1976, in PELIKÁN, Jiří – HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Psáno z Říma, psáno ze Ženevy. Korespondence 1969–1989* [Written from Rome, Written from Geneva. Correspondence 1969–1989]. Olomouc, Burian a Tichák 2013, p. 110.

97 On 9 August 1976, Hejzlar wrote to Pelikán: "Too many people are planning to go out and all of them generally expect that finding a place for them here does not pose much of a problem." (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0025.)

98 It is probably the text then published in the *L'76* magazine: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Zur Begründung sozialistischer Demokratie: Das Aktionsprogramm der KPT aus dem Jahr 1968 und die europäische kommunistische Bewegung. In: *L'76*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1976), pp. 12–32. The text was translated into German by Adolf Müller, as indicated in his letter to Pelikán dated 10 July 1976 (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0027).

99 See *Ibid.*, Correspondence, 0025, Hejzlar's Letter to Pelikán, 11 June 1976; see also Hejzlar's Letters to Pelikán, 3 March and 9 July 1976. See also Pelikán's Letter to František Janouch dated 26 October 1976, containing a description of the situation in Czechoslovakia based on talks with Prečan, Kaplan and Reiman: the three main streams could be personified by Dubček, Mlynář and Kriegel (and it seemed that the second and third persons named above "could reach an agreement"). JANOUCH, František – PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Korespondence* – see Footnote 51.

Charter 77

It seems that the failure of all attempts to achieve an agreement of sorts with Husák's regime together with the end of secret negotiations with Soviet political high-ups (Mlynář proposed "M. S. Gorbachev, whom I studied with at the Faculty of Law in Moscow with for five years" as their partner even then, and also suggested that "the talks should take place in Moscow")[100] made a numerous group of former reformist Communists (including Mlynář) question the possibility of reforming the system then existing in Czechoslovakia from inside. As early as 1975, in an interview for Swedish TV, Jiří Hájek and Zdeněk Mlynář highlighted that "the Helsinki Accords in fact represent the recognition of what is common for Europe," at the same time noting that "the existence of elements that are contrary to European civilisation and its cultural base is out of line with the spirit and meaning of the Helsinki Conference."[101] It is in this context that Mlynář's open letter dated 8 September 1976 and concerning the case of The Plastic People of the Universe, in which he protested against attempts to intimidate the youth and vigorously defended "a group of young people whose only crime is they were composing, singing and playing music and lyrics that went against the grain of various official authorities and administrators of culture and politics," should be interpreted. The letter analysed "both general social […] and specific historical causes" which make young people "want to run away from the society, to build their own community outside the official one, a community free of what one perceives as the falsehood and lies of official social structures."[102]

According to Mlynář, the protest actions and personal contacts in September 1976 resulted in "different ideological and political orientations, hitherto basically isolated" becoming closer; in November, the first "concrete proposal for a joint

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100 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 4.

101 Hovoří Z. Mlynář a J. Hájek [Z. Mlynář and J. Hájek Speaking]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, No. 7 (December 1975), pp. 13–17 (here p. 16). The "invitation" for the interview was Mlynář's idea (see HÁJEK, J.: *Paměti*, p. 314 – see Footnote 69).

102 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: Proti falši a lži: Otevřený dopis politickým činitelům, odpovědným za zákonnost v ČSSR. [Against Falsehood and Lies: An Open Letter of Zdeněk Mlynář to Political Authorities Responsible for Law and Order in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (1976), pp. 5–7; see also Una lettera di Mlynar sui problemi dei giovani. In: *l'Unità*, 15 September 1976, p. 14. For the context of Mlynář's letter and other initiatives of intellectuals in support of the musicians, see GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia.* London, Allen & Unwin 1981, pp. 9–11. In addition, the Italian *l'Unità* daily was closely watching the case and subsequently printed a number of additional shorter articles dealing with it. Antonetti's archives contain "a long and detailed account of the trial of four of 19 young musicians, poets and singers, members of The Plastic People of the Universe and of the DG 307 bands, who had been arrested in March and accused of being anti-social elements, parasites, drug addicts, alcoholics, perverts, public order disturbers, and repeated offenders, which took place 21 to 23 September 1976 in Prague," dated 8 November 1976. (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 001.)

protest"[103] was born. In a document concerning the "case of Josef Hodic" (in the summer of 1981, he disappeared from Vienna and reappeared in Prague as an agent of the Czechoslovak intelligence) and sent to other representatives of the socialist opposition in exile in July 1981, he later wrote that "after the conference of Communist Parties in Berlin in 1976, the political orientation of the opposition group of former KSČ functionaries, where I held a leading position, changed. We came to the conclusion that there were no prospects for our cause without 'pressure from below' against Husák's regime, and we thus sought a connection with other, non-communist groups of the opposition movement. At the end of 1976, the reorientation resulted in creating Charter 77; J. Hájek became its spokesman on behalf of the group of former Communists."[104]

This may also be a reason for explaining the participation of a substantial part of reformist Communists expelled from the Party after 1968 in the non-socialist platform demanding observance of human rights, i.e Charter 77.[105] Insofar as the important role of Zdeněk Mlynář, who was also, *inter alia*, one of the sharpest commentators on difficulties during the initial months of Charter 77's[106] existence, it is perhaps appropriate to mention the the following words of Václav Havel:

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103 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 3, Mlynář's Study Titled *Ideologické a politické směry uvnitř hnutí za občanská práva v současném Československu* [Ideological and Political Directions within the Civil Rights Movement in Today's Czechoslovakia], p. 28 n.

104 *Ibid.*, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 4.

105 See also Mlynář's "Statement on the Situation in Czechoslovakia," dated 16 January 1977, one day after Pavel Kohout's, which he addressed to "democratic public opinion and democratic governments," "European Communists" and "European Socialists," asking them to help find a solution to the situation. (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 10, Statement on the Situation in Czechoslovakia.) The appeal was also published in Italian: Arresto in Cecoslovacchia di quattro intellettuali che firmarono la "Charta 77." In: *l'Unità*, 19 January 1977, p. 12. Antonetti's Italian translations of Kohout's and Mlynář's appeals are kept in his fund (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 002). On 23 January 1977, Antonetti also wrote a letter addressed to Antonio Rubbi, Head of the International Department of the Communist Party of Italy, in which he conveyed requirements of the Czechoslovak socialist opposition: "[…] in addition, a request was presented (it seems that by Mlynář) whether it would be possible to notify them of the response of our Party, if any, to their appeals," and "whether it would be possible – just like other newspapers do – to call a local comrade from Rome and ask him for information or an interview." (*Ibid.*, Antonetti's Letter to Rubbi, 23 January 1977.)

106 Mlynář provided perhaps his most detailed account of the evolution of the opposition activities shortly after his emigration, in a university publication titled *Ideologische und politische Richtungen innerhalb der Bürgerrechtsbewegung in der heutigen Tschechoslowakei.* (Sonderveröffentlichung des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien.) (Köln/R., b.n. 1978). The Czech original, *Ideologické a politické směry uvnitř hnutí za občanská práva v současném Československu* [Ideological and Political Directions within the Civil Rights Movement in Today's Czechoslovakia], is deposited in Mlynář's *NA* fund, Part 1, k. 3. See also numerous articles in Czechoslovak exile press: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: První bilance Charty 77 [The First Results of Charter 77]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 1977), pp. 1–9; IDEM: Exkomunisté a křesťané v Chartě 77 [Ex-Communists and Christians in Charter 77]. In: *Studie*, No. 60 (1978), pp. 414–427 (the article was also

"The community of former KSČ functionaries around Zdeněk Mlynář had discussed the possibility of establishing a human rights committee or a Helsinki committee, similar to those founded in the Soviet Union, even earlier.

[…]

My nervousness was increased by the fact that the meeting had been scheduled to take place at four o'clock, but Zdeněk Mlynář, who was to bring signatures collected by several collectors among the ex-KSČ community, did not turn up, although it was close to five. However, he finally arrived (it turned out we had misunderstood each other as to the arrangements), bringing more than 100 signatures, which pulled my breath away. All in all, we had 243 signatures, the police did not appear, we dealt with the relevant agenda, and our small group had a toast of champagne.

[…]

Making this step was not easy for many non-Communists, but also for many Communists: the stepping out toward life and the true general state of mind, out of one's own shadow, was paid for by the necessity to give up the 'leading role' principle forever. It is true that many former Communists probably would not have defended it expressly, but it was undoubtedly still present in their blood or minds. Zdeněk Mlynář deserved a lot of credit for recognising, thanks to his fine political sense, the urgency of the step and for convincing people around him, thanks to the weight of his authority, to do so."[107]

The participation of reformist Communists in the inception of Charter 77 not only played a crucial role in the creation of the movement, but also was the moment that convinced many of them of the impossibility of implementing reforms from the top, although they still regarded western Communist Parties as their principal reference framework.[108] The support for Charter 77 voiced by some Italian

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published in Mlynář's work *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 43–54); IDEM: Místo disidentů na politické mapě dneška [The Place of Dissidents on Today's Political Map]. In: HAVEL, V. (ed.): *O svobodě a moci*, pp. 227–256 – see Footnote 3.

107 HAVEL, Václav: Dálkový výslech: Rozhovor s Karlem Hvížďalou [Long-Distance Interrogation: An Interview with Karel Hvížďala]. In: IDEM: *Spisy* [Collected Works], Vol. 4: *Eseje a jiné texty z let 1970–1989. Dálkový výslech* [Essays and Other Texts from the Years 1970–1989. Long-Distance Interrogation]. Ed. Jan Šulc, Praha, Torst 1999, pp. 699–917, here pp. 837 and 841–843. According to Mlynář, Havel was the principal author of the text; he himself professed to be the author of the "section dealing with the role of the Communist Party, and also the section on the nature of Charter 77 as an informal civic initiative without any fixed organisational structures." (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 3, MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Ideologické a politické směry uvnitř hnutí za občanská práva v současném Československu* [Ideological and Political Directions within the Civil Rights Movement in Today's Czechoslovakia], p. 29.)

108 GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, pp. 44–47 – see Footnote 101. Shortly thereafter, Petr Pithart, one of the prominent personages of the nascent dissident movement, characterises efforts of reformist Communists as pure "illusions of reformists in his monograph on 1968, published under the pen name of Josef Sládeček in Cologne. Pithart regarded Mlynář's book of 1975 as an attempt to present Moscow's policy as "something understandable, even excusable," in order to initiate a dialogue, first with "a vaguely defined and only presumed group of more enlightened politicians-ideologues

intellectuals and politicians is, after all, a well-known fact, and a report on international responses to Charter 77, prepared for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia dated 3 February 1977, even pointed out that "the leadership of the Communist Party of Italy is not only quite openly engaged in support for Charter 77, but also involves other organisations under the Party's control or influence, such as trade unions or even twin towns." The authors of the text were concerned about the public statement of six Italian intellectuals[109] and labelled the attitude of the Italian Communist Party leadership "cynical" (in this respect, they quoted, very suspiciously, a review of Mlynář's book *Praga – questione aperta*, which was published in the *Rinascita* weekly).[110] Another part of the report stressed that how the General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi replied to "dear comrade Mlynář" saying that Italian Socialists would protest against the persecution of Charter 77 signatories.[111]

The difficult period after the harsh repressions against Charter 77 by the regime[112] could be overcome only thanks to the assistance of other signatories – a "caucus" of sorts, the members of which were Zdeněk Mlynář, František Kriegel, Pavel Kohout, Ludvík Vaculík, Petr Uhl, Jan Vladislav, Pavel Landovský and many others.[113] When a very harsh article accusing Mlynář, on the basis of an authentic letter, of

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of the Eastern Bloc," and later with European Communists. (PITHART, Petr: *Osmašedesátý* [1968]. Praha, Rozmluvy 1990, pp. 207–210.)

109 Dichiarazione di intellettuali comunisti sulla Cecoslovacchia. In: *l'Unità*, 13 Jaunary 1977, p. 1. See also Mlynář's interview in the daily of the Italian Socialist Party: Che cosa vogliamo con "Charta 77." In: *Avanti*, 3 April 1977, p. 3.

110 See Footnote 84.

111 CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, Blanka – PREČAN, Vilém (ed.): *Charta 77: Dokumenty 1977–1989* [Charter 77: Documents 1977–1989], Vol. 3: *Přílohy* [Annexes]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR, 2007, pp. 183–195, P8/3 – Comprehensive Report on International Reactions to and Activities of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Connection with Charter 77, Submitted by Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Vasil Biľak for a Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; see also BLAŽEK, Petr (ed.): *"Tentokrát to bouchne": Edice dokumentů k organizaci a ohlasům kampaně proti signatářům Charty 77 (leden–únor 1977)* ["This Time It Will Explode": An Edition of Documents on the Organisation of and Reactions to the Campaign against the Signatories of Charter 77 (January–February 1977)]. Praha, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy [Faculty of Arts of Charles University] – Archiv bezpečnostních složek Ministerstva vnitra ČR [Security Services Archive of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic] 2007. In his reply to Mlynář dated 27 January 1977, General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi protested against the persecution of the signatories of Charter 77 and proposed a "joint action of leftist and all democratic forces in Italy and Europe" (Charta 77 ve světě [Charter 77 in the World]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1977), pp. 31–38, here p. 33).

112 Mlynář, for instance, lost his job; he published a letter announcing the termination of his employment contract with the National Museum in his book *Socialistou na volné noze* (p. 240 n.), and it has also been preserved in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 3, k. 2).

113 HÁJEK, J.: *Paměti*, p. 319 – see Footnote 72.

being a squealer in the 1950s appeared in the *Rudé právo* daily,[114] Mlynář lost the last vestiges of any illusions that the situation might ever improve. On the same day, 1 March 1977, he accepted the offer of political exile which Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had earlier made to Czech dissidents,[115] and left Czechoslovakia in June 1977.[116] (It is interesting to note that Mlynář wrote a letter to Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito on 30 January 1977, in which he indicated that his emigration to Austria could be politically misused and that he had been given until 4 February to think things over. He also asked whether it would be possible for him to "leave Czechoslovakia not for a capitalist country, but for Yugoslavia," as this possibility had been indicated by Yugoslav diplomats he had known as early as 1969.)[117]

Before his departure, he addressed a text titled "Conditions and Foreseeable Outlooks of Marxist Opposition in Czechoslovakia (Principles)" to former reformist Communists, in which he, rather heretically, very clearly defined "ideological schemes preventing the Marxist opposition from stepping over the limits which need to be stepped over." Generationally, most of the expelled Communists could play a decisive political role only "until 1980." However, the fundamental change did not come so early, which is why it is "necessary to firmly integrate the Marxist opposition into the general democratic stream of pressure on the system from 'the bottom up.'" To make this happen, the Marxist opposition has to "focus on a democratisation of the system" and "a concept of political and human rights (model: Charter 77) must be interpreted not as tactics leading to a limitation of the objective once it has been achieved, but as a way out of the situation." This would obviously mean stepping beyond the "the policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia officially formulated in 1968," one of the reasons being that it would "no longer be possible to obtain a majority consensus for the concept of the 'leading role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,' like in 1968," even at the expense of the Marxist opposition being "unable to rely on becoming the party that would win

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114 OBORSKÝ, Stanislav: Práskač: O mistrovi v převlékání kabátu [The Squealer: On a Master Turncoat]. In: *Rudé právo*, 1 March 1977, p. 2. Mlynář himself re-published this article, together with his column reacting to it by using the words squealing, blackmailing and other motives of the forthcoming spring, and a letter that Jan Patočka wrote to him in connection with the article, in his book *Socialistou na volné noze* (pp. 71–78).

115 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 6. A week later, Mlynář wrote to Kreisky that he had got an offer to emigrate from Czechoslovak authorities as early as on 28 January 1977, but he had refused to do so at the time. However, as he was subsequently placed under house arrest, he decided to accept the offer, and asked to be allowed to work as an entomologist in Vienna. (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Mlynář's Letter to Bruno Kreisky, 8 March 1977.)

116 Mlynář was allowed to take his personal belongings and his library with him (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 3, "List of Items Exported to Austria through Čechofracht"; Part 4, k. 18, "List of Books Exported from Czechoslovakia upon Relocation to Austria"). He was divested of Czechoslovak citizenship only on 21 July 1977, one of the reasons being that "he published a pamphlet titled 'The White Paper' in London." (*Ibid.*, Part 3, k. 2.) He got Austrian citizenship only on 28 November 1979 (*Ibid.*).

117 *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 3, Mlynář's Letter to Josip Broz Tito, 30 January 1977.

decisive power positions by democratic means."[118] It is interesting to note that this "political testament" of Mlynář also appeared in the sights of the State Security; however, in their opinion it did not unify the opposition, but divided them into "those for whom Mlynář is an authority and those who look at these principles with a critical eye."[119]

In Exile

By coincidence, Mlynář arrived in Vienna at the very moment as the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Vasil Biľak, who was there on a state visit. Interestingly enough Chancellor Kreisky received Mlynář early in the morning to meet him before Biľak.[120] Nevertheless, contacts with left-wing western politicians during his time in exile were sometimes a disappointment for Mlynář.

At that time, he pinned great hopes in the dialogue with Italian Communists and Socialists.[121] As a matter of fact, it was the reaction to subsequent developments in Eastern Europe – as confirmed by the so-called "Biennale of Dissent" held in Venice in the winter of 1977/1978[122] – a definitive turning point in the attitudes of Italy's

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118 *Ibid.*, Part 3, k. 4 (the author published part of the text in his book *Socialistou na volné noze,* pp. 35 – 41). A few years later, in an article for the samizdat *Lidové noviny* periodical, he wrote that "the so-called 'party of the expelled' ceased to be an influential political power sometimes in the mid-1970s." (MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Jsem socialista na volné noze [I Am a Freelance Socialist]. In: *Lidové noviny*, No. 11 (1988), p. 4 n.)

119 Quoted according to: OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1968–1989*, p. 219 n. – see Footnote 268.

120 See JANÝR, Přemysl: Ohlas Charty 77 v Rakousku [Reactions to Charter 77 in Austria]. In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, Blanka – DRÁPALA, Milan – PREČAN, Vilém – VANČURA, Jiří (ed.): *Charta 77 očima současníků: Po dvaceti letech* [Charter 77 in the Eyes of Contemporaries: 20 Years Later]. Brno, Doplněk 1997, pp. 67–72, particularly p. 70.

121 The first press conference of Mlynář in exile took place on 16 June 1977 in Vienna (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 3). His emigration elicited many reactions in Italian media: see, for instance, Zdenek Mlynar lascia la Cecoslovacchia. In: *l'Unità*, 14 June 1977, p. 14; see Dubček diceva: Sparo anch'io. In: *l'Espresso*, Vol. 23, No. 30 (1977), p. 41 (an interview with Mlynář); also see Zdeněk Mlynář na Západě [Zdeněk Mlynář in the West]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (October 1977), p. 17; MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: An interview for *l'Espresso*. 30 July 1977. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 17–19. The texts are also deposited in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 36).

122 Mlynář ultimately did not appear at the event in order to be able to finish his book, as he wrote to Irena Dubská: "Of course, I will not come to Venice, although there will be some unpleasant consequences, but there is nothing that can be done about it." (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 3, Mlynář's Letter to Dubská, 30 October 1977.) The biennale in Venice is also covered in correspondence with Jiří Pelikán (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 6). Mlynář's *NA* fund also contains an interesting proposal of two unrealised seminars on the political role of culture and the relation of culture and society in countries built on a Soviet model, which Mlynář wanted to organise (*Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 3, a text with a handwritten title "A Proposal for Venice (Biennale)").

two largest left-wing parties in favour of the dissident movement.[123] In March 1977, the editorial board of the *L'76* magazine, consisting of the writers Heinrich Böll and Günter Grass and the journalist Carola Stern, handed over Mlynář's text on Charter 77 and the political situation in Czechoslovakia addressed to the General Secretary of Italian Communists, Enrico Berlinguer, and to Lucio Lombardo Radice.[124] However, Mlynář's subsequent attempt to arrange a meeting with Berlinguer was – unlike his meeting with the General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi – unsuccessful, and the best-known Czechoslovak Communist dissident-in-exile was received only by Adalberto Minucci, a member of the leadership of the Party and editor-in-chief of the *Rinascita* weekly.[125] The failure of the attempt, indeed a "cold shower"[126] for the entire Czechoslovak socialist opposition, was partly a result of pressure exerted by Moscow on the just forming Euro-Communism. In any case, it charted a precise boundary in relations between the leadership of the Communist Party of Italy and Czechoslovak dissidents, who continued to be present on pages of the Italian CP's media, but were never recognised as a fully-fledged political partner.[127] On the other hand, Craxi unequivocally highlighted,

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123 See LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, pp. 115–122 – see Footnote 74. See also the reluctant letter of Jiří Pelikán dated 5 June 1977 and addressed to Head of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Italy Sergio Segre, which concerned Mlynář's arrival in Vienna and the attitude of Italian Communists to Mlynář (PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Io, esule indigesto: Il Pci e la lezione del '68 a Praga*. Milano, Antonio Carioti 1998, p. 124 n.).

124 The title of the text can be translated as "The Political Situation around Charter 77: An Attempt at a Recap of January 1977" (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4), an Italian summary of which was prepared by Luciano Antonetti (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 002, The Political Situation and Charter 77: The First Recap of January 1977). It was probably this text which Ota Šik wrote to Pelikán about in his letter dated 25 April 1977 – "Mlynář's analysis is fairly interesting, but does not tell much about the actual mood of the masses. I cannot imagine now whether people – and most of them are really workers and young people – have already put up, more or less, with the situation, or whether they are interested in any form of resistance." (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 15, Correspondence, 0007.)

125 See *BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 002, A Reminder for Sergio Segre, Antonetti's Text of 27 June 1977. However, *l'Unità* brought information about the meeting, although it comprised just a few lines. (Zdenek Mlynar ricevuto a "Rinascita." In: *l'Unità*, 8 July 1977, p. 1.) A summary of the interview which Mlynář had provided to the ANSA Press Agency while in Rome was then published. (Intervista di Mlynar sul dissenso in Cecoslovacchia. In: *Ibid.*, 17 July 1977, p. 15.)

126 REIMAN, M.: *Rusko jako téma a realita doma a v exilu*, p. 184 – see Footnote 42.

127 As indicated by a failed attempt to have an interview with Dubček, which Pelikán had repeatedly mentioned in his letters to Mlynář in the autumn of 1977, in *l'Unità* (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 8). There exist numerous sources on the topic (LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, p. 119 n. – see Footnote 74; IDEM: Il dissenso dell'Est tra PCI a PSI: Una guerra fredda nella sinistra italiana. In: POGGIO, Pier Paolo (ed.): *Dissenso: Critica e fine del comunismo*. Venezia, Fondazione Luigi Micheleti – Marsilio 2009, p. 153–156). Nevertheless, *l'Unità* continued to publish opinions and attitudes of the "Czechoslovak socialist opposition" (see at least "Dichiarazione della Opposizione socialista cecoslovacca in esilio." In: *l'Unità*, 7 January 1978, p. 14; Appello dell'opposizione cecoslovacca. In: *Ibid.*,

in connection with Mlynář, the political importance assigned to the issue of the dissent in Eastern Bloc countries, declaring that he was willing to get involved in favour thereof.[128] After all, the political opinions of Mlynář himself were at that time getting increasingly closer to the attitudes of western Social Democratic Parties, even at the expense of a tough exchange of opinions with former reformist Communists who found themselves in exile,[129] for example over an attempt to "strive more for the mutual cooperation of various exile groups, in a way similar to how the opposition at home was striving for it under the umbrella of 'Charter 77.'"[130]

Although Mlynář repeatedly stated that he had not "intended to 'rebuild something from scratch' in the Czechoslovak exile" and that he would "work within existing structures – particularly in the *Listy* group of J. Pelikán,"[131] he had quite a difficult time to find his place within the political emigration where "a fairly strong political structure built for years" already existed.[132] The *Listy* group underwent a fairly complex development and its common platform was built slowly. The "very loose and non-institutionalised grouping," which more or less matched the group of people cooperating with the *Listy* journal, was formed mainly during meetings in Como in May 1970 and in Milan in 1972.[133] The formation of Charter 77 was a great impetus also for the group around Jiří Pelikán, and the arrival of Zdeněk Mlynář, who soon became one of the group's leaders, caused profound changes in the activities of the socialist émigrés.

The likely rivalry between Pelikán and Mlynář in the *Listy* group, exacerbated by Mlynář's privileged position in the eyes of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, was sensed mainly by Zdeněk Hejzlar who counted on Mlynář's involvement in the activities of the socialist opposition, but was concerned about the scope of Mlynář's activities.[134] Assuming that disagreements might emerge during the meeting of the whole *Listy* group, Hejzlar recommended Pelikán to make better preparations for

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18 August 1978, p. 11). See also MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Lettera aperta ai giovani comunisti. In: *La città futura*, Vol. 31 (1978), p. 1 n.

128 See the article in the daily of the Socialist Party, "Craxi ha ricevuto Zdenek Mlynar." In: *l'Avanti*, 8 July 1977, p. 6; LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, p. 121.

129 See CACCAMO, F.: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, pp. 57–59 – see Footnote 68.

130 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 8.

131 *Ibid.,* p. 7.

132 Jak jsem vstoupil do Evropy [How I Entered Europe]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 81–85, here p. 82 – see Footnote 6.

133 O skupině LISTY [On the LISTY Group]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 3–4 (July 1977), p. 15.

134 In his letter to Pelikán dated 21 June 1977, Hejzlar wrote: "You should push Mlynář at all costs to remain as close as possible to Euro-Communists, to win their trust, and not to cross their lines too much, because this is the only thing that is worth the effort, and he can do more than anyone else in this respect." (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 10, Correspondence, 0063.) Also interesting are the words that Hejzlar had addressed to Pelikán 10 days earlier: "Anyway, you yourself know very well that there are certainly many things in what you have written over the years which could make pitching you against Mlynář as much as possible." (*Ibid.*, k. 16, Correspondence, 0025, Hejzlar's Letter to Pelikán, 11 June 1977.)

the event, as "Zdeněk definitely does not plan to work only along the lines which we see as positive."[135] A while later, he added: "You miscalculated – he wants to be involved in 'big' politics and he thinks he is the only one to make the wheels spin. This attitude has both positive and dangerous and negative aspects." His "sweep" could be so strong that it would be necessary to "make an insignificant concession in the matter of our relationship with 'other' exiles to show our goodwill," and thus "with Zdeněk, we will have to 'capture' exactly his manifestations of such 'goodwill.'"[136] As a matter of fact, Hejzlar was very surprised when he received a meticulously prepared text from Zdeněk Mlynář titled "Comments on the Political Situation in Czechoslovakia and Its Possible Development," including a detailed "Annex," both dated August 1977.[137] The analysis contained Mlynář's harsh criticism of the whole Prague Spring era and the "retreat policy of remnants of Dubček's reformist leadership." He wrote off the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as a totally discredited force, perceiving "normalisation" as a safety mechanism of sorts, which would prevent the system "from getting out of Soviet control again." In his opinion, ex-Communists could no longer expect that they would be rehabilitated as a fully-fledged political force, and he believed the only option was an orientation toward a "pluralistic democratic political system." The "Annex" analysed Czechoslovakia's subordination to the Soviet Union, economic difficulties, changes in the character of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (which, in his opinion, had become a "purely Soviet-style Party"), mechanisms used to suppress undesirable tendencies in the society, and the nature and influence of opposition groups. With this text, Mlynář presented the *Listy* group with a perspective that was somewhat different from the hitherto implemented policy of defending the slightly facelifted traditions of the Prague Spring.

Zdeněk Hejzlar's reaction was contained in his letter to Mlynář dated 1 September 1977. He admitted that Mlynář's "contacts with Kreisky are naturally very important and substantially benefit our interests, particularly in Austria and Germany." At the same time, he warned Mlynář "not to succumb to the illusion that too much can be obtained through Kreisky." He wrote that Mlynář's "Annex" was "valuable and remarkable," but he viewed the "catastrophic disintegration of structures with consequences that no one with common sense can wish" as very risky. He believed the positive evaluation of Pavel Tigrid's activities was a "great mistake," pointing at the unstable nature of the *Listy* group, which had never managed to advance beyond the level of a "free grouping," basically unable to develop a programme platform.[138] In his reply, Mlynář repeated that it was necessary to draw a "clearer political profile and orientation" of the *Listy* group, to include new people in it, and to demonstrate in a more obvious way that its programme is a "political programme

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135 *Ibid.*, k. 10, 0063, Hejzlar's Letter to Pelikán, 16 July 1977.
136 *Ibid.*, Hejzlar's Letter to Pelikán, 26 August 1977.
137 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4 (a copy of the text can be also found in Pelikán's fund in Rome, Serie 003, k. 10, Correspondence, 0063).
138 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Hejzlar's Letter to Mlynář, 1 September 1977.

of democratic socialism."[139] Jiří Pelikán also wrote to Mlynář, stating that he feels an "unclear orientation" in his text and that Mlynář should have highlighted that the "opposition wanted to retain (at least partly) the *socialist* character of the system."[140] Three days later, Pelikán wrote a letter to Hejzlar, saying that changes would be inevitable, but that Mlynář "does not want to be a 'deputy chairman' after the reorganisation, given that he held the highest post of us all." Although Pelikán was surprised by "some of Mlynář's political positions and attitudes to people, mainly those at home (mostly negative bordering on biased)," he admitted that "Mlynář stands a better chance of succeeding, because he has more energy than me, is more productive, formulates better, and is not so sensitive – on the contrary, he is harsh enough, which is what a politician should be."[141]

In October 1977, there was indeed an important meeting of the *Listy* group in Cologne,[142] during which Pelikán delivered a presentation titled "Results Achieved So Far and New Possibilities of Opposition Activities Abroad," while Mlynář presented his "Comments on the Situation in Czechoslovakia and Opposition Activities (Principles)." In a somewhat milder form, the document outlined the new situation in which, according to Mlynář's opinion, the opposition of ex-Communists should "support all others who strive for the society to be able to tell, on its own volition, what system it wants to have after the long experience with 'real socialism.'" The reorganisation of the group included the establishment of a coordination committee composed of Zdeněk Hejzlar, Jiří Pelikán, Zdeněk Mlynář and Adolf Müller (and in the years that followed also by some other people, e.g. Michal Reiman, on a temporary basis).[143]

From that moment, Mlynář, who had an information-exchange connection with Prague at his disposal,[144] became one of the prominent characters of the Czech socialist dissent abroad. His position was further strengthened by the success of his book *Mráz přichází z Kremlu* published in 1978 by Tomáš Kosta's Europäische

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139 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Hejzlar, 13 September 1977. Hejzlar reacted in a fairly conciliatory tone, although he very harshly criticised political capabilities of many émigrés, especially those living in German-speaking countries whom Mlynář wanted to install in top leadership positions (*Ibid.*, Hejzlar's Letter to Mlynář, 19 September 1977).

140 *Ibid.*, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 11 September 1977.

141 *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 10, 0062, Pelikán's Letter to Hejzlar, 14 September 1977. See also his letter to Havlíček dated 17 August 1977: PELIKÁN, Jiří – HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Psáno z Říma, psáno ze Ženevy. Korespondence 1969–1989*, p. 147 – see Footnote 97.

142 See also the draft statute prepared by Hejzlar on 1 October 1977 and other organisational materials in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 31).

143 On 28 October 1977, Pelikán wrote to Mlynář that "the impression of some people in Cologne was that there was some rivalry between us," even though they had no reason to think so (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 8).

144 In May 1978, Mlynář wrote to Jan Kavan on the subject: "My own connection – as I told you in the summer – does not compete with documents that are delivered to you. It has been built to acquire and deliver various inside information (i.e. on inside developments in the opposition and/or the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, etc.), generally brief and not written." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 6.)

Verlangsanstalt Publishing House,[145] which was much discussed[146] and soon filmed.[147] (According to Bedřich Utitz, who translated the book into German, the book originally started with a "very gripping and fascinatingly written 'non-fiction thriller,' which was followed by a typical lengthy political essay and a political analysis of the preceding text." He ultimately succeeded in talking the author out of including them in the book.[148]) Mlynář's public activities in those days were indeed remarkable: in January 1978, he made a presentation in Brussels; he and Pelikán travelled to Madrid shortly thereafter, having been invited there by the Communist Party of Spain; in May, he attended a meeting of the German Social Democrats in Frankfurt am Main[149]; in June, he took part in a seminar in Norway and a congress in Amsterdam, and he also spoke before the Council of Europe, not to speak of dozens of articles written for various European dailies and magazines.[150]

His attempt to reproduce the spirit of Charter 77 in exile, to establish contacts with different streams of the political emigration – not only with the Social Democrats,[151]

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145 According to financial reports of February 1979, the German edition of the book sold 4,395 copies by the end of 1978 (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 1, The Budget of the Europäische Verlangsanstalt Publishing House of 27 February 1979 and a Proposal of Tomáš Kosta for Further Cooperation with Mlynář). The French version of the book was recommended to Gallimard Publishing House by Milan Kundera, who very much appreciated that the author "resisted all psychoses" and had maintained "common sense, distance, restraint in his judgments and, at the same time, was audacious enough to oppose common opinions" (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Kundera's Letter to Mlynář, 27 December 1978).

146 As to former reformists, the "pamphlet" and his author provoked a very sharp objection ("he could have ended up in a place better than the dustbin of lies and slander") of, for instance, Čestmír Císař in his reaction of 1980 (CÍSAŘ, Čestmír: Veletoče Z. Mlynáře [The Grand Circles of Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: IDEM: *I kapky proděravějí kámen: Samizdatová memoranda a jiné texty z let 1975–1989* [Even Drops Can Hollow a Stone: Samizdat Memoranda and Other Texts from the Years 1975–1989]. Ed. Petra Paterová. Praha, Národní archiv 2011, pp. 14–16).

147 Documents on reactions to the *Invasion* movie are stored in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 37).

148 UTITZ, Bedřich: *Kaleidoskop mého století* [The Kaleidoscope of My Century]. Ed. Jana Hradilková. Praha, Academia 2013, p. 166 n.

149 The *Listy* group had a liaison person responsible for "Czechs in exile" in West Germany; until 1978, that person was Jürgen Schmude. When he was appointed a Minister of the Cabinet, he was succeeded by Karsten Voigt (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Adolf Müller's Letter to Mlynář, 26 April 1978). Pelikán made it clear to Willy Brandt that "ZM was made responsible for maintaining contacts" (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 10, Correspondence, 0062, Pelikán's Letter to Brandt, 20 September 1977).

150 Mlynář's relevant lectures, presentations and articles are kept in his *NA* fund (Part 1, k. 3 and 4; Part 3, k. 4), and also in the bibliography published in his book *Socialistou na volné noze* (pp. 231–235). Because of somewhat vague information on a "pardon" of sorts in Czechoslovakia (probably with respect to Dubček), there was a lengthy debate on the occasion of an appeal to supporters of the left, "Ten Years since the Prague Spring" (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31).

151 On 13 February 1978, a meeting of Czechoslovak left-wing politicians in exile and representatives of some European Social Democratic Parties took place in Vienna (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's [slightly polemic] Letter to Mlynář, 19 January 1978,

but also with Pavel Tigrid, as indicated by his regular attendance at seminars in Franken organised by the Catholic association Opus Bonum[152] – naturally could not dispense with polemics and discussions.[153] For instance, Zdeněk Hejzlar spoke very negatively of the "confusion of opinions" prevailing at the abovementioned meeting of the *Listy* group in Cologne, adding to Mlynář's address: "An even worse thing is what has obviously happened to Zdeněk. He has apparently undergone the 'exile' metamorphosis at cosmic speed – since February, when they slapped him with his juvenile offense of the 1950s in Prague. Now he thinks only about starting on the side of those who have power and influence, even in exile, which is why he is ready – as one of us said in a low voice in Cologne – to sell the legacy of the Prague Spring, including its 'orphans,' to Kreisky and company. [...] The matter is further complicated by developments at home, where the opposition has obviously advanced from defending the Prague Spring via a cleverly devised legalistic struggle for civil rights to a group plurality of various ideological ruins and immaturities."[154]

In a sense, these discussions culminated at the end of September 1978, during a meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International, which was supposed to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia.[155] When Hejzlar let other members of the coordination committee of the *Listy* group know that he had arranged, after lengthy negotiations with Socialist International's General Secretary Bernt Carlsson, the

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Hejzlar's Minutes of 15 February 1978, and [offended] Letters of Adolf Müller. [Müller had not been invited]). Opinions of Czechoslovak participants in the meeting differed; some were rather negative, as shown by Mlynář's correspondence with Jiří Loewy, Radomír Luža and Miroslav Souček, and by other documents in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 8).

152 For instance, in his letter to other members of the coordination committee of the *Listy* group dated 8 March 1978, Mlynář spoke of the Franken meeting as "good and useful," including how the problem of the resettlement of Germans had been handled in the joint communiqué (however, Pelikán, who had not been present, refused to attach his signature to it by phone) (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 7). In a published interview with Pavel Tigrid, he openly said: "[...] the nine years of 'normalisation' in Czechoslovakia of which I had first-hand experience with have brought me to the opinion that there is no other principled and ultimate way out of the totalitarian regime but to recognise full political freedom for the opposition, including opponents whose ideological and political orientation is utterly different from that of the regime, and to recognise the indivisibility of political, civil and human rights for all." (Nad rozbitým džbánem jedné politiky: Rozhovor Zdeňka Mlynáře s Pavlem Tigridem [Over a Broken Jug of One Policy: An Interview of Zdeněk Mlynář with Pavel Tigrid]. In: *Svědectví*, Vol. 15, No. 58 (1979), pp. 233–255, here p. 243.)

153 See, for instance, *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0023, [a very critical] Letter of Antonín Liehm to Pelikán, 21 February 1978.

154 *Ibid.*, Correspondence, 0025, Hejzlar's Letter to Pelikán, 20 November 1977.

155 See Socialistická internacionála o Československu [The Socialist International on Czechoslovakia]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 92 n. (the text of the lecture itself is on pp. 93–97). The polemics within the *Listy* group were described for the first time by Francesco Caccamo in his book *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, pp. 59–65 – see Footnote 68; see also HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Listy v exilu: Obsahová analýza časopisu Listy, který v letech 1971 až 1989 vydával v Římě Jiří Pelikán* [The *Listy* Journal in Exile: An Analysis of the Content of the *Listy* Jounal Published in Rome by Jiří Pelikán between 1971 and 1989]. Olomouc, Burian a Tichák 2008, pp. 62–64 and 218–223.

possibility to discuss the Czechoslovak problem at the next meeting of the Socialist International, and sent them a draft of a joint presentation that was to be delivered by Pelikán,[156] Mlynář objected, not only sending the members a new draft where he entirely ignored Hejzlar's concept of a potential "new reformist movement from 'above,'" but also assuring them that he would be "presenting his opinions under any circumstances" during the meeting.[157] Moreover, in spite of the fact "that it has so far always been Pelikán speaking on our behalf at international forums,"[158] Mlynář insisted that, should his proposal be chosen, he would want to present it himself at the meeting.[159] Two weeks later, he sent a new version with the comments of others, in which he explained his reasons, namely that he wanted the above arrangement "because of an explicit agreement to the effect that JP would focus more on Euro-Communists and I on the Socialist International." He also denied that he wanted to impose himself ("not to speak of any intention against JP"), reporting again for work within the group: "[...] I want to work with the *Listy* group; I think I naturally belong to it because of my entire political evolution. However, I have never been – whether at home as a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, or later, when a member of the home opposition – a mere interpreter of some 'collective opinions' – I have always presented my own."[160]

In any case, the text which was ultimately presented in Paris was significantly permeated with Mlynář's political opinions. It declared that "co-workers of the *Listy* group are not encapsulating themselves in their own past" and "strive for cooperation with all political forces whose programme is democratic socialism." Quite a lot of attention was paid to "parallel, unofficial culture" and "the movement defending human and civil rights – Charter 77"; the document also appreciated "the policy of détente" and looked for the support of younger people "who, as a rule, are no longer members of Social Democratic or Communist Parties."[161] Here the reorientation of the *Listy* group toward Social Democracies was indeed obvious.

Another discussion took place a year later, on the occasion of another meeting of the group in Munich, which was held only after it had been clear that Jiří Pelikán had been elected to the European Parliament on behalf of the Italian Socialist Party. Mlynář prepared a document entitled "Criticism of and Contemplations about Further Possibilities of the *Listy* Group," dated 8 March 1979, for the meeting.

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156 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's Letters to Mlynář (Müller, Pelikán), 31 July and 29 August 1978.

157 *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 3, Correspondence, 0011, Mlynář's Letters to Pelikán (Hejzlar, Müller), 5 September 1978.

158 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's Letters to Mlynář (Müller, Pelikán), 29 August 1978.

159 *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 3, Correspondence 0011, Mlynář's Letters to Pelikán (Hejzlar, Müller), 5 September 1978.

160 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letters to Pelikán (Hejzlar, Müller), 18 September 1978; copies of the letters in question and other documents are also kept in Mlynář's *NA* fund, Part 2, k. 6.

161 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4, Text [with a hand-written title] "SI Bureau Meeting – Paris, 28 to 29 September 1978."

At the beginning, he paid tribute to Pelikán and his activities for being able to retain "some attention" with respect to the Prague Spring in the international context, and expressed his hope that it would be possible to implement the so-called "Kádár-isation" in Czechoslovakia. However, the author also demanded a new approach toward the changed situation at home and toward the possibilities offered by Euro-Communism which were, in his opinion, exhausted. He argued that the indispensable prerequisite was "to hold a fundamental programme discussion on the ideas and concepts of democratic socialism." He also claimed the Prague Spring concept was "a historical hypothesis not verified in practice." In his opinion, authors belonging to the *Listy* group should have broken the taboo, refrained from interfering with disputes taking place at home, and tried "to become an active element in the formation of a new faction of the Czechoslovak opposition, with a programmatically socialist orientation." He therefore recommended that every issue of the *Listy* journal should be "focused on a specific topic,"[162] have a "different structure" (for instance, only a third of the members of the future editorial board were to be drawn from among former Communists), reflect more the critical discussion of the past at home ("I generally agree with the trend formulated by the author of the manuscript titled '1968'"), and go beyond the "position of Communists (including Euro-Communists) wherever they place the interests of the Communist Movement before the interests of the Socialist Movement as a whole or the before interests of political democracy." A greater openness toward all democratic exile groups and a proximity to the Socialist International were not to be a matter of tactics, but rather a "result of the evolution of opinions." Just as in all other cases involving the "values of European liberalism," Mlynář believed it would be necessary to further "solidarity without any calculations reflecting one's own particular interests."[163] Hejzlar's comments concerning these considerations were very irritable ("I do not harbour many illusions about the possibilities of 'cohesion' with ZM"); he hoped that Pelikán's election to the European Parliament might influence the situation because "Zdeněk's way of thinking is already different from ours" and "we stand at the threshold of endless troubles."[164] The fact is that Pelikán's election to the European Parliament marked, in a way, the conclusion of one phase of the activities of the Czechoslovak socialist opposition abroad.

