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Political Behavior in Metropolitan Areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 – Patterns, Trends, and the Relation to Suburbanization and Its Socio-Spatial Patterns

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Abstract

The study deals with the political consequences of the suburbanization process in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic after 1989. Aggregate socio-economic data on the level of municipalities are used first for the creation of a typology of suburban communes. Then the electoral turnout in suburban municipalities is studied in relation to their socio-economic, cultural and geographical features. Finally, the effects of suburban development on voting behavior are analyzed. The analyses show that not all features of the political behavior of the suburban population in the Czech Republic follow trends observable in the West, but most relations between socio-economic development and political behavior in suburbs are similar.

Key words

suburbanization, political behavior, participation, party preferences

Politické chování v metropolitních oblastech České republiky v letech 1990 až 2002 – vzorce, trendy a vztahy k suburbanizaci

Tomáš Kostelecký

Abstrakt

Předložená studie se zabývá politickými důsledky suburbanizace ve čtyřech největších metropolitních oblastech v České republice po roce 1989. Nejprve byla na základě analýzy agregátních socio-ekonomických dat a na úrovni obcí vytvořena typologie suburbánních komunit. Následně byly analyzovány souvislosti mezi participací obyvatel ve volbách a socioekonomickými, kulturními a geografickými charakteristikami příměstských obcí. Nakonec byl studován vliv suburbanizace na volební chování. Výsledky analýz potvrzují, že ne všechny rysy politického chování obyvatel suburbánních oblastí v České republice kopírují trendy pozorované na Západě, většina souvislostí mezi sociálně-ekonomickým vývojem v zázemí největších měst a politickým chováním obyvatel je však podobná.

Klíčová slova

suburbanizace, politické chování, participace, volební preference

Das politische Verhalten in den metropolitanen Gebieten Tschechiens in den Jahren 1990 bis 2002 – Muster, Trends und Beziehungen zur Suburbanisierung

Tomáš Kostelecký

Abstraktum

Die vorliegende Studie beschäftigt sich mit den politischen Folgen der Suburbanisierung in den vier größten metropolitanen Gebieten Tschechiens nach 1989. Zuerst wurde auf Grundlage der Analyse der gesammelten sozio-ökonomischen Daten auf Gemeindeebene eine Typologie suburbaner Kommunen erstellt. Anschließend wurden die Zusammenhänge zwischen den Einwohnern, der Wahlbeteiligung und den sozio-ökonomischen, kulturellen und geographischen Charakteristika der suburbanen Gemeinden analysiert. Als letztes wurde der Einfluss der Suburbanisierung auf das Wahlverhalten untersucht. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse bestätigen, dass nicht alle Charakteristika des politischen Verhaltens der Einwohner suburbaner Gebiete in Tschechien die Trends, die im Westen beobachtet werden, kopieren, die meisten Zusammenhänge zwischen der sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung im Umland der größten Städte und dem politischen Verhalten der Einwohner sind jedoch ähnlich.

Schlüsselworte

Suburbanisierung, politisches Verhalten, Partizipation, Wahlpräferenzen

Introduction

The study of urban issues has been one of the major topics of social sciences for decades. This is not surprising, as the process of urbanization, documented across the globe irrespective of differences in culture, religion or political regimes, has resulted in what is historically an exceptionally high percentage of the population living in cities. This rapid urbanization has increased the role of cities in virtually all spheres of society, because it "does not mean only the increase of absolute number and relative share of people living in cities but it is a social process, which affects the whole organization of the society, changing the way of life and relations between people" (Musil 1980). As a consequence, social scientists of various disciplines, including demographers, geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and psychologists, have devoted their expertise to the study of urban space. From the very beginning, the study of cities has followed two basic research designs. The first studies the geographic, social, political, and economic features of cities, contrasting them with those of the countryside. The process of urbanization is studied as it relates to the processes of industrialization and modernization. Usually, whole cities are used as units of observation, sometimes the whole settlement systems (Hampl 1971). The second research design focuses on looking into cities, concentrating on the internal social, economic, and morphologic structures, studying the differences within cities themselves, the internal development of the city, and conflicts over space (Park 1916; Burgess 1925). In this case, the units of observations were smaller – usually city boroughs, administrative districts or neighborhoods. This text basically is concerned with this second research approach.

For a long time, urbanization was a one-way process. Rapid industrialization and continued technological development attracted the formerly agrarian population to the rapidly growing cities. This process, however, could not continue forever, not least because of physical limits on the spatial concentration of people. Thus, both absolute and relative growth of the urban population gradually began to slow, and in the most developed countries the migration flows began to reverse: the population of cities, especially the largest ones, started to shrink. For various reasons, some people living in the big cities started to move outside the city boundaries, though not back to the villages from where their predecessors came but to the newly constructed suburbs. The migration of mostly wealthier families from central cities to the suburbs was made possible by the rapid growth in car ownership rates and massive public investment into the transport infrastructure. In the most developed and urbanized countries, one could see suburbanization beginning as early as the end of WWII. In the United States, by the beginning of the 1960s the number of people living in suburbs was reported to outnumber those staying in central cities (Putnam 2000). Later, in the 1970s and 80s, suburbanization became the most salient feature of urban development in the developed world (van den Berg et al. 1982). Suburbanization had several important consequences for the cities: the separa-

tion of workplace and the place of residence, urban sprawl, an increase in the intensity of personal car congestion in the metropolises, an increase in the spatial segregation of different social groups, fiscal problems for the central cities, jurisdiction fragmentation of metropolitan areas etc. Parallel to suburbanization (and to some extent in conjunction with it), was the emergence of the process of the de-industrialization of the city. Of course, this was a general economic trend, but its impact on cities was significant. The general contraction in industry and the sharp growth of the service sector changed not only the social structure of the inhabitants of the city, but also affected land use, the landscape, and the priorities of local political leaders (Sellers 2002). In the last decades of the 20th century, another process started to shape the face of cities and metropolises: globalization. The increasing interconnectedness of national states, dwindling trade barriers and the growing mobility of capital further affected the development of cities, exposing them to a variety of external factors beyond the control of the local inhabitants (Sassen 1991). Somewhat paradoxically, globalization also proved to have very local effects: the internal polarization of the cities, the sharp division between the wealthy residential areas of the winners in the global economy and the poor neighborhoods of the losers was cited as one of the most telling features of the contemporary metropolis (Marcuse, van Kempen 2000).

