Contact information	CERGE-EI Politických vězňů 7 111 21, Praha 1 Czech Republic	Phone: (+420) 732 502 653 Skype: vojta_b E-mail: vojtech.bartos@cerge-ei.cz Secondary e-mail: bartos.vojta@gmail.com		
Research Interests	Development economics, experimental economics, behavioral economics, econometrics, randomized policy evaluations		metrics, randomized	
GRADUATE EDUCATION	 CERGE-EI¹, Prague, Czech Republic / New York, USA 2010 – preser <i>Ph.D. candidate, Economics</i> Expected Ph.D. graduation: 2015 Dissertation title: Social norms and other-regarding preferences: Experimental evidence from developing countries Supervisor: Michal Bauer Dissertation Committee: Peter Katuščák (CERGE-EI), Randall Filer (Hunter College, NY) 			
	M.A., Economics (2011) Field Courses: Econometrics, Experimental Economics, Law and Economics			
	NYU Wagner ² , New York, USA		Sep – Dec 2014	
	Doctoral Fellow, visiting Prof. Jonathan Morduch			
	Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 2008 – 2010		2008 - 2010	
	 M.A. Economic Theory, 2010 (with distinction) Diploma thesis title: Discrimination, Information and Cognitive Effects: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Czech Rental Housing Market Field Courses: Economics of Least Developed Countries, Labor Economics, Public Finance 			
Undergraduate Education	Charles University, Prague, Cze	ech Republic	2004 - 2008	
	B.A., Economics, 2008 (with di			
	University of Konstanz , Konsta <i>Erasmus Scholarship</i>	anz, Germany	2008	
Working Papers	Bartoš, Vojtěch, Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, and Filip Matějka (2013): Attention discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments. IZA Discussion paper 8058, Bonn, Germany.			
Unpublished Work	Sharing norms during seasonal food shortages: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan. Mimeo.			
	Moral incentives and contract enforcement across ethnicity: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan. Mimeo (with Ian Levely).			
	¹ CERCE ELis a joint workplace of the	Contor for Economic Research and Craduate Educat	ion Charles University	

¹CERGE-EI is a joint workplace of the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. ²New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Services

	Risk sharing and fairness views: Experimental evidence from India. Mimeo (with Tushi Baul and Urmimala Sen).		
Research Presentations and Conferences	 2013: UEA PhD Workshop, London, UK; Spring School in Behavioral Economics, San Diego, USA 2013: GDN Seminar Series, New Delhi, India; 8th Nordic Conference on Behavioral Economics, Stockholm, Sweden; CERGE-EI Brown Bag seminar, Prague, Czech Republic; GDN Summer Workshop, Prague, Czech Republic; Discrimination as a factor of social exclusion, Olomouc, Czech Republic; Equality and non-discrimination in the work of the Ombudsman, Brno, Czech Republic 2012: Field and Lab Experiments in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway; The Thirteenth Annual Global Development Conference by GDN, Budapest, Hungary 2011: IES Seminar Series, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 2010: GDN Summer Workshop, Prague, Czech Republic 		
Grants and Scholarships	CERGE-EI Graduate Teaching FellowshipJan – Jun 2015Fellowship awarded for teaching Development Economics at the University of Economics, Prague		
	CERGE-EI Mobility Fund,Sep – Dec 2014Doctoral Fellowship stay at NYU Wagner		
	Global Development Network , CEE Research Competition Grant no. XIII/11 2013 – 2014 "Sharing norms adherence and enforcement during seasonal food shortages: Experimental evidence from rural Northern Afghanistan" – Principal investigator		
	Grant Agency of Charles University (GAUK) Grant no. 4683132013 – 2015"Sharing norms adherence and enforcement during seasonal food shortages: Experimental evidenceExperimental evidencefrom rural Northern Afghanistan" – Principal investigatorExperimental evidence		
	Global Development Network , CEE Research Competition Grant no. X/105 2010 – 2011 "Discrimination, information and transaction costs in the Czech Rental Housing Market: Field experiment" – Principal investigator		
	Grant Agency of Charles University (GAUK) Grant no. 716102010 - 2011"Discrimination, information and transaction costs in the Czech Rental Housing Market: FieldExperiment" - Principal investigator		
Workshops and Courses Attendee	 2014: Spring School in Behavioral Economics at Rady School of Management, San Diego, CA (with DAlexander Cappelen, Gary Charness, Uri Gneezy, Shachar Kariv, Sally Sadoff, Bertil Tungodden, Lise Vesterlund and others); JPAL101x Evaluating Social Programs online at EdX (with Rachel Glennerster and Marc Shotland, MIT) 2013: Topics in Experimental Economics at LEE, Prague (with Sean Crockett, CUNY); 14.73x The Challenges of Global Poverty online at EdX (with Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee, MIT) 2012: Field and Lab Experiments in Economics at LEE, Prague (with Andrew Schotter, NYU); Econometric Methods for Research in Education at CERGE-EI (with Steven G. Rivkin, Amherst College) 2010: Workshop on Experimental Economics at LEE, Prague (with Bart J. Wilson, Chapman U) 		
Teaching experience	Lecturer 2013: Program evaluation, Data collection in Developing Countries (NGO practitioners; e-learning)		
	 Teaching assistant 2014: Experimental Economics (Ph.D.) 2013: Microeconomics 0 (Ph.D.), Experimental Economics (Ph.D.) 2012: Microeconomics I (B.A.), Program evaluation (M.A.), Microeconomics 0 (Ph.D.) 		