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162 According to Hejzlar's letter to Pelikán dated 3 March 1979, Mlynář recommended, as early as in 1976 while still in Prague, that the *Listy* journal should be transformed into a "theoretical review" (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0025).

163 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 32, Mlynář's Text "Criticism of and Contemplations about Further Possibilities of the *Listy* Group." See also texts of Jiří Pelikán ("Comments on the Discussion on Future Work of the *Listy* Group"), Zdeněk Hejzlar ("On the Discussion of Activities and Possibilities in Exile") and Adolf Müller ("Comments on Possibilities and Work of the *Listy* Group") (all of them are kept in Mlynář's *NA* fund, Part 2, k. 32). Mlynář's reaction to Pelikán's text was as follows: "You are rounding something as much as possible, you are probably more right than me in other matters – but we will settle everything up orally. I do not think the whole matter is serious enough to make a fuss about it." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letter to Pelikán, 18 May 1979.)

164 *ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 4, 0017, Hejzlar's Letter to Pelikán, 14 June 1979.

Mlynář's personal situation changed almost at the same time, although his search for a definitive job for him to subsist on was to take a few years more.[165] He initially cooperated with various institutions (between September 1977 and December 1978, he worked as an entomologist in the Natural History Museum (*Naturhistorisches Museum*) in Vienna; from March 1979, he was a consultant at the Dr. Karl-Renner-Institut),[166] and he also had a few short university stints (in 1979, for instance, he spent two months in Oxford and lectured in Salzburg; in the academic year 1980/1981, he spent two semesters in Bremen as a Visiting Professor; and the academic year 1981/1982 saw him lecturing in Innsbruck). It was only on 1 June 1982 when he started working on a research project at the Austrian Institute for International Policy (*Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik*) in Laxenburg, outside Vienna, where he was employed until the late 1980s.[167] Under the influence of all these changes, Mlynář–politician was gradually becoming Mlynář–academician and –political-scientist, the contents of his academic and research activities being increasingly tied to projects managed from Vienna during the 1980s.

The "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" Project

Even the 1975 "memorandum" quoted above says that one of the two steps that could support political change in Czechoslovakia is to "carry out, within the International Communist Movement and as an organic part of resolving past and current broad problems and discrepancies in the policy and theory of the Communist Movement, a necessary analysis of the developments which led to the formation, attempted implementation and suppression of the political reform in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1968."[168]

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165 On 17 May 1979, he wrote the following to Tomáš Kosta: "I am thus looking for a job with a future (in my case at least for 15 years) to sustain me until I retire […] I am trying once again for an entomologist's job in Munich. As it is completely free of any stress, it would suit me perfectly; of course, it does not pay too much, but I could do some moonlighting in politics and political science. But it is in Bavaria and the opinion of [Minister-President of *Bundesland* Bavaria] Strauss will matter. However, if they gave me the job, I would take it. If not, then there is political science; I have written to Bern and I am of course looking at Cologne (Vogele Institute). If none of the cream jobs goes in my favour, I will of course start drinking milk or buttermilk – but I would have a hard time if I had to start drinking goat milk." (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 6.) There were lengthy scrambles about the arrival of Mlynář's wife Irena Dubská to Vienna (see *Ibid.*, k. 8).

166 See *Ibid.*, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Bruno Kreisky, 9 June 1980.

167 He maintained correspondence full of worries about his untenable financial situation with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and other Austrian public officials (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 1, 6 and 8). In his letter to Minister Heinz Fischer dated 13 July 1984, Mlynář clearly explained that a transfer to a university (which finally took place in 1989) was the only option that would make him entitled to an average old-age pension (*Ibid.*, k. 6).

168 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*, p. 267 – see Footnote 32.

In 1977, during the meeting in question with Adalberto Minucci, Director of the *Rinascita* weekly, Mlynář once again put forward a request to hold "a study seminar on lessons learned from the events in Czechoslovakia since 1948."[169] During the abovementioned meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in September 1978, he said, *inter alia*, the "common interests of socialist forces in Europe" would have benefitted "from the establishment of a similar information and research centre, for example as part of the Scientific Institute of a Socialist Party."[170] A few months later, the first of the projects arranged by Pelikán and managed by Mlynář, who ultimately became one of Europe's most recognised experts on changes taking place in Eastern Europe, was launched.[171]

Between 1979 and 1989, Zdeněk Mlynář, supported by an unnamed "common partner," various cultural and university institutions, and the Socialist International, was managing two research projects from Vienna: "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" and "The Crises in Soviet-Type Systems." Pelikán later wrote that "a few local Euro-Commies, Socialists and social scientists are willing to donate to us (anonymously, so that the Soviets do not get pissed off at them, and also to soothe their conscience) a sum of money for a series of academic and documentary works on "Spring 68" and its consequences for the Left in the West."[172] Both projects partly adopted the interdisciplinary approach to research of the second half of the 1960s and also the samizdat style of distribution.[173] In the first case, the works resulting from the project were disseminated in the form of mimeographed booklets, in the second case as printed brochures the distribution of which, however, was organised more or less privately.[174]

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169 See LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, p. 119 – see Footnote 74. Even in the interview for *l'Espresso* weekly mentioned above, Mlynář kept repeating that "it would be appropriate to study the developments in Czechoslovakia, both between 1945 and 1948, in the following two decades and, after all, also now, more intensively and more specifically, not just from the viewpoint of current and passing interests of journalists." (MLYNÁŘ, Z.: Interview se Zdeňkem Mlynářem o situaci Charty 77, p. 19 – see Footnote 105.)

170 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4, Text [with a hand-written title] "SI Bureau Meeting – Paris, 28 to 29 September 1978."

171 Michal Reiman states that "its establishment had been negotiated by Jiří Pelikán even before Zdeněk emigrated" (REIMAN, M.: *Rusko jako téma a realita doma a v exilu*, p. 186 – see Footnote 42).

172 In his letter to Havlíček dated 16 December 1978, PELIKÁN, Jiří – HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Psáno z Říma, psáno ze Ženevy. Korespondence 1969–1989*, pp. 185–186 – see Footnote 95.

173 According to Austrian tax statements, Mlynář was paid from the project's funds since April 1980 (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 1). See also tax documents and transfers to the project's account from two Munich and two Austrian banks (the first payment to Karel Kaplan – in the amount of 3,000 German Marks – is dated 15 March 1979), which can likewise be found in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 18).

174 Most of the texts are also quoted (in different language versions) in the list of Ludmila Šeflová *České a slovenské knihy v exilu: Bibliografie, 1948–1989* [Czech and Slovak Books in Exile: Bibliography, 1948–1989] (Praha, Československé dokumentační středisko [Czechoslovak Documentation Centre] 2008).

Pelikán's first specific message concerning the first project, which appeared in his correspondence with Mlynář, is dated 24 August 1978: "[…] I need to speak to you, confidentially; the thing with the 'Prague Spring Institute' which we talked about last year and which then fell asleep, looks realistic again, i.e. there would be funds for setting up a small place of work (two people) with the possibility of publishing 'Spring 68' documents in different languages."[175]

Mlynář expanded on the proposed research project in his letter dated 17 November 1978, in which he accepted only the "management of the project's contents" (while Pelikán was expected to retain the position of an "organisational secretary"), refusing the idea of having the project institutionalised in Vienna: "If you or our common partner think that the matter should have an official title, I do not object to something like 'Prague Spring 1968 Research Project,' but I do not recommend its institutionalisation, i.e. calling it an institute, research centre, etc.; this will bring only problems and no benefits. In addition, a 'research project' is not a legal entity; it is not necessary to register anything, to submit reports to the tax authority, etc."[176]

By January 1979, the project's preparations were in an advanced stage,[177] although Pelikán did not have any office to work from ("as a matter of fact, the Socialists were willing to let me have one room at their secretariat, but it would not have been good for our purpose because of the address").[178] As early as 6 February, Mlynář contacted more than 15 people who he thought might be interested in the matter[179] ("I contacted Prague on my own and also through V. Prečan").[180] However, some important co-workers of the *Listy* group (particularly Antonín J. Liehm, Zdeněk Hejzlar and Eduard Goldstücker) were not invited to cooperate from the very beginning.[181] Mlynář offered membership in the project's board to Ota Šik,

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175 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 7, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 24 August 1978.

176 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Pelikán, 17 November 1978.

177 See *Ibid.*, Mlynář's "Proposal of a Research Project of Experience of the 'Prague Spring' from the Viewpoint of Issues Relevant for the Western European Left."

178 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 15 January 1979.

179 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letters.

180 In his letter, he also asked Prečan "not to disclose various matters (regarding the fees, etc.) to Kavan or Jiřina Š[iklová] (and the Prague end 'KAT') [which probably means Prague contacts of Jiřina Šiklová, who was using the code name "Kateřina," shortened to "KAT," in her clandestine correspondence – author's note], to prevent them from getting into usual gossip" (*Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Vilém Prečan, 18 January 1979; see also Prečan's Answer, 24 January, and Mlynář's Reply, 29 January 1979).

181 In his letter dated 23 January 1979, Mlynář only notified Hejzlar of the new project – "so that you know about it as a member of the 'Vierbande'": the opportunity "arose at the end of the year, and it was necessary to grab it, or lose the possibility of financial support. I hope that Jirka [Pelikán] has also clearly told you that the matter does not have anything in common with proposals for a 'documentation centre,' etc. presented so far, that it was not been meant as an offer to the *Listy* group, but was tied to my person, etc." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Mlynář's Letter to Hejzlar, 23 January 1979.) Hejzlar was very offended by the information without any request for cooperation (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's Letter to Mlynář, 14 February 1979, Mlynář's Reply, 19 March 1979).

Jiří Kosta, Vladimír Klokočka and Karel Kaplan (the first of them did not accept it, and the panel was later joined by Jiří Pelikán, Eduard Goldstücker and Radoslav Selucký).[182] Mlynář's intention was to keep the matter "strictly an issue confined to professionals from social science disciplines, at least initially." He estimated he had "an additional five studies prepared by members of the exile community and at least three prepared at home tentatively arranged (promised) for the year 1979."[183] As early as January, in his letter to Karel Kaplan, Mlynář wrote that the texts should be focused on "Euro-Communists," and their form should therefore "be acceptable to them." He believed it was necessary to present, in particular, "documents and studies which they, because of their contents, are reluctant to start working on." As a financial reward, he offered "approximately 1,000 German Marks for selected and commented documents, approximately 1,500 German Marks for a study compiled from your other texts, and over 2,000 German Marks for an original study of about 50 pages in Czech (I want everything in Czech)."[184] Mlynář also confirmed to other potential co-workers that "the project does not depend on Communists, financially or otherwise," who should, on the contrary, "be continuously told things that even the best of them still do not like to hear."[185] The project was targeting mainly Italian, Spanish and French Communists: "The principal importance of the project is seen in affecting the ranks of Communists in the Roman language area."[186]

   The project got off to a rather slow start, as its principal actors could not be sure about its funding for quite a long time. It was only on 20 February 1979 when Pelikán notified Mlynář of a firm date: "The meeting will take place on Friday afternoon, 16 March, in Munich,"[187] which indicates that the funding was probably provided by the German Social Democrats.[188] The cooperation was proceeding

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182 Šik's was the only one to refuse Mlynář's offer; Šik disagreed "with Mlynář's entire logic," because "economic issues simply cannot be placed *alongside* other processes as one of them" (*Ibid.*, Šik's Letter to Mlynář, 18 February 1979; see also Mlynář's Reply, 11 March 1979).

183 He expected the following papers from Prague: "K. Kouba et al., K otázce příčin neefektivnosti hospodářství [On the Issue of Causes of Ineffectiveness in the Economy], Z. Jičínský, K otázce vztahu federalizace a demokratizace na Slovensku 1968 a důsledky toho [On the Issue of the Relation of Federalisation and Democratisation in Slovakia in 1968 and Its Consequences], Miloš Hájek et al. – an as yet unspecified topic dealing with the year 1968." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letter to Pelikán, 6 February 1979.)

184 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Karel Kaplan, 7 January 1979.

185 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Jiří Kosta, 13 January 1979; see also Mlynář's Letter to Karel Kaplan, 18 January 1979.

186 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's and Pelikán's "Report on the 'Experience of the Prague Spring 1968' Research Project," 10 December 1981.

187 In the same letter, Pelikán mentioned another important project of the Czechoslovak exile community: "I gave your and Áda's [Müller] phone number to the University of Bremen so that they could invite you to that meeting about the doc[umentation] centre, which I initiated some five years ago. It now looks very realistic, and it will probably start in the autumn, with three or four researchers one of whom will probably be a Czech (either Prečan or Reiman)." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 20 February 1979.)

188 The series of circulars titled *Nový proud*, which seems to be a deception campaign of the Czechoslovak secret police (see Spolupracovat ano – ale s kým [Cooperation – Yes, but with

smoothly, the bitter row that erupted between the two main actors a week later notwithstanding,[189] and in spite of the fact that "our partners have some administrative problems" and "do not want an address in Rome to appear on official papers of the 'project,'" as Pelikán wrote to Mlynář at the end of February. At the same time, Pelikán decided that he should join the board "[…] to appear in the 'project' at least in some way, I perhaps should be a member of the 'board' […] although I will not meddle with things which you will decide." He was only "worried whether you follow our principal objective, i.e. to address our know-how and information especially to Euro-Communist Parties, strictly enough."[190] In April, Pelikán announced his candidacy for the European Parliament and repeatedly informed Mlynář about problems with the office and with the compilation of the directory. Although he had already ordered translations of the first works, he was rather disappointed about the weak reflection of "specific experience of the Spring of 1968 and its generalisation."[191] In another letter, he noted that "Craxi did not give us an office, and I was not able to find another, or rather find another for free, because we do not have money. This means we also cannot buy a copier and have to outsource the copying work to *copisterias*, which, for a 60-page study issued in a hundred copies, costs about 500 German Marks DM."[192] A profound organisational change took place after the election of Jiří Pelikán to the European Parliament as Mlynář also took over the organisational management part of the project and started coordinating

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Whom]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 134–137) regularly attacked exiled Socialists, but it is mainly comments on sources of the funding of Mlynář's projects that are relevant for our topic (if for nothing else, then as an indication of the extent and quantity of information available to the Counterintelligence Service). Circular No. 64 of February 1981 published an article attacking Mlynář, whose "income is again counted in hundreds of thousands." The comments on Mlynář's income were as follows: "It is true that he only gets 5,000 Schillings a month from the Renner Institute, but it covers his pension insurance. His principal income is provided by the 'Prague Spring' project, for which he himself 'charges' the SPD 10,000 German Marks a year; he got 60,000 German Marks for the *Night Frost in Prague* movie screenplay; his visiting professorship in Bremen earns him 6,000 German marks a month, plus he of course gets rewarded for the studies and books that he writes. And because even this is not enough for him, he 'arranged' the assignment of another 'study' with the SPÖ, for which a 'benevolent' fund of one bank in Vienna will have paid him 200,000 Schillings only in this year." (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 5, Spolupracovat ano – ale s kým. In: *Nový proud*, No. 64 (January 1981).)

189 Pelikán was very irked by Mlynář's request to pay debts of the German version of the *Listy* journal from the account of the *Listy* journal (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 27 February 1979).

190 *Ibid.*, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 28 February 1979.

191 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 10 April 1979; see also Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letter to Pelikán, 19 April 1979.

192 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 20 April 1979; see also Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 25 April 1979.

translations and copying of texts from Vienna (Pelikán retained only the Italian part of the whole enterprise, which subsequently kept slipping far behind schedule).[193]

In January 1979, the authors-in-waiting received a document titled "The Research of Issues Related to the 'Prague Spring 1968' from the Viewpoint of Needs of the Western European Left." According to Mlynář, the purpose of the project was to "make Czechoslovakia's experience, which is of immediate relevance for the solution of theoretical and political issues associated with concepts of democratic socialism in Western Europe, to the West European Left (Euro-Communists, Socialists, and other Marxist groups)." The document proclaimed that the common study of "ideological, political, social, and economic issues" would be based on "an objective scientific analysis" and that "results of the research (separate studies) will be published in limited quantities (approximately 300 typewritten copies) and sent to research institutes of political parties, editorial boards of theoretical journals, and also to individual theoretically oriented representatives of left-wing political groups." The anticipated duration of the project was five years, the project was organised by Mlynář and Pelikán, and the raised funds were tied to the project, which meant "they have nothing in common with the *Listy* group, the identically titled magazine, or the political collective activities of exiles and émigrés." The topics of research were to be as follows:

"I. Internal political, social and economic foundations of the formation (1948–52) and forcible restoration (1968–72) of the Soviet-type totalitarian dictatorship system in Czechoslovakia;

II. Soviet influence on the evolution of Czechoslovak society;

III. Communist ideology as a factor in the formation of the totalitarian system and also a factor in efforts to reform and democratise it; the importance of Leninist ideological and organisational principles in the activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from the above viewpoints;

IV. The real look of the social and political system in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the possibilities of reforming its component parts and the system as a whole;

V. Opinions of Czechoslovak Communists on political pluralism and the role of the opposition; alternative concepts of non-communist political orientations in Czechoslovakia. The status of an individual as a citizen in a socialist society (the concept of human and civil rights);

VI. International contexts and influences in the evolution of Czechoslovak society."[194]

The board of the project had its first meeting in Munich on 29 June. By that time, the first six studies had already been completed and some others arranged

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193 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Mlynář's [detailed] Letter to Pelikán, 7 August 1979. The agenda was taken over by Irena Dubská during her trip to Rome in January 1980 (see Part 2, k. 13, List of Issues that Need to be Discussed in Rome).

194 *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 2, The Research of Issues Related to the 'Prague Spring 1968' from the Viewpoint of the Needs of the Western European Left.

or agreed upon (however, some of them never materialised, e.g. those which were to be prepared by Irena Dubská, Adolf Müller, Vilém Prečan, Vladimír Horský, Ivan Pfaff and others). Each member of the board was assigned with a specific area of research: Kosta was responsible for economic issues, Kaplan for history, Pelikán for international context and implications, and Mlynář and Klokočka for the sociological and political segment of the project.[195] A year later, the board discussed altogether 10 studies whose contents, however, "do not cover even the basic topics outlined in the accepted research plan."[196]

As to the addressees, the project's coordinators recognised a virtual community composed of experts potentially interested in the given topic, i.e. a "parallel polis" of sorts of the European Left (the final report mentions "more than 300 individuals and institutions"),[197] to which they intended to direct the work of the community of exiled dissidents (and, in some cases, texts circulating at home by underground channels of forbidden literature) using means typical for the samizdat: the outcome was to be a number of academic studies, copied on a mimeograph, which were to be disseminated within the "grey zone" of the European Left, as far as possible from Moscow's positions. For instance, the archives of Luciano Antonetti, who translated the studies into Italian,[198] contain an interesting photocopy of the Italian directory which contained, apart from several research centres, libraries and magazines, also fairly renowned names, including Giuliano Amato, Norberto Bobbio, Giorgio Bocca, Bettino Craxi, Paolo Flores d'Arcais, Ernesto Galli della Loggia, Marco Pannella and Carlo Ripa di Meana.[199]

The project's presentation, which appeared in the autumn 1979 issue of the *Listy* exile journal, reads as follows: "Last year's 10th anniversary of the Czechoslovak attempt at a combination of socialism and political democracy proved that there is still an interest in the lessons learned in those times, particularly among the European Left. [...] The result of the initiative was a concrete proposal: to attempt to process the lessons learned in Czechoslovakia before, during and after 1968 in a way which would help those in the West who are interested in it (particularly among the Left) understand positive aspects of the developments in Czechoslovakia and which would also help overcome myths and illusions about the so-called 'real socialism.'" The readers were also told that results of the research project would be

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195 *Ibid.*, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Board of the "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" Research Project, Munich 29 June 1979.

196 *Ibid.*, Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Board of the "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" Research Project, Munich 29 June 1980.

197 See *Ibid.*, MLYNÁŘ, Z. – PELIKÁN, J.: Report on the "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" Research Project (followed by "Appendix No. 2" containing lists of names).

198 On 25 January 1980, Irena Dubská wrote to Antonetti: "Otherwise I am very happy you and Jiří [Pelikán] have agreed to more permanent cooperation on the project about the Prague Spring." (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 4 Correspondence, Mlynář.)

199 The list of addresses has been retained in the same place: *Ibid.*, 2.3 Progetto The Spring Project of Z. Mlynář, 001. The complete extensive directory (English, French, Italian and German) is a part of Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 4, k. 19).

published as separate studies in different languages and sent to selected recipients. A list of translated, almost completed and soon-to-be-translated publications followed. Readers were also acquainted with planned studies and also notified of the volumes circulating in the form of samizdat publications in Czechoslovakia. They also learned that "the first four studies will be distributed according to a specific directory to addresses in France, Italy, Spain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Scandinavia and other countries of Western Europe, and the project will be presented to the public in the media."

"If the project proceeds successfully, a symposium on selected topics, attended by the whole team of authors and principal beneficiaries of the project, will be held late in 1980 or early in 1981. As soon as a greater number of studies have been completed, the board will also discuss the possibility of publishing the selected works (or excerpts therefrom) in Czech, in the form of a special collection, at the Index Publishing House, to make them available also to a broader community of interested parties in Czechoslovakia."[200]

Until now, the project entitled "Experiences of the Prague Spring 1968" has not become as renowned as it should have, as it represents one of the deepest and basically never published reflections on the roots, development and failure of the Prague Spring.[201] Its deliverables included approximately 25 mimeographed publications in three languages and a major final congress in Paris.[202] When the project was over, the addressees received an extensive file of texts in Italian, French and English (the texts in Czech were not "disseminated")[203] dealing with a very broad range of topics related to the Prague Spring, from studies on ideological character of the communist power to analyses of the military, social, economic, philosophical and cultural consequences of the reform, from the influence of the mass media and the cultural policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to international policy issues.[204] All in all, the project "Experiences of the Prague Spring 1968" produced the following publications between 1979 and 1982:

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200 The Experience of the "Prague Spring 1968" as a Research Project. In: *Listy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (September 1979), p. 66 n.

201 See HAVLÍČEK, D.: *Listy v exilu*, p. 254 n. – see Footnote 154.

202 The project's coordinators presented the project at a press conference in Paris, which was covered by French dailies (see Mlynar et Pelikan lancent un "projet de recherches sur le printemps de Prague." In: *Le Monde*, 17 November 1979). As proved by a copy of an English letter to potentially interested parties, the first two studies were indeed delivered a few months late (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 13).

203 The final report stated that "since the third study, translations into Spanish were abandoned (the Spanish recipients read French or Italian)" and that the "original Czech version of the manuscripts is produced in 30 copies which are sent to the project's authors, some individuals among Czechoslovak political exiles, and also to opposition groups in Prague" (MLYNÁŘ, Z. – PELIKÁN, J.: Report on the "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" Research Project).

204 See my introduction (CATALANO, Alessandro: Le esperienze della Primavera di Praga: Un progetto ingiustamente dimenticato. In: *eSamizdat*, No. 2–3 (2009), pp. 181–183) to the two volumes translated into Italian by Luciano Antonetti (CHVATÍK, Květoslav: *La politica*

1. Vladimír Klokočka: *The Ideological and Social Foundations of Power in the System of "Real Socialism"* (1979)
2. Karel Kaplan: *The Rise of a Monopoly of Power in the Hands of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 1948–1949* (1979)
3. Zdeněk Mlynář: *Notions of Political Pluralism in the Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968* (1979)
4. Karel Kaplan: *The Council for Mutual Economic Aid 1949–1951* (1979)
5. Josef Hodic: *Military Political Views Prevalent in the Czechoslovak Army 1948–1968 (with the Appendix: "Memorandum of the Military Political Academy")* (1979)
6. Josef Pokštefl: *The Interpretation of Democratic Centralism in the 1968 Statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (1979)
7. Vladimír Klokočka: *The Position of the Individual in the System of "Real Socialism"* (1979)
8. Jiří Kosta: *History and Concept of the Czechoslovak Economic Reform (1965–1969)* (1979)
9. Radoslav Selucký: *Consumer Orientation and Political Development in the ČSSR in the 1960s* (1980)
10. Radoslav Selucký: *The Development of Concepts of Planning in Czechoslovakia (1945–1968)* (1980)
11. Karel Kovanda: *Experiences with Democratic Self-Management in Czechoslovak Enterprises during 1968* (1980)
12. Miloš Hájek: *The Development of the Internal Regime in the International Communist Movement and in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1919–1968)* (1980)
13. Josef Pokštefl: *The Revival of the Theory of Division and Supervision of Power during the "Prague Spring"* (1980)
14. J. Präger [Jaroslav Klofáč]: *Changes in the Social Structure of Czechoslovakia between 1945–1980* (1980)
15. Zdeněk Strmiska: *The Social System and Structural Contradictions in Societies of the Soviet Type* (1980)
16. Dušan Havlíček: *The Mass Media in Czechoslovakia in 1956–1968* (1980)
17. Erazim Kohák: *The Philosophic Significance of the Czechoslovak Spring of 1968* (1981)
18. Jana Neumannová: *The Cultural Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1956* (1981)

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culturale in Cecoslovacchia dal 1945 al 1980. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 185–210; HODIC, Josef: *Opinioni politico-militari correnti nell'esercito cecoslovacco negli anni tra il 1948 e il 1968.* In: *Ibid.*, pp. 211–236). The second study – in spite of having been written by a collaborator of the State Security – contains the important "Memorandum of the Military Political Academy" of 1968. Five other volumes translated by Antonetti (by Mlynář, Kosta, Kovanda, Kohák and Liehm) were published much earlier in the collection: LEONCINI, Francesco (ed.): *Che cosa fu la „Primavera di Praga"? Idee e progetti di una riforma politica e sociale.* Bari – Roma, Manduria 1989 (there is also a re-edition: Venezia, Libreria Editrice Cafoscaria 2007).

19. Vratislav Pěchota: *Policy of the Possible: The Strategy of the Prague Spring in Regard to European Security and Cooperation* (1981)
20. Friedrich Levčík: *Czechoslovakia: Economic Performance in the Post-Reform Period and Prospects for the 1980s* (1981)
21. Zdeněk Strmiska: *The Social System and Structural Contradictions in Societies of the Soviet Type* (1981–1982)
22. Antonín J. Liehm: *From Culture to Politics* (1981)
23. Jiří Pelikán: *The International Workers' Movement and the "Prague Spring," and Other Attempts to Reforms the Soviet Model of Society* (1981)
24. Květoslav Chvatík: *Czechoslovak Cultural Policy 1945–1980* (1982)
25. Jan Skála [Jan Pauer]: *The Defeat of the "Prague Spring": From the Intervention in August 1968 to the Restoration of a Bureaucratic Power System* (1982)[205]

In spite of all attempts made, only four of the studies were ultimately produced by authors from Prague[206] and Czech versions of the texts remained practically unknown. Mlynář, for instance, included his study titled "Představy o politickém pluralismu v politice KSČ roku 1968" ["Ideas on Political Pluralism in the Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968] in the collection of his essays *Problémy politického systému* [Problems of the Political System][207] only in 1987;

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205 As to the total number of volumes, Mlynář himself claimed, on two occasions, that there were 28 of them, with both lists being introduced by the very same sentence: "Between 1979 and 1981, altogether 23 studies on the following topics were written"; in both cases, the lists contain an additional three volumes (25. Jiří Hájek: *Mezinárodní souvislosti čs. politiky roku 1968* [The International Contexts of the Czechoslovak Development in 1968]; 26. Anon. [Erika Kadlecová]: *Církve v Československu 1968* [Churches in Czechoslovakia 1968]; 28. Zdeněk Mlynář: *"Pražské jaro"1968 a současná krize politických systémů sovětského typu: Československo 1968 – Polsko 1981*) [The "Prague Spring 1968" and the Contemporary Crisis of Soviet-Type Political Systems: Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981], which probably were never distributed (see Úvodní poznámky [Opening Notes]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze)*, pp. 141–144, here p. 142 n.; STRMISKA, Zdeněk: *Sociální systém a strukturální rozpory společností sovětského typu* [The Social System and Structural Discrepancies of Soviet-Type Societies]. Cologne, Index 1983, Introduction, p. 5 n.). Annexes to the final report of the project provide information that permits a reconstruction of the assumed sequence of the last seven studies: "24. Lubomír Sochor: *The Ideology of 'Real Socialism' as a Type of Conservative Thought*; 25. Květoslav Chvatík: *Cultural Policy of the CPCz, 1945–1980*; 26. Vladimír Klokočka: *The Evolution of the Electoral System in Czechoslovakia*; 27. Jan Skála: *The 'Normalisation' Policy of the CPCz after 1969*; 28. Jiří Hájek: *The International Contexts of the Czechoslovak Development in 1968*; 29. Erika Kadlecová: *Churches in Czechoslovakia in 1968*; 30. Zdeněk Mlynář: *The Prague Spring 1968 and the Contemporary Crisis of the Soviet-Type Political System (Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981)*." (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's and Pelikán's "Report on the "Experience of the 'Prague Spring 1968' Research Project," 10 December 1981, Appendix No. 1.) Czech (unpublished) copies of most of the volumes are kept in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 23 and 24).

206 Other works that were not made use of are found in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 38).

207 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Problémy politického systému*, pp. 9–39 – see Footnote 13.

however, most of the texts were never published in any of the official channels.[208] On the other hand, the principal political objective seemed to have been fulfilled, as the project, in the opinion of its initiators, "has contributed to circles of the West European Left gradually adopting a critical view on and shedding illusions about Soviet-type socio-political systems. The project naturally cannot make political parties actually reflect the project's outcome in their official policies, but it has helped influence the way of thinking of individuals and smaller groups, even within Communist Parties."

He goes on to say: "Profound changes on the left part of the political spectrum have posed a certain problem; the project's orientation on Euro-Communist Parties has unnecessarily reduced the community of potentially interested subjects among the West European Left. Except for the Communist Party of Italy, most of the communist addressees belong to groups which are regarded as 'dissidents' within their own parties […] and in France, for instance, most of them have already been expelled from the Communist Party."

And finally: "On the other hand, there has been a growing level of interest in the project's deliverables among groups of non-Communists […] and also among Socialists, particularly in France and Germany."[209]

According to the plan, the end of the project was to coincide with a large final congress; in February 1981, Mlynář reminded the other members of the board that "the seminar will probably be a culmination of sorts of the whole project, which will conclude its activities in 1982. Basically all planned topics – if their authors have firmly promised to deliver them – will have been published in the form of studies, which means that the project will comprise some 25 studies and a book of proceedings from the seminar. [...] We will also have the opportunity to publish in Czech (and then deliver to Czechoslovakia) at least two collections of selected texts of the project (and perhaps also the proceedings of the seminar) at the Index Publishing House."[210]

In the light of the overall outcome, it is not so important that the idea of publishing two collections of selected texts of the project in Czech never materialised – one of the reasons probably being that the board ultimately preferred only the publication

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208 They were occasionally published after 1989 (see, for instance, KOSTA, Jiří: K historii a koncepci československé ekonomické reformy v letech 1965–1969 [On the History and Concept of the Czechoslovak Economic Reform in the Years 1965–1969]. In: *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2005), pp. 27–47).

209 MLYNÁŘ, Z. – PELIKÁN, J.: Report on the "Experience of the Prague Spring 1968" Research Project – see Footnote 185.

210 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 19, Mlynář's Report "To Members of the Board of the 'Experience of the Prague Spring 1968' Research Project," 27 February 1981. See also Mlynář's subsequent proposal titled "Draft Concept of the 'Prague Spring 1968 – Polish Autumn 1980' Seminar" (*Ibid.*).

of the seminar proceedings and one complete study (Strmiska's) at the Index Publishing House.[211]

These promisingly developing projects could have been dealt a heavy blow by the abovementioned affair of Josef Hodic, who had received a lot of confidential information from Mlynář; the latter thus decided to provide a detailed explanation of the matter. The lengthy report for exile circles has already been cited here on several occasions.[212] Nevertheless, Mlynář wrote another, much shorter memo for the board of the project, in which he announced that he had more or less confirmed to Hodic that "the main source of funding perhaps must be the German SPD."[213] Sometime later, Mlynář found "things which were perhaps meant to prove that I was spying for Eastern intelligence services" [214] in his apartment in Vienna. It is certainly by no coincidence that Mlynář's lengthy account has also been preserved as a translation into German dated 25 July 1981, together with a letter addressed to Bruno Kreisky dated 5 July. In the latter, Mlynář cautiously indicated that, under the circumstances, the support of the Austrian Chancellor might be used against him. In his reply dated 14 August, however, Kreisky reconfirmed his trust; he likewise confirmed he intervened on Mlynář's behalf with German Chancellor Willy Brandt in order to prevent the matter from having any further consequences.[215]

The final act of the project took place on 22 and 23 October 1981 in Paris, in the Medici Hall of the Senate of the French Republic, under the title "Lessons Learned from the Prague Spring 1968 and Current Perspectives on the Democratic Development of Socialism: An International Seminar Organised by the Group of Czechoslovak Researchers on the Experience of the Prague Spring 1968 and the Committee for the Defence of Liberties in Czechoslovakia in Paris, 22 and 23 October 1981" [originally *Les Leçons du Printemps de Prague 1968 et les Perspectives Actuelles du Développement Démocratique du Socialisme: Colloque International organisé par le Groupe de Recherches Tchécoslovaques sur les expériences du Printemps de Prague et par le Comité de Défense des Libertés en Tchécoslovaquie, à Paris, les 22 et 23 octobre 1981*].[216] It was attended by more than 200 people, of whom 180 were "representatives of

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211 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letter to Adolf Müller, 20 January 1981; Part 2, k. 7, Mlynář's Letter to Adolf Müller, 8 July 1982; Part 2, k. 13, Report on the Progress of the Research Project as of 1 June 1981 and Outlooks for 1982, 21 May 1981.

212 *Ibid.* Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic."

213 This memo of Mlynář is also titled "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic" and is dated 25 September 1981 (*Ibid.*).

214 See *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Count Richard Belcredi, 15 May 1981. Belcredi was one of the principal sponsors of the well-known exile conferences in Franken. This particular case is described in Mlynář's text "Amendment to the 'Information on the Case of Josef Hodic,'" dated 10 December 1981, which explains the finding of suspicious papers with encrypted texts in his apartment on 18 March 1981. These were suspect documents the purpose of which probably was to discredit him and which Mlynář handed over to the Austrian Ministry of the Interior (*Ibid.*, Part 4, k. 18).

215 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Kreisky, 5 July 1981, and Kreisky's Letter to Mlynář, 14 August 1981.

216 See also *http://histoire-sociale1.univ-paris1.fr/Document/Lit.htm* (downloaded on 16 April 2013).

various political and ideological trends of the West European Left: from Socialists and Social Democrats to Euro-Communists and other left-wing groups, such as the Italian 'Il Manifesto,' representatives of the Trotskyist orientation and non-affiliated left-wing intellectuals."[217]

Bruno Schacherl commented on the seminar on the pages of the *Rinascita* journal, where he interpreted it as an indication of "deep interest in unity of the European Left," praised its outcome and atmosphere, and stressed that "what was noticed by all observers of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has been confirmed: the crucial role of intellectuals in the new trend. And not any intellectuals at that – Marxist and Communist intellectuals; we should perhaps say Euro-Communists *ante litteram*, which is, after all, how some of them call themselves."[218]

The proceedings of the congress published by the Index Publishing House[219] were disseminated to a broad audience, and there were also German and French versions.[220] In a report in English written by Mlynář and Pelikán, the conference was described as a great success, although the authors regretted the low attendance of Italian Communists (probably caused by the intervention of Soviet and French Communists). They saw the main current problem of European Communist Parties in an ongoing loss of the influence of unorthodox groups, the inability to overcome the vision that socialist states could be reformed "from above," and concerns about opposition movements, generally perceived as a threat. On the other hand, they regarded the success of French Socialists, who, having won the election, had put together a government, as very important, regretting that they had not chosen that party as their cooperation partner when organising the conference.[221] A comprehensive financial report on the project has been preserved as well: the total amount

217 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Československo 1968 – Polsko 1981 [Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 1982), pp. 58–60, here p. 58.

218 SCHACHERL, Bruno: *Praga '68 a la sinistra europea*. In: *Rinascita*, Vol. 38, No. 44 (1981), p. 38. Gianlorenzo Pacini, on the other hand, appreciated the "very numerous and qualified" attendance and highlighted that the liveliest disputes had concerned the role of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which some of the debaters had still thought "capable of positive development" (PACINI, Gianlorenzo: *Praga, tredici anni dopo*. In: *La Nazione*, 14 November 1981). And, finally, Pelikán presented the congress in the French media (see PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Prague – Varsovie – Paris*. In: *Le Monde*, 3 November 1981).

219 *Československo 1968 – Polsko 1981 a krize sovětských systémů: Sborník z mezinárodního semináře v Paříži v říjnu 1981* [Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981 and the Crisis of Soviet Systems: Proceedings of the International Seminar in Paris in October 1981]. Cologne, Index 1983. The volume contained only a small part of the texts presented at the congress (refer also to *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 19, Mlynář's Letter to Šik, 4 January 1982, and many other documents concerning the preparation of the seminar).

220 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk (ed.): *"Der Prager Frühling": Ein wissenschaftliches Symposion*. Köln/R., Bund-Verlag 1983; MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk – PELIKÁN, Jiří (ed.): *Budapest, Prague, Varsovie: Le Printemps de Prague quinze ans après*. Paris, La Decouverte – Maspero 1983.

221 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 13, Report on the International Conference "The Lessons of Prague Spring 1968 and the Contemporary Prospects for a Democratic Development of Socialism" (October 22–23 1981 in Paris), 10 December 1981.

remitted to two accounts in Cologne and Munich (the second one was used to fund the Italian version) was close to 400,000 German Marks.[222]

The "Crises in Soviet-Type Systems" Project

The second project, "Crises in Soviet-Type Systems," started getting shape as early as the second half of 1981 this was so not just because of the new situation in Poland, but also because of changes in the community of addressees: "The existing focus on Euro-Communist Parties would, however, be changed; more specifically, it would be broadened to include Socialist Parties (especially in France) and Social Democratic Parties (especially in the Federal Republic of Germany – the left wing of the SPD)," stated the progress report of the first project when describing outlooks for next year.[223] The new project, which was expected to span the 1982 to 1985 period, got off to a quick start. It was to have a new board composed of Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian researchers in exile (Włodzimierz Brus, Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller, Pierre Kende, Jiří Kosta, Jiří Pelikán, Aleksander Smolar, Lubomír Sochor and Zdeněk Strmiska later indeed took part in its activities) and a similar structure (although there were to be two seminars and selected works were to be published also in Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Russian). Its orientation was characterised as follows:

"The common objective of research studies to be undertaken in the framework of the project is to present an analysis of crisis phenomena and forms of their overcoming in Soviet Bloc countries, to show system-resident causes which trigger the crises over and over again, and to justify the necessity of implementing system changes in the future (the necessity of doing away with totalitarian features of the systems). The research will cover the post-1956 period, its basic focus being the current state of Soviet-type systems and their evolution perspectives during the 1980s. Attention will be paid primarily to Central European countries of the Soviet Bloc: Poland, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic; however, the reality of the Soviet Union as the country from

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222 The payments remitted to these accounts were as follows: 19,200 and 50,800 German Marks in 1979; 71,900 and 28,100 German Marks in 1980; 88,500 and 51,500 German Marks in 1981 (plus 15,000 German Marks as a "special subsidy for the Index Publishing House"); 24,500 and 30,000 German Marks in 1982 (plus 15,000 German Marks as a "special subsidy for the Index Publishing House"). The costs of the organisation of the Paris seminar alone were almost 50,000 German Marks. (See *Ibid.*, Appendix No. 3, Financial Report.)

223 *Ibid.*, Report on the Progress of the Research Project as of 1 June 1981 and Outlooks for 1982, 21 May 1981. Sometime later, the interest of the *Listy* group in China started growing as well. Pelikán arranged several important visits and documents of the project were regularly sent to China (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Pelikán's "Preliminary Report on the Visit to China"; Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's "Notes on Sino-Soviet Relations," 20 February 1983).

which the socio-political system was 'exported' from and which is the principal power guarantor of its existence in Central Europe will also be studied."

It continued: "Politically, the project is expected to contribute to overcoming remnants of illusions about the so-called 'real socialism,' in particular among the West European Left, and to help furnish evidence that Soviet-type systems cannot be a positive alternative to the evolution of present Western societies."[224]

The new board started working very soon. It divided the research work into six thematic groups (each had its own head), expecting that three or four studies would be published as early as in 1982. At the same time, a new directory of recipients was to be prepared, this time "with a greater emphasis on the German language region."[225] There was also a plan to organise an international symposium titled "The Soviet Bloc after Brezhnev" some time in 1984 in Milan, for which presentations had already been prepared (they were later published as the fifth volume of the project's edition), but the political situation of Italian left-wing parties did not allow that. Consequently, there was no other option but to look for another left-wing organisation capable and willing to take over the organisational arrangements of the congress.[226] However, the publication rate of the studies fell very short of the initial intentions, as some authors did not submit their manuscripts at all, and the project also did not succeed in reducing the "unilateral prevalence of Czechoslovak authors." The first studies were thus distributed only in 1983.[227] The slow start of the project was also probably caused by Mlynář's serious personal crisis that he found himself in after surgery in 1982 and which he overcame with difficulty only after psychiatric treatment.[228] In any case, the slow start "resulted in substantial

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224 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15 (copy: Part 2, k. 21), Research Project: "Crises in Soviet-Type Systems." A Proposal of the Thematic Focus of Research Activities, which Will Be Discussed and Elaborated in Detail by the Board of the Project, 23 September 1982.

225 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of the "Crises in Soviet-Type Systems" Research Project Held in Paris on 30 January 1982.

226 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15, The "Evolution Possibilities of Soviet-Type Systems in the 1980s" International Symposium; Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meetings of the Board Held on 19 November 1983 and 17 March 1984. The second document contains the following sentence: "Given the current discordant relations between the Socialists and Communists in Italy, it is hardly possible, now or in the future, to count on the symposium being organised in cooperation with both of them."

227 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meetings of the Board Held on 19 June 1982, 9 October 1982, 8 January 1983 and 19 November 1983. The "Progress Report of the Project as of 1 October 1983" states that, compared to the first project, "delays in the fulfilment of the plan of studies are more frequent and there are greater difficulties with respect to the coordination of the work of the authors" (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15).