The development of cities in Central-East Europe was to some extent modified due to the fact that the respective countries happened to be under Communist rule from the late 1940s to the end of the 1980s. While some of the processes described above proved to be really global in nature and not dependent upon the political and economic regime (e.g. the process of urbanization itself), the nature of Communist economic and planning system to a great extent served to suppress other processes, such as suburbanization and the effect of globalization on cities (Musil 1980; Musil, Ryšavý 1983). The collapse of the Communist regime was thus a turning point in the development of metropolises in the newly emerged post-Communist world (Musil 1993). The regime change was soon followed by economic and social transformation. New parliaments and governments replaced hundreds of old laws and regulations with new ones. Decentralization and the devolution of competencies from the state to municipalities and private subjects, the large scale privatization of the economy, the restitution of most of the housing stock in the inner cities to the hands of the former owners or their heirs, and the liberalization of most prices had the most profound impact on city development (Sýkora 2001; Sýkora 2002). The return of the Czech Republic back to the "Western social and economic world" also facilitated processes that had been to some extent delayed under Communism. The trend of migration from the countryside to the central cities was soon reversed. Čermák (2001) reported that by the mid-1990s central parts of metropolitan areas had already started to lose inhabitants in favor of the suburbs. The impact of globalization was also soon evident, distinguishing Prague from other cities in the Czech Republic. Prague, included among the so called "world cities" (Taylor 2000), has attracted 48.3% of the direct foreign investment in the Czech Republic (Sýkora 2001), the absolute majority of both domestic and international company headquarters (Blažek 2001), and most of the foreign immigrants, from both the West and the East (Drbohlav, Čermák 1998; Burkner, H.-J. 2000).

The majority of the aspects of contemporary post-Communist urban development in the Czech Republic are being thoroughly studied. However, it does seem that one of the consequences has thus far been mostly overlooked: the changes in political behavior that are related directly to the rising polarization in cities, both within the cities and between the central cities and the suburbs. In contrast, in the West the relationship between urban development and politics has attracted consider-

able attention. Globalization is believed to be one reason for the emergence of a "new political culture" in the cities (Clark 2000). It is suspected that suburbanization is one of the key factors behind the general decline in civic engagement that is observed in the United States (Putnam 2000). Residence in the suburbs is linked to transformations in political identification and behavior. Although the precise nature and source of these shifts is not fully understood, they contribute greatly to the ways the territorial context and the practices intrinsic to it shape attitudes and perceptions. Processes of metropolitan segregation appear to be increasing in many European nations as well, which has had a major impact on politics. In particular, stronger and more vocal homeowner associations have emerged in many suburbs, and organizations representing ethnic groups have mobilized in central cities (Sellers 1999, 2002). Suburbanization, which usually comprised both social segregation and jurisdictional division of the metropolitan area at the same time, has especially influenced the political behavior of suburban residents. Most suburbs are independent municipalities. Because their residents tend to be relatively socially homogeneous, most of the conflicts that were usually resolved within municipalities are being transformed into conflicts between local governments (Oliver 2001).

The main objective of this text is to study the territorial differentiation and polarization of political behavior among citizens within metropolitan areas in post-Communist Czech Republic. The basic territorial unit by which local politics is organized is the municipality, and for this reason the municipalities became the basic unit of observation in the project. Readers should also be aware that the content of the text is very much influenced by the fact that it is one of the results of research conducted as part of an international comparative project called "International Metropolitan Observatory Project" (IMO). The project started in 2004 under the guidance of Jefferey Sellers (University of Southern California, United States) and Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot (CERVL-CNRS Bordeaux, France). The project represents the efforts of a large international consortium of research institutions studying governance at different territorial levels, to cooperate and to coordinate their research activities in order to systematically build a database of social and political indicators describing metropolitan areas in a manner that could be utilized for comparative research.

The requirement that the metropolitan areas studied be comparable internationally fundamentally influenced how they were defined in the Czech context. It was decided (see Hoffmann-Martinot, Sellers 2005, for details) that only large metropolitan areas with at least 200,000 inhabitants (core city plus the suburban areas) would be studied. This decision did not pose any substantial problem, as it only served to limit the number of metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic that were studied to the areas around the four largest core metropolitan cities: Prague (1,169,000 inhabitants), Brno (376,000), Ostrava (316,000), and Pilsen (165,000). Of similar importance was the decision regarding the criteria used for delineating the suburban areas. Generally, only municipalities that were functionally connected with the respective core cities of the metropolitan areas were considered part of the suburban area. It was decided that the actual criterion used to distinguish between the suburban municipalities (that would be considered part of the metropolitan area) and the "non-metropolitan" municipalities would be the intensity of daily commuting. Those municipalities where over 30% of the economically active population commuted daily to the core city were considered part of the suburban zone. Thus, in the case of the Czech Republic, the suburban zone of Prague comprised 197 municipalities with a total population of over 174,000; the Brno suburban zone included 132 municipalities with over 138,000 inhabitants; the Ostrava suburban zone 53 municipalities with over 355,000 inhabitants; and the Pilsen suburban area encompassing 81 municipalities with a total population of over 68,000 (for a detailed description of the delineation of the Czech