Academic and Working Experience	CERGE-EI , Prague, Czech RepublicJunior Researcher (economic experiments in developing countries)Sep 2013 - present		
	CERGE-EI, Prague, Czech Republic Research/Teaching Assistant (to Michal Bauer, Fabio Michelucci, Peter Katuščák; to GDN CEE hub) Dec 2008 – present		
	Freelance consultant for People in Need, Prague, Czech RepublicConsultancy on (electronic) data collection and impact evaluationsJul 2012 - Apr 2014.		
	Freelance evaluation consultant for People in Need, Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan Assessment of PIN Income Generating Activity programs in rural areas Sept/Oct 2012		
	Freelance evaluation consultant for People in Need, Mazar-i-Sharif, AfghanistanEx-post evaluation of an EC/EuropeAid project in Northern AfghanistanMar/Apr 2012		
	NGO People in Need, Kuito, AngolaProject manager for a rural livelihoods project (volunteering)Aug 2011 - Feb 2012		
	Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Institute of Sociology, Prague, Czech RepublicResearch Assistant to Martin Lux, Ph.D.2010 - 2011		
	National Economic Council of the Czech Government (NERV)Research Assistant to Vladimír Dlouhý, Jiří Rusnok, Tomáš Sedláček, Miroslav Zámečník2009		
Honors and Awards	2010 : M.A. distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an excellent state final examination performance		
	2008 : B.A. distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an extraordinarily good bachelors diploma thesis "Analysis of International Mobile Roaming and the European International Roaming Regulation"		
Membership	Economic Science Association; Group for Analysis of Poverty and Inequality; Global Development Network		
Language Skills	Czech (native), English (proficient user, C2), German (proficient user, C1), Spanish (independent user, B2), Portuguese (basic user, A2), French (basic user, A1)		
References	References available upon request.		

RESEARCH PAPERS Attention discrimination: Theory and field experiments

with Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, and Filip Matějka

We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and a lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. We model how knowledge of ethnicity influences allocation of attention to available information about an applicant. When only a small share of applicants is accepted, negative stereotypes are predicted to lower attention, while the effect is opposite when most applicants are accepted. We test for such "attention discrimination" in three field experiments. We send emails responding to job offers and apartment-rental advertisements and monitor information acquisition, a new feature in this type of experiment. We vary the names of applicants to signal ethnicity and find that minority names are about half as likely to receive an invitation for an apartment viewing or a job interview. The novel finding is that minority names affect the likelihood of resumes being read on the labor market as well as an applicant's personal website being inspected on the housing market, but the effects are opposite across the two markets. These results support the model's assumption of endogenous attention, which magnifies the role of prior beliefs in discrimination. The model implies persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, even if information about individuals is available and there are no differences in preferences, lower returns to employment qualifications for negatively stereotyped groups, and for policy, the important role of the timing of when a group attribute is revealed.

Current state: Published as IZA Discussion Paper no. 8058. Submitted to a journal.

Sharing norms during seasonal food shortages: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan

Seasonal variation in income and consequent food shortages are common in rural areas of many developing countries. While earlier studies have examined various coping strategies of the poor during seasonal shortages, little attention has been paid to the role of individual sharing behavior within rural communities in sustaining repetitive periods of scarcity. In this paper I ask 1) if sharing behavior is stronger during the lean periods, and 2) if sharing in lean periods needs to be more strictly enforced, if at all or if it arises naturally. Further, 3) I examine a link between individual exposure to income fluctuations and sharing behavior. I use simple economic games repeated within-subjects during good and lean periods with farmers in Marghzar and Amrakh regions of Balkh province, northern Afghanistan. The research aims to contribute to our understanding of the evolution and the sustaining of cooperation in human societies exposed to aggregate shocks.

Current state: Two rounds of experimental data collection completed. Data analysis completed. Paper writing stage.

Moral incentives and contract enforcement across ethnicity: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan

with Ian Levely

While it is understood that ethnic fractionalization impedes the formation of formal institutions, it is less well understood how the exogenous introduction of formal institutions affects cooperation between individuals from different ethnic groups. In this paper we examine how the introduction of economic sanctions affects trust and trustworthiness across ethnic groups (Hazara and Tajik) in ethnically segregated peri-urban settlements of northern Afghanistan. We use an artefactual field experiment that includes a trust game as well as a trust game with sanctions, in which Senders have the option of imposing a fine on Receivers who fail to return a requested amount. The design allows us to determine whether 1) discrimination of non-ethnics in levels of trust, trustworthiness, and the willingness to enforce behavior through employment of punishment is present, 2) the introduction of fines produces any 'crowding out' of moral incentives, and 3) if so, whether this is influenced by ethnicity. Preliminary results show that Receivers from both groups tend to honour the implicit contracts by sending back the requested amounts, although they are more likely to do so if matched with co-ethnics. Punishment does not crowd out trustworthiness, rather it increases the likelihood of honouring requests, especially by Hazaras, implying that formal enforcement mechanisms – if available – may be complementary to existing informal mechanisms both within and across ethnic groups. Understanding the role of ethnicity in exogenous introduction of formal institutions is of importance for nation building in ethnically heterogenous societies.

Current state: Experimental data collected. Data analysis completed. Paper writing stage.

Risk sharing and fairness views: Experimental evidence from India

with Tushi Baul and Urmimala Sen

We propose an experiment investigating willingness to share risk among farmers in West Bengal, India. The main emphasis of the study is to understand the differences in fairness views over expost redistribution of resources when the outcomes of risky situations are either fully determined by nature or when the level of risk is – to some extent – under the individuals' control. In other words, whether and how the farmers care about ex-ante opportunities when deciding about ex-post allocations. Second dimension of our study concerns differential redistributive behavior of low versus high caste individuals when dealing with in-group and out-group members. We argue that lower willingness to share with losers responsible for their risky actions might be detrimental to acquisition of new technologies, particularly so in the case of lower caste subjects.

Current state: Preparatory phase. Field work to start in August 2014.