228 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 3, the untitled personal text cited above; Part 2, k. 4, Irena Dubská's Letter to Zdeněk Strmiska, 5 September 1983; Part 2, k. 6, Mlynář's Letter to Strmiska, 9 August 1983. At the time, organisational matters of the project were taken over by Zdeněk Strmiska. (See also MINK, Georges: Zdeněk Strmiska ve Francii [Zdeněk Strmiska in France]. In: *Sociologický časopis*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2009), pp. 426–428; a former colleague in France also mentioned the group's extensive work "which is still waiting to become a subject of interest of a doctoral candidate.")

savings in the 'project's' budget," thanks to which it was possible to plan international symposiums without any additional subsidies.

The March 1983 letter which Mlynář and Pelikán sent to potentially interested parties and individuals outlined the principal directions of the new project, while the project that was about to end was described as follows: "A group of Czechoslovak researchers living in the West since 1968 has already published approximately 25 studies on the Czechoslovak attempt to reform the Soviet-type socio-political system in the framework of the project 'Experience of the Prague Spring 1968.' You have already received most of the studies and you will receive the rest in the next few months. The purpose of the project was to provide more detailed information to all in the West – in both political and academic circles – who were interested in the attempt, the conditions which had allowed its (short-lived) success, and the causes of its failure." It was explicitly promised that the studies of the new project "[would] be printed rather than photocopied"[229] and that they "will be distributed free of charge, just as in the case of the project which is being concluded right now."[230]

It was quite a radical change, but consistent with Mlynář's new concept. The "homemade samizdat" of sorts had developed into cooperation with one of the most important Czechoslovak publishing houses working in exile. Nevertheless, the series of studies produced by the project remained outside regular editions and its volumes were not available in the regular book market. In his recap of activities of Index's activities, publisher Adolf Müller also included them in a special category, adding that they were sent to "universities, research centres, and other institutions and private individuals all over the world."[231] Mlynář later explained his concept of dissemination of the project's results as follows: "During the eight years since the start of the first project, 'Experience of the Prague Spring 1968' (1979–1982), till the end of the current project, 'Crises in Soviet-Type Systems,' a relatively stable

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229 See the final report of Adolf Müller about the activities of his publishing house, titled "Report on the Activities of Index Publishing House from 1971 to 1989," which was reprinted in: PREČAN, Vilém: Ke spolupráci dvou posrpnových exilových nakladatelství: Korespondence z let 1971–1987 s dodatky z roku 1996 [On the Cooperation of Two Post-August Exile Publishing Houses: Correspondence of the Years 1971–1987, with Amendments added in 1996). In: *Ročenka Československého dokumentačního střediska 2003* [Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre 2003]. Praha, Československé dokumentační středisko 2004, pp. 53–134, the report is on pp. 127–134 (especially p. 134).

230 A copy of the letter is available in the fund of Luciano Antonetti (2.3, 001, The "Spring" project of Z. Mlynář).

231 MÜLLER, A.: Report on the Activities of Index Publishing House from 1971 to 1989, p. 133. Müller regularly received substantial sums of money. The average costs of one volume of the Project were about 4,000 German Marks per language version; in exceptional cases, the costs climbed up to 12,000 German Marks (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 1, Documents on the Finances and Accounting of Index Publishing House). As to relations with Index (including some financial problems), see also correspondence available in Mlynář's *NA* fund (Part 2, k. 22) and invoices for translations connected to each of the studies (Part 2, k. 7).

community of about 2,000 subscribers of studies published in the framework of the projects had developed."[232]

As also indicated by the selection of languages in which the volumes were published – German (black jacket), English (red jacket) and French (blue jacket) – the project leaders' first priority till the end of the 1980s – as we are yet going to see – was to maintain ties with the community they wanted to influence through the projects. Not even on this occasion were the texts disseminated in Czech; they were not so much interested in presenting the outcome of the project at the book market or in samizdat form circulating in Czechoslovakia and other countries. As late as the autumn of 1984, the project "Crises in Soviet-Type Systems" was expected to produce 20 to 25 publications.[233] At the end of the day, only the following came into being:

1. Włodzimierz Brus – Pierre Kende – Zdeněk Mlynář: *"Normalisation" Processes in Soviet-Dominated Central Europe: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland* (1982)
2. Zdeněk Mlynář: *Relative Stabilisation of the Soviet Systems in the 1970s* (1983)
3. Karel Kaplan: *Political Persecution in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1972* (1983)
4. Lubomír Sochor: *Contribution to an Analysis of the Conservative Features of the Ideaology of "Real Socialism"* (1984)
5. Włodzimierz Brus – Pierre Kende – Zdeněk Mlynář: *The Soviet Systems after Brezhnev* (1984)
6. Ferenc Fehér – Agnes Hellerová: *Eastern Europe under the Shadow of a New Rapallo* (1984)
7. Radoslav Selucký: *The Present Dilemma of Soviet-East European Integration* (1985)
8. Jiří Kosta – Bedřich Levčík: *Economic Crisis in the East European CMEA Countries* (1985)
9. Dušan Havlíček – Pierre Kende: *Public Information in the Soviet Political Systems* (1985)
10. Ferenc Fehér – Agnes Hellerová: *Eastern Left: Western Left: A Contribution to the Morphology of a Problematic Relationship* (1985)
11. Karel Kaplan: *The Overcoming of the Regime-Crisis after Stalin's Death in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary* (1986)
12. Maria Hirszowiczová – Patrick Michel – Georges Mink: *The Crisis: Problems in Poland, Part 1* (1986)
12a. Krzysztof Mreła – Jan Zielonka: *The Crisis-Problems in Poland, Part 2* (1988)[234]
13. Gert-Joachim Glaessner: *Bureaucratic Rule: Overcoming Conflicts in the GDR* (1986)
14. Zagorka Golubovičová – Svetozar Stojanović: *The Crisis of the Yugoslav System* (1986)

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232 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 20, Mlynář's "Proposal for Continuing Work after the Conclusion of Work on the 'Crises in Soviet-Type Systems' in the New Form of a Discussion Forum Titled 'Reforms in Soviet-Type Systems,'" 14 July 1987.

233 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board Held on 29 April 1984.

234 The volume was published only in English (see *Ibid.*, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board Held on 11 April 1986).

15.–16.   Zdeněk Strmiska: *Change and Stagnation in Soviet-Type Societies: A Theoretical Framework for Analysis* (1989)

17.–18.   Aleksander Smolar – Pierre Kende: *The Role of the Opposition: The Role of Opposition Groups on the Eve of Democratisation in Poland and Hungary (1987–1988)* (1989)

Some of the studies were later published separately and in other languages.[235] Mlynář himself published *Czech* versions of his texts "Normalizace v Československu po roce 1968" [Normalisation in Czechoslovakia after 1968] (from the first volume) and "Od Brežněva ke Gorbačovovi: Vývojové možnosti politického systému v sovětském bloku po Brežněvovi" [From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Evolution Possibilities of the Political System in the Soviet Bloc after Brezhnev] (from the fifth volume) in the book *Problémy politického systému* already cited above.[236] Moreover, the latter study is more or less identical with one chapter of the most elaborate analysis of Soviet-type systems, which Mlynář presented at the beginning of the second project, in the book *Krize v sovětských systémech 1953–1971* [Crises in Soviet Systems 1953–1971].[237]

Subsequent developments were dramatically affected by the new situation in Moscow after Mikhail Gorbachev's election to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 11 March 1985. Mlynář immediately commented on it in the *Listy* journal: "We are going to write a lot about what started with Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival to the Kremlin. […] The state of stagnation and agony, the funeral-to-funeral policy producing feelings of uncertainty and apathy, are over."[238] The board of the project had a similar view: "[…] previous stagnation is over. However, the developments so far cannot yet be regarded as reform steps. Nevertheless, we are in a situation that may develop into an attempt

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235 See, for instance, HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: Veřejná informace v sovětských politických systémech [Public Information in the Soviet Political System]. In: WOLÁK, Radim – KÖPPLOVÁ, Barbara (ed.): *Česká média a česká společnost v 60. letech* [Czech Media and Czech Society in the 1960s]. Praha, Radioservis 2008, pp. 115–167.

236 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Problémy politického systému*, pp. 40–64 and 65–75 – see Footnote 13. For instance, some studies were published in German in MEYER, Thomas – MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk (ed.): *Die Krise des Sowjetsystems und der Westen: Ökonomie, Ideologie, Politik und die Perspektiven der Ost- West-Beziehungen*. Köln/R., Bund-Verlag 1986.

237 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Krize v sovětských systémech 1953–1981: Příspěvek k teoretické analyse* [Crises in Soviet Systems 1953–1981: A Contribution to the Theoretical Analysis]. Kolín n/R., Index 1983 (the book was published in a reworked edition after November 1989; IDEM: *Krize v sovětských systémech od Stalina ke Gorbačovovi* [Crises in Soviet Systems from Stalin to Gorbachev]. Praha, Prospektrum 1991). At the same time, a German edition appeared: *Krisen und Krisenbewältigung im Sowjetblock*. Köln/R. – Wien, Bund-Verlag 1983. It was a work which Mlynář wrote while working at the Austrian Institute for International Policy (see *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 15, Zwischenbericht über den Fortgang der Arbeiten im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes, 25 September 1981).

238 Z. Mlynář: Stagnace končí [The Stagnation Is Over]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 15, No. 26 (April 1985), pp. 1–2.

at a reform of the system."[239] The situation caused a lot of problems for the project, which we are now able to trace back and reconstruct: by early September 1985, nine studies had already been published and an additional six (three of which contained very long texts) were in the process of translation. Due to the fast-paced developments in the Soviet Union, as a result of which some of the publications seemed obsolescent, some 30 studies were to be published by the end of 1987. As for their distribution, it was continuously highlighted that the number of subscribers had grown considerably (from about 1,500 to around 2,000 two years later).[240] Although the number may look impressive, it is clear that it was a "virtual" group of subscribers; for instance, Mlynář's archive contains a list of studies available in all three language versions as late as 31 October 1985, by which time nine studies had already been published. It is easy to find that it was the German version which the subscribers were interested in the most, but it is definitely impossible to say that the studies disappeared from the shelves in a few months.[241]

Various presentations and speeches at congresses, particularly at those organised by Zdeněk Mlynář in Freudenberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, together with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (*Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*), which was close to the West German Social Democrats, constituted an important part of the project. The first of these events, "The Analysis of Soviet Systems and Possibilities of Their Development," took place on 13 to 16 June 1985; the second one, "The Reform Policy of M. Gorbachev – A Potential Way Out of the Crisis," took place two years later, from 22 to 25 October 1987. It is worth mentioning, *inter alia*, that different internal documents prepared on these occasions (and especially for the first symposium) also highlighted apart from important relations with West German Social Democrats that interest was likewise shown by Italian Communists.[242]

The total number of studies published by the end of the second project, which was much more comparative than the first one, was 16; three of them were twice as extensive as the rest. There was a clear re-orientation to a German-speaking audience, which was obvious as early as during the first of the symposiums, in 1985 and was later also reflected in the general nature of the work of the team of authors. An October 1984 report on progress stated that "the political objective of the symposium is to help overcome (or at least help discuss) the illusions about the possibilities of reform-Communist developments in the Soviet Bloc, so widespread among the Left in Western Europe, and efforts of the 'Ostpolitik' to bypass or suppress uncomfortable political problems related thereto."[243] A year

239 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board Held on 27 September 1985.
240 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 20, Progress Reports of the "Project" as of 1 October 1983, 1 October 1984 and 1 September 1985.
241 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 22.
242 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15, Report on the International Symposium in Freudenberg, 13 to 16 June 1985.
243 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 20, Progress Report of the "Project" as of 1 October 1984.

later, a similar report mentioned that "the connection of the 'project' with the West German SPD has been strengthened,"[244] and, later still, that it was the SPD representatives themselves who "intentionally did not want any publicity at this time."[245]

The Final Report of the project of August 1987 stated that more than 20 studies had been prepared between 1982 and 1987 (although some of them were published only after the Final Report) and that the two abovementioned symposiums organised in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation had taken place. In addition, the report points out that the developments in the Soviet Union had necessitated a change in the initial concept of the project which, however, "has achieved its principal objective in relation to the Left in Western Europe." It seems that it produced the greatest response in Italy, "thanks to cooperation with the Communist Party of Italy and also the Socialist Party (or, more especially, their media). Representatives of both parties attend international symposiums organised by the 'Project,' and the 'Project's' studies and authors are promoted in the press."[246]

In this respect, it is worth mentioning that, according to the report cited below, the "Crises in Soviet-type Systems" project sponsored two conferences about the Prague Spring in 1988 – one in Freudenberg, organised in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the other in Bologna, organised by the Gramsci Institute, the Gramsci Foundation and the Pietro Nenni Foundation[247] – by the fairly substantial sum of 15,000 German Marks. The report comments on the later event with satisfaction: "The symposium drew extraordinary attention from the Italian press, mainly because of two reasons; it was the first event in 20 years which was jointly organised by the Italian Communist Party and the [Italian] Soc[ialist] Party [...] and, second, Alexander Dubček sent his written contribution to the conference."[248]

However, a proposal for a new project had already been presented a few months earlier. Compared to previous projects, it had a radically changed structure, its objective being to establish a discussion forum titled "Reforms in Soviet-type Systems." Zdeněk Mlynář's proposal first mentioned that "a relatively stable

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244 *Ibid.*, Progress Report of the "Project" as of 1 September 1985.
245 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Report on the Meeting Held on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the "Prague Spring" in Freudenberg, 20 April 1988.
246 The report specifically lists the *Ottavo giorno*, *Mondo operaio* and *Rinascita* magazines (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 22, Final Report of the "Crises in Soviet Systems" Research Project, 25 August 1987).
247 See the collection of the studies *La Primavera di Praga vent'anni dopo*, which was published in 1988 as a double issue (11–12) of the *Transizione* journal.
248 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 22, Report on the Progress of the Research Project in 1988, 10 August 1988. The report also explained the reasons why some of the studies had not been published (some had not been submitted, others had become obsolete because of rapid developments in the Soviet Union). See also *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Report on the Meeting Held on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the "Prague Spring" in Freudenberg, 20 April 1988, and Minutes of the Meeting of Members of the Board Held on the Same Day.

community of about 2,000 subscribers of studies published by the projects has been established" in the eight years from the start of the first project to the end of the second one, and later highlighted that "the interest of the stable circle of subscribers to studies produced by the research projects so far has recently been focused on monitoring current developments in the Soviet Union and basically also in the entire Soviet Bloc, in connection with the new reform line represented by M. Gorbachev." It was not only the subscribers that the new situation was affecting; it also reduced authors' options and required new forms of activities. As Mlynář wrote, "authors contributing to the current research projects are now unable to produce erudite scientific monographs on topical development issues, as the situation in Soviet Bloc countries is fluid. The present style of work – i.e. to publish monographic studies in the framework of a research project – is therefore no longer tenable."[249]

For this reason, it seemed more effective to change the activities of the group and transform it into one of the protagonists of debates within the left-wing movement in Western Europe. To this end, a number of discussion symposiums were to be organised, followed by the publication of volumes containing the results of these events, still in three language versions for the existing community of subscribers (the annual costs were estimated at 80,000 German Marks). Of particular interest is the fact that Mlynář believed, even in the late 1980s, that the distribution of publications on his own was "the only possible way to retain the existing community of about 2,000 regular subscribers in the West and contacts with the Soviet Block countries mentioned earlier. If the publication were transferred into the hands of regular publishing houses – they [the published volumes] would make their way to bookshops, but not to the stable community of subscribers to the research projects undertaken so far."

The conclusion of the project's creators at that time may seem almost unreal now, but it proves how uncertain the development of the socialist system, which was soon to collapse, almost painlessly, then was: "Such a discussion forum format would be possible and allow us to work for at least three years (1988–1990). Around 1990, the situation within the Soviet Bloc will probably be more stabilised, and then it would be possible to consider other forms of activities."[250] However, by that time the international situation started moving rapidly forward; in the autumn of 1988, Alexander Dubček visited Italy, where he received an honorary doctorate in political science in Bologna, again drawing all the attention of the European Left.[251] It is symptomatic that his attitude to émigrés was very reserved; he did not meet with Mlynář at all, and had only a brief meeting with Pelikán,

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249 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 20, Mlynář's "Proposal for a Continuation of Work after the Completion of the 'Crises in Soviet-Type Systems' Research Project in the New Form of a Discussion Forum Titled 'Reforms in Soviet-Type Systems,'" 14 July 1987.

250 *Ibid.*

251 See ANTONETTI, Luciano: Alexander Dubček v Itálii. Symbol "pražského jara" po dvaceti letech [Alexander Dubček in Italy. The "Prague Spring" Symbol after 20 Years]. In: *Soudobé dějiny,* Vol. 15, No. 3–4 (2008), pp. 670–685, REIMAN, Michal: Setkání s Alexandrem

which the latter, then a member of the European Parliament, bitterly commented on as follows: "What the Czechoslovak authorities did not succeed in – in isolating me – they managed to accomplish. It makes one feel like throwing up […]." Dubček's tactics allegedly counted on "his own way," as "he has contacts with the Big Brother and he believes that they will need him again one of these days. This is why he keeps a low profile."[252] The unification of the former "party of the expelled" was made impossible once again.

The 1989 progress report of the project shows that the fast-paced political developments made the board reconsider the publication of some studies that had already been completed. At the same time, its members regarded the format of one discussion seminar a year as very flexible. However, they dropped the idea of changing the name of the project, as "changing the 'trademark' of the project would make matters complicated and unclear." Various events in 1989 were thus held under the same heading, including the new symposium, "Legal State in Soviet-Type Societies," in Fraudenberg. On that occasion, texts were also translated into Russian, because "the event was attended by a number of representatives of Soviet Bloc countries (the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary), both officials and those from the ranks of critical groups," including Gorbachev's advisor Evgeny A. Ambartsumov.[253] That could be interpreted as "the next step on the way of our project to the countries which the studies deal with," which "could also be significant for the future (in particular, for instance, in the case of the personal involvement of the project's members in reform policies in their respective homelands)."[254] It seems that Mlynář sent a "letter with a sentence to the effect that, due to the developments in Russia, Euro-Communists do not stand a chance, and he advocated a clear orientation to the Socialist International" also to kindred opposition circles at home. According to Miloš Hájek, Mlynář's contacts with Prague, which allegedly "went through some embassies," were a known fact.[255]

Although the strategy of the project's team and its supporters still seemed promising at that stage, the following months showed that the assumptions were more or less illusory.

Dubčekem ve Vídni v listopadu 1988 [The Meeting with Alexander Dubček in Vienna in November 1988]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002), pp. 136–146.

252 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 7, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 23 November 1988 [with a hand-written note saying "destroy after reading"].

253 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Report on the Progress of the Research Project in 1989. By mid-1990, there was still a sum of 71,510 German Marks in the project's account (*Ibid.*, Financial and Accounting Report for the Period from 20 June 1989 to 30 June 1990).

254 *Ibid.*, Report on the International Symposium in Freudenberg, 17 to 19 May 1989.

255 See VANĚK, Miroslav – URBÁŠEK, Pavel (ed.): *Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview*, sv. 1: *Disent v období tzv. normalizace* [Winners? Losers? Biographic Interviews, Vol. 1: The Dissent during the So-Called Normalisation Era]. Praha, Prostor 2005, Interview with Miloš Hájek, pp. 109 and 111.

Conclusion

An attempt at a conclusion shows that, within a period of time only slightly longer than 10 years, Zdeněk Mlynář managed several projects which made a significant contribution to explaining many aspects of the functioning of socialist societies to western readers. It is worth noting that at the end of the 1980s, Mlynář's working method changed from the distribution of more or less elaborate samizdat publications to organising discussion forums. As late as on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, he saw the European Left as his partner in the dialogue, and he saw the distribution of works produced in a manner close to samizdat as an ideal tool to initiate the dialogue (which was, by the way, asymmetrical). Just at the time when Czechoslovak society started moving and samizdat was experiencing a heyday, as an increasing number of periodicals were issued (including the re-established *Lidové noviny* daily), Mlynář still did not see the establishment of deeper contacts with this world as his priority, continuing to prefer the tactics formulated by the Czechoslovak socialist opposition during the first half of the 1970s, i.e. instigating reforms through pressure jointly exercised by the principal forces of the European Left on the top leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Although we do not want to underrate Mlynář's research projects, which rather deserve a word of commendation for their quality and value, it is not very difficult to identify several weak spots in the abovementioned strategy; contrary to the *Listy* journal, the influence of individual studies and indeed of the whole projects was almost nil in Czechoslovakia (one of the reasons also being the step-by-step loss of interest in the legacy of the Prague Spring, as well as the issue of the reform ability of the system as such); and relations with authors in Czechoslovakia remained limited to a few texts included in the first project. This fact was probably the principal reason why the developments unfolding in Czechoslovakia were difficult to comprehend for Mlynář and his collaborators; the tool they chose, i.e. a "multi-lingual" samizdat of sorts, in fact prevented the texts, very rarely quoted even in the most detailed and thorough analyses, from finding their way not only into the research and academic environment, but also to libraries (only a few copies are available even now, often kept in marginal libraries, most of them coming from donated estates of some of the subscribers). Moreover, the subscribers' community was not just virtual, it was also vague, as it included people who, while being important for relations between Eastern countries and high-ups in Western Communist Parties, rarely held truly leading posts (which was perhaps the main difference between Mlynář's community and the network of contacts built by Jiří Pelikán, whose roots were much deeper). At the end of the day, the forum proposed in the late 1980s presented many issues that were quickly disappearing from political debates in Czechoslovakia as topical.

As for Zdeněk Mlynář, those times can be characterised by his renewed interest in political activities and his rather surprising return to the idea of reforms being implemented "from above." The fact that he once was a close friend of Mikhail

Gorbachev must have played a substantial role, and their mutual respect did not abate even after Gorbachev's very controversial visit to Prague in the spring of 1987, which Mlynář sharply rebuked him for even years later.[256] As proved by Mlynář's analysis of the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union published in the Italian *Rinascita* magazine, which has been cited above, the Czech political scientist believed, as late as the end of the 1980s, that it would again be possible "to make use of the Party, as the strongest and most authoritative organisation of the political system, to carry through the reform," although "it will initially be necessary, in the interest of the democratic reform, to make use of the *autocratic method*, which is characteristic of the existing, as yet unreformed system."[257] At the same time, he must have been well aware that "the solution in Czechoslovakia is not a return of the political crew of 1968," as "Czechoslovakia needs a political leadership that is not a captive of the past, but speaks on behalf of present generations and current problems."[258] However, the basic principle repeatedly put emphasis on in the first article, namely that the Soviet system is "reformable," was repeated again.[259] In the case of Mlynář, there was probably a certain paradox which made him unable to face the growing gap between developments in Czechoslovakia, where Socialist political forces were gradually losing their importance, and the great demand continuing to exist (also because of the Prague Spring) in various European Communist and Socialist Parties.

Nevertheless, even in Italy, hardly a year later, the ongoing differentiation within the Czechoslovak opposition became obvious during two major conferences dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Prague Spring; the first of them took place on 29 and 30 April 1988 in Cortona (it was organised by the Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Foundation under the auspices of the City of Cortona and the Region of Tuscany), the second one on 7 and 8 July 1988 in Bologna (it was organised by the Gramsci Institute of the Region of Emilia-Romagna, the Pietro Nenni Foundation and the Gramsci Foundation in Rome – also thanks to the above mentioned financial contribution by the project managed by Mlynář). Luciano Antonetti, one of the most sensitive persons in Italy insofar as the legacy of the Prague Spring was concerned, wrote the following about the first of the events:

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256 See manuscripts of Mlynář's numerous articles of those days, which are kept in his *NA* fund (Part 1, k. 5). As for the visit to Prague, see GORBACHEV, M. – MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Reformátoři nebývají šťastni*, pp. 70–73 – see Footnote 13.

257 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: L'ostacolo del primo stato. In: IDEM et al.: *Il progetto Gorbaciov*, p. 39 – see Footnote 13; the quotation comes from the Czech version titled The Role of the Communist Party in the Reform Process. In: IDEM: *Problémy politického systému*, p. 98 – see Footnote 13.

258 ANTONETTI, Luciano: La forza a i nemici di Gorbaciov: Intervista a Z. Mlynář. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z. et al.: *Il progetto Gorbaciov*, p. 171; the Czech quotation comes from the original of the interview titled On the Conclusion of the Discussion in *Rinascita* (Materials), p. 5 n. (*NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 32).

259 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Il crocevia della riforma politica. In: IDEM et al.: *Il progetto Gorbaciov*, p. 13; the Czech version titled The Starting Point and Possibilities of Political Reform. In: IDEM: *Problémy politického systému*, p. 85 – see Footnote 13.

"The conference clearly showed differences and opposing positions between old émigrés (those who left after 1948) and the new ones (post-1968). Nevertheless, there are differences and disputes even within the latter: the socialist opposition group, which heads the *Listy* journal, is acting in concert with 1968 reformers who had stayed at home; others, for example Vilém Prečan and Jan Pauer, stress the role of 'civic society' in their analyses, and are very critical toward Dubček and the leaders KSČ of 1968. In the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre of Independent Literature, which he has been the head of since he emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany, Prečan is a capable and convincing promoter of the ideas of Václav Havel and Jan Patočka. [...] It would indeed require no clairvoyant to understand that, in the event of a change of regime, a battle would break out between those who think about continuity with the reformist movement of 1968 and those who regard this chapter (and all the talk about reformed socialism or socialism combined with democracy) closed for good."[260]

Indeed, it is enough to compare Prečan's presentation at the conference in Cortona, which was focused entirely on the passivity (and subsequent capitulation) of KSČ leaders and the active role of the civic society,[261] with Mlynář's lecture in Bologna, which analyses similarities between the Prague Spring and Gorbachev's reforms and advocates the concept of reform-ability of socialist systems "from above,"[262] to see how far apart these two positions are. The fact that the opposition at home had in the meantime centred around Václav Havel and that Prečan's opinions prevailed in Czechoslovak society was to be confirmed a few months later by the so-called Velvet Revolution, the marginalisation of former reformist Communists, and also the reception of Mlynář at the moment of his hasty return to Prague, which has been mentioned at the beginning of this study.[263] The case of his alleged high treason and Mlynář's political activities

260 The excerpt taken over from Antonetti's unpublished biographic notes is quoted in an article by Claudia Natoli titled Luciano Antonetti, la storia e gli storici della Primavera di Praga. In: BIANCHINI, Stefano – GAMBETTA, Guido – MIRABELLA, Salvatore (ed.): *Una vita per la Cecoslovacchia: Il fondo Luciano Antonetti*. Bologna, CLUEB 2011, p. 61.

261 PREČAN, Vilém: Seven Great Days: The People and Civil Society during the "Prague Spring" of 1968–1969. In: CATALUCCIO, Francesco M. – GORI, Francesca (ed.): *La Primavera di Praga*. Milano, Franco Angeli 1990, pp. 165–175; the Czech version: Lid, veřejnost, občanská společnost jako aktér Pražského jara [The People, the Public and the Civic Society as Actors of the Prague Spring]. In: IDEM: *V kradeném čase: Výběr ze studií, článků a úvah z let 1973–1993* [During the Stolen Time: A Selection of Studies, Articles and Essays from 1973 to 1993]. Ed. Milan Drápala. Brno, Doplněk 1994.

262 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: La politica della "primavera di Praga," l'URSS e la riformabilità dei sistemi comunisti. In: *Transizione*, No. 11–12 (1988), pp. 30–59.

263 Even official representatives of the Communist Party perceived his return with a certain suspicion. For instance, film director Jiří Svoboda, the Chairman of the Communist Party from 1990 to 1993, said: "Mlynář was not with us in 1989, but he came to 'advice' us, he wanted us to screen all who had been involved in purges and he wanted to settle accounts. His reform started with repressions! [...] Of the dead, nothing but the good, but people like him will remain Bolsheviks until their death!" (Cited according to: MAYER, Françoise:

in the first half of the 1990s – starting with a proposal that the 68-ers run independently in the first elections in June 1990,[264] via efforts to create a new left-wing party,[265] and ending in the unsuccessful participation of the Left Block Party (of which Mlynář was Honorary Chairman) in the 1996 elections – were the swan song of his public activities.[266] Although these attempts were generally accepted with scepticism, Mlynář got some recognition even from some of his political opponents. On 24 April 1997, for instance, Václav Havel wrote in his letter of condolence to Mlynář's wife Irena Dubská that Mlynář "was one of the most respectable political opponents I have ever encountered."[267]

   It is possible to conclude that by the end of the 1980s, Czechoslovak society had grown apart from the analyses of Mlynář's team,[268] and it is likely that the lack of understanding for the revolutionary events of 1989 on the part of Italian Communists and other European left-wing parties is attributable to the information channels they chose.[269] Mlynář's team decision not to develop stronger relations with the civic society proved to be fatal and politically short-sighted when the communist system collapsed worldwide.[270] Nevertheless, the extensive work of Mlynář during the 1980s played a decisive role in influencing segment of the European public opinion which was ideologically closest to him. In this respect, Mlynář's projects indeed fulfilled the role that Mlynář's funding partners had in mind. Similarly, the decision not to publish the studies in Czech clearly indicates who was the partner whom the texts produced by the projects were meant for; the same decision, however, wasted an opportunity to start a real dialogue with the increasingly active Czechoslovak dissent. The ultimate consequence of the

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Češi a jejich komunismus: Paměť a politická identita [The Czechs and Their Communism: Memory and Political Identity]. Praha, Argo 2009, p. 91.)

264 See HÁJEK, M.: *Paměť české levice*, p. 311 n. – see Footnote 17.

265 See VANĚK, M. – URBÁŠEK, P. (ed.): *Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview*, Interview with Vojtěch Mencl, pp. 531 and 535 – see Footnote 254.

266 Insofar as Mlynář's political activities in the early 1990s are concerned, see the collection of interviews and articles in MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Proti srsti: Politické komentáře 1990–1995* [Against the Grain: Political Commentaries 1990–1995]. Praha, Periskop 1996.

267 *NA*, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2.

268 On the last phases of Communism in Czechoslovakia, see PULLMANN, Michal: *Konec experimentu: Přestavba a pád komunismu v Československu* [The End of an Experiment: The Restructuring and Fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia]. Praha, Scriptorium 2011.

269 In addition to five (partly quoted) articles on Gorbachev's reforms, Mlynář published many other texts in the *Rinascita* magazine between 1986 and 1989, and also gave several interviews to *l'Unità* (see at least Il mio compagno di studi Mikhail Gorbaciov. In: *l'Unità*, 9 April 1985, p. 9; in Czech, see My Schoolmate Gorbachev. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 123–128).

270 There have been repeated indications that Gorbachev was trying to probe the possibility of Mlynář becoming the Presidet of Czechoslovakia, but it is not certain how seriously these actions were meant (see, for instance, the interview with Karel Urbánek in: SÝS, K. – SPÁČIL, D. (ed.): *Záhady 17. listopadu*, p. 175 – see Footnote 18; and the interview with Jaroslav Jenerál in: VANĚK, M. – URBÁŠEK, P. (ed.): *Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview*, p. 275 – see Footnote 255).

decision of Mlynář and his collaborators to disseminate the works produced by the research project in the form of a "multi-lingual samizdat" was that the texts remained almost unknown even to the most meticulous and thorough researchers.

There is a lingering question why Zdeněk Mlynář was pushing for the "exile-styled" samizdat. It is likely that all the reasons outlined above played a role in that; his habits acquired in Czechoslovakia, where he, as a functionary of the KSČ, believed that influencing higher political spheres was more important than initiating a public debate; organisational reasons, which required maintaining existing contacts at all costs; and, after all, also financial reasons, as the "clandestine" funding prevented the projects from becoming known very much. In spite of all efforts, the idea of exporting the samizdat model to Western Europe without the background of a real "parallel polis" proved to be fallacious.

The War Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Phenomenon of Ethnic Cleansing

Ondřej Žíla

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation culminated in a bloody war conflict during which the belligerents were attempting to secure "ethnically clean" territories. In so doing, they were largely looking for a justification of the borders of the territories they had taken and their subsequent defence in the pre-war disposition of the constitutive nations. The pre-war ethnic structure of some regions thus played a key role in the legitimisation of war gains, i.e. control of ethnically "cleansed" territories. In its early stages, the civil conflict[1] *de facto* reflected the territorial disposition of Muslim, Serbian and Croatian populations. The belligerents (in particular the Serbs and Croats) were attempting to secure control of territories which they deemed "theirs." It was only at a later stage that they started – and the first to do so was mainly the *Vojska Republike Srpske* – VRS [Army of Republika Srpska] consolidating and securing the largest possible and easiest-to-control territories for their respective nations. In so doing, they were following the logic of the so-called *security dilemma*, i.e. attempting to secure control of the occupied territories as efficiently as possible through the annexation of strategically

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1   Although sometimes considered a result of the external aggression of Milošević's regime assisted by Tudjman's Croatia, the Bosnian conflict was, first and foremost, a complicated civil war among the Muslims, Serbs and Croatians, with each of the belligerents receiving material and logistic support from outside.

important areas (mainly those with vital infrastructure). The process was expected to result in homogeneous, safely sustainable territories.[2]

During the civil conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the term "ethnic cleansing" made its way into the global media discourse. It was based on an earlier military term, namely *čišćenje terena* [terrain cleansing], coined by the Croatian *Ustaše* to euphemistically refer to the practice they had been using during WWII.[3] In the context of the Bosnian conflict and the former Yugoslavia, the term "ethnic cleansing" first appeared in Western media in the article of Chuck Sudetić, a reporter of *The New York Times*, in 1992.[4] The first official definition of ethnic cleansing in relation to the Bosnian conflict appeared in the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 771 on 13 August 1992.[5]

Paradoxically enough, a universally accepted definition of ethnic cleansing, which would capture and comprehensively describe the practice in its entirety, still does not exist, although the term was appearing in the media on a daily basis. One of the most frequently cited definitions of the term "ethnic cleansing" is that of Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, who described it as a planned and intentional expulsion of people who are in some characteristic aspects (ethnic origin, religion, race, etc.) different from the majority in a specific territory. To qualify as ethnic cleansing, the reason(s) of the expulsion of the undesirable population segment must include at least one of the characteristics mentioned above. The presented definition of ethnic cleansing constitutes part of a broader continuum ranging from "voluntary" emigration to genocide. In this respect, Bell-Fialkoff defines the following order of actions: emigration under pressure – exchange of population – transfer – deportation or expulsion (cleansing) – genocide.[6]

The term "ethnic cleansing" thus primarily denotes the elimination of an ethnically different population segment in a territory hitherto shared with the dominant population. At the same time, it holds true that both ethnic groups see the territory the weaker or strategically disadvantaged ethnic group is being expelled from as their own. Any purposeful ethnic homogenisation of a given territory consisting of a violent expulsion (and potentially also physical liquidation) of undesirable people

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2   Refer also to MELANDER, Erik: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*. In: University of Essex [online] [cit. 2012-09-04], p. 21. A working document for the "Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence" conference, 24–25 November 2007, University of Essex. Available at: *http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/dscw2007/Melander.pdf*.

3   Refer also to ROUX, Michel: À propos de la "purification ethnique" en Bosnie-Herzégovine. In: *Hérodote*, Vol. 67, Issue 4 (1992), p. 51. However, ethnic cleansings in the Balkans had already been taking place in previous centuries.

4   SUDETIĆ, Chuck: Breaking Cease-Fire Serbs Launch Attacks into Bosnia. In: *The New York Times* [online], 15 April 1992 [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available at: *http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/15/world/breaking-cease-fire-serbs-launch-attacks-into-bosnia.html*.

5   *United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 771 (Concerning Information on Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia)*. In: United Nations General Assembly Security Council [online], 13 August 1992 [cit. 2012-08-15]. Available at: *http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/un-res-bih/pdf/s92r771e.pdf*.

6   See BELL-FIALKOFF, Andrew: *Ethnic Cleansing*. London, Macmillan 1996, p. 3 n.

therefore contains an ethnic cleansing element.[7] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the term was initially formulated as a strategy promising "humane resettlement" (i.e. a transfer or exchange of population) to ethnically different population groups in territories that had become the bone of contention for the belligerents; none of the parties actually respected and honoured it during the war conflict.

Ethnic cleansings and forced transfers and relocations naturally accompanied most conflicts in the 20th century. As often as not, superpowers even endorsed the practice when trying to ensure and maintain stability in countries and regions affected by ethnic clashes.[8] However, the situation underwent a radical change under the pressure of the turbulent events in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. It was particularly due to the dramatic developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina that a trend to reassess previous attitudes and to declare all forms of forced ethnic changes inhuman and unlawful[9] ultimately prevailed. The changed attitude was also reflected in a new usage of the term "ethnic cleansing" which the United Nations and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) started using in their reports and documents.[10] However, the formal recognition of the term did not put an end to heated debates on its significance. Many experts kept rejecting it as a phrase used mainly among journalists (and, consequently, as scientifically unsupported), or perceived it as a milder term for genocide.[11]

The Terms "Ethnic Cleansing" and "Genocide"

Researchers have not yet reached any agreement as to the interpretation, terminology or categorisation of the ethnic cleansings which occurred during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ongoing disputes mainly touch on the widely debated issue whether ethnic cleansings can be viewed as equivalent to genocide, i.e. whether they can be assigned the same weight as genocide. In this respect, the interpretation of war events in Bosnia and Herzegovina was made rather problematic due to the legal definition of genocide dating back to 1948, the broad framework of which included an extensive portfolio of violent acts; as a matter of fact, it claimed that a proof of genocide actually having happened should be

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7   Refer also to MANN, Michael: Explaining Murderous Ethnic Cleansing: The Macro-Level. In: GUIBERNAU, Montserrat – HUTCHINSON, John (ed.): *Understanding Nationalism*. Cambridge, Polity Press 2001, p. 38.

8   See MANN, Michael: *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge, *C*ambridge University Press 2004, pp. 1–33.

9   Refer also to BELLONI, Roberto: *State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia.* New York, Routledge 2007, p. 125.

10 See, for instance, *The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* In: United Nations General Assembly [online], General Assembly UN, A/RES/48/88, 84th Plenary Meeting, 20 December 1993 [cit. 2012-09-29]. Available at: *http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r088.htm*.

11 Refer also to HAYDEN, Robert: Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers. In: *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (1996), p. 742.

derived from an intention to destroy, partly or completely, a certain community rather than from the total number of victims.[12]

The greatest controversies concern the question whether there had been a preplanned intention – as indicated by many Bosniak and also some Western authors – not only to ethnically "cleanse" specific territories, but also to physically liquidate their undesirable inhabitants; or, in other words, whether the ethnic cleansings during the first phase of the war were an integral part of the thorough implementation of the strategic plans of the Bosnian Serb elites, or "just" a necessary collateral effect accompanying the efforts to gain absolute control over claimed territories. The most frequent reference in this respect is the Serbian RAM Plan, which allegedly anticipated the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by means of two corridors that were to (a) connect the various parts of Bosanska Krajina and (b) link the region's capital, Banja Luka, to Western Herzegovina. According to the plan, one of the corridors was to be broken through the lowlands of the Sava River in the northern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbian high command accomplished this part successfully; however, the Serbs failed with respect to the other one, through the central part of Bosnia, from Kupres to Mostar.[13] Another part of the thematically broad spectrum of discussions focusing on the causes of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the substance of subsequent war conflicts, and the approaches of Serbia and Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina are debates on the direct involvement of the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Comparisons of violent acts being perpetrated to genocide as defined in the UN convention of 1948 started spreading immediately after the first direct clashes at the end of March 1992. Moreover, many Western observers, experts and journalists believed that violent acts committed by Serbian forces were taking place within a pre-planned scenario, pointing at the alleged genocidal nature of their operations which, in their opinion, stemmed from Serbia's (and Croatia's) geopolitical plans to liquidate Bosnia and Herzegovina and its most numerous nation – the Bosniaks.[14] Through their conclusions, often based on the selective or one-sided evidence of Western journalists operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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12 The legal definition of 1948 defined genocide as a violent act committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (See *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.* In: United Nations General Assembly [online], Resolution 260 (III) A, 9 December 1948 [cit. 2012-08-31]. Available at: *http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html*.)

13 Relevant documents were published by the Serbian magazine *Vreme* on 9 March 1992. Cited according to UDOVIČKI, Jasminka – ŠTITKOVAC, Ejub: Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Second War. In: UDOVIČKI, Jasminka – RIDGEWAY, James (ed.): *Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia.* London, Duke University Press 2000, p. 180 n.

14 "Bosniak" is a designation adopted by the Bosnian Muslims in 1993. "Bosnian" is a general term denoting any inhabitant of Bosnia.

during the war, these authors[15] were substantially influencing public opinion in the West, preventing the interpretative framework of the conflict from becoming more even-handed and objective.[16] The prevailing Western opinion of the nature of the Bosnian conflict was effectively supported and confirmed by the Bosniaks, who were very actively emphasising the Serbian aggressive intention against the officially independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the international community was looking for causes of the conflict.[17] However, the Serbs and Croats were also pointing at the genocidal nature of the operations of the belligerents.[18]

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15 The most frequently cited works blaming only the Serbian side (and Serbia) for starting the war and the biggest massacres and ethnic cleansings include, in particular: CIGAR, Norman: *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing."* College Station, Texas A&M University Press 1995; GOW, James: *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes.* London, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers 2003; GUTMAN, Roy: *A Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-Winning Dispatches on the "Ethnic Cleansing" of Bosnia.* New York, Macmillan Publishing Company 1993; VULLIAMY, Ed: *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War.* New York, Simon & Schuster 1994.

16 The (predominantly negative) role of the media in the Bosnian conflict was described by Peter Brock who, using an extensive analysis of media resources, examines the background of the cleansings that took place, compares them to how different journalists interpreted them, and comments (often very critically) on the credibility of the reports of the journalists. He criticises very harshly many renowned journalists recognised in the West (including, for example, the 1993 Pulitzer Prize laureates Roy Gutman from *Newsday* and John F. Burns from the *New York Times*, who actually received the prize for their reports from Bosnia and Herzegovina) for their work. (See BROCK, Peter: *Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting Journalism & Tragedy in Yugoslavia.* Los Angeles, GM Books 2005, also published in an electronic version.) The biased approach of the media to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also dealt with an analysis by American journalist Thomas Brook, who examined approximately 1,500 newspaper articles published in the West in 1992, coming to the conclusion that the anti-Serbian ones prevailed at a ratio of 40:1 (see NIKIFOROV, Konstantin: *Izmedju Kremlja i Republike Srpske* [Between the Kremlin and the Republika Srpska]. Beograd, Igam 2000, p. 9).