metropolitan areas, consult either Kostelecký, Čermák 2004, or Kostelecký, Čermák 2005). Although this method for delineating the suburban areas assured the international comparability of the Czech metropolitan data, it may not necessarily be the best solution in the specific Czech case. The 30% threshold is relatively low in the Czech context. The result was that some municipalities included in the suburban zones were not very similar to the archetypal suburbs found in the United States. Owing to the evolution of the dense network of small towns and villages, numerous independent municipalities of different types traditionally surrounded the largest cities. Metropolitan growth thus represented changes in the existing settlements and the forging of closer ties with nearby cities, rather than the growth of the cities themselves, the proper "urban sprawl". Only some of the suburban municipalities were exposed to the suburban migration of the well-to-do from the core cities, to the extent that they were turned into typical affluent bedroom communities. Others, however, became "suburbanized" by the influence of the core city rather than by migration itself; they gradually lost their agricultural character and came to supply the core cities with a work-force, without radical changes to their own population. This process was even hastened by the post-Communist economic transformation that led to the loss of many agrarian and industrial jobs in the countryside but to the increasing needs of service jobs in most of the largest Czech cities. In fact, the development in the largest Czech metropolitan areas, namely suburbanization, has been particularly rapid since 2000, when the combination of low inflation and new offers from privatized banks started the real boom on the mortgage market (Ouředníček 2003). As the most recent available socio-economic data about suburban municipalities is from the last census in 2001, and the last parliamentary and local elections were both held in 2002, the reader should be aware that some aspects of the most recent suburban development could not be analyzed in this text.

The following text is divided into three main parts. In the first part, the focus is on the question of the homogeneity of suburban municipalities. Are all suburbs in the Czech metropolitan areas of the same type or not? Answering this question in the negative leads to the elaboration of the typology of suburban municipalities. The types of suburbs identified in the Czech Republic are compared with the suburban types known from other developed countries. The second part of the text is devoted to the study of electoral participation in the metropolitan areas, its variability and relation to the socio-economic and geographical features of the suburban municipalities. Finally, the third part concentrates on studying the voting patterns and their potential underlying factors.

1. Typology of Suburbs

For a long time, most researchers studying the social, economic and political situation in areas affected by the modern suburbanization process tended to treat suburbs as a rather homogeneous type of environment. When one wrote the word "suburb", readers usually imagined colonies of family homes built in a low population density area outside but not far from the core cities of the metropolitan areas, and that served primarily as a place of residence for their middle and upper middle class inhabitants.[1] It was quite natural, as suburbanization and its consequences was first identified in the United States, that the bulk of both scientific and popular literature about the suburbs described the mainstream model of US suburban development. When the suburbanization processes become visible in other developed industrialized countries around the world, the picture, naturally, become more colorful. Although suburbanization in different states displayed similar features and had similar consequences for the development of the metropolitan areas, not all suburbs around the world necessarily resembled the typical American suburbs (Sellers 2002). Moreover, as the suburbanization process in America lasted for a rather long time and the scientific literature about suburbs was more abundant, even the US situation came to be depicted in a more colorful way (Orfield 2002). Generally speaking: the suburbs should not automatically be identified with a bedroom location for middle and upper class white-collar men that commute daily by car to the core cities, leaving their wives at home to care for their children and the flowers in the garden of their family home.

There can be different types of suburbs. Some of them may be the result of newer trends in the development of the metropolitan areas that were not observable in the phases of suburbanization that gave birth to the classical image of the American suburb. In some metropolitan areas, the exodus of the middle and upper class labor force from the core cities was later accompanied by the exodus of the jobs for such people, from the core cities to the suburbs and the newly established edge cities. In other metropolitan areas, childless professional couples exchanged the potential luxury of their own house with a garden in the suburbs for a luxurious flat in newly gentrified areas in the inner core cities, leaving the less attractive suburbs as the housing alternative for the poorer inhabitants of the metropolitan areas. Some less luxurious suburbs, with a higher percentage of residents

1   We are well aware of the fact that, historically, many different types of suburbs have always existed. At least in the European context the word "suburb" was traditionally used to describe settlements that were developing around large cities in the period of their rapid population growth during the industrialization period. Such suburbs were either accommodating lower class newcomers that were hired as laborers in new industrial developments, or resembled typical north-American suburbs for the rich. Later, however, most lower-class suburbs and some of the upper-class suburbs were incorporated into adjacent cities and became parts of the compact core cities of the future metropolitan areas that are now subjects of our interest.

belonging to minority groups, became the prime target destination for new immigrants of the same ethnic origin (Hoffmann-Martinot, Sellers 2005).

Some of the suburbs that do not resemble the typical image of American suburbs are the result of the historical differences between the United States and many other countries. In Europe, typically in countries with a traditionally dense network of smaller towns and villages, many new suburbs came into existence by the transformation of the already existing settlements rather than being built on the green fields around large metropolitan cities. This is the reason that some suburbs were less homogeneous from the very beginning in terms of their social structure and the physical appearance of the settlement. In some countries, the development of suburban areas was very much affected by town-planning, regional planning, and land-use regulations. Also, the mass construction of social housing, often built on land in suburban municipalities, could lead to specific types of suburbs. In terms of its characteristics, such suburbs bore almost no resemblance to the typical American suburbs apart from the fact that they also served primarily as bedroom communities for the daily commuters to the nearby cities.

Historical developments preceding the suburbanization process in every case affected the forms of suburbanization and also influenced its present social and political consequences. It is even more important to bear in mind the path-dependency of suburban development when one studies development in the post-Communist countries. There, for decades the rules regulating both economic and social development were completely different from those in most developed countries of the world (Kostelecký, Čermák 2005).