17 Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić (and later Bosnia's Prime Minister) was particularly active and successful in this respect (compare TOAL, Gerard – DAHLMAN, Carl: Has Ethnic Cleansing Succeeded? Geographies of Minority Return and Its Meaning in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: GOSAR, Anton (ed.): *Dayton – Ten Years After: Conflict Resolution, Co-Operation Perspectives. Sarajevo, 29 November – 1 December 2005.* Primorska (Slovenia) 2006, p. 4). In Sarajevo, many books explaining the causes of the war from the viewpoint of the Bosniaks were published. These authors regard the term "ethnic cleansing" as a synonym of "genocide," or a construct of Serbian aggressors, used to camouflage their real intention, i.e. genocide of the Bosniak nation. (See, for instance, ČEKIĆ, Smail: *The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Planning, Preparation, Execution*. 2 Volumes. Sarajevo, Institute for the Research of Crimes against Humanity and International Law 2005.)

18 In 1992 and 1993, for instance, the Serbs were claiming that the Muslims fighting against their fellow nationals in the Drina River regions were committing genocide. (See *Memorandum on War Crimes and Genocide in Eastern Bosnia (Communes of Bratunac, Skelani and Srebrenica) Committed against the Serbian Population from April 1992 to April 1993*. In: United Nations General Assembly Security Council [online], Belgrade 1993 [cit. 2009-12-20]. Available at: *http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/325/70/IMG/N9332570. pdf?OpenElement*.)

Insofar as the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the 1948 legal definition of genocide seems to be too broad in many respects – although the difference between genocide and ethnic cleansing, if any, is rather complicated by the fact that any expulsion of a specific population group can hardly be done without some form of violence.[19] According to the European Court of Human Rights, neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ethnically homogeneous, nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such a policy, can as such be designated as genocide. In this respect, the International Court of Justice stated that, numerous similarities between a genocidal policy and a policy commonly known as ethnic cleansing notwithstanding, a clear distinction must be drawn between physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide.[20] Similarly, many experts advocate the distinction between "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing," as they are worried that confusing them leads to incorrectness which may in turn result in one-sided interpretations.[21] Robert Hayden, for example, puts these two terms in context with other events of the 20th century, which he uses to demonstrate how interpretatively fragile the perception of the term "genocide" may be.[22] Norman M. Naimark emphasises the qualitative difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide, although the two crimes may occur in parallel under certain circumstances. In his concept, genocide means a planned extermination of a specific ethnic, religious or national group of people, while ethnic cleansing consists of the removal of a specific nation or ethnic group (and often also all reminders of its existence) from a specific territory.[23] Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, already mentioned above, likewise views genocide and ethnic cleansing as two terminologically different terms.[24] According to Stéphane Rosière, ethnic cleansing differs from genocide mainly in that

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19 See MANN, M.: *The Dark Side of Democracy*, pp. 11–13 – see Footnote 9.
20 Refer also to KLEČKOVÁ, Renáta: *Subsidiární formy ochrany v mezinárodním právu uprchlickém* [Subsidiary Forms of Protection in International Refugee Law]. Dissertation manuscript, Faculty of Law, Masaryk University [online], Brno 2010 [cit. 2012-09-29]. Available at: *http://is.muni.cz/th/41613/pravf_d/DPfinal.txt*.
21 Interpretation differences between the two terms, including circumstances of their use in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are dealt with, for example, in the studies of Marie-Janine Čalić or Sabrina Ramet (compare ČALIĆ, Marie-Janine: Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995. In: INGRAO, Charles – EMMERT, Thomas: *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar's Initiative.* West Lafayette (Indiana), Purdue University Press 2009, p. 6 n.; RAMET, Sabrina: *Thinking about Yugoslavia.* New York, Cambridge University Press 2005, pp. 15–17).
22 HAYDEN, R.: Schindler's Fate, pp. 738–742 – see Footnote 12.
23 See also NAIMARK, Norman M.: *Plameny nenávisti: Etnické čistky v Evropě 20. století*. Praha, Nakladatelství Lidové noviny 2006, p. 9. Available in English as: *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentiech-Century Europe*. Cambridge (Mass.) – London, Harvard University Press 2001.
24 See BELL-FIALKOFF, A.: *Ethnic Cleansing*, pp. 1–4 – see Footnote 7.

the latter's objective is to exterminate a nation as such, while the purpose of ethnic cleansing is to "cleanse" a territory from a specific nation.[25]

The only event during the Bosnian conflict the scope and brutal character of which exceed common ethnic cleansing definitions occurred in Srebrenica. In 2005, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia designated it as an act of genocide.[26] However far as I am from questioning the tragic nature of the Srebrenica massacre, it should be noted that the Serbian operation in July 1995, which turned into an act of uncontrollable brutal revenge under tense circumstances, was in line with Serbian strategic interests and, because of previous events in the district, had its dreadful military logic (as described below). The events in Srebrenica were, first and foremost, a war crime. The gruesome acts committed by belligerents in Bosnia and Herzegovina were motivated by their efforts to "cleanse" the areas they were in control of and to secure a superior position for themselves there. The purpose of the ethnic homogenisation was to make unwanted populations leave rather than to intentionally exterminate them.

Issues in the Research of Ethnic Cleansings in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The fundamental problem of the research of ethnic cleansings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in fact of all events during the conflict, is that of enormous politicisation and all-pervading propaganda. The countless primary sources and secondary publications on the Bosnian war notwithstanding, there exists a significant imbalance in the relative representation of sources providing information on actions and operations of the belligerents during the war. It is obvious that ethnic cleansings committed against the Muslim nation are documented best.[27] As fittingly noted by Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, the atrocities perpetrated during ethnic cleansings in Serb-controlled areas were documented much more extensively and thoroughly

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25 Refer also to ROSIÈRE, Stéphane: Communauté internationale face au nettoyage ethnique: Dayton dans une perspective historique. In: SANGUIN, André-Louis (ed.): *L'Ex-Yugoslavie dix ans après Dayton.* Paris, l'Harmattan 2005, p. 32.

26 *Facts about Srebrenica.* In: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [online], The Hague 2005 [cit. 2011-10-12]. At: *http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/jit_srebrenica_en.pdf.*

27 As to ethnic cleansings against the Bosniak population, there exists ample evidence of many foreign journalists; however, information on Serbian or Croatian victims of ethnic cleansings is rarely found in other than Serbian or Croatian sources, which naturally reduces its significance. The most frequent sources in this respect are the Orthodox and Catholic churches. (Regarding the issue, refer, in particular, to contributions presented In: MOJZES, Paul (ed.): *Religion and the War in Bosnia.* Atlanta, Scholars Press 1998.) The scope, intensity and forms of ethnic cleansings in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also reported on by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Polish ex-Prime Minister and Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (refer also to *Mazowiecki Izvještaji 1992–1995* [Mazowiecki's Reports 1992–1995]. Tuzla, Univerzitet u Tuzli 2007).

than the ones whose victims were Serbs and Croatians.[28] The extent of ethnic cle-
ansings in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus has not been examined in its entirety
and in a relevant manner. Similarly, there has not yet been any comprehensive
and detailed analysis of violent acts committed during the Bosnian war. This fact
must obviously be taken into account when comparing the intensity and scope of
violence exercised by each of the warring nations.

Most Western works investigating the implementation and extent of ethnic cleans-
ings in Bosnia and Herzegovina proceeded in chronological order. In this respect,
it must be emphasised that the final interpretation of the consequences of military
operations and the scope of ethnic cleansings was significantly influenced by the
dynamism of the conflict. This is also why the central (and rather generalising)
proposition derived from the chronology accentuates that the ethnic cleansings
were initially carried out (almost) exclusively by the Serbs, and to a much lesser
extent by the Croatians, while the Bosniaks implemented them, if at all, only in
reaction to previous violence. Most of the authors researching ethnic cleansing
practices and cited herein (e.g. Michael Mann, Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman,
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, Norman M. Naimark, Stéphane Rosière) view the Bosnian
conflict through the chronological prism outlined above.

A question remains whether the scheme outlined above represents the conflict's
perception prevailing in the West, according to which Serbia and Croatia wanted
to parcel out the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between themselves. Western
observes often tended to overlook or marginalise violent acts committed by the
Bosniaks during the war, or viewed them as a part of necessary defence against the
advancing enemy. The myth of the single victim permitted pointing at the division
of roles in the war conflict in which the enemy was always the aggressor.[29] Accord-
ing to some authors, it even *de facto* did not make any sense for the Bosniaks to
carry out ethnic cleansings during the war as, being the dominant ethnic group
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was in their interest to preserve the integrity of the
country. For example, it is quite surprising that US historian Norman M. Naimark
stubbornly refers to often no less brutal acts of the Bosniaks which served the

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28   See BURG, Steven – SHOUP, Paul: *The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and
     International Intervention.* New York, Armonk 1999, p. 173.
29   An interesting answer to a question of the Bosnian *BH Dani* weekly, namely whether the
     continuing insistence on just one nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina being the victim of
     genocide (and another nation its perpetrator) can be the starting point for a common state,
     is provided by Jakob Finci, Chairman of the Jewish community in Sarajevo: "The victim
     syndrome is something that makes everyone in the Balkans proud. To put it simply, every-
     one here is beating his or her chest about having become a victim of the last war, or of some
     of the previous wars; everyone's talking about his or her suffering. I know that one of the
     reasons is the conviction that a victim is incapable of perpetrating evil. No one is prepared
     to accept even the tiniest part of the blame. In short, playing the victim card over and over
     again is not something that could bring any benefit." (See FINCI, Jakob: Pogrešno igranje
     na kartu žrtve [Wrong Play with the Victim Card]. In: *BH Dani* [online], 27 April 2007
     [cit. 2009-12-13]. Available at: *http://www.bhdani.com/default.asp?kat=txt&broj_
     id=515&tekst_rb=4.*)

same purpose – i.e. the expulsion of the non-Muslim population – as war crimes.[30] A statement of Peter Galbraith, US Ambassador to Zagreb, is another example how the interpretation of the term "ethnic cleansing" can be bent. When interviewed by the BBC, he stated that expelling the Serbs from Krajina had not been ethnic cleansing, as he perceived the term as a practice supported solely by Belgrade and, as such, implemented only by the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The exodus of the Croatian Serbs as a result of Croatia's Operation Storm therefore was, in his view, a positive step toward a solution of the Yugoslav crisis.[31] Although the statement regarding the Bosniaks' intention to maintain the indivisibility of Bosnia is basically true, the assumption that they were not expelling non-Muslim population from areas under their control indicates a lack of understanding of the many facets of the Bosnian conflict. In his typology of ethnic cleansings, Erik Melander, for instance, has even coined a special term, "rearguard cleansing," for one of their forms, which occurred in territories controlled by a militarily weaker side on the defensive. He claims this form was used to relocate ethnically undesirable populations living close to defensive lines or along key routes connecting frontlines with supply bases in the rear.[32]

Moreover, if we accept the opinion that the ethnic cleansings carried out by the Bosniaks were almost exclusively a reaction to previous wrongs, we must also ask ourselves the question whether the violence they committed as earlier victims justified or somehow mitigated the inhumanity of the acts perpetrated by them. In like manner, it is very difficult to distinguish whether ethnic cleansings carried out under the direction of this or that warring party were "strategic" acts linked to military operations, revenge, or intentional liquidation. Let us reiterate once again that, while different episodes of ethnic cleansing varied as to their violence level, their purpose remained the same: to expel ethnically different populations from a specific territory. Given the complexity of the civil war, I believe that too much effort to emphasize only the extent of the accompanying violence is out of place.

In addition, the intensity of crimes perpetrated with an intention to ethnically homogenise controlled areas started changing and leveling, reflecting the developments and vagaries of the conflict, particularly from the moment the tension between the Bosniaks and the Croats, until then military allies, grew into real armed clashes. The responsibility for ethnic cleansings and war crimes was thus distributed more uniformly among the three belligerents after the splitting of the Bosniak-Croatian coalition in 1993 and the outbreak of the conflict between the Bosniaks supporting General Fikret Abdić and the Bosniaks loyal to Sarajevo in so-called Cazinska Krajina.

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30 NAIMARK, N. N.: *Plameny nenávisti* – see Footnote 24.

31 *OMRI Daily Report.* In: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online], No. 155, Part 2, 10 August 1995 [cit. 2012-09-15]. Available at: *http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1995/08/950810II.html*.

32 MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, p. 9 n. – see Footnote 2.

It is true that observers and experts were attempting to measure, albeit in a piece-meal fashion, the scope of the ethnic cleansings and forced relocations; yet, the approach they had chosen indirectly assigned the blame to whole nations. The resulting generalisation is nevertheless extremely misleading.[33] The relations of ethnic groups were generally examined comprehensively, for the entire duration of the war (1992–1995) and in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the war was fought. However, to understand the diversity of the Bosnian conflict, it makes much more sense to study the ethnic cleansings at a lower, local level (i.e. at the level of *opshtine*)[34] and against the backdrop of different phases characterising the course of the civil war (and also the scope and intensity of ethnic cleansings).[35]

Ethnic Cleansings at the Local Level

Opinions of the Western professional community on the onset and form of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were divided into two opposite groups; one consisting of those who claimed that the reasons why the conflict had broken out were primarily related to the local deeply rooted ethnic hatred (*primordial hatred school*), the other comprising those who, on the other hand, emphasised that Bosnia and Herzegovina's nations had coexisted in peace for quite a long time (*paradise lost approach*).[36] These contrasting opinions were reflected in different views on and interpretations of the intrinsic nature of the conflict and the scope of violent acts at the local level. In their attitude to the Yugoslav crisis, Western representatives did not fully realise that the reason why the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were leaning toward secessionism/separatism was that they were very much afraid, because of their deeply ingrained historical experience with the South Slavic environment, of becoming a minority in the successor state.[37] The war conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in earnest due to the forcible implementation of the separatist

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33   The generalisation naturally worked the other way round as well. Because of reports on atrocities committed by their own paramilitary units elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnic minorities found themselves under pressure from the ethnically different majority. The revenge element is dealt with below.

34   The municipality (*municipality*), for instance, is equivalent to "okres" (district), the Czech Republic's Local Administrative Unit (LAU) until 2003.

35   See MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, p. 6.

36   These are two extreme concepts which were naturally changing in the course of time. For details on the ethnic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, see ŽÍLA, Ondřej: Sebeidentifikace, statistika a její interpretace: Etnicky smíšená manželství, Jugoslávci a muslimská otázka v Bosně a Hercegovině v kontextu národnostní politiky socialistické Jugoslávie [Self-Identification, Statistics and Their Interpretation: Ethnically Mixed Marriages, Yugoslavs, and the Muslim Issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Context of the Nationality Policy of Socialist Yugoslavia]. In: *Historický časopis*, Vol. 61, Issue No. 3 (2013), pp. 515–517.

37   See SMAJLOVIĆ, Ljiljana: From the Heart of the Former Yugoslavia. In: *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Issue No. 3 (1995), p. 14.

programme of the Serb Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka* – SDS), which, however, was supported by the overwhelming majority of the Bosnian Serbs.

Nevertheless, the coexistence of the multi-ethnic Bosnian society after the first pluralistic elections in 1990 was incompatible with the ideologies and ethnic-territorial aspirations of the other two victorious parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* – HDZ) and the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcje* – SDA). The extremely escalated atmosphere in which mutual tensions and phobias among the constitutive nations were mounting played into the hand of SDP and CDU (and, to some extent, also PDA) whose intention was to forcibly split the society along ethnic lines.[38] The ethnic cleansings thus were not a collateral effect of the starting war; they were its strategy directed from above and its intended objective.[39] In this respect, some authors believe the ethnic cleansings were not directly driven by ethnic hatred; in their opinion, it was the nationalist policy that was intentionally fuelling these sentiments and escalating mutual animosities up to their extreme pathological forms.[40] Analyses of the Bosnian conflict also do not assign enough significance to the fact that the inter-ethnic harmony of the three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina was getting weaker as each of the nationalist parties was stepping up its contacts with religious representatives.[41] The supreme officials of the Orthodox and Catholic churches and the head of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina were playing key roles in nationalist propaganda and ethnic mobilisation strategies of central political representatives.[42]

The reverse side of the non-critical acceptance of the interpretation which sees the development of the conflict only as a result of the actions of nationalist politicians is a parallel rejection of everything that does not fit the above outlined concept. Using the results of a long-term survey conducted in rural areas of Herzegovina between 1984 and 1999 to prove his point, Dutch cultural anthropologist Mart Bax showed that tendencies toward the ethnic homogenisation of the region can be only partly attributed to the ethnic cleansing policy. The local fighting in these areas during the war (between 1992 and 1995) was taking place against the backdrop of local vendettas and long-standing, albeit previously partly suppressed conflicts.

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38 Refer also to BUGAREL, Ksavije: *Bosna: Anatomija rata* [Bosnia: The Anatomy of War]. Beograd, Fabrika knjiga 2004, pp. 80–85. The Party of Democratic Action is still the most prominent Bosniak, or Muslim, political party. The Serb Democratic Party was representing interests of the Bosnian Serbs, while the Croatian Democratic Union was a branch of the most important political party of neighbouring Croatia, which the Bosnian Croats identified themselves with.

39 Refer also to *Mazowiecki Izvještaji 1992–1995*, p. 42 – see Footnote 28.

40 See VRCAN, Srdjan: The Religious Factor and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: MOJZES, P. (ed.): *Religion and the War in Bosnia*, p. 117 – see Footnote 28.

41 Refer also to COHEN, Lenard: Bosnia's "Tribal Gods": The Role of Religion in Nationalist Politics. In: *Ibid.*, p. 58.

42 See PERICA, Vjekoslav: *Balkanski idoli: Religija i nacionalizam u jugoslovenskim državama* [The Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in South Slavic States], 2 Volumes. Beograd, Knjižara Krug 2006.

In his interpretation, the Bosnian conflict acquired extra facets indicating that war clashes need not necessarily have been taking place exclusively along ethnic lines, but also within each of the nations involved.[43] The hypothesis was also supported by the above mentioned conflict between Bosniaks in Western Krajina.

International negotiators also made an indirect contribution to the ethnic homogenisation during the war. One of the reasons why the relations between the Bosniaks and the Croats, tense enough as they were, developed into straightforward clashes was the draft of the so-called Vance-Owen peace plan.[44] As the plan proposed a division of the country according to an ethnical key, the belligerents were implementing a policy of ethnic homogenisation of regions to gain the best possible initial position for the forthcoming peace talks.[45]

As mentioned on the previous lines, the implementation of ethnic cleansings reflected the war developments and its intensity varied. However, acts of violence on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were quite often not just one-off affairs. Because of changing frontlines, previously expelled minority inhabitants were able to return to many places, while members of the nation whose forces had previously carried out the ethnic cleansing were forced to leave. In this respect, the willingness of the expellees to return to their former homes after the war dropped dramatically, if they had actively participated in the cleansings themselves.

The ethnic homogenisation during the conflict created or helped create a new, often irreversible reality at the local level. Contributing to the process were both original inhabitants and newcomers seeking a safe haven or intentionally resettled by local political elites. It was the unwillingness of the latter, who were living in other people's houses and showed no desire to return to their former homes, fuelled by skilful manipulations of local politicians, which was one of the main obstacles – particularly in the early stages of the postwar reconstruction – of the repatriation process, which was not too successful.

As each of the three nationalist parties – the Serb Democratic Party, Croatian Democratic Union and the Party of Democratic Action – were striving to create a national state rather than a truly democratic community of all nations, it is absolutely vital to ask oneself the question how the different ethnic groups comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina's population behaved to each other since the outbreak of the war. To what extent were their relations upset by the nationalist propaganda tirelessly supported by media? How fast was the hitherto relatively functional coexistence of

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43 Refer also to BAX, Mart: Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: A Case Study from Rural Bosnia Hercegovina. In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2000), pp. 16–29.

44 See Vance-Owenov mirovni plan: Nacrt dogovora o Bosni i Hercegovini [Vance-Owen Peace Plan: A Draft Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Geneva, January 1993.). In: TUDJMAN, Miroslav – BILIĆ, Ivan (eds.): *Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991–1995* [Plans, Agreements, Statements on the Constitutional Arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991–1995]. Zagreb, b.n. 2005, pp. 198–201.

45 See MITROVIĆ, Momčilo: Etničko čišćenje kao strategija država na prostoru bivše SFRJ [Ethnic Cleansings as a Strategy of States in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia]. In: *Tokovi istorije: Časopis Instituta za Noviju Istoriju Srbije*, Vol. 13, Issue No. 1–2 (2005), p. 181.

ethnically mixed communities changing under the pressure of war developments? At what rate was the coexistence of the heterogeneous community eroding? And were these processes directly proportional to the advancing conflict? Were there indeed violent clashes between locals in municipalities since the very outbreak of the war, or were they initiated by (para)military forces that had arrived from elsewhere? To what extent were local people, i.e. ethnically different neighbours sharing the same living space, participating in the "cleansings" in local communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Unambiguous answers to these questions are very hard to find. There are no micro-regional studies or deeper probes analysing inter-ethnic relations within local communities in greater detail. Most primary sources deal mainly with the political and socio-economic consequences of the civil war. Published testimonies, recollections of horrors and bad experiences that people of Bosnia and Herzegovina had to live through during the war are, as a rule, presented only by the Bosniaks. As often as not, reminiscences of the suffering were used not only to prove war crimes perpetrated by the Serbs, but also to confirm their intent to carry out the ethnic homogenisation, or even their genocidal intentions. We do not know much about the feelings, mood and opinions of Serbian and Croatian refugees who were eking out a living as internally displaced persons elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their hardships were eclipsed by news about the dreadful events in Podrinje or in Western (Bosnian) Krajina during the first phase of the ethnic cleansings, from April to September 1992 (see below).

This notwithstanding, it is possible to provide some basic comments on the questions asked above. In most cases, the war was probably brought to local communities from outside, as a result of the movements of military or paramilitary units that began operating in the region.[46] On the other hand, it is true that, as the conflict which affected practically every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina in some way was escalating, mutual ethno-stereotypes and deep-rooted prejudices existing among the three constitutive nations were peaking up to extreme levels. All remnants of rationality were eclipsed by the war psychosis assisted by omnipresent violence, which rendered any matter-of-fact attitude impossible.

Still, relations within quite a few ethnically mixed communities not yet directly affected by war events remained relatively free of conflict. In spite of the ongoing fighting, the coexistence in rural communities was of course tense, but more or less stabilised. It need not necessarily have turned into mutual destruction from the very beginning. Observers attributed the fact that the neighbourly relations in these ethnically diverse communities ultimately had not survived and instead turned into open enmity mainly to external factors, i.e. to violence brought from outside. Regarding that, it should be noted that the atrocities which took place were committed only by some members of the communities, and under certain specific

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46   Refer also to different reports on ethnic cleansings in *Mazowiecki Izvještaji 1992–1995* – see Footnote 28.

circumstances.[47] Although the conflict largely penetrated to ethnically heterogeneous areas of central Bosnia from outside, there was nothing that prevented Bosniak and Croatian military units, which were cooperating at that time, to coordinate expulsions of the local Serbian minority.

The fragile peace was also often disturbed by violent acts reacting to violence and terror in neighbouring regions. Drastic war events in other regions made the element of revenge appear with an increasing frequency in local clashes. As a result, spiral of ubiquitous violence started spinning, which made an increasing number of people react to the situation in a violent manner.[48] The coexistence, until then relatively peaceful, was also efficiently attacked by intentional terror. Using an example from the *municipality* of Bosanska Krupa, Jasminka Udovički notices how fast mistrust and panic due to a premeditated murder were spreading among the local ethnic groups whose coexistence had hitherto been peaceful.[49]

Other sources and secondary publications mention the participation of locals, who indicated houses of their ethnically different neighbours to paramilitary militiamen.[50] However, because of the selective, and perhaps also calculated and not always credible documentation of the war crimes, it is not possible to determine with enough relevance whether local people were indeed helping paramilitary units and to what extent, and whether they did so voluntarily, or in fear for their own

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47 In her excellent TV document of 1993, Tone Bringa shows a relatively harmonic ethnically mixed environment of Bosniaks and Croats in a rural settlement in central Bosnia (CHRISTIE, Debbie – BRINGA, Tone: *We Are All Neighbours.* London, A Granada Production 1993). Similar conclusions are presented by Filip Tesař for one of the better-documented massacres in the municipality of Ahmići in central Bosnia (TESAŘ, Filip: *Etnické konflikty* [Ethnic Conflicts]. Praha, Portál 2007, p. 122).

48 For example, testimonies of Muslim refugees escaping from the *municipality* of Han Pijesak indicated that some attacks by Serbs against them had been motivated by lust for revenge. One Muslim woman claimed that her house had been attacked by an exasperated Serb – the father of a son who had been shot in Sarajevo. (See UDOVIČKI, J. – ŠTITKOVAC, E.: Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 186 – see Footnote 14.)

49 In the summer of 1992, a Serbian farmer found his wife murdered in a barn alongside slaughtered cows. Next to the body of the dead wife was a piece of paper with the signature of his Muslim neighbour, whose farm was situated on the other bank of the Una River. The farmer was unable to tell whether the signature was genuine, as he had never seen his Muslim neighbour's handwriting before. Although it was never established with certainty who had really killed the woman, news about her violent death was rapidly and uncontrollably spreading throughout the Cazin region. The unknown perpetrator (or perpetrators) thus achieved his (or their) objective, as the wave of mistrust and feelings of an impending threat of conflict between the two nations comprising the local community later developed into direct armed clashes. (*Ibid.*, p. 181 n.)

50 See, for instance, *The Fall of Srebrenica: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35.* In: United Nations [online], New York 1999 [cit. 2010-04-13]. Available at: *http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6afb34.html.* Crimes in the region of Bosanska Krajina are often mentioned as well. According to Peter Maass, who visited one of the villages in the region, several dozen Muslims were executed by their Serbian neighbours. (MAASS, Peter: *Love Thy Neighbour: A Story of War.* London, Pan Macmillan Ltd. 1996, pp. 76–79.)

fate.[51] In a number of areas, on the other hand, paramilitary units and local elites had to exercise considerable efforts to make the local population cooperate. According to some journalists, the greatest problem for Serbian ultra-nationalists was to convince local Serbs, accustomed to living in relative harmony with Muslims and Croats, to take part in, or at least not interfere with, military operations.[52] In this respect, spreading fear and mistrust among the population which helped start the spiral of violent reactions proved to be a worthwhile policy for the political elites.

Most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina agree that relations in ethnically mixed communities before the war (and often also during the war) were proper. Still, there exists a fairly widespread opinion in Bosnia and Croatia that the Serbs did not warn their neighbours of an attack of Serbian military forces against this or that village, although they had been notified of it in advance. In this respect, relevant studies often contain statements such as "The Serbs knew," which the Bosniaks used to point at the fact that the local Serbian population had known about attacks of Serbian units before they actually took place.[53] However, the impulse for a preventive departure of people might often stem from utterly different circumstances, as suggested by Filip Tesař in his analysis of the massacre in the Muslim-Croatian village of Ahmići. In the light of his field research, the initial conclusion to the effect that the Croats left the village immediately before the attack because they had known about it beforehand must be revisited. According to his findings, the Croats fled from the village after they had learnt about an alleged attack of the *mujahedeen*. Therefore, they did not have to worry about their Muslim neighbours and, according to Tesař, they only called the local Croats.[54] Of course, it may also have been an intentional piece of misinformation provided by Croatian military units.

It is therefore rather difficult to draw a line separating conflicts of neighbours, conflicts assisted by neighbours, or a military operation that wrecked the local inter-ethnic tolerance of the feuding parties. Similarly, conclusions based on the course and extent of ethnic cleansings in a specific part of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be generalised and applied to the entire territory of the country.

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51 In this respect, the frequent argument claiming that Serbian villagers were willingly helping the paramilitary groups because they wanted to settle their personal accounts with local Bosniaks can certainly be regarded as heavily biased (refer also to, for instance, NAIMARK, N. M.: *Plameny nenávisti*, pp. 148 and 150 – see Footnote 24).

52 See WESSELINGH, Isabelle – VAULERIN, Arnaud: *Bosnie, la Mémoire a vif: Prijedor, laboratoire de la purification ethnique.* Paris, Buchet – Chastel 2003, p. 47.

53 Refer also to JANSEN, Stef: Remembering with a Difference: Clashing Memories of Bosnian Conflict in Everyday Life. In: BOUGAREL, Xavier – HELMS, Elisa – DUIJZINGS, Ger (ed.): *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society.* Aldershot, Ashgate 2007, pp. 200–203.

54 See TESAŘ, F.: *Etnické konflikty*, p. 118 n. – see Footnote 48.

Forms of Ethnic Cleansings

An analysis of different features of ethnic cleansings shows the methods used to achieve the intended goal, i.e. to create an ethnically homogeneous territory. Although, insofar as ethnic cleansings are concerned, it generally holds true that the dominating population segment gets rid of the physical presence of the unwanted and disadvantaged group, one can observe substantial differences in their implementation (i.e. the methods used and level of violence) in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a matter of fact, the "cleansing" operations were conducted by armies or militias which officially did not depend on the ex-Yugoslav successor states.[55] For this reason, there were many different military formations or paramilitary units of all the warring parties operating in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the war, which acted fully or almost autonomously and independently. The situation was reflected in the level of brutality which these groups did not have to answer for to anyone.[56] It took some time before their sovereign activities were suppressed and stemmed – although not fully – under the military leadership of the different armies.

As stated earlier, the purpose of violent acts perpetrated against civilians was to spread fear and panic, to force people who had not yet decided to leave their homes to make up their mind as quickly as possible. In spite of chaotic war developments, the ethnic cleansings accompanying the advance of armed forces suggest a phasing of sorts. The conflict was developing from direct violent acts of individuals to larger-scale rampaging of numerous armed gangs, and finally to a somewhat systematic expulsion of ethnically different people, during which the unwanted population was counted and tagged.[57]

When expelling people from their homes, military and paramilitary units used different methods, including harassment, beating, torture, rape, kangaroo court executions, forced relocations, property confiscation, etc. However, it was the destruction of houses and buildings that played the key role in the ethnic homogenisation. In addition to houses and apartment blocks, sacral buildings and other objects of culture were likewise intentionally damaged and destroyed, especially in ethnically mixed areas. The nature of the multi-ethnic environment was most frequently reflected in larger towns and cities. Their systematic destruction, i.e. the

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55 In practice, however, there was a fairly obvious connection between the *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* – JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the newborn *Vojska Republike Srpske* – VRS [Army of Republika Srpska] on the one hand, while the *Hrvatsko vijeće obrane* – HVO [Croatian Defence Council] was subordinated to the military forces of Croatia.

56 A review of different paramilitary units and their activities between 1992 and 1994 is presented in the following extensive report of the United Nations: *Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex III: A Special Forces United Nations*. In: United Nations [online], New York 1994 [cit. 2010-08-16]. Available at: *http://ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/III-A.htm*.

57 See ROUX, M.: À propos de la "purification ethnique" en Bosnie-Herzégovine, p. 50 – see Footnote 4.

collapse of the previous urban lifestyle, also meant the destruction of the previous ethnic heterogeneity. Settlements of ethnic minorities in rural regions were being destroyed in a similar way (but much more intensively). Indeed, the practice of ethnic cleansings gradually spread practically all over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The loss of their homes – not just in a geographical sense, but also in terms of their way of living[58] – made the refugees feel uprooted, and even the successful property restitution undertaken later failed to mitigate the feeling. As a matter of fact, another objective of the ethnic cleansings was to systematically and purposefully destroy pre-war recollections of the refugees by relativising them. The feeling of safety their abodes had provided before the war was torn to pieces by the intentional destruction of their homes and their neighbourhoods. Last but by no means least, the war dramatically disrupted previous social links and made the very term "neighbourhood" questionable.[59]

The authors studying the phenomenon of ethnic cleansings did not examine, at least not comprehensively, to what extent the knowledge of the ethnic situation in one's place of residence influenced the decision of members of ethnic minorities to leave their homes even before the outbreak of the war and ethnic cleansings.[60] Escalated nationalism of the early 1990s actually made many hitherto ethnically tolerant people think along the "us-or-them" dichotomy lines, or at least take them into account. At least some idea about the ethnic structure of a broader area around one's own house often contributed – particularly in the case of ethnic minorities – to a decision to move to "safety," i.e. to regions with a majority of one's own ethnic group.

Some people left their homes preventively, others under the targeted pressure of local political elites. The former, "preventive" departure cannot be regarded as a "classic" form of ethnic cleansing. Yet, the purposeful pressure under which ethnically different populations had to leave their homes fell into ethnic cleansing practices. The boundaries between the "voluntary" departures, flight, forced expulsion and other forms of war-induced migration were very fluid.[61] In all the cases listed above, however, it held true that people's decisions and actions were based on the knowledge of the ethnic situation in the immediate area. The information about the ethnic structure of different regions was particularly important if none of the ethnic groups living in a given region had an absolute majority. In ethnically mixed regions, there was an emphasis on the drawing of clearly defined ethnic lines along which tension subsequently escalated.

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58 See ŽÍLA, Ondřej: Vnitřní uprchlíci v Bosně a Hercegovině a jejich percepce "domova" [Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Their Perception of "Home"]. In: *Český lid*, Vol. 100, Issue No. 2 (2013), pp. 129–149.

59 BUGAREL, K.: *Bosna*, pp. 133–137 – see Footnote 39.

60 See JANSEN, Stef: National Numbers in Context: Maps and Stats in Representations of the Post-Yugoslav Wars. In: *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, Vol. 12, Issue No. 1(2005), p. 48.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 48 n.

Resulting Scope of the Ethnic Cleansings

If we want to determine, at least approximately, the number of people in each nation who left their homes, we must first retrospectively convert the ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 to the new administrative template of the country after the war. However, the conversion is methodologically difficult. The Dayton Agreement divided more than 30 *municipalities* between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. As the lines were drawn on a 1:50,000 map, it was very difficult to determine which entity some places actually belong to. The greatest problem arose in the densely populated urban *municipalities* of Sarajevo Ilidža and Sarajevo Novo, which the ethnic line passes through (figuratively speaking, it even cuts through some houses and apartments). Consequently, there are marked differences in published calculations of the numbers of the Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats and other nationalities living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska as of the 1991 census, which render the estimation of the absolute number of refugees of each of the constitutive nations on the basis of their place of origin very difficult. Based on my own calculations, I believe that the estimates most accurately reflecting the truth are those of Ante Markotić, who was the only demographer to deduct the number of people who, as of the 1991 census, had been residing abroad (an overwhelming majority of them did not return to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the outbreak of the war) from official statistical data. His calculations thus provide the most credible picture of the presumed ethnic structure of the country in 1991.

Numbers and percentages of members of the three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 1991, converted to the Dayton arrangement[62]

Constitutive nations	Bosniaks		Serbs		Croats	
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,333,345	55%	550,850	22.7%	490,454	20%
Republika Srpska	480,413	30%	742,643	45.6%	136,088	8.35%
Total	1,852,430	44.5%	1,311,626	31.5%	670 868	16.1%

Using Markotić's data, we can attempt to quantify the flight of ethnical undesirables more accurately and to examine how the mass relocations of people were reflected

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62 The conversion includes only the three constitutive nations, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Citizens who proclaimed themselves Yugoslavs were left out, and the total figures in the table are thus lower than 100 percent. (Source: MARKOTIĆ, Ante: Ratni učinci na promjene u broju stanovnika Bosne i Hercegovine i Hrvatske 1991–1998 [The War and Its Effects on Changes of the Populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 1991–1998]. In: *Društveno Istraživanje*, Zagreb, Vol. 8, Issue No. 5–6 (1999), p. 756.)

in the ethnic structure of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska after the war. International observers agree that approximately 90 percent of the Serbs fled from the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while up to 95 percent of Bosniaks and Croats were expelled from Republika Srpska.[63] If these percentages are converted to absolute numbers using the data from the table, it is possible to conclude that almost half a million Serbs fled from the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and almost 460,000 Bosniaks and 130,000 Croats were expelled from the territory of Republika Srpska.

However superimposing the 1991 ethnic data on the new administrative template is, to some extent, misleading, as it prompts, in line with the ethnic cleansing definition, an incorrect notion that only members of ethnical minorities or otherwise disadvantaged inhabitants were fleeing from these territories. It is true that most of the refugees fled from places where they constituted a minority; nevertheless, there were also many members of the ethnic majority among them, who were leaving their homes under the direct or indirect pressure of war events.[64] Although it is almost impossible, because of the absence of relevant sources, to determine the extent and level of violence in the participation of members of each of the nations in the ethnic cleansings, we cannot ignore the fact that people belonging to all the three constitutive nations were leaving their homes.

In spite of the rather deceptive significance of the data, it is obvious that the percentages of refugees in terms of nation were fairly consistent with the percentage shares of the constitutive nations in the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 and also with the development of the conflict. The significantly higher number of expelled Bosniaks is largely attributable – apart from clashes with the Serbs – to the conflict with the Croats in Central Bosnia and to the skirmishes between opposing Bosniak armies due to the declaration of the so-called Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia around Velika Kladuša.[65] Yet, the oft-voiced opinion stating that the Serbs were leaving territories controlled by Bosniak or Croatian forces voluntarily seems misleading and untrue, if viewed through the prism of quantitative data. It is quite obvious that many Serbs too had to leave their homes due to a combination of direct war events, ethnic cleansings, pressure, fear of revenge, etc. At the same time, however, it is difficult to say whether and to what

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63 See, for instance, ROSAND, Eric: The Right to Return under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent. In: *Michigan Journal of International Law*, Vol. 19, Issue No. 2 (1998), p. 1100.

64 For example, the Serbs living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were also fleeing from areas where they had constituted the majority before the war (Titov Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoč, Bosanski Petrovac). Similarly, majority Bosniaks from relevant *municipalities* in Eastern Bosnia or majority Croats living along the Sava River were leaving their homes due to the advance of Serbian troops.

65 According to the information of political leader Fikret Abdić and General Atif Dudaković, some 30,000 civilians fled to Croatia from Cazinska Krajina in the summer of 1994. (Refer also to FOTINI, Cristia: Following the Money: Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia's Civil War. In: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2008), p. 468.)

extent Serbian propaganda was effective and "exclusive" in persuading the Ser-
bian population to leave territories controlled by the Bosniaks or Croats; in short,
whether the Serbian population was fleeing under the pressure of war events or
preventively (as described above), or whether they were talked into fleeing and
leaving their homeland permanently by Serbian politicians claiming that no coex-
istence was possible is not clear.

*Strategic Interests of Ethnic Elites: Examples and Implementation of Ethnic
Cleansings*

The relation between the population dynamics of the constitutive nations of Bosnia
and Herzegovina during the existence of the Yugoslav Federation and the deve-
loping character of the Bosnian conflict must be based on a chronological listing
of empirical data (i.e. records concerning different cases of ethnic cleansing).[66]
Because of the different population growth rates of the Serbs and Muslims, their
changes in the last two decades of the existence of the Yugoslav Federation, and
the escalation of political and economic tensions, the subsequent war conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was unfolding with inescapable logic, which resulted in the
formation of defensible and geographically functional and sustainable territories.

   The territories where the Muslims had been in greatest demographic competition
with the Serbs in the last few decades before the conflict and which were, at the
same time, close to Serb-dominated regions (or had even been incorporated into
them pursuant to a resolution of the Parliament of the Serbian Nation) became
the first targets of military attacks.[67] The most atrocious attacks against the civil-
ian population then occurred in areas where the proportions of the Bosniak and
the Serbian populations had been changing (increasing in the former case and
decreasing in the latter case) due to differences in their population behaviour.[68]

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66   In this respect, the already cited reports of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur on the
     Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, as well as reports of
     NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or International Human Rights
     Law Institute, may be considered fairly relevant, although not entirely balanced sources.
     Information on ethnic cleansings was collected by experts mentioned above, including Erik
     Melander, Gerard Toal, Carl Dahlman, etc.
67   Using their calculations, Andrew Slack and Roy Doyon confirmed an obvious correlation
     between the level of violence and the weakening of the proportion of the Serbian nation
     between 1961 and 1991 (refer also to SLACK, Andrew – DOYON, Roy: Population Dynamics
     and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: *Journal of
     Peace Research*, Vol. 38, Issue No. 2 (2001), p. 157).
68   More accurately, the violent events were mapped best and in greatest detail in these dis-
     tricts. The ethnic heterogeneity between the Serbian and the Muslim populations as
     of 1991 had increased most in the *municipalities* of Ključ, Prijedor, Foča, Čajniče, Sanski
     Most, Doboj, Derventa. As to Bosniak-Croatian *municipalities*, the same development could
     be observed in Busovača, Vitez, Novi Travnik, Fojnica, Mostar (refer also to ŽILA, Ondřej:
     Ethno-Demographic Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1971–1991 and Its Pro-

However, let us stress, in like manner, that the conclusions concerning the extent and locations of the ethnic cleansings, which would be based solely on demographic developments, would not represent a comprehensive mosaic of the course of the war. The assumption that there were no ethnic cleansings in low ethnic heterogeneity areas is incorrect, or rather incomplete. To safeguard a piece of territory satisfactorily, it was often necessary, from a military perspective, to attach additional, strategically important areas with key road and rail connections without which the defence of the territory would have been difficult, if not indeed impossible. Strategic considerations were thus the reason why ethnic cleansings occurred even in places where the ethnic structure and other demographic characteristics had not suggested this.

During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most ethnic cleansings were not random events and they were not uniformly distributed in time and space. On the contrary – they were concentrated in several specific areas and took place during three (or four) main phases of the ethnic homogenisation process. The first of these took place between April and September 1992. The second one occurred a year later, also between April and September.[69] The joint Bosniak-Croatian offensive in August and September 1995 marks the third stage of the process. The fourth and last phase comprises events related to the departure of the Serbs from Sarajevo in 1996.[70] The ethnic cleansing periods mentioned above indicate that, although the Bosnian conflict lasted more than three continuous years, major military operations were conducted mainly in the summer months because of Bosnia's rugged and mountainous terrain.

Strategic Interests of Serbian Elites and Their Implementation
From the outbreak of the conflict till the end of 1992, Serbian forces quickly took military control of 60 to 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This piece of information, which suggests that the Serbs took by force a larger territory than just where they had a majority in 1991, must be compared to the pre-war geographic distribution of the country's population. In September 1991, four so-called Serb Autonomous Districts (SAD Bosanska Krajina, SAD Semberija, SAD Romanija, SAD Herzegovina) were proclaimed. These administrative structures, created in parallel to the existing administrative system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were established only in regions with a majority of the Serbian population. As of the moment of their self-proclamation, there were two parallel power structures: existing regional authorities (without any representatives of the Serb Democratic Party, who were replaced by other persons) and authorities of the Serb Autonomous

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pensity for Ethnic Conflict. In: *Geographica: Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis, Facultas Rerum Naturalium*, Vol. 44, No. 1(2013), pp. 5–25).

69 See MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, pp. 5 and 21 – see Footnote 2.

70 Refer also to SELL, Louis: The Serb Flight from Sarajevo: Dayton's First Failure. In: *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 14, Issue No. 1(2000), pp. 179–202.

Region (*oblast*). In many places, groups of members and sympathisers of the Serb Democratic Party started patrolling borders of the districts incorporated into the Serb Autonomous Districts.[71] At that time, the Serbs as yet did not use any violence against local ethnic minorities (mostly Muslims) when taking over the political and military power, which political representatives of the Bosniaks naturally saw as usurpation. For the moment, let us leave aside the question of the legality of these autonomous administrative units, and focus instead on their territorial boundaries.

The borders of the four non-contiguous regions were based on the administrative boundaries of *municipalities*, which in turn copied the local ethnic majorities (at the level of *municipalities*) and also the ethnic reality at the level of municipalities/settlements. In like manner, statistical data on the ethnic structure shows that the Serb Autonomous Districts were initially delineated exclusively on the Serb majority basis. The Serb Autonomous Districts comprised a total of 33 *municipalities*, in which the average percentage of the Serb population was 68 percent (own calculation). In almost all of them, the Serbs had an absolute majority (except for Ključ, Kotor Varoš and Kupres, where they only had a relative majority). This was perhaps the reason why the Serb Autonomous Districts initially did not include the strategic districts of Prijedor, Sanski Most, Doboj and others, where the Serbs had lost their majority to the Muslims due to their own unfavourable demographic development.[72] The four Serb Autonomous Districts were generally situated in mountainous and sparsely populated areas which accounted for 40 percent of the country's territory, but only for 22 percent of its population.[73]

However, the situation kept radicalising at a fast pace. When the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed sovereignty on 15 October 1991,[74] Bosnian Serb elites (with the massive support of their nation) rejected the act, left the *Skupshtina*, and created their own constitutional body, the so-called "Assembly of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina." It must be emphasised that the legislative process followed by MPs representing the Muslim Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Union with respect to the adoption of the Memorandum

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71 See TESAŘ, Filip: Ozbrojený konflikt na území Bosny a Hercegoviny po rozpadu SFRJ [The Armed Conflict in the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia]. In: GABAL, Ivan (ed.): *Etnické menšiny ve střední Evropě: Konflikt nebo integrace* [Ethnic Minorities in Central Europe: Conflict or Integration]. Praha, G plus G 1999, p. 285.

72 Refer also to ŽÍLA, O.: Ethno-Demographic Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina…, p. 18.

73 The second most populous ethnic group in the Serb Autonomous Districts were the Muslims (21.6 percent), followed by the Croats (6.5 percent); the remaining people proclaimed themselves Yugoslavs. However, the borders of the Serb Autonomous Districts were not officially or accurately (from the administrative point of view) delineated. (Refer also to ROUX, M.: À propos de la "purification ethnique" en Bosnie-Herzégovine, p. 56 – see Footnote 4.)

74 The "Memorandum on Sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" proclaimed sovereignty of the new state within Yugoslavia, and hence the supremacy of state over federal law.

of Sovereignty was a contravention of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as – with the Serbian deputies absent – less than two thirds of the members of the Parliament voted for the resolution. The Serbs then designated the Memorandum unconstitutional and declared that, unless and until repealed, they would not participate in the work of bodies of the republic's government or respect its decisions. As a matter of fact, the Serb Democratic Party organised its own referendum in November 1991 in which the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to choose whether they wished to remain within the state of Yugoslavia.[75] Based on the outcome of the referendum, the Assembly of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed a total of five Serb Autonomous Districts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which continued to remain part of the Yugoslav Federation.[76] The initial territorial extent of the Serb Autonomous Districts, which was supposed, according to Serbian (and also Croatian) plans, to regionalise and decentralise the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the ethnic principle, more or less included areas with a Serbian majority. However, the late November 1991 declaration on the Serb Autonomous Districts increased the initial number of *municipalities* incorporated in the autonomous districts, adding *municipalities* where the Serbs did not have an absolute majority, or where they even were a small minority (Banovići, Živinice), which constituted a major contravention of the initial regionalisation concept based on the ethnic principle.[77]

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75 The referendum question was as follows: "Do you agree with the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 24 October 1991 that the Serbian people should remain in a common Yugoslav state with Serbia, Montenegro, the SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem, and with others who have come out for remaining?" (Quoted according to: WESSELINGH, I. – VAULERIN, A.: *Bosnie, la Mémoire a vif*, p. 42 – see Footnote 53.)

76 See "Odluka o verifikaciji proglašenih srpskih autonomnih oblasti u Bosni i Hercegovini" [*Decision* on *Verification* of the Proclaimed *Serbian* Autonomous Districts in *Bosnia and Herzegovina*] (Sarajevo, 21 November 1991). In: TUDJMAN, M. – BILIĆ, I. (ed.): *Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991–1995*, p. 39 – see Footnote 45. In January 1992, the Assembly of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed the Republic of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consisted of the *Serbian* Autonomous Districts. As a whole, the Republic declared itself a part of the Yugoslav Federation. The declaration was accompanied by a proclamation of sovereignty and supremacy of legal acts adopted by the Assembly of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina over legal acts adopted by the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

77 For example, the *municipalities* of Bosanska Krupa and Donji Vakuf were incorporated into the *Serbian* Autonomous District of Bosanska Krajina. The *municipality* of Foča was added to the *Serbian* Autonomous District of Herzegovina, as were the *municipalities* where the number of Serbs was low (Neum and Stolac). A brand new creation was the Romanija-Birač *Serbian* Autonomous District, which included, for instance, the *municipalities* of Vlasenica, Olovo, Šekovići and the Serbian part of Rogatica. The *Serbian* Autonomous District Semberija was expanded into adjacent areas inhabited by Serbs. However, the strategically important town of Zvornik was not explicitly mentioned in the *Decision* on *Verification*. (Ibid., p. 39 n.)

The information about the Serbian occupation of two thirds of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 1992 therefore has to be analysed in greater detail. It is estimated that the Serbs expanded the area under their military control from roughly 40 percent of the country's territory, where they had had an absolute majority before the war, by another 25 percent in 1992. By that time, they had already been intensively using ethnic cleansings to secure the areas they claimed in the most efficient manner. In addition to linking the Serbian Autonomous Districts (inordinately large as they were), the strategic plan of the Serb Democratic Party aimed to annex additional territories, all of them with a Muslim majority (the entire eastern belt along the Drina River including, for instance, the *municipalities* of Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Rogatica, Višegrad or Goražde). It is thus fairly obvious that the primary goal of the Serbs was to control the territory of Podrinje to maintain the connection with Serbia,[78] but also to cut off Muslim Central Bosnia from the Muslim population in Sandjak. Attacks of Serbian military forces[79] since early April 1992 were targeting exactly the regions listed above.

However, the fighting in Podrinje had been preceded first by heavy clashes at Bosanski Brod and Kupres as early as in March 1992. Both towns were extremely important for the strategic objectives of the Serbian leaders. Bosanski Brod was a vital connection point between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, from which supplies of arms and war materiel were flowing to the united Bosniak/Croatian forces. Apart from Brčko, the local bridge across the Sava River was the only one not controlled or destroyed by the Serbs. On the other hand, Kupres was an important point on the route connecting Western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia. The logic of the escalating conflict made heavy fighting between the Serbs and the Croats inevitable, as the highway there was a vital link to Bugojno and other Croatian *municipalities* in the central part of the country for the Croats. The Serbs, on the other hand, considered it an important segment of their planned second axis of advance from Banja Luka to Mostar. Particularly the tough fighting between the Serbs and the Croats in Posavlje (initially centred around the *municipality* of Derventa) showed that the conflict, since its very beginning, was not only taking place in regions with significant inter-ethnic demographic interactions, but that its parallel objective was to secure strategic nodes without which future military campaigns would have been impossible. The war (and together with it the first brutal cleansings) broke out in full on the last day of March 1992 in Bijeljina, from where it quickly spread across the region of Podrinje.

Having suffered defeats in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar, the Bosnian Serb army focused its attention even more on military expansion in Posavlje and on absolute control of the territory of Bosanska Krajina. Local districts (Prijedor, Sanski Most,

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78 The connection with Serbia (and Montenegro) south of Bijeljina was provided by four main highways, three of them crossing the Drina River in Zvornik, Višegrad and Foča, the fourth one crossing the Trebišnjica River in Trebinje.

79 The term "Serbian military forces" denotes the newly formed *Vojska Republike Srpske*, which was officially established on 12 May 1992, and units of the Yugoslav People's Army sympathising with the Bosnian Serbs.

Ključ) were strung along another key route connecting Serb-populated areas in Bosanska Krajina via Drvar with regions controlled by Croatian Serbs. The taking of two key towns, Doboj and Derventa, in May and June 1992 respectively, allowed the Serbian forces to continue their advance toward the strategically most important city of the region of Posavlje, Brčko, which was controlled by the Croats. The city was particularly important for the Bosnian Serb forces; due to their failure at Tuzla, it was the only connection to North-Eastern Bosnia. The objective of the military actions that were taking place there was also to link Serb-controlled territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina with areas held by Croatian Serbs.

Drastic ethnic cleansings committed by Serbian forces were significantly suppressed in the autumn of 1992. The Serbs then concentrated more on consolidating and retaining the areas under their control (which, by that time, were already ethnically homogeneous). The situation more or less held until the coordinated offensive of Croatian and Bosniak forces in Western Herzegovina and Krajina in 1995. At that time, the Serbs intensified their military activities in the Podrinje regions which had so far resisted them (Srebrenica, Goražde). In this respect, Erik Melander points out the fact that *municipalities* populated by an ethnic minority, which found themselves "sandwiched" between districts controlled by a different dominant ethnic group, were most prone to being attacked and ethnic cleansings.[80] And it was exactly what happened in Srebrenica (and nearby Bratunac and Goražde) after the taking of Višegrad and Zvornik in the Drina River valley. However, the oft-voiced claim to the effect that the Serbs had planned the brutal intervention in the Safe Area of Srebrenica in advance and implemented it without having been provoked into it in any way is very simplistic, and, consequently, extremely inaccurate.[81] The fact is that units of Bosnian Serbs did not conquer Srebrenica in 1992.[82] The social climate in the *municipality* was growing increasingly tenser, as units of Bosnian Muslims were using the Safe Zone controlled by UN "blue helmets" to mount intensive raids against Serbian villages around Srebrenica (see below). Moreover, both warring parties interpreted the UN order to demilitarise the Srebrenica enclave differently.[83] Because of their weakening position in the battlefield in 1995 and continuing raids of Bosniaks, the Serbs finally decided to take Srebrenica by force.[84] Although the Srebrenica massacre and its horrendous outcome are inexcusable, the appalling crime was, from a military viewpoint, the

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80 MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, p. 68 n. – see Footnote 2.
81 Refer also to MOJZES, Paul: *Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century.* Lanham (Maryland), Rowman & Littlefield 2011, pp. 178–183.
82 See HONIG, Jan – BOTH, Norbert: *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime.* New York, Penguin Books 1996, p. 78.
83 While the Serbs anticipated that the entire *municipality* of Srebrenica would be demilitarised, the Bosniaks interpreted the resolution as applying only to the town of Srebrenica. According to Dutch journalists Jan Honig and Norbert Both, the United Nations never attempted to systematically disarm the Muslims in Srebrenica. (See *Ibid.*, p. 106.)
84 The proverbial last straw was probably the raid of Bosniak forces against the Serbian village of Višnjica on 26 June 1995 (refer also to MOJZES, P.: *Balkan Genocides*, p. 181).

completion of the purposeful ethnic homogenisation of Podrinje as part of Republika Srpska's efforts to consolidate its positions.[85]

Strategic Interests of Croatian Elites and Their Implementation
Following the same ethno-territorial scenario implemented by the Serb Democratic Party in Serb-majority *municipalities*, the Croats too quickly initiated the formation of parallel political and military structures in "Croatian" districts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first step was the declaration of the Croat Community of Bosanska Posavina on 12 November 1991, which included eight *municipalities* in northern Posavlje,[86] although the Croats had an absolute or relative majority in only four of them. A week later, representatives of the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*) proclaimed the so-called Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia in western Herzegovina, with Mostar as its capital. The new entity, which was the maximalistic expression of Croatian strategic interests, included altogether 30 *municipalities* of western Herzegovina and central Bosnia.[87]

In addition to "Croatian" areas, this territorial unit also comprised regions in which the Croats had only a relative majority (Vitez, Busovača, Vareš), or even *municipalities* where they constituted a minority (Jablanica, Konjic, Kakanj, Gornji Vakuf).[88] The initiative of local leaders of the Croatian Democratic Union resulted in the formation of a militia force, the so-called Croatian Defence Council (*Hrvatska vijeće obrane* – HVO). Because of the impending war, leaders of Bosnian Croats were upgrading roads and highways on "their" territory, and were also quickly building new infrastructure linking central Bosnia and Croatia via Tomislavgrad.[89]

In May 1992, the Croatian Defence Council, acting in coordination with the army of neighbouring Croatia, successfully stopped Serbian forces advancing through Herzegovina, and then launched a counterattack that pushed the Serbs back; as the Serbs were retreating, the advancing Croats were ethnically cleansing local Serbian villages.[90] Ethnic cleansings coordinated with the Bosniaks were also taking place in other *municipalities* of central Bosnia (Konjica, Zenica, Zavidovići, Žepče and

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85 See MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, p. 26.
86 Refer also to TOAL, Gerard – DAHLMAN, Carl: *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal.* New York, Oxford University Press 2011, p. 104.
87 The official declaration did not mention the defence of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina at all (refer also to Odluka o uspostavi Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna [Decision to Establish the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia] (Grude, 18 November 1991). In: TUDJMAN, M. – BILIĆ, I. (ed.): *Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991–1995*, p. 37 n. – see Footnote 45).
88 Refer also to ŽÍLA, O.: Ethno-Demographic Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina…, p. 17 – see Footnote 69.
89 E.g. new highway sections Tomislavgrad–Jablanica, Tomislavgrad–Prozor, Gornji Vakuf–Novi Travnik, Prozor–Fojnica (see TESAŘ, F.: Ozbrojený konflikt na území Bosny a Hercegoviny po rozpadu SFRJ, p. 286 – see Footnote 72).
90 The Croatian Defence Council was responsible for most of the ethnic cleansings in Herzegovina (see MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, p. 51).

elsewhere), and of course in Posavlje, where the town of Brčko bore the brunt of continuous heavy fighting.

Croatian nationalists were striving for a far-reaching decentralisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the country was to be divided into cantons along ethnic lines, which were supposed to have a considerable measure of autonomy. Although they were calculatedly cooperating with the Bosniaks in the first year of the conflict, the pragmatic military cooperation was limited mainly to areas in which the Croats had their own strategic interests. As a matter of fact, the absolutely opposing attitudes of the two parties to the administrative arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina simply had to result in a conflict of interests. The situation was reflected in a growing number of initially low-scale mutual skirmishes which, however, intensified quite significantly in the autumn of 1992.[91] Battles between the Croats and Bosniaks broke out in earnest a week after the disclosure of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan of January 1993, which supported – as mentioned above – a territorial division of the country along ethnic lines. This plan, however, assigned some *municipalities* with a relative or even absolute Muslim majority (Konjic, Jablanica, Gornji Vakuf, Donji Vakuf, Bugojno, Travnik) to the Croats. Moreover, the Croats demanded two *municipalities* that the plan initially awarded to the Bosniaks (Vareš and Žepče). Although neither the Croats nor the Bosniaks agreed with the plan; both of them followed its logic and were trying to gain absolute control over the assigned territories, as a result of which fierce fighting broke out in most districts in central Bosnia.

Since the spring of 1993, very tough clashes were taking place in the *municipality* of Gornji Vakuf, in the Lašva River valley (Busovača, Vitez, Travnik), along the Bosna River (Kiseljak, Kreševo, Žepče) and in Herzegovina (Mostar, Stolac). Mutual conflicts between the Croats and the Bosniaks reached their peak in the district of Vareš which had maintained an exceptional level of peaceful coexistence between local Croats and Bosniaks until October 1993, in spite of changes in the political leadership of the *municipality*, which moderate Croatian representatives left and which was subsequently cooperating with Serbian military forces. Also exceptional was the fact that the involuntary departure of the Croats at the end of October 1993 had been primarily caused by hardliners of the Croatian Democratic Union arriving in Vareš from Kiseljak together with special units of the Croatian Defence Council.[92] Furthermore, the tension between local Croats and Bosniaks grew when Croatian refugees from neighbouring districts started arriving in Vareš.

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91 In October 1992, for instance, there were violent clashes between the Croats and Bosniaks in central Bosnia, in the *municipality* of Prozor, from where the Muslim Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* – ARBiH) had to pull out, whereupon all local Muslims were expelled as well.

92 Refer also to KOSTIĆ, Roland: *Strategies of Livelihood in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Study of the Economic Predicament of Returning Home. Vareš Case Study.* (Legacy of War and Violence Project, Working Document No. 4.) In: University of Gothenburg, School of Global Studies [online], 2003, p. 13 [cit. 2012-06-19]. Available at: *http://www.globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAsserts/809/809972_WP4Kostic.pdf.*

From a Croatian point of view, Vareš was an exclave surrounded by Bosniak territory, separated from the contiguous Croat-held areas by the Bosna River valley. Efforts of Croatian units to drive a corridor to Vareš from Kiseljak in the spring of 1993 failed. Having suffered a defeat in central Bosnia, the Croatian Defence Council, which had so far managed to retain its positions almost exclusively only in western Bosnia, obviously concentrated on consolidating and defending the line connecting the districts of Kiseljak, Busovača and Vitez.[93] Croatian political elites in Vareš thus subsequently took steps meant to provoke Bosniak forces into a retaliation which would in turn make the Croatian population leave the *municipality* as quickly as possible. The brutal attack against the Muslim village of Stupni Do nearby Vareš, in late October 1993, during which more than 30 people were massacred, was perhaps influenced and prompted by the plan.[94] At the same time, special units of the Croatian Defence Council drove out almost all Bosniaks still remaining in Vareš, of whom almost 7,000 had lived there before the war.

The Croatian Defence Council continued to fuel the already ubiquitous fear and worries of local Croats by threats of an impending retaliation by the Bosniaks and a collective ethnic punishment. The propaganda worked well among the Croats of Vareš, especially if augmented by spreading rumours of the brutality of the radical Islamists of the 7th Brigade of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina advancing toward Vareš. At the end of the day, this was also one of the reasons why 7,150 people later collectively left the *municipality* of Vareš.[95] The 7th Brigade, composed of the *mujahedeen* and constituting a regular part of the 3rd Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, subsequently occupied the district, systematically burning all deserted Croatian and Serbian villages and killing Croats who had stayed in Vareš in spite of all previous warnings.[96] The strategic importance of the *municipality* for the Bosniaks, because of a major highway linking Bosniak-controlled territories in central Bosnia and Tuzla and other areas in the north-eastern part of the country running through Vareš, made the intensity of the ethnic cleansings there even higher.

Strategic Interests of Bosniak Elites and Their Implementation
The Bosniaks had an absolute majority in 33 *municipalities*, plus they were close to it in another 20. Of the three constitutive nations, theirs was the most numerous and also the most geographically widespread in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, for the very two reasons mentioned above, the Muslims found themselves, insofar as securing their territories in the most effective way was concerned, in a very difficult situation. As a matter of fact, the territory of

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93   See MELANDER, E.: *Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–1995*, pp. 62–65.
94   Refer also to *Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajić, a.k.a. Viktor Andrić: Ivica Rajić Sentencing Judgement.* In: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [online], 2006 [cit. 2012-09-19]. Available at: *http://www.icty.org/x/cases/rajic/tjug/en/raj-tj0060508e.pdf*.
95   Although an overwhelming majority of them were Croats, the remaining Serbs fled as well. (Refer also to *Mazowiecki Izvještaji 1992–1995*, p. 272.)
96   Refer also to KOSTIĆ, R.: Strategies of Livelihood in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 13 n.

their vital strategic interest comprised almost a half of all *municipalities* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which accounted for more than 50 percent of the country's area. This fact made them vulnerable to threats from the other two constitutive nations. Because of their numbers, territorial distribution and the absence of a neighbouring parent nation state, the Bosniaks advocated and promoted the idea of a united, indivisible and centralised Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which ethnic considerations would not play any role in the delineation of administrative boundaries. However, they too reacted to the formation of the Serb Autonomous Districts and Croatian Herzeg-Bosnia by creating "their own" districts, most of which were either urban parts of existing *municipalities*, or *municipalities* that had existed and been cancelled in the past and were now reconstituted.[97]

In the first phase of the conflict, the strategic interests of the Bosniaks were naturally directed and limited by their militarily weak (and thus inevitably defensive) position resulting from lack of armaments and other military equipment. Following the key success at Tuzla, units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially formed on 15 April 1992, yet managed to stop the Serbian advance, regain control over the town of Kalesija, defend the towns of Gradačac and Čelić, and start their own offensive to the north, toward Brčko. Due to their military weakness, the Bosniak elites were primarily focusing on full control and ethnic homogenisation of their territories (e.g. the *municipalities* of Lukavac, Konjic, Jablanica, Zavidovići, Žepče, Goražde, Gračanica and others).[98] From there, para-military units the step-by-step integration of which into the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had only begun launched raids whose purpose was to hit the opponent as hard as possible in "his own" territory. The Bosniaks likewise staged ethnic cleansings to consolidate the frontline, as their army was trying to safeguard its positions by expelling inhabitants of Serbian villages situated in the territory it controlled.[99] Bit by bit, more centres of successful resistance against

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97 The first such attempt was a referendum organised at the end of 1991 in Bijeljina, which was to decide on the establishment of a new district, Bijeljina-Town (see TESAŘ, F.: Ozbrojený konflikt na území Bosny a Hercegoviny po rozpadu SFRJ, p. 286 – see Footnote 72).

98 The Bosniaks managed to hold the *municipality* of Goražde, which most Serbs fled from (in 1991, almost 10,000 of them had been living there). Satellite images of the area showed destroyed houses. The Bosniaks initially claimed the houses had been shelled by Serbian artillery positioned on the opposite bank of the Drina River, but were disproved by British General Michael Rose. In fact, the houses belonging to Serbian refugees were not destroyed by artillery fire, but taken apart by local Bosniaks as building material. (Refer also to BROCK, P.: *Media Cleansing*, p. 135 – see Footnote 17.)

99 The ethnic cleansings were taking place in broader surroundings of Bosniak-controlled town and cities (Hadžići at Sarajevo, Drivuša at Zenice, Bukvik and Kladanj at Tuzla). Refer also to TESAŘ, Filip: *Dopady migrací v rámci území bývalé Jugoslávie: Stručný přehled migrací v postjugoslávském prostoru v letech 1991–2005* [Impacts of Migrations in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: A Brief Review of Migrations in the Post-Yugoslav Region between 1991 and 2005]. Praha, Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic] 2005, p. 14.

Serbian forces were formed, from where the Bosniak army was waging what was *de facto* guerilla warfare.[100]

Such an exemplary situation occurred in Bosniak-controlled Srebrenica, from where Muslim units were launching frequent raids against Serbian villages in the area. Led by Naser Orić, these attacks constituting a part of the Bosniak defence strategy and its emphasis on the consolidation (i.e. "cleansing") of controlled territories were exceptional in their brutality and scope of systematic ethnic cleansings. In 1992 only, the local Muslim military forces attacked roughly 50 Serbian villages (including, for instance, Gladovići, Žabokvica, Brežani, Bjelovac),[101] without having any military rationale to do so. Although most of the ethnic cleansings which the Bosniaks were responsible for in the first year of the war were isolated events, the destruction and violence around Srebrenica were systematic.

The Bosniaks also started using the practice of ethnic cleansings more intensively since the outbreak of their conflict with the Croats in central Bosnia (for example in the *municipalities* of Fojnica, Travnik, Bugojno, Konjic, Zenica, Kakanj and others), but also with remaining Serbs (e.g. in Vareš). In 1993, Bosniak military operations focused on the strategic Mostar–Jablanica–Prozor–Bugojno–Jajce highway. If they had succeeded in gaining control over it, they would have cut off the Croats in western Bosnia from Croatian enclaves around Vitez. As a result, the most extensive Bosniak military operation "Neretva 93" included ethnic cleansings in parts of the *municipalities* abutting on the frontline with Bosnian Croats.

Only in 1994, when the United States started playing a more active role in the search for a peaceful solution, was the cooperation between the Bosniaks and the Croats restored and an agreement on the formation of a Bosniak-Croat federation signed. The latter was confirmed by joint military operations of the regular Croatian army, Croatian Defence Council and the Muslim Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, which resulted in a breakthrough of Serbian positions in the country's territory. In September 1995, the cooperating armies occupied large areas in western and central Bosnia, until then controlled by the Serbs (Donji Vakuf, Bosansko Grahovo, Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Ključ, Sanski Most, Jajce, Mrkonjić Grad and others). The massive offensive triggered a third phase of ethnic cleansings. The local Serbs who fled *en masse* from the conquered *municipalities* were to be replaced by Croatian newcomers or returning refugees.[102]

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100 The Bosniaks succeeded in defending several *municipalities* in Podrinje, from where Serbian military forces were pushed out. They also scored similar local-level successes in Bosanska Krajina (Kotor Varoš, Skender Vakuf) and in Posavlje.

101 See *Memorandum on War Crimes and Genocide in Eastern Bosnia…* – see Footnote 19.

102 See ŽÍLA, Ondřej: (Ne)úspěšnost repatriačního procesu v postdaytonské Bosně a Hercegovině: Politické příčiny slabé návratnosti [The (Un)Successful Repatriation Process in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina: Political Reasons of the Low Return Rate]. The paper was presented at the "Academic Discourses of the Balkans with a Focus on Issues Related to Bosnia and Herzegovina" conference, Faculty of Humanities of Charles University in Prague, 24 May 2013.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was not to examine in detail the course of military operations during the war or to meticulously analyse the geopolitical plans and intents of the belligerents, but to determine where, why and to what extent ethnic cleansings occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A quantitative analysis of the ethnic structure and growth of the Bosnian population during the last two decades of the existence of the Yugoslav Federation may partly clarify the reasons why the ethnic cleansings took place where they did. Territories where the Muslims had been competing, in demographic terms, most with the Serbs during the last decades before the war broke out and which were also very close to Serb-dominated regions became the first targets of military attacks. Consequently, there exists a clear correlation between the decreasing number of the Serbs and the level of violence (see the regions of Podrinje or Prijedor for instance). It was in these regions where the most brutal attacks against civilians belonging to the ethnic minority took place. The conflict was therefore unfolding with almost inescapable logic, which resulted in the formation of defensible and geographically functional and sustainable territories.

Ethnic cleansings as the key and central element of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus were an extremely inhuman tool which the belligerents employed to implement their geostrategic plans and to confirm (or "restore") the appurtenance of a specific region to the nation that used them. Although they were used by all the belligerents, it was the Bosniaks who were their most frequent victims, due to the material and armament superiority of Serbian and Croatian forces. Some of the territories under their control were besieged for years; in addition to Sarajevo, the encircled regions included Goražde, Bihać, Žepa enclave and, first and foremost, Srebrenica, where the 1995 intervention of Serbian troops was brutal enough to redefine ethnic cleansing definitions.

The fact is that all the three nationalist parties – the Serb Democratic Party, the Croatian Democratic Union and the Party of Democratic Action – were striving for a national state. This is why it was necessary to analyse how different ethnic segments of the population were behaving to each other after the outbreak of the war. An ethnic conflict is most often defined and explained as a war of everybody against everybody, with the different ethnicity being the key distinguishing criterion. While the tension in some regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina may have escalated to a level high enough for people who had until then been neighbours to take up arms against each other, the statement claiming that all Bosnians were unconditionally engaged in the war seems rather simplified. As a matter of fact, it is rather difficult to draw a line separating the feuds of neighbours, military conflicts assisted by villagers, or a paramilitary operation that wrecked the local inter-ethnic tolerance. Similarly, conclusions based on the course and extent of ethnic cleansings in a specific part of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be generalised and applied to the entire territory of the country. We lack, in particular, more comprehensive data on the motives of individuals participating in the ethnic cleansings. Due to media manipulations and incomplete documentation, it is not possible to evaluate the

resulting scope of violence affecting the civilian populations of each warring party objectively enough. Moreover, the intensity of crimes perpetrated for the purpose of ethnic homogenisation of controlled territories was changing and becoming balanced, especially from the moment when mutual tensions between the Bosniaks and the Croats, until then cooperating military partners, turned into real armed clashes. The hard fighting resulting from the splitting of the Bosniak-Croatian coalition in 1993 and the outbreak of the internal conflict between Bosniak factions in so-called Cazinska Krajine were also accompanied by war crimes and ethnic cleansing practices. Let us reiterate again that 90 percent of the Serbs fled from the territory of the future Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while 95 percent of the Bosniaks and Croats left the territory of the Republika Srpska.

Although each of the episodes of ethnic cleansings is different as to the level of violence, their purpose was invariably identical: to expel ethnically different populations from a specific territory. Given the complexity of the civil war, it seems that too much effort to emphasise only the extent of the accompanying violence is out of place and not quite appropriate.

Ninety Years of the Fruitful Life of Lenka Kalinová (1924–2014)

Václav Průcha

Associate Professor PhDr. Lenka Kalinová, CSc., a leading academic personality of the Czech Republic in the field of recent social history, celebrated her 90th birthday on 11 June 2014. At that time no one knew that she would leave us forever soon thereafter, on 27 June 2014. Her life story was full of obstacles and hardships, but it was dominated by purposefulness and persistence on her way to academic study and research of Czech society.[1]

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1 In addition to the author's recollections of 50 years of cooperation with Lenka Kalinová, the article is based on the following sources: her own (unpublished) biography of 2012, a publication of the Institute for Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic titled *K životnímu jubileu Lenky Kalinové* [On the Occasion of the Life's Jubilee of Lenka Kalinová] of 2009, containing an interview of Václav Průcha and of the Institute's Director Oldřich Tůma with Lenka Kalinová (Historička sociálních dějin odpovídá [A Social Historian Answers]), a bibliography of her published and unpublished research studies, and Václav Průcha's review of Lenka Kalinová's book *Konec nadějím a nová očekávání* [The End of Hopes and New Expectations] (PRŮCHA, Václav: Syntetická práce o sociálních dějinách v posledním čtvrtstoletí Československa [A Synthetic Work on the Social History in the Last 25 Years of Czechoslovakia's Existence]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2012), pp. 324–330). Published works and unpublished research studies, translations and other texts of Lenka Kalinová are deposited in the National Archives,

She was born in 1924 in what was then Carpathian Ruthenia, in the village of Roztoka, Iršava district. This was where Lenka, née Drumerová, attended a Czech elementary school. When she was 15, the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia was annexed by Hungary; in 1941, she went to Budapest looking for a job. She started working as a seamstress in a textile factory, became involved in trade union activities and in their framework also in anti-Fascist resistance. This was, indeed, a fairly rare phenomenon in Hungary in those days. Her activity in the communist-oriented resistance group consisted mainly of forging documents for people living underground or for those threatened by Hungary's policy of antisemitism. Later, in 1980 or so, during an academic visit to Budapest, she was lucky and got to see a then new movie on the resistance organisation. After 1989, her resistance activities in Hungary were also officially recognised in the Czech Republic.

Lenka Kalinová's knack for languages manifested itself as early as during the war; apart from mastering standard Czech, she also spoke and wrote perfect Hungarian. This knowledge became useful later, during her systematic monitoring of social developments in Hungary and in her frequent interpreting and translation work. Similarly, the knowledge of German and Russian enabled her to keep track of foreign literature and communicate with experts from other countries.

In 1945, during the first postwar months, in the times that were still troubled and, moreover, under legal and citizenship circumstances that were still unclear and vague, she was commuting between her birthplace, already belonging to Ukraine, Budapest and Prague. She opted for Czechoslovak citizenship and she, together with her younger sister who had survived the war and returned from Auschwitz, settled in the Czech border city of Teplice, where she again started working as a seamstress. She married Eduard Kalina, an engineer working for a power company, with whom she spent her whole life in mutual harmony. After giving birth to her daughter Blanka, she was enrolled in what was then known as workers' courses – a prep stage for university studies. She was permitted to study according to an individual, customised plan.

After moving to Prague, she was accepted as an extra-mural student by the Faculty of Arts of Charles University in 1953, her subjects being history and pedagogical studies. She gave birth to her son Miroslav while studying. At that time, she likewise started to teach history at the Central School of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and she continued to do so after successfully completing her studies in 1958. Between 1962 and 1965, she was a doctoral candidate; having defended her dissertation at the Institute of the History of Socialism, she joined the same institution as a researcher. Indeed, the topic of her dissertation – "Changes in the Structure and Status of the Working Class in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1953" – indicated what one of the main spheres of Lenka Kalinová's lifelong interest would be.

Fund of Economic and Social History, Personalities – Economic Historians and Economists, Associate Professor PhDr. Lenka Kalinová, CSc. (including indexes of topics and names).

After she had published the initial results of her research, the Institute made her responsible for the establishment and leadership of a research team the task of which was to analyse the development of the social structure of Czechoslovak society since 1918. At that time, most works and official documents were content to use general terms, such as the "working class," "bourgeoisie," "petty bourgeoisie," "peasantry" or "intelligentsia," but little was known about the internal structure of these categories or specific features and quantities of their subgroups. And these were exactly the issues which the research team led by Lenka Kalinová was focusing on. The team's members included Václav Průcha (specialising in the 1918–1945 period) and Karel Jech, both from the University of Economics; Lenka Kalinová, Václav Brabec, Viliam Hanzel and Zdena Cejpová (responsible for bibliography) from the Institute of the History of Socialism, and Jiří Maňák from the Institute of Socio-Political Sciences of Charles University, all of them focusing on research of the postwar period. Other researchers from historical institutes, sociological institutions and the University of Economics in Bratislava, such as Karel Kaplan, Jozef Faltus or sociologists from the team of Pavel Machonin, who worked on a close topic of social stratification of Czechoslovak society, were cooperating with Lenka Kalinová's team, providing analyses and papers on specific subjects the same as consultations or participating in many different discussions. Results of the first stage of the research project, including its bibliography, were published and submitted to the professional community for discussion in a special issue of the journal *Revue dějin socialismu* [History of Socialism Review] in 1968[2] as part of a planned broader research project looking at the development of Czechoslovak society during the previous 50 years. The final version could not be published after 1968, and was released, with negligible changes, only in 1993 by the Institute of Socio-Political Sciences of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University under the name *K proměnám sociální struktury v Československu 1918–1968* [On Transformations of the Social Structure in Czechoslovakia 1918–1968].

The above mentioned research project was a starting point of Lenka Kalinová's systematic academic research in the field of the latest social history of Czechoslovakia and subsequently also of the Czech Republic. In the mid-1960s, she started external cooperation with the then existing Cabinet of Economic History of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, University of Economics in Prague. In fact, this was the beginning of her cooperation with the university in concern that went on for decades.

In 1970, she was crossed out of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and lost her job at the Institute of the History of Socialism, which had been in fact disbanded. Due to her asthma which had plagued her ever since the war and her other ailments, she was granted a partial disability pension. In those difficult days and without a permanent job, she was invited by a team of economic historians

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2   The issue contained contributions by Václav Průcha, Jiří Maňák, Lenka Kalinová, Václav Brabec, Karel Jech and Viliam Hanzel (pp. 961–1189).

of the University of Economics to participate in the "Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia since 1945" State Research Project. She subsequently prepared and published academic works on the development of wages and socio-economic structures of European socialist states. Step by step, she likewise became involved in teams of authors of collective works. Since that time, she devoted herself fully to different social aspects of economic history.

At the same time, she also interpreted from and to Hungarian (partly also through the Prague Information Service) and translated economic and sociological works published in Hungary. She prepared excerpts from Hungarian professional journals and magazines for the Institute of Economy of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, which were much in demand because of the reformist efforts taking place in Hungary. She established contacts with leading Hungarian economic historians and sociologists and wrote articles for Hungarian professional journals and magazines. The absurdness of the situation in those days is illustrated by the fact that, while she was not permitted to work in the field of social sciences, government limousines came to pick her up and take her to interpret because of her broad range of knowledge for Hungarian state visits. She was repeatedly a guest of Professor Iván T. Berend, Rector of the University of Economics in Budapest, including after he was elected the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He was, at the very same time, the director of one of the US institutes studying economic developments in European socialist countries (indeed, something unthinkable in Czechoslovakia). As early as in 1971, Kalinová translated and the University of Economics published Berend's review of the development of Hungary's economy under the title *Socialist Reform of Economy and the Development of Production Assets in Hungary 1945–1970.* Berend's fast-moving academic career culminated in his chairmanship of the World Congress of Historical Sciences in Oslo in 2000.

In 1976, Lenka Kalinová was invited to cooperate as an external expert with a research team of the Department of the National Economy Planning of the University of Economics, which was tasked to analyse the economic situation and to "improve the plan-based management system." Although she had published, by then, many works, participated in the preparation of textbooks for students of the University of Economics (seven titles since 1979), and although she had also mentored and guided those working on their theses, it was not until 1982, despite many previous vain attempts, when she got a job at the University of Economics – under an employment contract renewed every year, for just one third of regular working time, and in the position of an "aid." The works that Lenka Kalinová wrote in those days include the book titled *Máme nedostatek pracovních sil?* [Do We Lack Labour Force?], co-authored a monograph entitled *Hospodářské dějiny evropských socialistických zemí* [The Economic History of European Socialist Countries] and the publication of the name *Dlouhodobé tendence ve vývoji struktury československého hospodářství* [Long-Term Trends in the Development of Czechoslovak Economy]

written together with Václav Průcha.[3] Until 1989, her articles were published in a number of journals and magazines, including *Politická ekonomie* [Political Economy] (eight contributions), *Plánované hospodářství* [Planned Economy], *Demografie* [Demography], *Ekonomika práce* [Economy of Labour], *Práce a mzdy* [Labour and Wages], *Odbory a společnost* [Trade Unions and Society], *Pedagogika* [Pedagogy], and also in foreign languages in *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia.* She often contributed to the *Ekonomické studie Výzkumného ústavu plánování a řízení* [Economic Studies of the Research Institute of Planning and Management]. The institute tasked her with research of selected segments of the social sphere.

One of the paradoxes of the political situation in those days was that editors of publishing houses, such as Svoboda or Horizont, and professional journals and magazines, as well as directors and managers of research institutes, most of whom were members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, did not have any problems to publish Lenka Kalinová's works and to express their support for her, but the Party authorities of the Žižkov district of Prague, which the University of Economics fell under, stubbornly and dogmatically insisted that she could not be employed there, not even in the research section of the university, i.e. outside the teaching process. At the time, Kalinová was externally cooperating with the Department of National Economy Planning of the University of Economics, i.e. after 1976, or after she received the part-time employment contract in 1982, the situation was embarrassing for the Department's personnel, as all of them knew that the "aid" ranked among the best qualified and most productive core members of the Department.

At the turn of the 1980s, the interest of Lenka Kalinová was directed at labour resources, remuneration, level of education and qualification as an economic growth factor, and requirements of scientific and technical progress on labour force. She also examined these issues in the context of international comparison. Following her research taking place during the 1960s, she also continued to study the social structure of society, now with a focus on the professional and qualification structure of technical workers and managers. She published articles on these underestimated issues in Hungary and the Soviet Union, and also on the occasion of the World Congress of Economic History in Belgium.

She characterised her later status as follows: "The general situation was changing somehow during the 1980s. When I was working at the University of Economics, no one really cared about my position there. At the time, there were just a few people studying education and employment issues, so there was a great deal of interest in these topics. When referring to myself and those days, I still use the [Czech] proverb 'In the country of the blind, the one-eyed is a King.' This was why editorial boards of various journals and institutions kept asking me for articles, contributions,

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3   KALINOVÁ, Lenka: *Máme nedostatek pracovních sil?* Praha, Svoboda 1979; PRŮCHA, Václav et al.: *Hospodářské dějiny evropských socialistických zemí.* Praha, Svoboda 1977; PRŮCHA, Václav – KALINOVÁ, Lenka: *Dlouhodobé tendence ve vývoji struktury československého hospodářství* [Long-Term Trends in the Development of the Czechoslovak Economy]. Praha, Horizont 1981.

external examinations, expert opinions and appraisals. For quite a few years, I was an external examiner of research works at the Research Institute of Labour in Bratislava. [...] I was involved in research at other institutions as well – Research Institute of Scientific and Technical Development, research institutes of universities and secondary schools, in a project of the Faculty of Mathematics and Physics ('Modelling in Education'), the Ministry of Education – and also continued to work for the Central Institute of National Economy Research."[4]

After the launch of the economic reform in the mid-1980s, Kalinová was looking for opportunities how to make its social aspect more effective through a contribution of her expertise and knowledge. In 1986 and 1989, respectively, the Svoboda Publishing House included her works, namely *Zaměstnanost, vzdělání a intenzifikace* [Employment, Education and Intensification] and *Lidský potenciál v podmínkách přestavby* [Human Potential under Perestroika Conditions] (co-authored by Václav Sova) in its "Economics and Society" series. In 1989, she contributed chapters on the labour force and tertiary sphere to the monograph *Hospodářský vývoj evropských zemí RVHP po roce 1970* [Economic Development of the European CMEA Countries since 1970].[5] Although her texts were understandably based on and reflected the reality of the pre-November period, they contain numerous recommendations and lessons applicable to later years and, indeed, even to the present.

November 1989 opened broad opportunities for Lenka Kalinová. It was necessary to seek answers to new phenomena accompanying economic transition, for instance the role of social policy in changed circumstances, formation of the labour market, unemployment (including its regional and generational variations), social structure transformations, placement of graduates of professional schools and young people in general in the labour market, etc. In 1991, she transferred to the Institute of Economic Policy of the University of Economics; one year later, she was invited by the Dean's Office of the Faculty of National Economy of the University of Economics to habilitate. In 1992, she thus defended her work *Některé otázky sociální transformace v Československu* [Some Issues of Social Transformation in Czechoslovakia] and was appointed Associate Professor. When the Institute of Economic Policy was closed down, she terminated her employment contract with the University of Economics, but she continued her external cooperation with the Department of Economic History of the University of Economics (renewed in 1990), working on an extensive project of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, "Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1992." Under the leadership of Václav Průcha, the grant-funded project resulted in a two-volume monograph with the same title[6]; apart from shorter contributions on the interwar period for

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4   Historička sociálních dějin odpovídá. In: *K životnímu jubileu Lenky Kalinové*, p. 5.

5   PRŮCHA, Václav – URBAN, Luděk et al.: *Hospodářský vývoj evropských zemí RVHP po roce 1970*. Praha, Svoboda 1989.

6   PRŮCHA, Václav et al.: *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa v letech 1918–1992* [Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1992], Vol. 1: *Období 1918–1945* [The 1918–1945 Period]; Vol. 2: *Období 1945–1992* [The 1945–1992 Period]. Brno, Doplněk 2004 and 2009.

the first volume, she wrote all of the sections devoted to social issues since 1945, including sciences, education, health care, social security, demography and public opinion polls for the second volume.