1.1 Methodological notes

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the different types of suburban communities around the core cities in four metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic. When trying to identify the different types, one can basically use one of the following strategies. The first is to see if any set of pre-existing types of municipalities already exists, based either on some theoretical considerations or on some previous empirical studies, and try to discover whether and to what extent such types exist in the territories studied. The second approach is used when no types of suburban municipalities are pre-defined; one can then make an exploratory analytical work and create the typology of the suburban municipalities without any relation to the theory or previous empirical work. The first approach has obvious advantages: the researcher knows what he/she is looking for and the results of such a typology may be used for comparative studies in the future. The downside of this approach is that the use of such "model typologies" may be misleading in cases where the "model types" are the results of observation where the context is completely different from that in the studied territories. In the worst case, the use of a model typology leads to the identification of the model types of suburbs, but the model types are not relevant in the local context and some truly substantial differences between nationally specific types of suburbs are left unnoticed. The second approach allows the researcher greater freedom to explore the country specific situation and to create a typology that very precisely describes the situation in the studied metropolitan areas. However, the results of this "country-specific typology" approach may be so specific that it is not useful for any comparative purposes.

It was far from easy to decide which of the two possible approaches to use. Naturally, the first approach was preferable as it would ensure that the Czech results could be used for international comparison. As suburbanization in the Czech Republic is a relatively new phenomenon, no empirical work on suburban municipality types can be found in the Czech scientific literature. So the model types have to be imported from abroad in any case. The coordinators of the International Metropolitan Observatory project suggested using the suburban typology based on the study of American politics in metropolitan areas by Orfield (2002), the analyses of Sellers (1998, 2002) and Walks (2004). In addition to advice on distinguishing outer and inner suburbs, the suggested typology included the following types of suburban settlements:

a) *Affluent bedroom communities* inhabited by middle to upper class communities, of almost exclusively residential character.
b) *Middle-class/working class low density and rapidly developing bedroom suburbs* inhabited by low to middle income groups and characterized by rapid population growth and a high percentage of newly constructed houses.
c) *At-risk middle/working class high-density suburbs,* similar to the previous category, but which can be distinguished by a higher population density. They are older and facing relative decline.
d) *At risk minority/working class suburbs* that are similar to the previous category, but which can be distinguished by large numbers of immigrants and minorities.
e) *Affluent job centers*, characterized not only by well-to-do residents but also by the fact that in these settlements its residential function is supplemented by a greater supply of jobs provided in offices and retail sectors.
f) *University centers* dominated by a local university or college located there.

The suggested types of suburbs certainly capture more of the possible variations among the different types of suburbs than does the traditional picture of the American residential bedroom community, but it is still clear that the typology was primarily based on the observation of a situation that is not very similar to that in the Czech Republic. So there is still the question of the extent to which it is possible to use and/or adapt the typology to the local context of the Czech Republic.

The other methodological problem connected with the "transfer" of suburban types from one national and cultural context to another is more practical. The use and/or replication of the existing typology in a different country is possible only when the same (or at least similar) indicators are available. Every typology is also to some extent the result of the existing data. It can be noted that the typology presented above is based on the observation of a set of indicators that includes: indicators of social status (namely wealth and income…), ethnic structure, commuting patterns, population density and growth, information about the structure and age of housing, and the structures of economic activities. Moreover, all the indicators have to be available at the level of the individual municipalities. The structure of the statistical data that is collected in different countries is also highly path-dependent. Traditionally, most of the data at the municipal level is collected only during the population censuses in the Czech Republic. There were two censuses in the observed period: 1991 and 2001. Unfortunately, not all of the statistical categories used in these two censuses are entirely compatible, as the first one was prepared basically at the end of the Communist period, allowing little time to make adjustments according to the new situation. The other complication is that the extensive splitting of municipalities, a process begun in 1990, had not yet been completed in spring 1991 when the first post-Communist census was organized. Thus, a noticeable portion of the

municipalities that were split between 1991 and 2001, and, as a consequence, the sets of suburban municipalities in 1991 and 2001, are not entirely compatible.

Generally, good and reliable demographic statistics were collected in both censuses; detailed housing statistics also exist (though some categories describing ownership and legal matters are not compatible as they reflect substantive changes in the inter-censal period). Categories for structures of economic activities have changed substantially. Paradoxically, the main problem remains the indicators of social structure. Under Communism, vast statistical data sets about personal incomes were collected (but were not necessarily available at the municipal level), practically no data about poverty existed (why measure poverty in a "poverty-free" society?), and data on class membership was abundant (but after the liquidation of the "bourgeoisie", only two classes in the classical Marxian terms were distinguished: "workers" and "peasants", with the "working intelligentsia" as a special social strata). After the breakdown of the Communist government, the public was very sensitive to the intrusion of the state into the personal sphere, which included resistance to the collection of any income data and a general disregard for the concept of social classes in any form. Thus, although the tax offices later started to collect some personal income data, it was never published. Neither of the two post-Communist censuses included questions about income. Instead, the Czech Statistical Office established a system of income surveys, and the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs developed a system of labor costs reporting for middle-sized and large companies. But neither of the mentioned sources of information provide any data at the municipal level (apart from the four largest cities, which also have the status of administrative district). Moreover, labor cost data collected via the reports of employers are localized to individual districts in accordance with the seat of the company and not the employees' places of residence. In the metropolitan areas, such data about labor costs is mostly assigned to the core city, while many employees may live in the suburbs.

The last technical note concerning the types of suburbs suggested by the IMO project coordinators relates to the fact that in the suggested typology some indicators of suburban diversity were not used. Here we would like to mention specifically the indicators describing the religious affiliation of the population. It is well known from the numerous studies of voting behavior that religious cleavages may be significant in politics. This was traditionally true in countries in Western Europe (Lipset, Rokkan 1967), but it has also been identified as a significant factor in the Central European post-Communist countries (Tóka 1992, Krivý et al. 1996, Kostelecký 2002). We would strongly suggest including data about religious affiliation into the set of criteria by which the typology is created. We are well aware, however, that there is no guarantee that such data is available at the municipal level in all countries.