The year 1990 marked the beginning of long years of cooperation of Lenka Kalinová with the newly established Institute for Contemporary History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, where she was involved in a collective grant-funded project, "On the History of Czech Society after WWII." She specialised in social aspects of the development in the context of a number of political issues, particularly in the 1945–1948 period and the 1960s, analysing the influence of the so-called "normalisation" on the social policy and capturing crucial moments in the history of the trade union movement. Lenka Kalinová's bibliography indicates that she published, in addition to several books, articles in 17 local and three foreign journals and 14 contributions in academic anthologies, half of them abroad – in the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Hungary and in 1990 still in the Soviet Union.

The active participation of Lenka Kalinová in the grant-funded project of the Institute for Contemporary History is illustrated by the fact that the first volume of the Institute's new series of publications, "Czech Society after 1945," was her book *Východiska, očekávání a realita poválečné doby: K dějinám české společnosti v letech 1945–1948* [Departure Points, Expectations and Reality 1945–1948], published in 2004, in which she examined principal features of the social development in the early postwar years of Czechoslovakia. Her analysis of ideological sources of postwar social changes indeed provided interesting information. In addition to John Maynard Keynes, it was primarily on the concept of "social security," presented in the United Kingdom by Sir William Beveridge during the war. The works of both men represented a revolution in economic and social thinking, becoming a turning point in the social welfare state concept and influencing social policies of many countries. Beveridge's theory was reflected in postwar projects of international institutions and government programmes of many countries, including Czechoslovakia.

The above mentioned publication was followed by two more monographs in which Lenka Kalinová summarised results of many years of her theoretical work, capturing fundamental trends of the socio-political development of Czech society between 1945 and 1993 on a qualitatively higher level. These monographs can be regarded as the ultimate culmination of her creative work. Both were published by Prague's Academia Publishing House in 2007 and 2012, respectively, the first one under the title *Společenské proměny v čase socialistického experimentu: K sociálním dějinám v letech 1945–1969* [Social Metamorphoses during the Socialist Experiment: On Social History between 1945 and 1969], the other entitled *Konec nadějím a nová očekávání: K dějinám české společnosti 1969–1993* [Dashed Hopes, New Expectations: On the History of Czech Society between 1969 and 1993].

In the books mentioned above, social development is set into a broader framework of general Czechoslovak and Czech history, as well as into international political and economic context. The authoress had been putting together a mosaic of pieces of knowledge resulting in these mainstay works crowning her systematic research

for a long time. Her synthetic and interdisciplinary approach and her ability to confront social reality with set objectives of social and economic policies were becoming increasingly evident in the books. Her analytical methods also included international comparison of the studied phenomena.

In her *Společenské proměny v čase socialistického experimentu*, Kalinová examines the development of social policies and social reality in Czechoslovakia during the period of almost a quarter of a century after WWII. She analyses the step-by-step transformation of the society from many viewpoints – in terms of political, economic and social objectives of political elites, which were changing over time, changes in the social structure and mobility of the population, in different areas characterising the social status and living standard of people, including the achieved level of education, fluctuations of the public opinion or the role of trade unions.

Since the onset of the reformist movement until 1968, the authoress characterises social consequences and reflections of reform measures and their echoes in society, restoration of sovereignty of social policy and strengthening of the roles of its subjects, including, *inter alia,* plant and company councils and trade unions. The purpose of the proposed and partly also implemented measures was to eliminate the paternalistic orientation of the social welfare state, to reintroduce differences into revenues from work, and to change the structure of revenues flowing from social funds.

The other book, *Konec nadějím a nová očekávání*, was based on an analysis of events which took place in and after 1969. In its first part, the authoress not only describes the "restoration of the old order," but also outlines political, economic, social and international developments until 1989, and sometimes even beyond this date. In so doing, she mentions the fact that symptoms of a crisis were visible both in countries of the Socialist Bloc and in developed capitalist states at the turn of the 1970s. In Czechoslovakia, however, the attempted reform, which was supposed to resolve the crisis in a systematic manner, was stopped by an outside intervention, with the "normalisation" policy rendering the republic's smooth involvement in new civilisation processes, which were just starting in Western countries at that time, impossible.

Due to their chronology, a similar structure and a similar method of preparation, the two monographs provide a plastic picture of almost half a century of social development of Czechoslovakia, or the Czech Lands, including an overlap of sorts into the 1990s. An analysis of a number of factors participating in the formation of the status of different social layers, such as the level and structure of their revenues and expenditures, social security, personal and so-called social consumption, style of living, including how free time was spent, reflections on political events in different social layers and age groups, opposition movements, trade unions or the ruling Communist Party, deepens the knowledge of the social development and contributes to its better understanding. In addition to the text parts, the monographs in question contain numerical data presented in tables adapted or taken over from statistical yearbooks, international statistics, departmental publications, one-off micro-censi and other surveys.

Just like in her previous research projects and particularly in her last synthesising texts, the authoress accentuated a comparison with the world in all stages of the evolution of the social welfare state, from the initial upswing to present attempts at its theoretical and practical destruction at the time of growing globalisation and the worldwide financial crisis.

Lenka Kalinová's bibliography prepared in 2009 by herself contains 130 published titles and 61 unpublished research studies, expert opinions, etc., including 13 publications and eight expert opinions abroad. The list includes six books, seven co-authored books and seven university textbooks, some of them also co-authored. Most of the published works are articles in academic journals and magazines, publications from research centres, contributions to collective works and almanacs, and printed presentations delivered at different academic events both at home and abroad.

Apart from her academic contribution – which is unfortunately now a legacy – there was also Lenka Kalinová's personality and qualities appreciated by all of those who knew her more closely. Since her youth, she had a strong desire for learning and knowledge, accompanied by industriousness, purpose of mind, dutifulness, zeal for academic work and research and a reliable performance of tasks entrusted to her. If there were any shifts in her opinions on and assessments of certain phenomena or processes, their reasons were never circumstantial, but always based on deeper knowledge of the matter in question. She was willing to accept tasks even in situations when it was not clear how she would be remunerated for them, and more than once risking that she might not receive any financial reward at all. She was open to critical comments and almost too self-critical about the results of her own work. Especially her modesty and friendly attitude toward people need to be highlighted. At the same time, she had to struggle all her life with problems caused by her poor health, but her interest in social developments did not leave her even in the most difficult moments of hospital treatment, and she never stopped making plans for future creative work. This was obvious from the conversations we had in hospital corridors and during my last visit in her apartment a few days before she passed away.

Throughout her life, she could rely on her husband's support in every possible way and the respect of her two children whom she guided toward being responsible for their lives and professionally demanding toward themselves in their respective professions, economics and medicine.

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The importance and qualities of Lenka Kalinová were fittingly characterised by Michal Pullman, the Director of the Institute of Economic and Social History of the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, in his eulogy delivered in the funeral hall of Motol Crematorium on 2 July 2015, when he said, *inter alia*:

"Lenka Kalinová ranked among very prominent personalities of historical research. She always belonged to historians who formulated their own opinions and

had an unmistakable style; yet, she was – and this was what I appreciated very much – open to various suggestions and particularly to different interpretations. I will refrain from naming all aspects and motives she brought into social history – issues of social stratification, demographic analyses or economic processes. We now find, more and more often, that our today's questions and queries were a natural part of her world of thoughts. And that her work ranks among our most valuable possessions. […]

I could mention facts and data capturing her life and work. However, I prefer to emphasise the intrinsic truthfulness of her work – which is sometimes called the 'spirit of work.' As a matter of fact, Lenka Kalinová, even when using the most demanding academic and research techniques and methods, always took into account the motive which is difficult to prove by academic evidence, but without which even science would not pass muster – the importance of justice and search for human happiness.

I remember how I was listening, holding my breath, to rigmaroles of her life experiences from wartime Budapest, studies at the Faculty of Arts in the 1950s, or work on social stratification issues in 1960s. It was exactly her life story I saw as an explanation of her emphasis on the search of human happiness which cannot be pigeonholed into categories such as cooperation with the regime or opposition, trust in ideology or lack thereof, fear or enthusiasm, conformity or dissent. People in the past were not bearers of some enteral truths and categories, but they were indeed looking for their happiness – sometimes making mistakes, sometimes with unexpected results.

The high sensitivity of Lenka Kalinová toward the most important questions of human life and ambiguity of decisions was also reflected in her personal attitude – always was lively and full of energy, but also tolerant, hard-working and kind, she had her concepts well-arranged, but never too tight or sterilely encapsulated. She avoided praise and recognition – claiming that she was not perfect.

These qualities – ability to admit her imperfection and sensitivity toward the complexity of human fates in the past – were another reason why I respected her so much. If we managed to combine academic efforts of today with the amount of truthfulness of thoughts and human genuineness, especially with the emphasis on justice as something which is not a random individual choice, but a commitment for us all, as Lenka Kalinová did in the past, perhaps we would be able to speak as insistently and pleadingly as Lenka Kalinová used to speak to us.

We will all miss Lenka Kalinová very much."

The Czech version of this article, entitled Devadesát let plodného života Lenky Kalinové (1924–2014), *was originally published in* Soudobé dějiny, *Vol. 21, No. 3 (2014), pp. 474–482.*

Prague Chronicle

Re-thinking the Revolution

Petr Kužel

Last autumn, a quarter of a century has elapsed since 1989, which was an important milestone in the development of Central and Eastern Europe. On this occasion, the Department of Late- and Post-Socialism of the Institute for Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and the Department for the Study of Modern Czech Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic organised an international conference entitled *1989: Thinking Revolution in East-Central Europe.*

The symposium was held in Villa Lanna in Prague's neighbourhood of Bubeneč and was intended to open new and unconventional views on the fall of "real socialist" regimes, to provide space for an interdisciplinary debate of political scientists, historians, philosophers, economists or sociologists both from the Czech Republic and from abroad, and, last but not least, to critically assess not only the events of 1989 and the subsequent developments, but also the theoretical concepts through which they are theoretically reflected nowadays.

Apart from describing the historical context itself, the participants strove to historicise theoretical concepts that deal with it, placing them in a historical setting and their own evolution. The use of a certain theoretical apparatus always carries a risk of some facts being suppressed or omitted, while others, on the other hand, being overemphasised. The reflection of theoretical concepts and analysis of their deficiencies, thus, are not an end in itself – their purpose is to provide a better

insight into the events. Since the empirical mapping of what took place in 1989 can already be regarded adequate, it is now the question of its interpretation which indeed comes to the forefront. The *1989: Thinking Revolution in East-Central Europe* conference was therefore expected to provide space for additional interpretations and to reveal new connections and contexts. At the same time, the high number of international participants provided a representative picture of how the year 1989 and the subsequent developments toward liberal democracy are perceived outside the countries in which these changes actually occurred. There were five thematic panels with experts analysing topics related not only to social changes that were happening in those days, but also to present society.

The participants of the first panel were asking questions about the character of the 1989 revolution and subsequent changes; more specifically, what their intended purpose had been in the minds of people taking part in them. The topics discussed thus included, *inter alia*, the importance of liberalism and neoliberalism and the role of these doctrines in the transformation process. The topic was elaborated by Jan Drahokoupil (European Trade Union Institute, Belgium; a Czech translation of the book he wrote together with Martin Myant, *Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, was published only a short while before the conference was held), who analysed problems of a specific implementation of the global political strategy based on the so-called Washington Consensus in real politics. Furthermore, he examined consequences of the implementation in countries of the former Eastern Bloc.

In her contribution rather provocatively titled *1989 as a Thwarted Transition to Socialism,* American sociologist Johanna Bockman (George Mason University, USA) presented the debate of neoclassical economists about the possibility of transforming a centrally-planned command economy into a certain form of "decentralised market socialism" as an alternative to privatisation and capitalism. She presented convincing evidence that neoclassical economists did not consider strange the idea of a market-based, but at the same time non-capitalist economy; she further argued that neoclassical economics had not equalled the notions of "market" and "capitalism" at that time. The confusion of terms, and hence the withdrawal of developmental opportunities, occurred only later. The two mentioned presentations were supplemented by interventions of sociologist Tereza Stöckelová (Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), who described (and questioned the validity of) some sociological statistical data illustrating public opinion at the end of 1989, and of Slovenian historian Luka L. Gabrielčič (CEU, Budapest), and Czech lawyer Jan Komárek (London School of Economics, United Kingdom), both of whom likewise presented interesting comments.

The second panel dealt with the role and importance of dissidence and post-dissidence and presented an analysis of the political and ideological base of a dominant part of its members. The topic of liberalism and an analysis of the thinking of the dissident political ideas were productively combined in the contribution of Michal Kopeček (Institute for Contemporary History) who analysed the role and content of the thinking of the dissidents in those times leading to the post-November 1989

developments. In addition, Kopeček was likewise interested in factors which had enabled the turn from revolution to democracy, self-governing society, civic involvement and development of a civil society toward liberal hegemony emphasising privatisation and "a market without attributes" in the early 1990s. His contribution primarily followed a genetic line in the development of the dissidents thought, which was closely tied to legalism and the rule of law, showing how many of them had gradually accepted the liberal worldview, although they had scarcely regarded themselves as liberals in 1989.

Other presentations, too, dealt with the question of how the future had been conceptualised after the collapse of the "Eastern Bloc," when according to Francis Fukuyama the "end of history" should have supervened. However, the discussion also touched on how the discourse and subject matter of the research of the so-called Eastern Bloc countries had been changing in 1989; the issue was examined by German historian Dieter Segert (University of Vienna). He analysed the influence of current politics on research in the field of social sciences and especially of the so-called Research of the East (*Ostforschung*). He devoted his presentation primarily to the West German research into the former German Democratic Republic.

Questions about the character of the previous regime comprised yet another part of the symposium. Hillel Ticktin (University of Glasgow), for example, analysed some discrepancies of the Soviet system while also arguing that Soviet-type societies should not be labelled as socialist in any sense. He rejected the possibility of a long-term existence of so-called "market socialism" (the topic mentioned the previous day of the conference), arguing that the notions "market" and "socialism" were mutually incompatible and that "market socialism" was an antagonistic economic form which could only incline either toward socialism or toward the market in the long run. Ticktin also mentioned the importance of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc countries, which had helped delay the onset of the economic crisis.

Ticktin's contribution was followed by a presentation of a Russian sociologist and dissident of both the Soviet and the post-Soviet era, Boris Kagarlitsky, who emphasised the contradictory nature of revolutions, including, *inter alia,* a provocative comparison of the events of 1989 with the so-called "colour revolutions" and with the events taking place in Ukraine at the moment.

The final panel dealt with the second life of the Prague Spring of 1968 and its legacy in 1989; indeed, it mapped efforts in 1989 to make a sort of a return prior to 21 August 1968 and to "complete" the project known as "socialism with a human face." The topic was covered by Alessandro Catalano, James Krapfl, Kacper Szulecki, Juraj Marušiak, and Tomáš Zahradníček.

Italian specialist in Czech studies Alessandro Catalano (University of Padua) analysed the significance of the legacy of the Prague Spring for Communists expelled from the Party after 1969. In particular, he focused on the question to what extent the legacy had been influencing political efforts that were defined as opposite to the then existing regime of "real socialism." Catalano highlighted a somewhat paradoxical situation: socialist opposition forces were gradually losing their importance while, on the other hand, there had still been a strong demand for the

Prague Spring legacy from different European Communist Parties. Catalano also reflected the step-by-step abandonment of the ex-Communists' strategy to initiate reforms by collective pressure of major European left-wing forces on leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and its replacement by a strategy of pressure "from below" and away from the socialist perspective.

Using public opinion analyses of November, December and January 1989–1990, American historian J. Krapfl (McGill University, Canada) explained preferences of the population prevailing in those days. He mapped the developments and analysed the causes of the step-by-step departure on the part of the people from a "third way" between Western-style capitalism and state socialism and their shift to Václav Klaus's "market without attributes."

The interest demonstrated by international guests and the inspiring discussion have shown that the topic of democratic revolutions of 1989 is far from being closed. Indeed, it keeps prompting provocative questions. However, the discussion has also revealed that theoreticians from abroad are interested not only in the year 1989, but also in the events of 1968, which represented an attempt for an alternative to both the non-democratic central dirigisme and liberal capitalism, thus bringing new political ideas and a political emancipation project. In this respect, the topic still draws a lot of interest in the West, as confirmed, for instance, by Catalano. However, as indicated by a recent visit of French philosopher Alain Badiou in the Czech Republic, who made a presentation at another conference held in Prague at the end of October 2014, the issues connected to the events of 1968 and 1989 are important not just as historical events, but also as a potential source of inspiration in the search for alternatives in today's world.

The Czech version of this article, entitled Promýšlení revoluce z roku 1989*, was origi-nally published in* Akademický bulletin *[Academic bulletin], Vol. 25, No. 11 (2014).*

Review

Křesťan's Nejedlý (With a Small Addition)

Petr Čornej

KŘESŤAN, Jiří: *Zdeněk Nejedlý: Politik a vědec v osamění* [Zdeněk Nejedlý: A Politician and Scientist in Solitude]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka – Národní archiv 2012, 569 pp.

It has taken a long time, but the Czech audience has finally got at its disposal an extensive, and also a brilliantly written, monograph dealing with an important personality from the Czech cultural, academic and political life of the 20th century, who was controversial in many respects, but definitely not to be overlooked. I dare to say that this work of Jiří Křesťan is the most detailed, most extensive, most factually reliable and unquestionably the best biography of Zdeněk Nejedlý ever written. This positive assessment is not based only on the qualities of the author, who has been known as an excellent historian and a very good stylist for the last two decades, but also on objective facts. Křesťan has made use not only of Nejedlý's huge documentary estate, but also of the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and other funds until recently unavailable; moreover, he likewise visited Russian archives, "locked up" until a short time ago, and on top of that also one German archive. His heuristics are thus almost exhaustive, which means that new discoveries, if any, can be expected only in the archives of the Soviet security services, if ever declassified. Documents from more than 30 archives (including, for instance, photographs from the Czech National Film Archives), hundreds of perused books, his perfect knowledge of period journalism, and exemplary

use of the *oral history* method, so widespread today, speak for themselves. In this respect, I cannot have even the slightest critical comment and all I can do is to bow to the author and silently regret I did not create something similar myself, although I had once thought about it.

Křesťan's text, furnished with an impressive footnote apparatus evoking nostalgia for the customary academic and scientific practices of bygone times, is basically arranged chronologically. The thematic segmentation (which revolves roughly around a public-and-political-activities and private-matters axis) is used to "rhythmise" seven chapters of the book, ingeniously dividing Nejedlý's *curriculum vitae* into periods. The division is remarkably similar to St. Augustine's view of different periods of human life (infancy, boyhood, adolescence, youth, maturity, old age, and demise), which is not surprising, as laws of biology are simply unchangeable. Křesťan uses the basic structure as of a skeleton which he fleshes out with layers of information so captivatingly that Nejedlý's personality is presented to the reader in all its plasticity, including its psychic dimension.

The researcher's conscientious and thorough approach logically paid off. Many myths still enshrouding Zdeněk Nejedlý's collapse under meticulously collected and analysed sources. It is with gusto that I note five long-lived and persistent errors which the author proves false and whose destruction may surprise a less knowledgeable reader, but not the academic community to which most of these facts have been known for about 30 years. A frequently cited letter of Antonín Dvořák's son finally confronts the rumour claiming that Nejedlý denigrated the work of the renowned composer only because Dvořák had rejected him when he had asked for his daughter Otilka's hand in marriage to the realm of fabrications for good.[1] Perhaps even more surprising is the finding that Nejedlý disagreed with the notorious School Act adopted in 1953, refused to sign it (the act was signed later by Ernest Sýkora, Nejedlý's successor as Minister of Education), and was removed from the position of Minister of Education, Sciences and Arts as a result. However, he did not dare to openly resist Gottwald and the Soviet officials who were promoting the absurd reduction of school attendance for the sake of increased production capacities. He was disciplined – to the extent that, although aware of the impending monetary reform, he left all his cash in a drawer, thus driving all the members of his family crazy. Křesťan does not mention this episode, which I learnt from Nejedlý's daughter Zdenka Nedvědová-Nejedlá. I know from the same source that Nejedlý, upon receiving his portrait by Max Švabinský, which showed him as an old man at his grave, did not say "so he did take revenge on me," but appreciated the work of the great master very highly. It was actually his daughter who did not like the portrait and who kept needling her father against the famous

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1   For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the first researcher drawing attention to the key letter addressed by Antonín Dvořák's son Otakar to Zdeněk Nejedlý on 7 January 1961 was Dagmar Mocná. (See *Masarykův ústav a Archiv Akademie věd ČR* [Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic], Fund Zdeněk Nejedlý, Personal Correspondence, Box No. 10.)

painter.[2] The third myth was created by Václav Černý, who claimed that Nejedlý had become a radical socialist hardliner because Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk had not offered him an adequate position in the state administration or politics.[3] It is an opinion which has been repeated several times in good faith by historian Josef Hanzal and to which I myself once succumbed. According to Křesťan, however, Nejedlý did receive some offers from Masaryk, but did not react to them. Yet, I believe that Masaryk would have hardly accepted his former disciple at the time of the "building of the state." Nejedlý's radical opinions (Suk's affair, Kramář case) were adding fuel to the fire, while the head of state logically preferred that the situation be calmed down. Křesťan can also be credited with the fall of another long-lived (especially thanks to the Communists) rumour saying that Nejedlý had already joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1921 or 1929; as a matter of fact, he did so only in 1939 and did so in Moscow. Similarly, the vindication of Nejedlý in the case of Václav Talich, who was arrested for suspected collaboration with the Germans, is also very convincing, and there is hardly anyone who could make Křesťan's arguments look doubtful.[4]

However, there is also a reverse side to the destruction of age-old myths and legends. Trying to be as objective as possible, which is of course laudable, Křesťan sometimes idealises his hero too much. This concerns mainly Nejedlý's attitude to Antonín Dvořák and Leoš Janáček, whose works were incessantly criticised by the temperamental professor, who rarely found words of praise for their music, and when he did, then mainly for tactical reasons. Jaroslav Jiránek, the biographer of his son Vít Nejedlý and a prominent Czech musicologist, once related to me how old Nejedlý, since 1956 disoriented by the condemnation of the so-called personality cult, had repeatedly expressed himself roughly as follows: "I think that the future will prove I was right when praising Stalin, Masaryk and Jirásek and criticising Dvořák and Janáček." The negative attitude to Dvořák and Janáček was probably rooted in Nejedlý's soul deeper than Křesťan believes. However, I am not a musicologist, so please bear that in mind when interpreting my statements.

The author justifies his efforts to understand Nejedlý and to penetrate Nejedlý's inner world by the hermeneutical principle of "pre-understanding." However, he has sometimes gone too far, at least in my opinion. The *Vorverständnis* thus

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2   See also KŘESŤAN, Jiří: "Když je třeba, jde se i přes mrtvoly." Zdeněk Nejedlý v denících Jaroslava Kojzara. ["You Have to Play Hardball, If Necessary." Zdeněk Nejedlý in the Diaries of Jaroslav Kojzar]. In: *Acta historica Univeristatis Silesianae Opaviensis,* Vol. 4 (2011), pp. 253–286, here pp. 268–269.

3   See ČERNÝ, Václav: *Paměti* [Memoirs], Vol. 1: *1921–1938.* Brno, Atlantis 1994, p. 91.

4   For details see KŘESŤAN, Jiří: Srdce Václava Talicha se ztratilo: K problému národní očisty (1. část) [Václav Talich Has Lost Heart: On the Purging of the Nation (Part 1)]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 69–111; Srdce Václava Talicha se ztratilo: K problému národní očisty (2. část) [Part 2]. In: *Ibid.*, No. 2–3 (2009), pp. 243–275. The work has also been recently published as a book. See KŘESŤAN, Jiří: *Případ Václava Talicha. K problému národní očisty a českého heroismu* [The Case of Václav Talich. On the Issue of the Purging of the Nation and Czech Heroism]. Praha, Akropolis 2014.

occasionally changes into too much understanding, which applies particularly to the chapters dealing with the interwar period. I believe that Nejedlý stood more to the Left and closer to the Communists than Křesťan's text indicates. I will permit myself yet another comment concerning the hermeneutical method. As early as the first chapter of his book, the author refers to the opinion of Jindřich Růžička, ex-archivist of the town of Litomyšl, who doubted whether Nejedlý could be explained by depth psychology. Just like Křesťan, I believe we should not renounce this option. As a matter of fact, even the protagonist of the extensive monograph preferred intuitivism as a scientific method between 1909 and 1918; it is true that the intuitivism had nothing in common with Freud's teachings and was instead based on the spiritual scientific school (whose influence on Czech humanists – e.g. Max Dvořák, F. X. Šalda, Arne Novák, Vlastimil Kybal, Josef Šusta – was extraordinarily strong), but Nejedlý would not have accepted the influential trend if he had not tested the strength of its principles on himself. Křesťan himself shows an aptitude for depth psychology in other places, when analysing Nejedlý's relations with his wife, platonic loves, mistresses and admirers with a noblesse that makes these parts of the book the ultimate reading experience.

   If anyone reading my contemplations acquires the impression that I am arguing with Křesťan on these lines, then he or she is indeed mistaken. While I see Nejedlý in a somewhat different light and I would have applied colours in somewhat different shades, I respect the author's opinion. Křesťan (in line with his research orientation) is primarily interested in Nejedlý as a citizen and a politician; he is excellent when reconstructing Nejedlý's "rigmaroles" in life and his mental world, but he surprisingly leaves aside, almost completely, Nejedlý as scientist. Analyses of Nejedlý's historical and musicological works, including large monographs on the Hussite song, Smetana, Masaryk, Lenin and Litomyšl, are unusually brief (and the same applies to the participation of the natural-born polemicist in the dispute on the meaning of Czech history), resigning to capturing Nejedlý's place in Czech (but also European) historiography and musical science. Curiously enough, the author does not come to terms with a thesis voiced a long time ago, namely that Nejedlý was, first and foremost, a cultural historian and all his academic works reflect this fact. Perhaps Křesťan does not feel as strong in the history and theory of historiography as he does when monitoring political problems or dealing with personality aspects. I thus feel compelled to dwell on these issues for some time in an excursus which will inevitably be incomplete and incomprehensive.

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Although Nejedlý is often labelled a late revivalist relic, the label does not apply to the longer part of his academic career. As early as in the 1960s, František Červinka and Jaromír Dvořák correctly noted that the young man's opinions had been formed at the turn of the 20th century, in the cauldron of disputes between the

revivalist legacy and modern scientific and artistic trends.[5] Whether emphasising the necessity of an objective cognisance of reality or stressing the irreplaceable role of the subjective contribution of a great creative individual, they were invariably in conflict with revivalist values and views. Nejedlý dealt with the discrepancy in his own way. He used arguments of modern science to defend traditional Czech cultural and historical values, stabilised and canonised in the 19th century, not hesitating to combine seemingly incompatible principles, namely the empirico-critical approach with neo-Romanticism and spiritual science orientation. This was indeed how he interpreted and defended the Hussite movement, Bedřich Smetana or Alois Jirásek as early as the very beginning of the 20th century. Of a downright demonstrative nature was his siding with the opponents of the authenticity of the Manuscripts of Dvůr Králové and of Zelená Hora, in particular his contribution that appeared in the collection published on the occasion of the 60th birthday of historian Jaroslav Goll.[6] He thus made it plain that he was on the same side as his other favourite teachers, especially Otakar Hostinský and T. G. Masaryk. On other occasions, however, this did not prevent him from siding, with the same vehemence, with the nationalist conservative group of the so-called *museychiks* who were holding a protective hand over him and who also arranged his first job in the archives of the then Museum of the Kingdom of Bohemia. Nevertheless, I would not dare to draw an exact line between heartfelt admiration of renowned personalities and the utilitarian calculation of a scientist-beginner patiently, literally one tiny step after another, building the university career that he was dreaming of. His strictly rational acts were also demonstrated by his decision to habilitate as Associate Professor of musical science, but only after his hopes of Associate Professorship of (cultural or ecclesiastical) history or aesthetics had not proven very realistic.

Nejedlý's perception of musicology and, after all, also aesthetics reflected his natural historicism. He basically regarded musicology and aesthetics as historical sciences, as he perceived music, and indeed all works of art, as an integral part of history, fully in line with the credo of the cultural historians of those days (but also of Jaroslav Goll) that there was just one history, just as there was just one life. This was also why he was later displeased with, *inter alia,* the separation of the history of the workers' movement from general history. The cultural history approach, perceiving history as an organic whole consisting of interrelated components, permitted Nejedlý to overarch his broad research interests and to overcome the dichotomy between science and arts. However, his concept was not static, but

5 ČERVINKA, František: *Zdeněk Nejedlý.* Praha, Melantrich 1969, pp. 27–157; DVOŘÁK, Jaromír: *Zdeněk Nejedlý 1878–1938 a nová česká literatura* [Zdeněk Nejedlý 1878–1938 and New Czech Literature]. Olomouc, Filozofická fakulty Univerzity Palackého [Faculty of Arts of Palacký University] 1969.

6 NEJEDLÝ, Zdeněk: Kotle a lesní rohy [Kettledrums and French Horns]. In: BIDLO, Jaroslav – FRIEDRICH, Gustav – KROFTA, Kamil (ed.): *Sborník prací historických k šedesátým narozeninám dvor. rady prof. dra Jaroslava Golla vydali jeho žáci* [A Collection of Historical Works Published on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Birthday of Court Councillor Professor Dr. Jaroslav Goll by His Students]. Praha, Hitorický klub 1906, pp. 380–388.

internally extremely dynamic. Since his appearance on the academic stage, Nejedlý saw history as a perpetual contention of opposite principles, especially of the old and the new, or of obsolete and new elements, which he believed to be a guarantee of progress. He remained more or less faithful to the concept throughout his life, although he continuously modified his notional (and ideological) veneer.

The initial phase of Nejedlý's academic career, roughly between 1900 and 1909, was characterised by a combination of the empirico-critical method relying on extensive heuristics and a factographic description with the spiritual research stimuli of Wilhelm Dilthey, especially with the thesis that the ideological structure of a specific historical (and *eo ipso* cultural) period was best learnt through a prominent personality co-forming and expressing its character. This was why Nejedlý stressed the biographical genre so much, in which the main character was the key to a broadly defined historical epoch and also a building stone of canonical lines of prominent personalities, no matter whether representing the birth, climax and end of the Hussite movement (Jan Hus – Jacob of Mies – Jan Želivský – Jan Rokycana and also Václav Koranda Jr.), Czech musical culture (Bedřich Smetana – Zdeněk Fibich – Otakar Ostrčil) or belles-lettres (Josef Kajetán Tyl – Božena Němcová – Alois Jirásek). Having leaned to the radical socialist Left, he constructed a similar picture of political trends in the 19ᵗʰ and the first half of the 20ᵗʰ century (Palacký – Masaryk – Lenin), ultimately resulting in a propagandistic explication describing Communists as the heirs of great national traditions. It already reflected Lenin's and Zhdanov's axioms on progressive (popular) and reactionary (bankrupt) cultures.

The first phase of Nejedlý's academic career ended in 1909, when he finished the voluminous *Dějiny husitského zpěvu za válek husitských* [History of the Hussite Song during the Hussite Wars], published as late as 1913 and submitted in support of his full professorship.[7] He even intensified his spiritual research orientation in the following decade, when – influenced by the academic and research climate and friendly relations with František Xaver Šalda and Vlastimil Kybal – he became infatuated with the then popular intuitivism. The concept that a researcher in the humanities could achieve the most convincing results in the same way as an artist and that science and art mutually intertwined and complemented each other was a typical anti-positivist reaction, fully resonating with Nejedlý's orientation. The method of empathy, i.e. of a deep submersion into the psyche and work of an exceptional personality, was close to him (his invariable topics were personalities he resonated with), as close as the uncovering of the spiritual coordinates of cultural epochs. The research process and particularly its interpretation component were thus becoming a creative, indeed an artistic, act. Nejedlý's uncompleted monograph on Richard Wagner[8] or treatises such as "Krize estetiky" [Crisis of Aesthetics],[9]

7 NEJEDLÝ, Zdeněk: *Dějiny husitského zpěvu za válek husitských*. Praha, Jubilejní fond Král. České společnosti nauk [The Jubilee Fund of the Royal Czech Academy of Sciences] 1913.

8 IDEM: *Richard Wagner*, Vol. 1: *Richard Wagner romantik. 1813–1848.* [Richard Wagner Romanticist. 1813–1848]. Praha, Melantrich 1916.

9 IDEM: Krize estetiky. In: *Česká kultura*, Vol. 1 (1912/1913), pp. 19–23, 42–47 and 76–78.

"Wagnerismus Terézy Novákové: K české premiéře Tristana" [Wagnerism of Teréza Nováková: On the Czech Premiere of Tristan][10] and "Nietzscheova tragédie" [Nietzsche's Tragedy][11] manifestly professed intuitivism and principles of combining science and art.

The remarkable essay *Spor o smysl českých dějin* [The Dispute over the Meaning of Czech History], which was Nejedlý's contribution to the well-known discussion, grows from the same background.[12] It does not make sense to repeat here what has been common knowledge for decades. I will just summarise that the author of the captivating essay took a mediating position between T. G. Masaryk and Jaroslav Goll, speaking in favour of the usefulness of the philosophy of history, but rejecting Masaryk's proposition suggesting that the National Revival followed from the humanitarian ideals of the Czech Reformation as an ahistorical construct. Nejedlý's interpretations of the key epochs of Czech history look fresh and novel even after all these years. It does not apply as much to the Hussite movement (which the author saw as the most beautiful moral blossom of the Middle Ages)[13] as it does to subsequent periods. For example, Nejedlý spoke highly of 16th-century Catholicism which, in his opinion, "undertook such a thorough reorganisation of itself that one cannot help but admire it."[14] He pointed to the indefensibility of deep-rooted stereotypes about the utter decline of the Czech nation, all the blood of which had been sucked by the "black flocks of foreigners and Jesuits"[15] after the Battle of the White Mountain; he praised Czech Baroque art ("our art culture in those days was never better, before or after")[16]; and he proclaimed the National Revival a progressive phenomenon, because it had surpassed the religious meaning of Czech history produced by the Counter-Reformation and opened new, in fact secular, horizons to the Czech man.[17] As a matter of fact, his opinion (as well as his frequent references to Jaroslav Goll and his disciples, especially Josef Pekař) did not please the "Masaryk sect" very much.

There exist different answers to the question as to why Nejedlý showed, on the eve of the Great War, so much sympathy for the Hussite movement, which he regarded as an integral part of the Middle Ages, and, at the same time, for reformed Catholicism of the 16th century and Baroque art. Personally, I believe that, in this particular case, his research and academic interest in periods representing historical progress (the Hussite movement, National Revival) were combined with the then existing enthusiasm of researchers of a spiritual science orientation for cultural epochs characterised by passionate emotionality (Gothic, Baroque, Romanticism).

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10 IDEM: Wagnerismus Terézy Novákové: K české premiéře Tristana. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 461–466 and 496–499.
11 IDEM: Nietzscheova tragédie. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 641–644, 680–685, 714–722 and 733–748.
12 IDEM: *Spor o smysl českých dějin*. Praha, Pokroková revue 1914.
13 *Ibid.*, p. 33 n.
14 *Ibid.*, p. 52.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 57.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 61.
17 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

This was, of course, also a manifestation of distaste toward plain scientism (in particular positivism), unacceptably reducing the role of the human subject, and particularly of creative individuals.

In Nejedlý's case, his presence in the camp of the anti-positivist activists looks rather paradoxical. As a matter of fact, his extensive works about the history of the pre-Hussite and Hussite song, his book dedicated to the medieval history of his hometown, Litomyšl, as well as his later uncompleted monographs on Bedřich Smetana and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, reveal a close genetic link with empirico-critical historiography. I even daresay that the combination of the specific variety of positivism with a descriptive culturo-historical, Winter- and Zíbrt-like approach was their unquestionable strength (as a matter of fact, they contained every bit of information, even the tiniest), but also – and even more – their curse. While empirico-critical principles accentuating careful heuristics and the no less careful criticism of sources could be applied, with some success, in studies of ancient and medieval subjects, their application inevitably failed when research efforts were focused on more recent historical periods with the mass of documentary and other sources whose full command is impossible even in the computer age. However, there were also other reasons why Nejedlý, a trained medievalist, did not bring his projects to a successful conclusion. Although his heuristics were in many cases (the Hussite song, Smetana) basically complete, the completeness was the very reason why the topic stopped interesting him. He learnt what he needed or wished to learn, the time-consuming final processing of collected data did not appeal to him, and more important (in his view) tasks had arisen in the meantime. It must be added that Nejedlý was not the only historian having a problem with the relation of academic and narrative component in his historiographic work. Even excellent contemporaries of his generation were struggling with the issue, as shown by Šusta's *Dvě knihy českých dějin* [Two Books of Czech History][18] or Pekař's *Kniha o Kosti* [The Book on Kost][19] (with the third volume which got out of control and was published only posthumously), and even more by his book on Žižka, already affected by his noetic scepticism (suppressed, but still obvious).[20] Symptomatically enough, Nejedlý's only larger and completed work written during the interwar period was thus a book on

18 ŠUSTA, Josef: *Dvě knihy českých dějin: Kniha první. Poslední Přemyslovci a jejich dědictví* [Two Books of Czech History: Book One. The Last Přemyslides and Their Heritage]. Praha, Česká akademie císaře Františka Josefa pro vědy, slovesnost a umění [Emperor Franz Josef Czech Academy for Science, Literature and Arts] 1917; *Kniha druhá. Počátky lucemburské 1308–1320* [Book Two. The Early Luxembourgs 1308–1320]. Praha, Česká akademie věd a umění [Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts] 1919.

19 PEKAŘ, Josef: *Kniha o Kosti. Kus české historie* [The Book on Kost. A Piece of Czech History], Vols. 1 and 2. Praha, self-published 1909 and 1911.

20 IDEM: *Žižka a jeho doba* [Žižka and His Time], Vol. 1: *Doba se zvláštním zřetelem k Táboru* [The Period with a Specific Focus on the Town of Tábor]; Vol. 2: *Jan Žižka*; Vol. 3: *Žižka vůdce revoluce* [Žižka, the Revolutionary Leader]; Vol. 4: *Poznámky k dílu třetímu. Opravy a dodatky – Příloha. Rejstříky* [Comments on Volume Three. Corrections and Amendments – Annex. Indexes]. Praha, Vesmír 1927, 1928, 1930 and 1933.

the thousand year history of the town of Litomyšl, addressed to a broader audience and intentionally without any footnote apparatus.[21]

This was already at the time when Nejedlý was ostentatiously professing radical socialism and dramatically manifesting his need to lean on a strong and unquestionable system of values which neither an individual nor a nation could succeed without and which offered a guarantee of historical progress. The desire to be controlled by timeless and supra-personal truths and ideals, to follow great examples, and to ultimately become one of them had been present in Nejedlý since his adolescence. This was why he asked, all the more so, that the young Czechoslovak state be governed by a comprehensible and ideologically anchored programme. The liberalism which, in his view, relativized the timeless truths and values was unacceptable to him. This too was one of the reasons why he was gradually converging toward the Communist movement. This is perhaps a more fitting description than speaking of Nejedlý's communion with Marxism, whose accentuation of economic issues was a long way from the fundamental priorities of the left-wing professor. Being a part of the political Left also meant a *de facto* parting with Goll's school, although Nejedlý still considered himself a member and maintained proper relations with most of its other members.

However, insofar as his academic work was concerned, the change of Nejedlý's political orientation was fully manifested only in the final quarter of his life influenced by his membership of the Communist Party, his stay in the Soviet Union, his official position and – why not admit it – the obvious deterioration of his mental capabilities. Yet Nejedlý kept writing about history almost until his very death. I will now intentionally skip his extensive, mostly purposive journalism and instead dwell on two works which unfortunately have not attracted enough attention. The first of them was the incomplete (and inferior) *Dějiny národa českého* [History of the Czech Nation],[22] the second one a set of afterwords to selected works of Alois Jirásek published under the summarising name *Doslovy k souboru spisů Aloise Jiráska "Odkaz národu"* [Afterword to the Collection of the Works of Alois Jirásek "Legacy to the Nation"].[23] What was really significant for Nejedlý's true mind set and way of thinking was the frequency and definition of the term *nation*, which unquestionably referred to roots embedded in the 19th century. After all, the title of his attempt to capture Czech history was inspired by Palacký, including Nejedlý's intention to write the history of the Czech nation, not of Bohemia or Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's history made sense to him only since the autumn of 1918. The interesting thing about Nejedlý's *Dějiny národa českého*, often ridiculed for dilettantish

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21 NEJEDLÝ, Zdeněk: *Litomyšl. Tisíc let života českého města* [Litomyšl. A Thousand Years of the Life of a Czech Town]. Litomyšl, Výstavní výbor města Litomyšle [Exhibition Committee of the Town of Litomyšl] 1934.

22 IDEM: *Dějiny národa českého*, Vol. 1: *Starověk* [Ancient Times]. Praha, Svoboda 1949; Vol. 2: *Raný středověk* [Early Middle Ages]. Praha, Státní nakladatelství politické literatury [State Publishing House of Political Literature] 1955.

23 IDEM: *Doslovy k souboru spisů Aloise Jiráska "Odkaz národu."* Praha, Státní nakladatelství politické literatury 1960.

excursions into the realm of archaeology, is not its academic merit (which was equal to zero even as the book was completed), but the capture of the topic, obvious from the work's periodisation. In this respect, too, Nejedlý was coming back to Palacký, convinced that Palacký had been right when saying the Hussite epoch was the essence of Czech history. At that time, the Czechs were the first "to boldly and valiantly raise the flag of new age freedom, social, political and spiritual, which even the greatest nations started striving for only after the Czechs had done so."[24] At the same time, he combined the turn toward Palacký, criticised by Czech interwar Communist journalists, with the official adoration of Alois Jirásek, the works of whom he had always promoted and defended. He interpreted the historical prosaic works of the prolific nationalist in a way similar to that outlined in his treatises written at the turn of the 20th century.

Nearing the end of his life, Zdeněk Nejedlý thus updated the concept of Czech history he had held, captivated by works of Palacký and Jirásek, at the time of his school-leaving exam and shortly thereafter. A cynic would say that the old man was returning to the time of his long-gone youth, but the reality was more complex than that. The topicality of Palacký's and Jirásek's texts was enhanced by their national defence role during the German occupation which Nejedlý repeatedly referred to in his speeches broadcast from Moscow. Nejedlý's efforts to combine what was basically a National Revival model with the Stalinist variety of Marxism were neither natural nor convincing and their effect on Czech historiography was negligible. Although they did to some degree slow down leftist excesses, the appeal urging society to follow National Revival examples, (supposedly) topical at the threshold of the "socialist revival," was inevitably short-lived, did not address the feelings of younger generations, and slowly fizzled out after 1956. The edition of Jirásek's works ending in 1960 with the publication of Nejedlý's afterwords put an end to it completely.