In the end we decided to use a somewhat combined approach to delineating suburban types in the Czech Republic metropolitan areas. To the extent allowed by the availability of data and the transferability of "model types", we would like to build our typology on the same logic as used to create the "model typology" described above. However, we decided to also include some additional indicators not used in the "model typology" but that could be relevant in distinguishing suburban types in the Czech Republic, and possibly in other countries.

1.2 Types of suburbs in the Czech Republic's metropolitan areas

1.2.1 Which types cannot be identified

Before we present the results of our effort to create a typology of suburban municipalities, we should make some effort to explain which "model types" are not transferable to the context of the Czech Republic for substantive or methodological reasons.

It is immediately clear that one of the suggested types does not exist in the Czech Republic: university centers. Historically, academic establishments were localized in the core of the largest cities. Although the development of new universities in the 20th century led in some cases to universities being located on the outskirts of the existing large cities, none of them were built beyond their administrative boundaries. Even now, fifteen years after the collapse of the Communist regime, the absolute majority of tertiary education is provided by long-established state universities in the core cities of the largest metropolitan areas. Most of the new academic establishments that have come into existence since the change in the regime remain in state hands and were built either in the largest cities or in the regional capitals. The sector of private universities and colleges is still generally highly underdeveloped. Most of the small number of existing private colleges located themselves in the historical parts of the cities in the hope that such a location would help in attracting students from the West who could pay the rather high tuition fees.

Another type of suburb probably not yet found in the Czech Republic is the *at-risk minority/working class suburb*. In this case, doubts about the presence of this type are partly based on substantive differences between the Czech Republic and most other developed countries and partly on methodological problems. Although soon after the regime change the Czech Republic became an immigration country instead of a net emigration country (Drbohlav 2003), the number of immigrants is still relatively low in terms of absolute numbers. Generally, the percentage of inhabitants who can be considered members of some ethnic minority group is still quite low. Only about 6% of Czech Republic inhabitants belong to ethnic minorities at the time of the last population census in the 2001. Moreover, of that number, about one third are Slovaks (most of whom resided in the Czech Republic during the 63 years when Czechoslovakia existed as the common state of the Czech and Slovaks), some of whom emigrated to the Czech Republic from Slovakia after the split of Czechoslovakia. It is questionable whether they should be considered a proper ethnic minority, especially as most of them do not see themselves as an ethnic minority, they are very well integrated into society, use a very similar language and do not differ from the Czech population by any relevant social and demographic characteristic.

Aside from Slovaks, the largest ethnic minorities are Poles and Germans. The majority of the members of these two ethnic minorities are not immigrants but descendants of the pre-war inhabitants of multiethnic Czechoslovakia. While the Polish minority is highly spatially concentrated into the small region close to the Polish border, the German minority (who are, in fact, descendants of the small portion of the three million Germans that were allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia after WWII) is scattered across the country and in no place do they represent a significant proportion of the inhabitants. Many foreigners who live in the Czech Republic, and especially in the largest metropolitan areas, notably in Prague, come from the most developed Western countries. They are, in fact, either well-paid foreign professional employees of both domestic and international companies, or young people that either study, teach foreign languages or just live in still relatively cheap cities

while being supported by their parents (Drbohlav 2003). Such people are usually only temporary immigrants, and while they could create communities, their impact on the socio-spatial structures of the Czech metropolitan areas has thus far been very limited.

Thus, there are only three ethnic groups in the Czech Republic that could potentially be considered similar to the immigrants to which the typology of suburban settlements refers: Ukrainians, Vietnamese and Romany (Gypsies). Immigrants from the Ukraine are typical examples of the economic immigrants who enter the Czech Republic looking for jobs that are better paid than in their home country. Typically, Ukrainians females are employed in low-paid jobs within the service sector, while males are predominantly employed as construction workers. A portion of the Ukrainians consider their residence in the Czech Republic as temporary as the remainder of their families are still in the Ukraine, but some of them are followed by their families. Official numbers from the population census in 2001 suggests that 22,000 Ukrainian immigrants were living in the Czech Republic (0.2% of the total population) in March 2001, the majority of them living in large cities. The accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union in 2004, and the relatively good performance of the Czech economy in the last several years has substantially increased the attractiveness of the country for economic immigrants, so the number of Ukrainians has increased substantially since the last census. Ministry of Interior sources (Directorate of Alien and Border Police 2005) declared that as at the end of the year 2004, the number of Ukrainians legally living in the Czech Republic reached 78,000 (of which over 24,000 were residing in Prague, where they constitute 2.1% of the total inhabitants). The official numbers of Ukrainian immigrants living in suburban areas are not known, as the police statistics are not published at the municipal level, but it can be estimated that these numbers are not particularly high. In the two districts adjacent to Prague, altogether less than 3000 Ukrainians were reported to be living there; 2227 Ukrainians were officially registered in Plzeň, (1.3%); 5130 lived officially in Brno (1.4%); and relatively the lowest share of Ukrainian immigrants lived in Ostrava (1870, i.e. 0.4% of the population), a city which face more serious problems connected with economic restructuring from all the four largest Czech cities. Recent studies (e.g. Drbohlav 2003) estimate that the number of legal immigrants are supplemented by almost the same number of illegal immigrants. There is, however, no reliable data about illegal immigrants that could be used in our project. In any case, illegal immigrants tend to live in the largest cities (where they are least visible), and not in the still small suburban settlements where the risk is much higher.

Vietnamese represent the most visible ethnic minority, as it is the only substantial non-European ethnic group in the Czech Republic. Immigration from Vietnam has its origin in the Communist period when the government "imported" noticeable numbers of Vietnamese manual workers as a labor force for the Czech industrial companies. After the fall of the Communist regime, most Vietnamese workers opted to stay in the country. Most soon switched their economic activities towards retail. Other immigrants from Vietnam later gradually supplemented the original numbers. Due to the nature of this typical "chain immigration" and the low level of integration of Vietnamese ethnic groups into society at large, the Vietnamese have the greatest potential to create relatively separate communities in Czech metropolitan areas. Their good work ethic, support for their extended families and the ethnic community typical of many Asian immigrants elsewhere in the world make the Vietnamese rather low-problem immigrants. The official data from the census suggests there were about 17,000 Vietnamese in the Czech Republic (less than 0.2% of the total population). The number of Vietnamese has also increased substantially since the last census. The official number of Vietnamese in the Czech Republic reached 34,179 at the end of the year 2004

(Directorate of Alien and Border Police 2005). They are more evenly spread around the country, with the major concentrations being outside the largest metropolitan areas, specifically in the districts bordering Germany.

The Romany minority is undoubtedly the most socially depressed ethnic group in the Czech Republic. Readers should be aware, however, that many Romany living in the Czech Republic cannot be considered proper immigrants, as they have lived here for several generations and have Czech citizenship. Historically, however, the majority of the Romany population who now live in the Czech Republic are descendants of the Romany immigrants who came to the Czech Lands from Slovakia after WWII[2] in a program of resettlement of the Sudetenland, as an unskilled labor supply for the Czech industrial plants. In fact, despite the long history of Romany settlement in the Czech Republic, this ethnic group could be considered an example of a poorly integrated immigrant group. The number of Romany could be considered as one of the relevant indicators used in the typology of suburban settlements. Practically, however, it is not possible to get any detailed data on the Romany community, to say nothing about data at the level of individual municipalities. As the absolute majority of Romany are citizens of the Czech Republic, they are, of course, not registered with the Alien and Border Police. In the population censuses, ethnic origin is declaratory: it is at the discretion of the individual to declare ethnicity. In the 1991 census, 32,903 people declared their ethnicity as Romany; in the following census ten years later, this number fell to only 11,716. This is in a sharp contrast with the unofficial register of the Romany population administered by the Communist local governments, which suggested there were about 145,000 individuals of Romany ethnic origin in the Czech Republic in 1989 (Langhamrová, Fiala 2003). Soon after the fall of the Communist regime, the Romany register was abolished as being politically incorrect, and no reliable data source has since appeared.

The number of Romany living in the Czech Republic ranges from the 2001 census figure of about 11,000, to estimates by Romany political activists who claim to represent approximately 300,000 Romany. Although the quality of the Romany register by the Communist local governments may be somewhat disputed, it is clear that these latter numbers are closer to reality than the numbers provided by the census. Demographers who have studied the demographic behavior of the Romany community (Langhamrová, Fiala 2003) estimate their recent numbers at about 200,000 (i.e. around 2% of the total population of the Czech Republic).

The lack of reliable data about the Romany community paradoxically makes the situation even more complicated for government and various public institutions designed to help improve the situation of Romany. All materials published concerning the Romany suffer from a lack of reliable information. At most, qualified estimates are provided to readers. Thus, the recent Report about the situation of the Romany communities in the Czech Republic (*Zpráva…* 2005) provides only estimates of the most relevant characteristics of this ethnic groups. Thus it is estimated that 60% of Romany adults have incomplete primary education, 29% have only completed primary education, 9% underwent some apprentice training, while only about 1% have a secondary higher education. Although enrollment in secondary schools among the younger Romany generations is higher than in previous Romany generations, the percentage of young Romany enrolled in upper secondary education (6%) cannot be compared with the similar figure for the majority population (49%). Similarly, it is estima-

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2   Most of members of the Romany community who lived in the Czech Lands before WWII were killed during the Nazi occupation.

ted that the level of unemployment ranges between 40% and 70% of the economically active popula-
tion. The majority of Romany live in social rental housing estates (almost 80%), specifically in cities.
After the privatization of a large part of the rental housing stock, Romany are threatened with relo-
cation to spatially concentrated enclaves of substandard housing that could give rise to real ghettoes
in the future.

This subchapter could be briefly summarized as follows. Suburban university centers do not yet
exist in the Czech Republic. Minority, immigrant and ethnically specific neighborhoods are quickly
developing, but there is a serious lack of reliable data that could describe the situation. However, the
information available thus far suggests that concentrations of ethnic groups probably do not occur
in suburban areas of the largest cities. For this reason, it probably does not represent a significant
problem that this dimension of the suburban typology cannot be used in the Czech context.

1.2.2 Which types can be identified

Taking into account the aim of this chapter, we first collected the data available at the municipal
level that would describe the situation in the individual suburban municipalities. At first, we collec-
ted all available indicators, than carefully checked the quality of the data and searched for outliers
among municipalities that would distort the classification procedures. Later we analyzed the mutual
relationships of the collected indicators by correlation and cluster analyses, finally we used
a selected number of indicators as input variables into the cluster analysis to help us create a proper
typology of suburban communities.