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I have perhaps strayed too far from Křesťan's book whose final parts I will now dwell on a little longer. The author knows so much about the First Republic period that, sometimes, less would have been actually more. The reconstruction of Nejedlý's stay in the Soviet Union during WWII is a brand new piece of information based on studies of sources which were unavailable for a long time. The last chapter is literally "unputdownable," although Nejedlý's cultural activities after 1945 would deserve some complements (e.g. an explanation as to why Nejedlý rejected Karel Hynek Mácha or preferred theatre to film, etc.). However, even this chapter looks like an apparition, as most of it is based on private and hitherto unpublished documents (various diary entries, interviews with contemporaries). This being said, it should be noted that the narration does not always seem well arranged, which applies particularly to the 1918–1938 period; this is, however, a reflection of Nejedlý's

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24   IDEM: *Dějiny národa českého,* Vol. 1, pp. 18–19.

hectic and fragmented activities the width of which is incomprehensible and inexplicable for the ordinary man.

An explanation of sorts is provided in the recollections of Nejedlý's contemporaries, which Křesťan surprisingly did not record. Until his advanced age, Nejedlý needed very little sleep; he had a short nap during the day and slept only an average of three hours during the night. To complete the picture, I will add two titbits here. Zdeněk Nejedlý was not a dyed-in-the-wool teetotaller – until late in life, he had a shot of Kümmel every now and then, and was a moderate consumer of beer. He liked bread spread with lard all his life, which was allegedly his favourite breakfast staple. However, I do not want the readers to view these and similar pieces of information as an out-of-place personal exhibition. I mention them here for a reason. For the time being, they have been living in imperfect human memory and will certainly be lost unless fixed in writing or otherwise. And this would be a pity, as it still holds true that every recorded detail is an important and valuable source, if set in an appropriate context.

I will give you a small example as an illustration. One of the numerous visitors to the presentation of Křesťan's book in Litomyšl on 10 March 2013 brought photographs of her distant relative and Nejedlý's first love Marie Seidlová. I touched upon this interesting relation approximately 30 years ago.[25] The rumours about Miss Seidlová captured in private diaries, correspondence and unpublished memories did not lie. She was (even by today's standards) a striking beauty, a pleasant-looking and charming brunette whose marriage was separated from Nejedlý's own marriage with Marie Brichtová by just a few days. She died prematurely, allegedly because of a serious renal ailment. It is always a blessing for a historian if the persons he or she is writing about get a face and if he or she learns more about their destinies. No less important is the fact that the awareness of the relationship between the beauty of Litomyšl and Zdeněk Nejedlý has been preserved among generations of their descendants for more than a century. This brings me to a more general issue, namely how far back live historical memory can reach.

Křesťan's gripping and revealing monograph will undoubtedly bring about some critical comments as well. It is always like this with principal works. As is usual today, reservations can be expected, for example, in addressing the book's inadequate theoretical anchoring. This objection offers itself particularly in comparison with the previous extensive monograph on Nejedlý, which František Červinka published in Melantrich's "Legacies" series in 1969. However, let us not compare the incomparable! Červinka's pioneering book is not a conventional biography; it belongs to a different genre. The author conceived it as a problem-oriented work, his selection of key questions obviously reflecting the topics exciting non-conformist left-wing intellectuals of the latter half of the 1960s (the relation between national tradition and modern styles, Nejedlý's attitude to the interwar avant-garde, critical evaluation

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25 ČORNEJ, Petr: Zdeňka Nejedlého léta učňovská a vandrovní [Zdeněk Nejedlý's Years of Apprenticeship and Wandering]. In: *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1983), pp. 7–42, here especially pp. 28–29.

of Leoš Janáček). He touched the delicate post-February issues only marginally, one of the reasons certainly being the relatively short time that had elapsed since February 1948. Červinka himself explained his approach by saying that his objective had not been to describe the events of Nejedlý's life, but to "present a picture of his spiritual and opinion world."[26] The motivations of the two researchers were also different. While Červinka felt an inner urge to critically deal with Nejedlý, whom he and his wife Milada had been very close to for several years and of whose youth he had written an admiring dissertation, Křesťan was in a different situation. Nejedlý interested him as a significant and unignorably historical personality that he did not have any personal relation to; his only motive was to capture the place and significance of this prominent and contradictory individual in history.

Both approaches are naturally quite legitimate. As Nejedlý was a historian, Křesťan's approach would certainly appeal more to him. If for nothing else, then for honouring the biographic structure, presenting the period context within the frame of his protagonist's life story, and not burdening his narration with lengthy theoretical parts which readers of biographies generally do not expect. Nejedlý himself was not much of a theoretician. Although his library contained the collected works of Arthur Schopenhauer, numerous publications of other German philosophers, and also some works of Wilhelm Dilthey, his thinking was strictly historical, and his approach to what is known today as sciences of art was historical rather than theoretical. If we view Křesťan's excellent book through this prism, we can say without blushing that it falls into the traditional mainstream of Czech historiography and unquestionably meets the strict criteria applied to academic biographies.

The Czech version of this article, entitled Křesťanův Nejedlý (s malým doplněním), *was originally published in* Soudobé dějiny, *Vol. 21, No. 1–2 (2014), pp. 168–179.*

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26   ČERVINKA, F.: *Zdeněk Nejedlý,* p. 366.

Review

Disgruntled Fighters against Tito

Přemysl Houda

VOJTĚCHOVSKÝ, Ondřej: *Z Prahy proti Titovi! Jugoslávská prosovětská emigrace v Československu* [From Prague against Tito! Yugoslav Pro-Soviet Émigrés in Czechoslovakia]. Praha, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy [Faculty of Arts of the Charles University] 2012, 695 pp.

It is quite seldom that a massive work about a historical dead end, for example about an individual or a group of people whose efforts and visions over the years have been wrecked to an extent justifying the use of the term "crushing defeat," and, moreover, a defeat accompanied by the stigma of renegade and traitor, appears on the scene. The monograph *Z Prahy proti Titovi!* by Ondřej Vojtěchovský is a case in point, covering a topic that, indeed, has not yet been dealt with: its 700 pages describe the lives of less than 200 Yugoslav political émigrés who, after the split between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948, decided to permanently settle in Czechoslovakia and manifest their loyalty to Stalin and their dislike for the "mangy dog," Tito.

Vojtěchovský's book is the story of people who – viewed from outside – effectively served propaganda and power purposes (of both foreign and domestic policies of the so-called Eastern Bloc) in the late 1940s and early 1950s; when no longer needed by anyone, they were transformed into pariahs, living reminders of by-gone times. However, Vojtěchovský not only shows the external side of the matter;

he describes, with keen interest, the life and microcosmos of these unsuccessful émigrés. Countless pages of his monograph dwell (sometimes, however, too much so) on details from the lives of characters that are now almost forgotten, such as Slobodan Ivanović and Pero Dragila, formerly Tito's diplomats in the United States, Milutin Rajković, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Belgrade's daily *Politika*, Josip Milunić, a member of Yugoslavia's UN mission, the writer and journalist Teodor Balk, Anton Rupnik, a Slovene previously permanently residing in France, and many others – generally none of them being significant people in one way or another. With a bit of overstatement, some chapters of his book are remindful of the TV genre which people now know under the term *reality show* – we can read about animosities existing between the wives of the émigrés, their lovers and sweethearts, or the everyday problems they had to struggle with in houses where they were living together.

However, Ondřej Vojtěchovský is not after sensation, the purpose of his approach is different: he shows the Yugoslav political émigrés as people living in a peculiar environment suggestive of a ghetto. He presents them as people preoccupied with the ideological disputes of those days, often understandable only to them, who were capable of radically denigrating those who were their allies not so very long ago (both on the grounds of a "noble principle" and for pragmatic reasons), only to self-flagellate and criticise themselves or to ostentatiously fraternise with recent mortal enemies just a few months or even days later. Through lengthy descriptions of their sometimes boring and repetitive disputes, Vojtěchovský ultimately manages to bring the ideology- and passion-laden atmosphere of the founding phase of the Communist dictatorship – of the time still permeated with unswerving faith and hopes – to the present day.

The author also marginally touches upon a broader "Yugoslav" context. As a matter of fact, Czechoslovakia was not the only Eastern Bloc country providing a safe haven for pro-Stalinist Yugoslavs, although it was, at least initially, an important centre in this respect. This is why the book provides information on Yugoslav political émigrés in other countries as well – mostly about the "Hungarian" Yugoslavs, whose leadership (Lazar Brankov) was hit hard by the trial of Hungarian Foreign Minister László Rajk. It triggered panic among the Yugoslavs living in Prague, as they expected that a similar political trial would also be staged in Prague. However, their worries ultimately proved unnecessary and the hunt for traitors in their own ranks and mutual accusations finally died down.

It is true that Ondřej Vojtěchovský pays only marginal attention to anti-Titoist Yugoslavs in other Eastern Bloc countries, but this actually benefitted the book; his intent was other than comparative. However, his analysis could have touched more upon the link between leaders of the Yugoslav émigrés in the Soviet Union and their Czechoslovak counterparts. To what extent did the "Czechoslovak" Yugoslavs have to obey Pera Popivoda, ex-guerilla commander and general, who had become the head of the Yugoslav Stalinists in the Soviet Union? Vojtěchovský only describes Popivoda's on-and-off trips to Prague, which look like a slightly chaotic *deus ex machina* in his narration. It reflects a broader issue: How did Moscow's

plans for the Yugoslav émigrés evolve over time and what instructions or orders did Moscow give them? We find less than could be expected about these issues in the book, and most of it only implicitly at that.

However, Vojtěchovský's monograph, originally his dissertation which he defended at the Institute of World History of the Faculty of Arts of Charles University, does not show only the somewhat strange and encapsulated universe of self-centered political émigrés, which ended in one big depression: flights to the Soviet Union and, as often as not, even penitent returns to the homeland (insofar as the leaders of the Yugoslav émigrés in Czechoslovakia are concerned, the "Walk-to-Canossa" option was selected, for example, by Milutin Rajković, Jovan Prodanović or Borivoj Nikolajević). As a matter of fact, the book provides an insight not only into the world of disgruntled political émigrés, but also into internal political matters of Czechoslovakia under the rule of the Communist Party from the perspective of the "Yugoslav problem": for example, it casts light on the circumstances of the trial of Rudolf Slánský and the "Yugoslav card" in it, or relations between the State Security and the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (in this respect, it is interesting, for example, to read the communication between Geminder's International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the State Security on possibilities of tailing and keeping an eye on political émigrés).

Thanks to the second – "Czechoslovak" – aspect, the book is a remarkable contribution to understanding how the power hubs of the Communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia worked in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which is the period that most of the book's content falls into. And it is exactly the second aspect which elevates the work of Ondřej Vojtěchovský to a much higher level.

Many pages of the book mention Lenka Reinerová, the well-known Czech-German writer who, as Teodor Balk's wife, was a *de facto* connection ensuring communication between the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslav political émigrés. While I do not intend to dwell on this issue longer than necessary in my review, it is worth noting that the information of the author of the monograph sometimes interestingly complements, and even corrects, the testimony of Lenka Reinerová captured in her memoir texts which – quite naturally – tend to be somewhat self-serving.

Being the first extensive work dealing with the topic, this monograph of Ondřej Vojtěchovský draws mainly on archival sources, both Czechoslovak and ex-Yugoslav. The author also interviewed several contemporaries, but declined to use the interviews in the text, explaining, perhaps somewhat unusually, that he "is not concerned about historical memory, but tries to reconstruct the events on the basis of primary sources." In this respect, he expresses his conviction that "a historian studying archival documents has much better knowledge of facts than the actors of the events that happened dozens of years ago" (p. 28). Does this mean that an interview with a narrator does not produce a primary source?

And this leads to the only problem of the book: Vojtěchovský's monograph is unquestionably a solid historical work, written in a style that makes it readable,

and which analyses a huge amount of documents and materials (including hundreds of pages of minutes and protocols of vetting commissions, etc.); however, it lacks a theoretical anchor. The author started describing historical facts and human fates from the very beginning, dispensing with a more general treatise on suitable methodological approaches. However, the book *Z Prahy proti Titovi!* does not deserve that the review end with a critical remark – indeed, it is an extremely interesting contribution to Yugoslav and Czechoslovak history at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s.

The Czech version of this article, entitled Frustrovaní bojovníci proti Titovi*, was originally published in* Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 21, No. 1–2 (2014), pp. 224–226.*

Review

A Fruitful Asymmetry
*A Precise Book on Cultural Exchange
across the Iron Curtain*

Soňa Mikulová

LIZCOVÁ, Zuzana: *Kulturní vztahy mezi ČSSR a SRN v 60. letech 20. století* [Cultural Relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s]. Praha, Dokořán – Fakulta sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy [Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University] 2012, 194 pp.

How to understand culture? What role does culture play in internal political developments of a country and what significance can it achieve in international politics if recognised as one of the factors influencing the interaction between nations and states? Indeed, these were the questions that Zuzana Lizcová asked herself in the introduction of her monograph dealing with a very specific area of bilateral cultural relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s.

The appropriateness of the territorial and time framework of the book supposed to answer the above mentioned questions is obvious. After WWII, relations between the two states, whose historical predecessors in previous centuries had been characterised by permanent "contacts and conflicts," hit the rock bottom. The traumas of the Munich Agreement and the Nazi occupation on the one hand and the resettlement

and expulsion of Sudeten Germans on the other, which were felt most in the 1950s, only confirmed the reality of Europe politically and ideologically divided into two hostile power blocs. Although there was a first Cold War détente at the international level in the 1960s, Prague established official diplomatic relations with Bonn only after the signature of the so-called Treaty of Prague in 1973. The trade mission in Frankfurt am Main, which was also performing consular services, was established as late as 1968, indeed 18 years after the Czechoslovak general consulates operating in former occupation zones of Western Allies had been closed down. Only the Czechoslovak Permanent Military Mission at the Allied Control Council existed throughout the whole period. Although political contacts were almost non-existent, the 1960s saw the hitherto most intensive cultural exchange between the two countries, which the occupation of Czechoslovakia by armies of the Warsaw Pact countries put a stop to and whose diversity and intensity never again reached the 1960s levels until the fall of the communist regime in 1989.

The work under review is thus, first and foremost, a study of cultural and cultural-political developments in the two countries since the end of WWII until the early 1970s, with an accent put on the period of the 1960s. In line with the spirit of new political history and new cultural history, Lizcová examines not only the role of high politics – i.e. of those who were influencing foreign cultural policy toward the other country – but also the role of social groups outside state structures, i.e. particularly of creators and consumers of cultural products which constituted the subject matter of the cultural exchange between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, she notices how these processes and events were commented on in contemporary media, and she generally attempts to depict the cultural phenomena she studies in the context of the political, social and economic climate prevailing in each of the countries. The authoress does not expressly profess the concept of transfer,[1] which would suggest itself as fitting given the topic of the study, although she has partly applied it in her work. This is reflected mainly in one of the final conclusions, namely what the respective foreign cultural policies achieved or failed to achieve in the other country.

The work has a remarkably clear and logical structure proceeding from the general to the more specific. The elaborate introduction not only sets the topic of the study in the context of existing research efforts, but also serves as a theoretical prologue of the topic's analysis based on numerous published titles and primary sources. The book thus proceeds from the notion of "culture" as such, its historical evolution and two basic ways of perceiving the term to a definition of culture in international relations. The authoress professes a liberal-idealistic perception of culture as an important factor in international relations. In her subsequent

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1   Refer also to WERNER, Michael – ZIMMERMANN, Bénédicte: Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2002), pp. 607–636; THER, Philipp: Deutsche Geschichte als transnationale Geschichte: Überlegungen zu einer Histoire Croisée Deutschlands und Ostmitteleuropas. In: *Comparativ*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2003), pp. 156–181.

explications, she uses the concept of American political scientist Joseph Nye, who views foreign cultural policy as a "soft power" the efficiency of which is based on a positive persuasion of foreign audiences rather than on acts of force or threats.

The authoress's own research draws from archival sources (mainly from documents of archives of the respective Foreign Ministries of the two countries and from party documents of the Fund of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the National Archives of the Czech Republic), articles in period media, catalogues of exhibitions or cinema art yearbooks, memoirs and last but not least Czech and German published titles on the subject. She analyses the foreign (and particularly cultural foreign) policies of the two countries in their interactions against the backdrop of political, economic and cultural developments in the Federal Republic of Germany and in socialist Czechoslovakia. She also ultimately follows attitudes and strategies of political representations in Bonn and Prague, as well as the most prominent cultural exchange events in two specific areas – cinema and graphic art. In the final chapter, the authoress in fact applies the results of her research presented in previous chapters of the book.

Although the selection of the two areas mentioned above has not been thoroughly explained, the authoress's general analysis suggests that adding others would not change the resulting picture – they would just make different specific features which the authoress mentioned earlier more visibly. The exchange in literature is a good example because it was the only sphere of art in which imports from Germany exceeded Czechoslovak exports. The authoress explains the fact that postwar West German literary production was better known in Czechoslovakia than the Czechoslovak one was for its western neighbours by (a) sponsoring of cost-free exports of books in the Federal Republic of Germany, and (b) complexity of and difficulties with translations from Czech and Slovak.

So, what was the nature of the cultural exchange between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia during the period under scrutiny? What made it happen and to what extent did lively cultural contacts prove to be an efficient tool of international policy in a situation in which diplomatic relations were absent?

According to Zuzana Lizcová, the essential prerequisite of the two countries becoming closer consisted in an international political détente between the Western and Eastern Bloc and in their specific internal political and social developments in which the authoress sees certain parallels, their different political systems notwithstanding. She claims that the young generation in both West Germany and Czechoslovakia opposed the existing economic system and ossified political and social structures, albeit with a different intensity and a different content. In both countries, the people demanding reforms and reconciliation with the criminal past of their parents and grandparents were mainly students, artists and intellectuals. What they had in common was a resistance against authoritarian tendencies in their respective countries and criticism of militarism as an international policy tool.

In the 1960s, artists both in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Czechoslovakia started to devote their attention to global developments in arts, and albeit with some delay in Czechoslovakia, they were reacting to them in a lively fashion.

As a consequence, artists in both countries showed more interest in the development of mutual cultural exchange "from below." Good quality and unhackneyed works of Czechoslovak artists offered the West German audience an alternative to the dominant American culture, while people in Czechoslovakia were looking for an alternative to the then prevailing rigid model of socialism. At the same time, Czechoslovak artists were able to distribute their works in other Western countries by way of West Germany. The result was a varied and broad cultural interaction with a multitude of genres, the principal characteristic of which was an asymmetry reflecting different strategies of the Czechoslovak and West German cultural foreign policies.

The authoress rightly notes that the cultural exchange with the western neighbour in those days would have hardly developed into such dimensions without some positive measures taken by the Czechoslovak state, such as softer travel and visa regulations. In like manner, one should not deny some credit to relevant state authorities. These were putting up with or even supporting art production depicting not only the idealised socialist realism reality, but also current "general human" topics, which naturally increased the attractiveness of such works in the eyes of the domestic audience, as well as their competitive ability abroad. As obvious from period documents analysed by Lizcová, Czechoslovakia, apart from trying to justify and legitimise its own political arrangements through cultural presentations abroad, was primarily interested in hard currency revenues from exports of Czechoslovak art products. On the other hand, conservative Czechoslovak diplomats and officials opposed the influx of "subversive" Western art creations. The resulting asymmetry in mutual cultural contacts combined with the conspicuous surplus of Czechoslovak art imports into the Federal Republic was naturally something that responsible West German officials were not very happy about. This was why they were trying, very cautiously, to reverse the balance which was unfavourable for them. It must be added that they, just like their Czechoslovak counterparts, perceived cultural policy as a wholly second-rate tool of foreign policy, which could be primarily used to promote one's own social model or to acquire material benefits. In any case, the cultural exchange between the two countries remained significantly asymmetrical in favour of Czechoslovak exports throughout the 1960s.

When examining the Czechoslovak-German relations, the authoress did not forget to consider the role of other players in the cultural exchange between Czechoslovakia and both German states. It was in West Berlin where the only political representation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, whose powers partly extended also to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, was seated in those days. While it played an extraordinarily positive role in the development of cultural relations, the role of the German Democratic Republic in this respect was near to negligible. The above-standard political relations between Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic with the bloc of Soviet satellites had survived only until the early 1960s. East German leaders were criticising the Czechoslovak reformist course both in politics and in culture, reproaching their Czechoslovak counterparts for not adequately defending their own culture against it while also scaling down

cultural contacts with Czechoslovak artists. However, neither the artists nor state authorities were doing much to improve their image harboured by the northern neighbour; they cared much more about cultural contacts with the Federal Republic of Germany, albeit for different reasons. It should be noted, however, that, insofar as foreign policy matters were concerned, Prague was loyally standing by East Berlin throughout the period in concern.

We finally get to the initial question concerning the importance of culture in international relations. The authoress confirms its role of a specific and relevant factor of international politics which, however, "is a somewhat unpredictable element which is also unreliable from the viewpoint of state authorities" (p. 160). The role of cultural interaction in bilateral relations between countries may be particularly strong if traditional diplomacy does not work. It is only logical that it exists, to a large extent, outside state structures and one of its greatest advantages is that it brings long-term and lasting benefits. The example of cultural relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany shows that, while the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops put a stop to the rich cultural exchange, contacts and friendships between artists or even ordinary citizens of the two countries made later the life and work in exile easier for many Czechoslovaks. Some of the artists could take advantage of their reputation they had built up through presentations of their works in West Germany in previous years.

However, cultural contacts between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s, which were also substantially influencing tourism and mutual economic cooperation, had a much greater and longer-term impact on the knowledge of the neighbouring country and its international prestige. In particular, the mutual cultural relations laid the groundwork for overcoming prejudices and stereotypes toward the neighbouring state, fuelled, on the one hand, by the negative experience of the Nazi occupation and seditious anti-capitalism and, on the other hand, by the revisionism and anti-Communist rhetoric of Sudeten Germans. The next two decades did not succeed in restoring the isolation, open distrust and mutual condemnations which had been disrupted thanks to the multi-faceted and multi-layered dialogue in the field of arts and culture during the 1960s.

The language used by the authoress makes the book extremely readable and precise in its formulations. In terms of its content, the book sticks perhaps too strictly to the main story line of each of the chapters and, looking at the wealth of information contained in the footnotes, we cannot help but be sorry that some of it has not been incorporated directly into the text – whether to enliven it with biographic details or to emphasise the complex nature and structure of the topic.

The previously mentioned comments, however, cannot change the fact that the book is a remarkable work which will please even readers who are not Czech-German history specialists. Zuzana Lizcová's work documents the development of cultural policies in two neighbouring countries, determines the role of cultural policy in mutual foreign policy relations, and follows the widening gap between official strategies and dynamically developing activities of individuals and cultural institutions. By doing so, the book also offers a number of impulses for thoughts

about the function, possibilities and limits of support or tolerance of cultural activities in the field of both domestic and international politics in general. First and foremost, however, the book provides a novel insight into Czechoslovak-West German relations in the 1960s from the viewpoint of state representations and societies in both countries, capturing the transformation of the mutual perception of their citizens across the Iron Curtain. Particularly highlighted should be the fact that the active involvement in the cultural exchange turned the hated, feared or overlooked neighbours into admirers, colleagues bringing fresh inspiration or at least into reliable business partners.

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Review

Socialist Friendship between Indestructible Unity and a Press War

Michal Pullmann

ZIMMERMANN, Volker: *Eine sozialistische Freundschaft im Wandel: Die Beziehungen zwischen der SBZ/DDR und der Tschechoslowakei (1945–1969)*. Essen, Klartext 2010, 639 pp.

Relations between Eastern Bloc countries are now more and more frequently in the focus of attention of historians. First, it is becoming increasingly clearer that the dependence of each of these countries on the Soviet Union as the hegemon did not result in the suppression of all possibilities of having independent foreign relations; second, these relations – forms of cooperation and conflict lines – can be used to better understand similarities and differences in arrangements prevailing in each of them. The book *Eine sozialistische Freundschaft im Wandel: Die Beziehungen zwischen der SBZ/DDR und der Tschechoslowakei (1945–1969)* written by German historian Volker Zimmermann, which is a reworked version of his habilitation thesis of 2005, deals with relations between Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (including the latter's predecessor, the Soviet Occupation Zone) during the two decades after WWII. It analyses a colourful palette of relations between the two countries, forms of the closest mutual cooperation, less successful attempts at collaboration, and gradually developing conflict lines and escalating disputes in 1968.

It is especially the depth of coverage of the book that is particularly noteworthy. It analyses not only diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic; the author devotes his attention to a number of other areas where contacts or cooperation occurred, including trade unions, youth organisations, scientific projects, cultural relations and, last but not least, tourism. He provides evidence indicating that mutual relations were developing differently in different areas – the political cooling in the 1960s, for example, was not reflected in the field of cultural cooperation or tourism. While the different levels and areas of cooperation were not separated – they remained tied by key ideological principles and strategic-political interests throughout the period covered by the book – each of them, if viewed from a broader historical perspective, had its own dynamics that could not be reduced to a mere one-dimensional relationship defined only by ideological, power and political factors.

The work is divided into seven parts; the second and fifth are dedicated to diplomatic relations – in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. The first chapter naturally deals with the resettlement of Czechoslovak Germans and the cautious re-establishment of relations before 1949. The four remaining chapters of Zimmermann's book are dedicated to the other-than-diplomatic contacts mentioned above – the third chapter is devoted to cultural contacts and ideologically conditioned efforts to establish closer relations with the German Democratic Republic during the first half of the 1950s, the fourth to the development of cooperation in culture, sciences and tourism until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The sixth chapter monitors the uneven development of cooperation in different areas against the backdrop of the political alienation in the mid-1960s, and the seventh deals with the open confrontation during the Prague Spring in 1968 and the subsequent beginnings of the Czechoslovak "normalisation" process which the East German leadership did not hesitate to intervene in. By way of excursus, Zimmermann attaches an analysis of how the history of each of the countries was presented in the other, the cooperation of historians, and ideology-dependent interpretations of history.

One of the greatest strengths of the book is that Volker Zimmermann did not only pay attention to the institutional development and diplomatic aspects of mutual relations, but also offered a view of the relevant actors – their biographies, world of ideas, motivations and interests, their perception and use of ideology, as well as the strategies they employed to promote and implement their visions and projects. The most interesting parts of the narration are those where Zimmermann shows the closeness of different motivations – tourism, use of ideological language, the implementation strategies used by trade union organisations, ruling parties, youth organisations and those involved in the field of arts – or where he describes the escalating tensions from the mid-1960s and especially in 1968: the press war between the two countries, contrasting with the sympathies of many East German citizens for the Czechoslovak project of democratic socialism.

The book shows, and very convincingly, that the approach of East Germany to diplomatic relations was much more aggressive and that Berlin gradually got the upper hand in the step-by-step deterioration of relations between the two

countries (and played a very important role in the 1968 occupation as a result). Within less than a quarter of a century, the balance of power between the two countries had turned completely – with Czechoslovakia losing its initial postwar influence, while the German Democratic Republic had become one of the most important players in Central Europe.

The meticulous approach of Zimmerman to official documents and materials is perhaps slightly in contrast with his attempts to place the institutional development into social and cultural settings. The historisation of relations between the two countries (i.e. taking into account the social, cultural and economic settings and circumstances of diplomatic relations) could often have gone deeper. For example, Zimmermann provides a very interesting account of the activities of the Czechoslovak Cultural Centre in East Berlin, which became a place of social and political criticism, particularly in the 1960s (pp. 369–373). Citizens of the German Democratic Republic had access to exhibitions or openly critical movies there; moreover, the Czechoslovak cultural production of those days did not evade Western influences, which meant that otherwise tabooed issues had been able to find their way to the East German capital by way of the Czechoslovak Cultural Centre. According to preserved reports of the East German Foreign Ministry, it was the Czechoslovak Cultural Centre where open criticism of the regime of the German Democratic Republic could be voiced. Although Zimmermann mentions some important examples (an exhibition of caricatures ridiculing the so-called "cult of personality," the showing of critical movies previously rejected by the East German censorship authority, jazz concerts), he unfortunately leaves an analysis of the topics and motives presented there completely aside. The meticulous evaluation of official archival documents and materials notwithstanding, the reader will not learn which topics, interpretations and symbols resonated there most frequently, upsetting the ideologically strait-jacketed world of the East German dictatorship.

The same or something similar applies to the tensions and conflicts between members of youth organisations, which showed during exchange visits. Zimmermann offers a list of conflicts, including questionable topics (art styles, concerts of rock bands, etc.), but has completely refrained from an ideological analysis – i.e. which topics were undermining the trust of people in the rightness of the socialist undertaking, and, particularly, how they did so. A compensation of sorts in this respect is Zimmermann's historiographic excursus, where Zimmermann very nicely combines an analysis of forms of cooperation and ideological content; as a matter of fact, it is only against the backdrop of differing opinions and specific topics (whether the bourgeoisie was a part of the struggle for freedom in the 19th century; whether the 1848 revolution can be interpreted only in class struggle categories – see pp. 492–493) that the readiness of historians for cooperation, or conflict, can be explained.

And this is also why the book is so significant, as it (a) proves that there was, by and large, enough room for the independent formation and development of mutual relations even within the political and ideological constraints set by the Soviet hegemon, and (b) meticulously shows the high level of manoeuvring, strategic

thinking, mutual pressure and tough negotiations between the "friendly" partners. While the book confirms that the ruling parties were the most powerful authorities, the forms and directions of cooperation ultimately depended more on what relevant players – trade union leaders, officials of ministries, representatives of youth organisations, tourists, workers, journalists, historians, etc. – saw under the official requirements and ideological phrases, how they interpreted them within the set limitations, and what they saw as important. From an empirical point of view, it is interesting to note that East German diplomacy was much more offensive and strategically more inventive than its Czechoslovak counterpart and that the German Democratic Republic became a hegemon in its own right in the region of Soviet satellites in Central Europe. For all the reasons outlined above, the book can be regarded as one of the most important contributions to the contemporary history of both countries.

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Review

Havel's Anti-Politics à la Different Modes
On Suk's Book on Václav Havel

Milan Znoj

Suk's monograph on Václav Havel is a book on freedom and responsibility, both personal and historical, taken seriously; yet, the subtitle suggests it is an absurd drama, and we learn at the very beginning that even comedy may be a fitting interpretation framework. However, does responsibility have a place in a comedy, and what kind of freedom can be born of absurdity? Are these terminological ingredients in fact not incompatible? And does the somewhat divergent perspective not make Suk's work unnecessarily disjointed? Let us say most emphatically that it does not. Jiří Suk confirms that he is the best historian of the period of Havel's dissent and of the end of the era of Husák's communist rule. The book represents a solid piece of historical work backed by a thorough study of sources. For the benefit of the chosen topic, the author does not stop at flat positivism, but looks for appropriate theoretical frameworks for historical interpretations. The outcome is a penetrating analysis of recent Czech history for which, however, appropriate words seem to be missing.

Freedom and responsibility, absurd drama and Husák's period comedy are fairly different interpretation frameworks which in a way illustrate the multi-faceted nature of Havel-related topics of the end of the communist era. Jiří Suk struggles with this problem successfully, striving to capture the historical matter in a knowledgeable and credible manner and to explain it, while being aware that it represents crucial turning points of recent history of the Czech nation. The interpretation frameworks permit dramatic events, both personal and historical, to be fleshed out with a specific meaning; however, other aspects and consequences of these events may sometimes be overshadowed as a result. It is the keenness and a few overshadowed pages of Suk's book that my interpretative deliberation is to be about.

Neither Hegel, nor Keane

The topic of the book is Václav Havel and Czech society of the late communist era on the way to freedom (and responsibility); in this respect, it is not quite clear what conjunction should be used in between – whether it should be *and*, *against*, or *together*. However, Jiří Suk's book is not a historical *Bildungsroman* about a hero looking for his right place in society and finding it, hardships and vagaries of his dramatic fate notwithstanding. The reason is perhaps less the limitation of the genre, which generally focuses on the social psychology of a young hero. After all, Hegel succeeded in giving it a history-forming significance, approaching it as a way by which society, through its representative hero, overcomes its own intrinsic alienation in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister,* he thus traced the road of German literature to Romanticism, which he, however, claimed had failed in understanding how a hero could "appropriately" represent the whole society. The integration of a Romantic hero into society was quite dramatic in Hegel's interpretation; for, he was supposed to overcome a multiple personality problem and social alienation, which also meant pretence and make-believe, even hypocrisy, with particular importance assigned to the character of the Schillerian "beautiful soul" which, true to its genuineness, was not even capable of any act, as it might always bring a defiling of some sort.

Yet, Václav Havel was not a Romantic hero and Jiří Suk has not written any historical *Bildungsroman*. Still, his work is also based on believing that the dramatic life story of Václav Havel tells something substantial about him and Czech society. Suk's book is in fact an antidote to another biography of Václav Havel, namely that by John Keane, the subtitle of which contains words "political tragedy."[1] Of course, it is likewise possible to say that Suk's book is a meticulous historical work, while Keane wrote a philosophical biography, and sometimes did not care too much about sources. Such a polemic, however, would be shallow and superficial, as the content

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[1]   KEANE, John: *Václav Havel: Politická tragédie v šesti dějstvích* [Václav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts]. Praha, Volvox Globator 1999 (published also in English: *Václav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts.* London, Bloomsbury 1999).

tension of each of the two books ensues, first and foremost, from the different interpretation frameworks hiding behind the difference between Keane's political tragedy, in which Václav Havel is pictured as a little Czech Romantic Robespierre, and Suk's absurd drama, or comedy, which presents a dishevelled, or even controversial, moral hero, a dissident who was able to deliver political statements on behalf of Czech society at the time of its "normalisation stagnancy," until his word become a political power.

We therefore read Václav Havel's biography presented as an absurd historical comedy taking place in the era of Husák's Communism, which climaxes in the "Velvet Revolution." It is actually a comedy, as Jiří Suk says, referring to literary theorist Northrop Frye,[2] which arguably represents a fitting interpretation principle of such events, as it depicts a non-violent transformation of society, with the choir (of people) becoming the ultimate vehicle of the transformation, although it otherwise only comments on events. However, Suk's version of the comedy is not a light genre at all. It was, after all, a clash between the dissent and the dictatorship, with the "political regime speaking the language of legality (which gives rules), and the dissident movement producing the language of truth (which liberates)," which is how Jiří Suk summarises, in a nutshell, the historical dialectics of giving rules and liberating in his book (p. 15).

Suk admits he has also sought methodological inspiration in the book *Reign and Salvation*[3] by Egyptologist and theorist of culture Jan Assmann. However, what could he learn from Assmann, with the book being on political theology in the ancient empires of Egypt and Israel? He himself mentions discourse analysis which teaches how to connect texts with political power and how to thematise moral notions, such as "justice" or "truth" in this relation. Yet, Assmann deals with political theology, which means the topic is in fact the relation of morals and politics from the viewpoint of theology. Suk's specific inspiration source may have been Assmann's notion of vertical socialism, resulting from the application of the political theology of pharaohs to socialist regimes that might be everything but free societies, as initially promised. A characteristic feature of the politics of pharaohs was that people were living outside the truth and justice and were getting them only through the ruler, the only person communicating with the realm of gods. On the other hand, the politics of Israel were the word of the prophet who had a unique link to god and was urging and encouraging Israeli rulers and society to live in political harmony with god. If Jiří Suk is looking for inspiration here, it cannot be in anything else but in studying the ways how a word becomes a political act. A conflict between Husák's regime, the dictatorship that has deprived its citizens of political capacity, and dissident Václav Havel as a prophet who politically represents mute citizens

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2   FRYE, Northrop: *Anatomie kritiky: Čtyři eseje* [Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays]. Brno, Host 2003.

3   ASSMANN, Jan: *Panství a spása: Politická theologie ve starověkém Egyptě, Izraeli a Evropě* [Reign and Salvation: Political Theology in Ancient Egypt, Israel and Europe]. Praha, OIKOYMENH 2012.

until they, as if by a miracle, reach a political revolution,[4] is thus unfolding right in front of our eyes against the backdrop of a melodramatic comedy.

The genre of comedy allows the author to work with the absurd in his explication, and thus to avoid any teleology or moral perfectionism when interpreting history. Teleology of history seems almost a logical choice in reflections on the victory of democracy, and many theorists, including Francis Fukuyama for instance, succumbed to its charm in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the absurdity of history is always a part of a game in Jiří Suk's interpretation.

Viewed through the prism of definitions of revolutions presented in history text-books, the so-called Velvet Revolution, which is the punchline of the interpretation, can therefore hardly be a revolution of citizens and progressivists, i.e. a Hegelian revolution. In a way, Jiří Suk continues to insist on the term, which is good, considering the rather stupid and superficial discussion on whether November 1989 had indeed been a revolution or not, which broke out in the Czech Republic after the publication of Suk's *Labyrintem revoluce* [Through the Labyrinth of the Revolution].[5] Some people missed blood on the streets and resistance of communist power holders, others Communists in prisons. Conspiracy theories therefore seem all the more inviting. Jiří Suk also has a problem with what was actually negotiated during the handover of power and to what extent Václav Havel allowed himself to be drawn into "political trades," but he still thinks in terms of a democratic revolution, although it now becomes "only" the final act of a melodramatic comedy.

In any case, the interpretation framework of the comedy on how a dissident's word became a political power gives the revolution a specific meaning. There is no tragedy taking place that would represent a classical clash of a hero with a histori-cal mission, aka destiny, and ending in a catharsis of spectators, all this narrated in political terms. Instead, Jiří Suk prefers to unfold plots of a comedy melodrama in front of us, although he does not hesitate to speak of the "Velvet Revolution" as of a "catharsis experienced by the society." It is still, genre-wise, a comedy: the sad grotesqueness and the resolution of the story emanate from the audience. Let us appreciate that the comedic revolution in Suk's interpretation has an integrating function. It is a reconciliation which everybody joined in. However, happy ends

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4   We are watching the historical story of Václav Havel, not an explanation of the fall of Com-munism in Czechoslovakia. The explanation would have to take geopolitical factors into account, including, for example, either that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher de-feated the communist "Empire of Evil" using the carrot-and-stick method, or that Mikhail Gorbachev launched reforms of the communist system in the Soviet Union which got out of hand and became too much to handle for the rulers. The explanation would also have to deal with the dissident movement in Czechoslovakia more broadly, as the latter was com-posed of numerous factions of different orientation. Jiří Suk concentrates on the story of Václav Havel and gives it a political meaning, but we also learn fairly substantial things about the fall of the communist rule as well.

5   SUK, Jiří: *Labyrintem revoluce: Aktéři, zápletky a křižovatky jedné politické krize. Od listo-padu 1989 do června 1990* [Through the Labyrinth of the Revolution: Actors, Plots and Crossroads of a Political Crisis. From November 1989 to June 1990]. Praha, Prostor 2003 and 2009.

like this do not appear truthful – this is also one of the things which Jiří Suk had in mind in his interpretation of the Czech democratic revolution.

Absurdity versus "Real Socialism" and "Normalisation"

Is it not absurd when a dissident becomes a president? What kind of history is this? We have already noted that the concept of the absurd in Suk's narration has helped eliminate any teleology of history, which means that we will not find any Masarykian-sounding sections about the historical victory of democracy over totalitarianism in the book (with Masaryk, it was the victory over the Monarchy in World War I). There are other, and quite different, narrations about prisoners and presidents. For example, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was also a dissident and a prisoner of the Tsar, who later became the political dictator of Soviet Russia. We would perhaps like to call his ascent to political power an absurdity, but it is hardly the way his supporters – but also his opponents – think. The language of the former would be full of words on revolutionary justice and laws of history. They would simply stick to the Marxist vocabulary. There would be no place for absurdities there. Or, Nelson Mandela was also imprisoned and no one would think of his road to presidency and the end of the Apartheid in South Africa as absurd, not to speak of viewing these events in terms of an absurd drama. Why, then, is the Czech case absurd? We can look for the answer in the character of Czech society of the late communist era. Contrary to South Africa, late Communism in Bohemia and its "real socialist" "normalisation" exhibit many features of an absurd drama. Even when studying the archives of the State Security, one cannot help but feel absurd when reading about the behaviour of individuals and institutions at that time. Jiří Suk can therefore credibly play with absurdities of a dissident's life, and find them in acts of the repressive elements of the communist regime as well. Nevertheless, the sociological explanation of the absurdness of Communism is not enough for Suk. The book presents the absurd nature of the late communist era from the viewpoint of political theology – how a dissident's word became a political power which liberates. For the benefit of the topic the book deals with, Jiří Suk sticks to Havel's theatrical vocabulary, in which the absurd has its place.

Havel's Philosophy of the Absurd

Václav Havel had been attracted by the philosophico-existential sense-nonsense of the socialist absurdness as early as during his theatrical 1960s. Of course, Jiří Suk leaves those years aside, but it should be emphasised that the 1960s concept, all its semantic changes notwithstanding, remained a permanent and lasting subsoil of Havel's thinking about the man, society and politics. Regarding Suk's chosen topic, it is possible to say that his philosophical, theatrical and political theme was *absurdness*

versus "normalisation" rather than the absurdness of the "normalisation," and it is only in this context that the meaning of Havel's anti-politics is slowly emerging.

However, the absurdity of the human world is not Havel's original concept. It is a subject-matter of French postwar existentialism, which had its heyday in the 1960s, i.e. the time when Václav Havel became a playwright. To put it in a nutshell, the absurdness, as rendered by French existentialism, was the end of metaphysics, i.e. the end of all old metaphysical, religious and also scientific essences which were attempting to give the human world its sense and order. In metaphysics, the essence determines the existence; in existentialism, on the other hand, human existence precedes and determines the essence, as Jean-Paul Sartre said. Essentially, a human being is nothing; he or she is exposed to nothingness. There is no metaphysical order essentially determining what an individual should and should not do. All metaphysical orders, standards and laws are human derivatives. The individual himself or herself determines, through his/her existence, which comprises of fundamentally free acts and choices, what he/she is and what his/her substance, meaning of life, character, etc. are like. Of course, such freedom is a burden, regarding the existential nothingness and absurdness of the world, which he/she faces. It is therefore hardly surprising that an individual, confronted with the anxiety of the existential situation, is looking for anchoring points, creating a god or a Platonic world of eternal ideas, a metaphysical system of sorts to give his/her life a proper order and a practical meaning. The individual then lives his or her life in subordination to the order, the limitations of which he or she learns to obediently follow in everyday life.