The following list includes the final set of indicators used in the typology:
a) POOR2003 – *The percentage of households that have a household income lower than the 1.4 multiple of*
    the subsistence level in 2003. This is the only relatively reliable indicator of the concentration of
    poor families at the municipal level. The source is the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
    which allocates means-tested social payments to such households. The main advantage of the
    indicator is the relatively high level of accuracy of the information about incomes, as the appli-
    cants must reveal the incomes of their household in order to receive welfare payments. The
    applicants must also allow the respective social welfare office to verify the declared amounts.
    The main disadvantage is that some eligible households may opt to not apply for the benefits
    and, thus, may remain unrevealed. However, this is probably relatively rare, as the social benefit
    system is well established and well known by the general population. This indicator was favored
    over other indicators that also could potentially describe the income structure (an example of
    another indicator is revenues from personal income tax per capita,[3] which can be estimated
    from publicized municipal budgets, but these tax numbers proved to be extremely sensitive to
    changes in tax laws). Moreover, average tax incomes of the municipalities from the personal tax
    tend to hide often extremely great differences between different social groups within the indivi-
    dual community, namely in the smallest communities. The rate of unemployment at the muni-
    cipal level at the time of population census was also available, but we preferred the share of

3   In the Czech Republic, municipalities do not have the right to impose their own local taxes and they just share some
tax revenues with the state. Therefore, the municipal revenue from income tax is not influenced by the taxation policy
of the municipality but only mirrors the income structure of its inhabitants.

poor households as it also takes into consideration the households of economically inactive pensioners.

b) *UNIV9101 – The change in the percentage of university-educated inhabitants in the individual municipalities between 1991 and 2001.* This number is a good indicator of the dynamic of the social changes in the suburban settlement. We decided to prefer such a dynamic indicator over the static indicator describing the percentage of university-educated people in 1991 or 2001. It is not correlated with the share of university educated in 1991, but highly correlated with the share of university educated in the 2001. It means that dynamic of the change was the main reason of the present differences in educational structures. The selected indicator is highly correlated with some other potentially usable indicators of educational structure, such as the percentage of people with only a primary education, the percentage with at least a secondary education, and the indicators of the dynamic of the change. The percentage of university-educated people was selected because the people with the highest education are usually the primary actors in suburbanization and, specifically, are the least dependent on the age structure of all the educational indicators. It is important to note, however, that the change in the percentage of university-educated inhabitants in a municipality does not necessarily mean population growth. Sometimes it represents a portion of the local, less educated population being replaced by more educated newcomers.

c) *FAMH9101 – The index of the change in the number of family houses in individual municipalities between 1991 and 2001.* This number serves as the indicator of suburban growth (calculated as the number of family houses in 2001 less the number of family houses in 1991, then divided by the number of family houses in 1991). The greater the number of new family houses that appeared in the municipality between 1991 and 2001, the higher the number. This indicator has been favored over the simple index of population growth, as it is not influenced by the natural population increase. Also, it was preferred over the percentage of family houses in the housing stock of the municipality, as in the majority of small suburban municipalities the percentage of family houses is 100 percent, and such figures do not distinguish booming new suburbs from the poorer or declining ones.

d) *COMMUT01 – The percentage of commuters to the core cities from the suburban municipalities in 2001.* This indicator identifies bedroom communities from larger suburban municipalities that serve more than just a residential function and that are less dependent on the core cities with respect to employment.

e) *CATHOL01 – The percentage of Roman Catholics in the population of the municipalities in 2001.* In the last census, almost two-thirds of Czech citizens declared no religious affiliation. Of those affiliated with some church, Roman Catholics constitute the absolute majority. Moreover, the Catholic Church is known for providing moderate support to the Christian Democratic Party, at least at the municipal level.

f) *SHFAMH01 – The percentage of family houses from the total number of dwellings in the municipality in 2001.* This indicator distinguishes the high-rise residential suburbs constructed during the Communist regime and the edge cities from the typical suburban bedroom communities.

g) *INDUST01 – The percentage of economically active inhabitants employed in either industry or the construction sector.* It should be noted that this number does not mean the number of industrial workers. Regardless, a relatively high percentage of those who are employees in industry or construction are manual workers. The percentage of agricultural employment is small in the Czech Republic, and almost negligible in the metropolitan areas. There is no available indicator at the municipal level distinguishing manual and non-manual workers.

Finally, the scales of the chosen indicators were standardized by z-scores and used as independent variables in a series of cluster analyses. The analyses were aimed at identifying groups of suburban municipalities that demonstrate the greatest similarity within the group but are as dissimilar as possible from municipalities in the other groups. In total, 444 of the total number of 460 suburban municipalities were subject to cluster analysis (the remaining 16 municipalities did not exist in 1991, and therefore some indicators were not available for them). From the various attempts, the most meaningful results were obtained by using the QUICK CLUSTER procedure from the SPSS program pack, in which the number of clusters was predefined as being 10. In such case, the clustering procedure identified (as pre-defined) ten different types of suburban municipalities. Four of the ten types, however, were "clusters" consisting of only one, two or three municipalities, which in fact represented the municipalities that were extremely specific in some respect.[4] Basically, it can be concluded that the cluster analysis identified six different types of suburban municipalities, which we have labeled as: Developing middle class suburbs, Rapidly developing upper class suburbs, Satellite working class edge cities, Service low middle class suburbs, Working class bedroom suburbs, and Traditional Catholic settlements.

a) *Developing middle class suburbs* have features of the first two "model types" (Affluent bedroom communities and Middle-class/working class, low density and rapidly developing bedroom suburbs). There is a very low percentage of poor households and a high percentage of commuters to the central cities. In the decade between 1991 and 2001, the percentage of university-educated inhabitants increased substantially, as did the number of newly constructed family houses on their territories. The percentage of economically active people in industry and agriculture is low, which suggests that most newcomers are professional service employees (N = 67).

b) *Rapidly developing upper class suburbs* are in fact a somewhat extreme variant of the previous type. They are relatively rare and can be distinguished from the previous type by the substantially higher rates of housing construction and population development, leading to the situation that newcomers are becoming the majority in the local population. Therefore, the overall social status of the inhabitants of such communities far exceeds the average of the suburban settlements in the Czech Republic. These are the most similar to classical North American affluent bedroom communities in the phase of rapid development (N = 5).

c) *Satellite working class edge cities* are to a great extent the legacy of metropolitan development under Communism. They have the lowest percentage of people dwelling in family housing and the highest percentage of poor households. They are losing rather than gaining university-educated inhabitants. They are usually larger municipalities, for the most part not designed as only bedroom communities, they retain some economic functions, and therefore the inhabitants are less dependent on commuting to the core cities (N = 37).