Havel's theatrical work during the 1960s had exactly this meaning. It showed how we were living our everyday lives entangled into rationalisation and coercive nets of the socialist society from which there seemed to be no escape. Only theatre, properly absurd, was showing how these disciplinarian mechanisms were working and how they could be laughed at and ridiculed on the stage; in philosophical terms, how an individual could liberate himself or herself from established and bureaucratised metaphysics in all its disciplinarian disguises. The impressiveness of Havel's playwriting was due to the fact that he was showing socialist variations of the abovementioned existentialist theme on the stage. In his plays, he staged the decaying absurdness of the socialist world of everydayness, with people living their lives without identities and distinctive qualities in its fossilised and hollow structures.

The 1970s saw a change of the stage set, but not of the theme. With the onset of Husák's "normalisation," Václav Havel was forbidden to stage the absurdness of the socialist world in theatres. Of course, he did not give up his theme, but was looking for another venue where he could unmask the hidden absurdness of the socialist "normalisation" everydayness. In short, the anti-politics replace the theatre. The turning point in this respect was the "Open Letter to Gustáv Husák," as Jiří Suk aptly demonstrates. One must realise that the letter was not an attempt of an intellectual for a public discussion – this was not how the letter to Husák was meant. Václav Havel was not trying to discuss with the regime, as he knew

it would not have made any sense and that he could in any case be punished. He wanted to demonstrate the absurd nature of the "normalisation" life in the gears of which Czech society was becoming increasingly entangled, which he could not do in the theatre. It is true that he was still writing mainly theatrical plays, but he had to find another scene where he could publicly show and explain the theme of the absurdness of human existence in the socialist society. That new scene was not a theatre, or political public, or politics themselves. It was anti-politics.

Anti-Politics as the Morality of the Dissident Movement

How should one perceive anti-politics? Generally speaking, it is a rhetoric construct of a moral world of non-politics, which is a rejection of a given political order. In this respect, the rejection is a step toward freedom, which reveals a world of human togetherness which is dramatically different from the world of real politics, based on domination and coercion. At the same time, there is no transition between the political world of coercion and the free world of human togetherness. It is not known at all how freedom could become a political fact. The free world can be entered only through an inner spiritual transformation. The moral vocabulary of anti-politics, according to which the "other" world is a world of authentic humaneness, moral togetherness without violence and coercion, is characteristic. In *The Power of the Powerless*, Václav Havel even presents the surpassing of the established political order as an existential revolution, which he sees as a "radical renewal of the relationship of human beings to what I have called the 'human order,' which no political order can replace."[6] The perspective of the existential revolution should not be mistaken for the "escape into oneself," implied in the stoical attitude that an individual can be free even in prison, as a free mind cannot be imprisoned. The anti-politics also serves as a moral asylum, but is not an escape into an inner fortress. Using Kantian vocabulary, we can identify three main features of the anti-politics: 1) rejection of real politics as a world dehumanising violence, although the violence may be disguised in crafty mechanisms used to control people; 2) rhetoric revelation of a moral world of human togetherness, which in fact does not, but should, exist; 3) political intention of this initially moral attitude.[7]

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6   HAVEL, Václav: Moc bezmocných [The Power of the Powerless]. In: IDEM: *Eseje a jiné texty z let 1970–1989. Dálkový výslech* [Essays and Other Texts from the 1970–1989 Period. Remote Interrogation). Vol. 4. Ed. Jan Šulc. Praha, Torst 1999, pp. 224–330, here p. 324. (Both texts are available also in English translations.)

7   In this respect, there is an important question to what extent being a dissident, or dissidentism, was political behaviour. In general, it can be answered as follows: 1) it was confronted with a real repressive policy. The non-political, e.g. music, was political; 2) it was breeding political ideas arguing with communist power. Of key importance in this respect was the concept of liberal rights and freedoms the defence of which was a "common minimum" for dissidents; 3) it was offering moral politics. Dissidentism as an extraordinary way of establishing an anti-political community was a specific topic of Havel. The ways of thinking

The anti-politics knows of itself that it is political, that it not only affect the politics, but is also an appeal for a political change of reality. In Havel's rendition, however, the anti-politics still had features of existential absurdness, as indicated by the fact that it was expressly presented as the power of the powerless.

In his interpretation of the anti-politics, Jiří Suk adheres a lot to the Kantian vocabulary mentioned above, which is, after all, also found in documents of the Charter 77 or in Patočka's explanatory text. However, Havel's anti-politics is quite different from Kant's morality, with a persisting influence of Havel's previous theatrical existentialism and concept of absurdness.[8]

In the 1970s and 1980s, however, Havel significantly reformulated the theatrical existentialism of absurdness, probably influenced by Patočka, or Heidegger, who also represented existentialism, but rather its phenomenological variety. The result was a specific theory of dissidentism, which we know mainly from *The Power of the Powerless*.

In his well-known example, Havel tells a story of a greengrocer putting an ideological poster with "Workers of the World, Unite!" in his shop-window. What is absurd about this situation? First, the greengrocer is placing the poster without giving it much thought; in fact, he does not give a damn what it says, and he is not alone in that. A typist, for example, who perhaps wants to buy some produce and looks into the shop-window, does not even notice it; as a matter of fact, she does not care – she wants to buy vegetables and nothing else interests her. However, Havel claims that the greengrocer's obliging indifference and the typist's unconcerned tolerance are the sources of power of the "normalisation" regime, which both of them probably dislike, but help maintain by their behaviour. We can see the behaviour of the greengrocer and the typist is absurd, as they are doing something that they do not want to do and are not interested in, thus maintaining the power which is a nuisance for them. Unmasking this absurdness means seeing the hollowness of ideological rituals of the "normalisation" socialism and the manipulation power of socialist consumerism. Freedom is born out of rejection. One "must" decide, as Havel says, one "must" step out of living in lie and discover the appeal of living in truth. On the other hand, a life of obliging indifference and unconcerned tolerance guarantees everyday livelihood securities to people; they can comfortably sell and buy vegetables, look at TV in the evening, and holiday at the Black Sea. As soon as someone decides to disagree and becomes a dissident, he or she will voice the absurd truths and will live in truth, but the offended political power, which possesses means of coercion of various types and varieties, will wilfully intervene; the everyday life securities will be lost and he or she, being a dissident, will live his/her life unsecured, facing the absurdness of the political regime deliberately.

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of, for instance, Petr Pithart, or reformist Communists, for that matter, were different. Only the third point is specific for Havel's anti-politics.

8   There is no room for a more detailed explanation. Suffice is to point out Kant's Constitutional Liberalism and theoretical efforts to clearly separate morality and legality (and politics) and to assign a distinctive principle of human behaviour in the form of law, rightness and freedom to each. There is nothing anti-political about it.

Confronting the coercion mechanism is therefore also absurd. This step cannot be explained in "everyday" terms, such as utility or rationality, not to speak of the economy of human behaviour. The decision to live in truth is actually absurd, as if from a different world; we already know that it is born out of the moral world of anti-politics. Havel thus often speaks about the folly of dissidents.

We should not overlook the fact that these reflections and deliberations significantly changed the previous existential concept of the absurd. The absurdness no longer means the existential exposure to nothingness, as we know it from the atheistic existentialism of the 1960s. The anti-politics now reveals a world, perhaps a bit absurd, but a world in which some things are worth suffering for, as the well-known sentence of Patočka says. It is thus perhaps more appropriate to talk about Platonism, which sees a world of paragons of moral ideas behind the visible world of "normalisation" shadows. This Platonism, however, is not contemplative, but activist and political or, more accurately, politically anti-political.

Moral renaissance with a political intention is of course something quite different from real political action. It is here that the last reasons why dissident Havel was rejecting direct political action and kept insisting on affecting political power indirectly can be looked for,[9] although he was also adverting to the concept of civic society which he perceived as a parallel *polis*. He saw anti-politics as the basis of a community which is, first and foremost, a society of people living in truth. The political change was not a direct implication. As written in *The Power of the Powerless*: "This power does not participate in any direct struggle for power; rather, it makes its influence felt in the obscure arena of being itself."[10] It is therefore hardly surprising that the above also implies a conviction that the anti-political moral community stands above all temporal and political orders, be they in the West or in the East, and we cannot achieve fulfilment in any of them.

Suk's Political Screening of Havel's Anti-Politics

We have already mentioned that the melodramatic comedy concept allowed Jiří Suk to avoid any teleology of history in the interpretation of Havel's political biography. However, the political *telos* of the story was not lost, as we follow how a dissident's word becomes a political power. This methodological assumption makes the Velvet Revolution a political *causa finalis*. Thus, an absurd drama aka political comedy resulting in a democratic revolution? Why not! In Suk's rendition, however, the revolutionary politicum retransforms the meanings of the absurdness

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9   As written in *The Power of the Powerless*: "These movements, therefore, always affect the power structure as such *indirectly*, as a part of society as a whole, for they are primarily addressing the hidden spheres of society, since it is not a matter of confronting the regime on the level of actual power." (*Ibid.*, p. 310.) It was not a question, but a principle arising from anti-politics.

10   *Ibid.*, p. 251.

under the "normalisation," when moral resistance of a dissident becomes a political power during a revolution. In Václav Havel's biography, we can therefore watch how political history asserts itself as a continuity; this approach gives the book a unifying perspective, but sometimes irons out some ideological seams and period discrepancies. I would like to briefly mention three such situations of discontinuity which have been screened out of Suk's work, namely: 1) it ignores Havel's certain aloofness vis-à-vis politics of Western democracies, and even vis-à-vis the regime of liberal democracy itself; 2) Havel's hesitation at the time when politicisation of the dissident movement was the order of the day has remained unexplained; and 3) it underappreciates the turning point in the concept of anti-politics, when Václav Havel became a political leader and used real politics tools and means in the fight for power.

1) Post-Totalitarianism and/or Post-Democracy

The anti-politics as professed by Havel was supposed to ultimately bring people to an existential human order which "no political order can replace," as written in *The Power of the Powerless*.[11] In this respect, the anti-politics was a starting point for criticising not only "real socialism," but also liberal democracy. As we watch the book unfold and a dissident's word becoming a political power in plots of Husák's comedic drama ending in the victory of liberal democracy, it is obvious that the certain aloofness which dissidents were showing toward Western democracy remains left out; although it is somehow understandable in a biography like this, as Havel's life was indeed predominantly a confrontation between a dissident and the communist dictatorship, with the anti-communist orientation giving a direction to all Havel's efforts.

In this respect, an important thing was that Havel identified himself with the concept of post-totalitarianism in his reflections on anti-politics elaborated in *The Power of the Powerless*. The issue was, after all, the end of the communist rule, although, in Havel's perception, not due to a political action, but by a "diversion" into the moral world of anti-politics, which was to have its political implications in some way and somehow. Nevertheless, in addition to the main line of thoughts about post-totalitarianism, Havel also ventured into the realm of post-democracy, where he professed Martin Heidegger and his concept of a crisis of democracy in the West. The result is a political fumbling of sorts when Havel contemplates a "political" system that would replace the communist post-totalitarianism. He is looking, vaguely and unclearly, for a potential political solution in civic self-government under the heading of a self-organisation of society, which can be seen as a rather peculiar echo of anarcho-syndicalism in Havel's thinking, here "surprisingly" set into the ideas of the early 20th century German conservative revolution about the decline of the West. Parliamentary democracy is experiencing a crisis, says Havel and, inspired by Heidegger, he claims: "[…] it would appear that the traditional

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11   *Ibid.,* p. 324.

parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the automatism of technological civilisation and the industrial-consumer society […]."[12]

Yet, Havel does not place the crisis of Western democracies at the same level as the post-totalitarian regimes of the late communist era. Still, he obviously views parliamentary democracy "only" as an interim, a useful and pragmatic solution which, however, cannot stand up to the requirements of the anti-political life in truth. As he himself says: "Of course […] the traditional parliamentary system with the usual spectrum of large political parties might be an appropriate transitional solution […]."[13] He uses similar arguments in the Anatomie jedné zdrženlivosti [Anatomy of a Reticence]: "[…] to consider the current situation as symmetrical, in the sense that both colossi are equally dangerous, appears to me a monstrous oversimplification. Yes, both are dangerous, but each in a different way; they definitely are not dangerous in the same way."[14] Havel's post-totalitarianism understandably deals with the danger of late Communism, in which ideology became a shallow horizon of everydayness and dictatorship joined forces with consumerism. The aspect of post-democracy mentioned above certainly does not belong to the main line of the story, but it is important, as it influenced Havel's later thinking.

2) Pitfalls of the Politicisation of Dissent in 1989

At the end of the 1980s, non-communist political opposition was increasingly heard in communist countries of Central Europe. The politicisation of dissent was the order of the day also in Czechoslovakia. After the so-called Palach Week in January 1989, it became obvious that Husák's "normalisation" dictatorship was confronted with a political activity of citizens which rough repressions would not be able to stop, as they provoked an even higher level of public aversion. Various independent civic associations were emerging and petitions were being circulated, which could not be kept within limits of the ostracised dissident movement. In a way, this was the decisive moment of Jiří Suk's story of a dissident's word becoming a political power. This is the reason why Jiří Suk approaches these issues thoroughly and carefully. Of course, he has to deal somehow with the fact that Václav Havel hesitated to set out on this road of political activism. Suk sees Havel's hesitation as vacillation and inappropriate reticence. However, I believe he is rather short of understanding for Havel's reasons, as accepting the role of a political leader was not at all easy. Jiří Suk suddenly sees him through the eyes of young dissidents who indeed wanted to be political activists. In his interpretation, it is therefore Ivan Lamper, who published an interview with Václav Havel about why he had called off a demonstration on the anniversary of the August occupation in the *Sport* samizdat magazine,[15] who

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12   *Ibid.,* p. 322.
13   *Ibid.,* p. 323.
14   HAVEL, Václav: Anatomie jedné zdrženlivosti. In: IDEM: *Spisy* [Collected Works], Vol. 4, pp. 523–561, here p. 556.
15   "Terén, na který nikdy nevstoupím" ["The terrain I Will Never Step On"]: An Interview of Václav Havel by Ivan Lamper. In: *Sport: Časopis pro kulturní a společenskou informaci*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 6–11 (samizdat).

had the main say. Jiří Suk believes that irritation can be felt in Havel's words and that Havel did independent initiatives an injustice; however, I think that Suk rather underrates the magnitude of the change the acceptance of political agenda meant for Havel's opinions. It is certain that the change cannot be expressed in simple terms, as a transition from "step one" to "step two," as written in the book (pp. 380–383). The direct politicisation of anti-politics was a crucial and painful theme for Havel.

Václav Havel ultimately chose a bit different role for himself out of all this – a "role of a mediator of understanding, not just within the differentiated opposition, but also during anticipated round table negotiations with the power," to use the words of Jiří Suk (p. 381). However, the role of the political mediator between citizens and rulers still fit the job description of a "kingmaker," which meant it complied with the modified anti-political condition set by Havel, who had earlier claimed he preferred being a "kingmaker" to being a "King." Something dramatic in Havel's concept of anti-politics changed, and we do not know exactly what. It was not a question of tactics or concerns, but one of principles. Havel's non-political politics acquired a new meaning, which was determining *pro futuro*.

3) Revolutionary Politics

We have been able to see that Havel's anti-politics is intrinsically individualist, existentialist ethics which draws a sharp line between morals and politics. But the democratic revolution made Václav Havel face the role of a political leader which, however, meant stepping across the border of the anti-politics, as he had perceived it earlier, and do politics in the world of power and rule over people, using mechanisms of coercion, political competition and power coalitions, i.e. living in the world he had so far been rejecting. Jiří Suk narrates details of this transformation which, in his opinion, was determining the dynamics of the revolution very perceptively.

In broad terms, it is possible to say that he describes the transformation as a moderated development from indirect power of citizens pushing the communist government toward a change to a direct acquisition of political power. The development, however, was increasingly activist, so it is rather misleading to present it as if it had taken place in cycles, which Jiří Suk does when first referring to events of the revolution under the heading "They Want to Dominate, but They Do Not Yet Want to Rule," and later switching to "They Do Not Want to Dominate, but They Want to Rule." Suk's narration culminates in the description of the real politics which Václav Havel and the Civic Forum started implementing when they wanted Havel to be elected President by the Federal Assembly. It is an excellent narration, succinct and concise, fair and showing understanding of the motives of principal actors of the political drama, as it draws a picture of the political struggle for the victory of the democratic revolution in front of our eyes. The moral content of anti-politics turns into political rhetoric in a struggle for the power.

It is symptomatic that the most frequent terms used in the narration still are "real politics" and "absurdness." However, both have gotten different meanings. Revolutionary citizens, or "the street," as mentioned therein in a positive sense, are more or less a background of proposals and actions of political actors. The

question is how to interpret the transformation of Václav Havel into a real politician for whom the street is a backdrop for negotiations, but who still professes the existential morality of his anti-politics. As he says in a radio interview in which he was presenting himself as a presidential candidate to the public: "If I make it to the Castle, I will speak only the truth. Nothing can make me a liar. The prison did not make me a liar, and neither will the presidential office."[16] Nevertheless, can a combination of real politics and the above moral maxim actually be credible? In this respect, Suk's historical narration about a dissident's word becoming a political power feels a bit embarrassing, as if we were supposed to be offended by some things.

However, is there any other way to capture the political dimension of Havel's anti-politics during the democratic revolution? I think that the concept of ethical populism helps better understand this transformation of Havel's anti-politics, so that it seems to be a more suitable interpretation framework than the heterogeneous combination of realism and morality.[17] Yet, the term "populism" as used here does not mean an ideology, not to speak of being used as a pejorative attribute, as kowtowing or pandering to popular masses. The term denotes a political style in which a political leader "directly" represents citizens, creating a public political space outside government institutions, the parliament or political parties, his role being that of a unifier of the will of people, as existing political institutions and ruling political elites no longer represent them. I think that Suk's narration contains many situations showing Václav Havel using exactly this political style, both at mass rallies of citizens during the democratic revolution and in the backstage, during negotiations concerning the acquisition of political power. When negotiating with representatives of the communist power, he was always backed by public power of citizens which he was able to mobilise and make use of in real politics. On the other hand, Suk's interpretation perhaps "demonises" too much the role of Marián Čalfa, as if it were him who taught Havel the "bad" real politics.

The concept of ethical populism explains how anti-politics can be used to make a revolution. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to see that the anti-politics has changed beyond recognition in the process. The changes can be summarised as follows. The first of them was the place where the truth about the mechanisms of the ruling power was being disclosed. Initially, when the topic was the absurdness of the socialist everydayness, the disclosure was taking place on the stage of an absurd theatre. Then it was anti-politics as individualistic ethics of living in truth against life in lie at the time of Husák's "normalisation." In the end, the venue of the disclosure was the public space of the democratic revolution in which Václav Havel was acting as a populist political leader against communist power holders.

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16 Cited according to: SUK, J.: *Politika jako absurdní drama*, p. 391.

17 For details refer to M. Znoj: Václav Havel, His Idea of Civil Society, and the Czech Liberal Tradition, in M. Kopeček, P. Wcislik: *Thinking Through Transition. Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts, and Intellectual History in East Central Europe after 1989*, Budapest – New York, CEU Press 2015.

Instead of a Conclusion

Havel's presidency is remarkable in that the language of the absurd was always present to some extent. The example is the strange stubbornness of Havel's insistence on the phrase "Truth and love will prevail over lie and hatred." When reminding it as President, it was always with a touch of flamboyancy, mild irony, and a lot of provocation – he did it as if to shove it in the face of all real politicians.

   In this regard, the neon heart by Jiří David installed atop the Prague Castle, the seat of Czech kings and presidents, at the time Havel was leaving the post, is indeed an idea of a genius. Of the ancient concept of theatrical absurdness, it retained a somewhat special nature, plus a touch of childishness expressed by the almost funfair-like heart; still, in spite of all the absurd childishness, we feel it is meant dead seriously. David's neon heart atop the Prague Castle summarises Havel's presidency more fittingly than Havel's own play *Leaving*, which is in fact an estheticising resignation of Havel's morality to politics. It would, however, be a poor legacy. Jiří Suk's book, however, presents us with a much livelier rendition of Havel's theme and, moreover, is an excellent example of thorough and meticulous historical work.

Summaries

Essays and articles

The British, the Americans, and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943

Vít Smetana

The Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on 12 December 1943 in Moscow had a fundamental impact on the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy at the end of the war and in the years that followed. At the same time, the lengthy negotiations in 1943, which ultimately resulted in signing the treaty in question, were one of the few moments during the war when Czechoslovakia became the object of an opinion clash between the Great Powers. In this study, which is based primarily on British and US documents (some of which have not been used before), the author analyses in detail the role of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty project in the policies of the two Western powers until the signing of the document, before assessing the impact of the treaty in concern on Czechoslovakia's relations with the United Kingdom and the United States at the end of the war. He points out that neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to conclude a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia since both Western powers wanted the international security system to be based on foundations different from those which had repeatedly failed during the previous three decades. However, the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty dramatically reduced any chance for a federative or confederative arrangement in the region of Central Europe, as well as hopes for a multilateral treaty of alliance ensuring security in this region. For this reason, it was accepted without enthusiasm both in London and in Washington.

Renegades, Traitors, Murderers in White Coats
*The Image of the "Jew" as the "Enemy" in the Propaganda
of the Late Stalinist Period*

Kateřina Šimová

When Stalinism was at its peak, between 1948 and 1953, there was a marked escala-
tion in anti-Jewish manifestations by the Soviet regime, which has often been called
"state," "official," or "Stalinist" antisemitism. This article endeavours to provide an
account of this by analysing the image of the "Jew" in the propaganda of the time.
The basis for the analysis is the concept of the "image of the enemy" as a basic
figure of the totalitarian ideological canon. The article traces the way in which the
image was filled with meanings linked with the term "Jew." To this end, the author
employs the so-called semiotic textual analysis, which enables her to gradually
uncover the character of the signs in the propagandistic language. She focuses on
two propaganda campaigns that dominated the Soviet public space in this period.
One was against so-called "cosmopolitanism," from January to March 1949; the
other was the so-called "Doctor's Plot" from January to March 1953. The method
in concern enables her to provide evidence of the anti-Jewish orientation of the
campaigns, which have so far been deduced chiefly from quantitative lists of acts of
repression against specific individuals of Jewish descent. Analysis of the semantic
field of the image of the "Jew" then reveals the mechanisms that, because of the
many layers of the sign character of this image, were used to provide reasons for
the home and foreign policies of the Soviet regime, as well as to justify its problems
at home and abroad. The last part of the article consists of conclusions that the
author finds applicable to the Czechoslovak case at that time.

The Tool of Power Legitimisation and Guardianship
*Social Policy and Its Implementation in the Pension Systems of Czechoslovakia and
the German Democratic Republic (1970–1989)*

Tomáš Vilímek

The article deals with the topic of socialist social policy as a special feature and an
extremely important instrument of legitimating power and of guardianship. Draw-
ing on his extensive archival research, the author compares the starting points of
the social-policy measures of the Czechoslovak and the East German CP leader-
ships from 1970 to 1989. He discusses the fundamental systemic prerequisites and
ambitions of social policy, points out the limits of economic policy, and outlines
the individual stages in the development of social policy in the two countries in
the period under scrutiny. The focal point of the article is a systematic comparison
of the development of pension plans, to which the political establishment in each
country paid considerable attention. Providing social security to their senior citizens

was a serious problem for both regimes right up to late 1989, and the implemented measures were only partly successful in dealing with it. The article identifies the pitfalls of retirement insurance, and takes into account the standard of living of pensioners in both countries. From his research, he concludes that old-age pensions were the Achilles' heel of East German Socialism. The unanticipated circumstances of senior citizens, the tangible decline in their standard of living, the considerable employment of people of a post-productive age, and the continuous violation of the publicly declared principle of merit are, however, among the problems the Czechoslovak regime also struggled with throughout the years of reinstating hard-line Communism in the post-1969 policy of "normalisation."

Zdeněk Mlynář and the Search for Socialist Opposition
From an Active Politician to a Dissident to Editorial Work in Exile

Alessandro Catalano

The presented essay was originally published as "Il samizdat tra dialogo e monologo: Le attività editoriali di Zdeněk Mlynář e la scelta degli interlocutori" in the Italian online journal *eSamizdat: Rivista di culture dei paesi slavi* (2010–11, pp. 261–80). This double issue is based on papers given at the conference "Samizdat between Memory and Utopia: Independent Culture in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century," which was held at Padua University in late May and early June 2011, and is freely accessible on the periodical website (http://www.esamizdat.it/rivista/2010-2011/index.htm). For its publication in *Soudobé dějiny*, the author has considerably expanded his essay, particularly after doing research in the Mlynář Papers deposited in the National Archive, Prague.

The author concentrates mainly on the research and publishing activities of the politician and political scientist Zdeněk Mlynář (1930–1997) while he was in exile, which he puts into a detailed chronology of his career as a public figure. He asks and seeks to answer the general question whether the milieu of samizdat and independent publishing, which developed in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, did or did not leave deep traces also in the structures of the various political activities of those who criticised the state-sanctioned arts and sciences of "normalisation" Czechoslovakia.

The author points out that Mlynář has today been largely ousted from Czech historical memory, even though he was amongst the leading opponents of the regime after its collapse, and tried to regain a place in Czechoslovak politics. The author recalls Mlynář's becoming a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, his law studies in Moscow in the first half of the 1950s, where he formed a lasting friendship with his fellow-student Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), and last but not least Mlynář as an expert researching the prospects of the socialist political system in the 1960s. He then concentrates on Mlynář's work during the Prague Spring of 1968, when he became a member of the reformist leadership of the Communist

Party on the side of Alexander Dubček (1921–1992). After the August intervention by the armies of five Warsaw Pact states, Mlynář gradually became disillusioned with the possibilities of continuing reform, and he resigned from the Party leadership. In the early 1970s, he found employment in the Department of Entomology of the National Museum, Prague, and avoided political life completely. Nevertheless, he gradually started to take part in debates with other reformists expelled from the Party about the possibilities of influencing developments in Czechoslovakia with the help of left-wing parties in Western Europe. The author discusses Mlynář's analyses of the situation at the time, the development of his views, and his integration into the nascent dissident movement, which appeared after the founding of Charter 77. A few months later, in June 1977 to be precise, Mlynář emigrated to Austria as a consequence of a smear campaign against the Chartists.

The author focuses on Mlynář's close work amongst Czech exiles, particularly with the increasingly diverse *Listy* group, which was established by Jiří Pelikán (1923–1999). The group in question was centred on the exile periodical of the same title, which was published in Rome and formed the core of Czechoslovak socialist opposition in exile. In addition, the author focuses on the efforts of Mlynář and his colleagues to win support among Western left-wing circles, particularly in relation to the Italian Communists and Socialists and later the West German Social Democrats. He also takes into account Mlynář's political essays, which met with a considerable response amongst the public of Western Europe, and the clear shift in opinion from the initial model of a political system with Communist Party hegemony to political pluralism. In this context, the author then gives a comprehensive account of two large research and publishing projects coordinated by Mlynář. The first project, from 1979 to 1982, was entitled "Experiences of the Prague Spring of 1968"; its participants were almost exclusively Czech sociologists, historians, economists, jurists, and other specialists in exile. The project resulted in almost 30 mimeographed volumes in three language versions (mostly Italian, French, and English), which were distributed by several hundred carefully selected left-wing individuals and institutions in the West, and it culminated in a congress held in Paris. According to the author, this little known project represents one of the most profound and essentially never-published reflections on the origins, development, and failure of the Prague Spring. The second project, entitled "Crises in Soviet-type Systems," ran from 1982 to the late 1980s, and presented the perspectives of authors from a wider range of central European countries. It resulted in 16 works by Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and East German authors, published by the leading Czech exile publishing house, Index, as small paperback editions in English, French, and indeed German. The number of its subscribers grew to about 2,000. Part of the project was presenting papers at conferences and other international forums. Both of the projects in question, according to the author, demonstrate Mlynář and his colleagues' persistent orientation to exclusive circles of the political Left in the West, whom, in their efforts to change things in Czechoslovakia, they preferred to the dissidents still in Czechoslovakia.

The War Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Phenomenon of Ethnic Cleansing

Ondřej Žíla

The article is deals with ethnic cleansing, that is, the violent methods that constituted the central element of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. The article aims to show the fatal consequences of the military operations that were conducted with the aim of the ethnic homogenisation of the individual territories, and were rooted in the differences in the demographic development of the constituent peoples (the Serbs, Croatians, and Muslim Bosniaks) of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the outbreak of the conflict and the impact of this development on the transformation of the ethnic composition of the individual regions. After defining the terms "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide," the author analyses the character and extent of the violent local homogenisation that led to the greatest refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. On the basis of a summary of the individual stages of the ethnic cleansing during the war from 1992 to 1995, the author seeks to demonstrate that the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina at first erupted mainly in places that had, during the last two decades before the breakup of Yugoslavia, manifested the most striking changes in the ethnic representation of the constituent nations (chiefly the Eastern Orthodox Serbs and the Muslims). In the second part of the text, the author focuses on analysing the strategic interests of the elites of the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks and the forms these interests took during the violent ethnic homogenisation of the territory under their military control.

Prague Chronicle

Ninety Years of the Fruitful Life of Lenka Kalinová (1924–2014)

Václav Průcha

The author sums up the life and career of Lenka Kalinová (1924–2014), who was for a long time the leading authority on the social history of Czechoslovakia, particularly of the years after the Second World War. In the 1960s, she established and led a team of scholars to analyse the social structure of Czechoslovakia as it had developed from 1918 onward. In 1970, she lost her job, but in the following years worked with specialised institutions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and eventually also published intensively in both countries. New opportunities opened up for her in the early 1990s, when she began to work closely with the Institute of Contemporary History, part of the Czech Academy of Sciences. In consequence of her years of work in the field of theory of social and economic history,

she published two syntheses in which she made good use of a great deal of facts in order to identify and explain basic trends in Czech society and politics from 1945 to 1993.

Re-Thinking the Revolution

Petr Kužel

The report describes a two-day conference organised on the 25th commemoration of the collapse of the communist regimes in East Central Europe entitled "1989: Thinking Revolution," held in Prague in September 2014. It characterises five main panels focusing respectively on the character of the revolution (democratic, liberal, or neoliberal?), the phenomenon of post-dissidence and the memory of Communism, the transformation of the disciplines of Sovietology, the evolution of the theories of Soviet-type societies and, finally, the second life of the 1968 Prague Spring in 1989. The main aim of the conference was to historicise the theoretical concepts employed in the hitherto reflections of 1989 in the region.

Book Reviews

Křesťan's Nejedlý (With a Small Addition)

Jiří Křesťan's *Zdeněk Nejedlý: Politik a vědec v osamění* [Zdeněk Nejedlý: A Politician and Scholar All Alone]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka, 2012, 569 pp.

Petr Čornej

The author assesses Jiří Křesťan's biography of Zdeněk Nejedlý (1878–1962), which won the prestigious Magnesia Litera prize in the category of non-fiction in 2013, as the most detailed, largest, factually reliable, and clearly the best biography of this figure of Czech history written so far. He points out some of the traditional legends, which Křesťan, thanks to his almost exhaustive and honest research, has been able to debunk. Křesťan offers an exceptionally thorough treatment of the subject, particularly Nejedlý's fortunes in the first Czechoslovak Republic and, in a completely new way, his wartime exile in the Soviet Union. In his endeavour to be fair, however, Křesťan, according to Čornej, occasionally idealises Nejedlý and goes too far in his *Vorverständnis* approach to the primary sources. Křesťan is chiefly interested in Nejedlý the citizen and politician, while leaving almost completely aside Nejedlý the historian and musicologist. To these aspects of Nejedlý's work Čornej devotes a greater part of his article. He outlines the phases of Nejedlý's career as a scholar and, for the period before the First World War, he emphasises

Nejedlý's combining empirical-critical methods with psychological ones, as appears, among other places, in his works about Richard Wagner and Gustav Mahler. Čornej considers Nejedlý's growing closer to the Communist Movement between the world wars and how this is reflected in his scholarly works after 1945, when Nejedlý began to hold high political office. Nejedlý's efforts to link together historical and cultural models, based on the Czech National Revival of the 19th century, together with Stalinist Marxism did not, however, according to Čornej, seem either organic or convincing, and ultimately had only an insignificant impact on Czech historiography.

Disgruntled Fighters against Tito

Přemysl Houda

Vojtěchovský, Ondřej: *Z Prahy proti Titovi! Jugoslávská prosovětská emigrace v Československu* [From Prague against Tito! Yugoslav Pro-Soviet Emigration in Czechoslovakia]. Praha. Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy, 2012, 695 pp.

The publication in question describes the live of almost 200 Yugoslav political exiles, who, after the dispute between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948, settled permanently in Czechoslovakia, where they could manifest their loyalty to Stalin and opposition to Josip Broz Tito. The reviewer appreciates the depth with which the author discusses the microcosm the exiles lived in, which in some respect resembled a ghetto, and he presents a vivid picture of the ideology and the atmosphere, fraught with passion, of the founding phase of the communist regimes. Delving into the "Yugoslav Question," he casts light on some relations and mechanisms in the operation of the dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, and it is this second dimension, at least according to the reviewer, which elevates the work clearly above the usual standards. One of the marked weak points, according the reviewer, is the absence of a theoretical basis of interpretation.

A Fruitful Asymmetry
A Precise Book on Cultural Exchange across the Iron Curtain

Soňa Mikulová

Lizcová, Zuzana: *Kulturní vztahy mezi ČSSR a SRN v 60. letech 20. století* [Cultural Relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and West Germany in the 1960s]. Praha, Dokořán – Fakulta sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy, 2012, 194 pp.

The book under review discusses cultural and cultural-political developments in Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the 1970s, with the main focus on the 1960s. In the spirit of

new political history and new cultural history, the author explores the role of high-level politics and social groups outside the state structures, mainly the creators and consumers of cultural products that became an object of exchange between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic. The book also casts light on how these processes and events were commented on in contemporary press, and seeks to provide an overall picture of the expressions of culture in the political, social, and economic climates in both countries. Main emphasis is put on film and the fine arts, and particularly on the extraordinary importance of mutual cultural exchanges between the two countries at a time when no diplomatic relations existed between them.

Socialist Friendship between Indestructible Unity and a Press War

Michal Pullmann

Zimmermann, Volker: *Eine sozialistische Freundschaft im Wandel: Die Beziehungen zwischen der SBZ/DDR und der Tschechoslowakei (1945–1969)*. Essen, Klartext, 2010, 639 pp.

This publication by a German historian focuses on the relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet-occupied zone in Germany and later the German Democratic Republic in the first 25 years after the end of the Second World War. The reviewer is impressed by the breadth of the material covered here, which goes beyond diplomatic and institutional relations in general, and includes relations in the arts and sciences, amongst the youth, and trade unions, as well as travel. It thereby penetrates the mental world, motivations, interests, and strategies of various actors. The book's main outcome, according to the reviewer, is the conclusion that there had been considerable space for creating mutual relations and articulating distinctive interests within the existing ideological and political bounds. In like manner, one must appreciate the finding that the German Democratic Republic was diplomatically far more on the offensive than Czechoslovakia in the 1960s.

Havel's Anti-Politics à la Different Modes

Milan Znoj

Suk, Jiří: *Politika jako absurdní drama: Václav Havel v letech 1975–1989* [Politics as an Absurd Drama: Václav Havel in the Years 1975–1989]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka, 2013, 447 pp.

In the presented essay, the author first takes into consideration some of the sources of inspiration and interpretative frameworks of Suk's book, which have led the author, Znoj, to consider the theme of the absurdity of the socialist world as a component

of Havel's work as a dramatist and a dissident. In a nutshell, the author argues that the anti-politics of the "normalisation" period of the 1970s and 1980s took the place of the theatre of the absurd of the 1960s. He then describes anti-politics as the construction of a moral world that maintained a distance from the existing political order, and he points out its main features and analyses the meaning of that distance by considering Havel's well-known essay, "The Power of the Powerless" (1978). Suk's book, according to the author, is the story of how the dissident's word became political power. Suk, he argues, has thus demonstrated that he is the best historian of Havel's dissidence and the end of the regime led by Husák. The book in question is a solid historical work based on a thorough examination of the sources, but its author has gone beyond mere positivism; he has developed a suitable theoretical framework for historical interpretation. The result casts a penetrating light on recent Czech history. Suk's emphasis on historical continuity gives the interpretation a unifying perspective while, according to the author, papering over some of the seams and smoothing out some of the conflicts of the period. First, Suk has omitted Havel's distancing himself from Western democracies when he was a dissident, even his distancing himself from liberal democracy per se. Second, he has underestimated Havel's reluctance to politicise the dissident movement when the matter was being hotly debated in 1989. And, third, Suk appears not to have fully appreciated Havel's sudden change in his conception of "anti-politics," which meant Havel's becoming a political leader and using the methods of realpolitik in the struggle for power.

Authors

Alessandro Catalano (1970) graduated with a degree in Czech Studies from Sapienza University, Rome. He lectured on Czech literature at Florence and Pisa, and is now Professor of Czech Literature at Padua University. His chief areas of research are early modern Czech history, Czech-Italian relations, and modern Czech literature. He has also translated works from Czech, for example, those written by Bohumil Hrabal, Jiří Kolář, Vítězslav Nezval, and Michal Viewegh. Together with Simone Guagnelli, he edits the online journal *eSamizdat*. His publications include *Sole rosso su Praga: La letteratura ceca tra socialismo e underground (1945–1959)* (Rome, 2004; in Czech: *Rudá záře nad literaturou* [Red Glow over Literature], Brno, 2009) and *La Boemia e la riconquista delle coscienze: Ernst Adalbert von Harrach e la Controriforma in Europa centrale (1620–1667)* (Rome, 2005; in Czech: *Zápas o svědomí* [Struggle for Conscience], Prague, 2008).

Petr Čornej (1951) is a professor of history. He currently works at the Josef Škvorecký Literary Academy, Prague (of which he was rector from 2006 to 2010). He is also a scholar at the Institute of Czech History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, and he likewise lectures within the Department of History and History Teaching, at the Faculty of Education, Charles University, Prague. His chief research interests are Bohemian history in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Age, particularly the Hussite movement, interpretations of historical traditions, the history of Czech historiography, and the life and works of Zdeněk Nejedlý. Apart from many popular-history books and articles, his publications include *Tajemství českých kronik: Cesty ke kořenům husitské tradice* [The Secret of Czech Chronicles: Pathways to the Roots of the Hussite Tradition] (Prague, 1987; expanded edition 2003), *Lipanská křižovatka: Příčiny, průběh a historický význam jedné bitvy* [The Lipany Crossroad: Causes and Historical Consequences of One Battle] (Prague, 1992), *Lipanské ozvěny* [Lipany Echoes] (Prague, 1995), and *30. 7. 1419: První pražská defenestrace. Krvavá neděle uprostřed léta* [30 July 1419: The First Prague Defenestration. Bloody Sunday in the Middle of Summer] (Prague, 2010).

He is the author of Volume 5 of the *Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české* [Great History of the Lands of the Czech Crown], covering the period 1402–37 (Prague, 2000), and, with Milena Bartlová, a co-author of Volume 6, covering the period 1437–26 (Prague and Litomyšl, 2007). A selection of his essays was published as *Světla a stíny husitství: Události, osobnosti, texty, tradice* [Lights and Shadows of the Hussite Movement: Events, Characters, Texts and Traditions] (Prague, 2011).

Přemysl Houda (1981), a historian and political scientist, lectures on contemporary Czech history at the Faculty of International Studies, University of Economics, Prague, and the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague. His primary research interest is alternative and establishment culture in communist Czechoslovakia. His publications include *Šafrán: Kniha o sdružení písničkářů* [Saffron: A Book about the Association of Songwriters] (Prague, 2008), *Intelektuální protest, nebo masová zábava? Folk jako společenský fenomén v době tzv. normalizace* [Intellectual Protest or Mass Entertainment? Folk as a Social Phenomenon during the So-Called Normalisation] (Prague, 2014), and, together with Jan Rataj, he wrote the textbook *Československo v proměnách komunistického režimu* [Czechoslovakia in the Metamorphoses of the Communist Regime] (Prague, 2010).

Petr Kužel (1982) is a research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. His areas of interests include modern Czech and French philosophy, political philosophy, theories of the subject, and non-substantial ontology. He is the author of a monograph entitled *Filosofie Louise Althussera. O filosofii, která chtěla změnit svět* [Philosophy of Louis Althusser. About Philosophy that Wanted to Change the World] (Prague, 2014).

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
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Mark Kramer – Vít Smetana (ed.): *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain. The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989*. Lanham – Boulder – New York – Toronto – Plymouth (UK), Lexington Books 2014.

This book consists of cutting-edge essays by distinguished experts who discuss the Cold War in Europe from beginning to end, with a particular focus on the countries that were behind the "Iron Curtain". The contributors take account of structural conditions that helped generate the Cold War schism in Europe, but they also ascribe agency to local actors as well as to superpowers. The chapters dealing with the end of the Cold War in Europe explain not only why it ended but also why the events leading to that outcome occurred almost entirely peacefully.

Contributors: Oliver Bange, Csaba Békés, Thomas Blanton, László Borhi, Anne Deighton, Hope M. Harrison, James G. Hershberg, David Holloway, Michael F. Hopkins, Mark Kramer, Richard Ned Lebow, Silvio Pons, Alex Pravda, Peter Ruggenthaler, Svetlana Savranskaya, Bernd Schaefer, Rolf Steininger, Vít Smetana, Georges-Henri Soutou, Soňa Szomolányi, and Oldřich Tůma.

Kateřina Čapková: *Czechs, Germans, Jews? National Identity and the Jews of Bohemia*. **Translated by Derek and Marzia Paton, New York – Oxford, Berghahn Books 2012.**

The phenomenon of national identities, always a key issue in the modern history of Bohemian Jewry, was particularly complex because of the marginal differences that existed between the available choices. Considerable overlap was evident in the programs of the various national movements and it was possible to change one's national identity or even to opt for more than one such identity without necessarily experiencing any far-reaching consequences in everyday life. Based on many hitherto unknown archival sources from the Czech Republic, Israel and Austria, the author's research reveals the inner dynamic of each of the national movements and maps out the three most important constructions of national identity within Bohemian Jewry – the German-Jewish, the Czech-Jewish and the Zionist. This book provides a needed framework for understanding the rich history of German- and Czech-Jewish politics and culture in Bohemia and is a notable contribution to the historiography of Bohemian, Czechoslovak and central European Jewry.

Czech Journal of Contemporary History
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1 In this context, the standardized page numbers 1 800 characters including spaces.
2 Two printed pages are usually equal to three pages as defined in footnote 1.

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