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4   One example is the village Okoř which had only 32 inhabitants in 1991 and the only 56 inhabitants in 2001. In this municipality the share of university-educated population skyrocketed from 10% (that is, three people) to 36% (that is, 17 people). As the majority of newcomers were entrepreneurs, the municipality became the richest in terms of personal income tax per capita in comparison with all other suburban municipalities, collecting about forty times higher per capita income tax than the average in the observed suburban municipalities. At the same time, however, the number of family houses in the municipality stayed the same.

Another such example of the suburban type consisting of only one municipality is represented by the village Blažim, in which of 86 inhabitants no one has university education, while over 70% of households are considered poor and are eligible for welfare benefits. This number sharply contrasts with the average of 3.5% in the other suburban municipalities.

d) *Service lower-middle class suburbs* are neither particularly growing in terms of population nor particularly attracting new housing construction. The inhabitants are not highly educated, and the increase in the percentage of the most educated is below the suburban average. The percentage of people employed in industry and construction is lower (relatively) compared to most of the other types of suburbs. In municipalities of this type, most inhabitants are homeowners. The percentage of commuters to the central cities is relatively lower than in other types of suburbs apart from working class edge cities, but the percentage of commuters is generally high. Most suburbs of this type are located in the Prague metropolitan area (N = 116).

e) *Working class bedroom suburbs* are similar to the previous type, but can be distinguished by a substantially higher percentage of people working in industry and construction, and also by a higher percentage of people commuting to the central city of the metropolitan area. This is a typical type of suburb in the outskirts of Pilsen (N = 76).

f) *Traditional Catholic settlements* differ from all the other types mainly by the much higher percentage of inhabitants who declare an affiliation to the Catholic Church. The inhabitants of these communities are not particularly well educated, and the percentage of poor households is higher than in most of the other types of suburbs (apart from the satellite working class edge cities). They do not attract much new housing construction, but of all the suburban types they have the highest percentage of homeowners. A relatively high percentage of the inhabitants are employed in industry and the construction sectors. This type is typically located in the Brno area (N = 136).

The following maps illustrate the spatial distribution of the six identified types.

Map 1. Types of suburban municipalities in the Prague metropolitan area

Legend
- Developing middle class suburbs
- Rapidly developing upper class suburbs
- Satellite working class edge cities
- Service lower middle class suburbs
- Working class bedroom suburbs
- Traditional Catholic suburbs

Map 2. Types of suburban municipalities in the Pilsen metropolitan area

Map 3. Types of suburban municipalities in the Brno metropolitan area

Map 4. Types of suburban municipalities in the Ostrava metropolitan area

The following table summarizes the average values of the observed characteristics for each of the six identified types described above.

Table 1. Characteristics of the types of suburbs in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic (average values of the respective indicators)

Type of suburb	POOR2003 %	UNIV9101 index	FAMH9101 index	COMMUT01 %	CATHOL01 %	SHFAMH01 %	INDUST01 %
Developing middle class suburbs	1.3	5.5	20.8	49.4	35.5	89.9	30.0
Rapidly developing upper class suburbs	2.7	**9.2**	**73.1**	53.3	22.6	86.5	31.0
Satellite working class edge cities	**5.5**	1.3	6.7	32.2	38.3	49.8	42.6
Service lower-middle class suburbs	2.0	2.1	6.8	40.2	33.7	89.6	29.8
Working class bedroom suburbs	2.5	2.0	6.0	**53.7**	33.2	89.1	**43.8**
Traditional Catholic settlements	5.0	1.7	6.5	47.0	**67.9**	**94.6**	43.2

Source: Author's calculations, based on data from the Czech Statistical Office and the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs.

The results of the cluster analysis as illustrated by the maps and the table confirm some of the theoretical assumptions. Namely, it is clear that nothing like a "universal suburb" exists in the Czech Republic. The suburbs are of different types – neither existing structures nor the development path are uniform. The classical suburbanization processes characterized by the development of colonies of family houses in low density areas on the outskirts of large cities for the well-to-do can be documented, but the majority of suburbs could not be considered to fit that scheme. Many communities, although clearly suburban because of their residential character and the dependence on the labor market of the nearby core cities of the metropolises, are in fact the remnants of the pre-metropolitan settlements structures. Such municipalities were gradually losing their other functions and evolved into bedroom communities without being the target of migration from central cities. Municipalities labeled "satellite working class edge cities" represent the specific type of the suburbs. Most of them evolved during the phase of extensive industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, but some are just smaller towns of large villages that for some reason retained enough jobs so that they are not totally dependent on commuting to the central city. No such municipality could be considered the result of post-Communist economic development. The movement of economic activities to suburban areas is not yet a very important trend in the Czech Republic, apart from the suburbanization of the retail (which is extensive but which has not given birth to "full-scale" cities).

What is clear from the maps is that regional and inter-metropolitan differences matter. Suburbs of the same type tend to be mostly concentrated in one or two metropolitan areas, and even within them they tend to be spatially concentrated. The economic structure of the core city greatly influences the type of suburb. Service suburbs can be found mostly around Prague because Prague is predominantly a service city. Working class suburbs are located around Pilsen, a city that has long been the location of many industrial plants. Satellite working class edge cities are typical for the Ostrava metropolitan area, where their growth was closely connected with the development of the Ostrava coal basin and heavy industry. Traditional Catholic suburbs are mostly around Brno, which is the historical capitol of traditionally Catholic Moravia. The Prague metropolitan area is the only metropolitan area, where the number of quickly developing affluent suburbs can be found. Prague is by far the wealthiest of the cities in the Czech Republic, and so its suburbs are more dynamic and wealthier than those of other cities.

It is also worth mentioning that the distance from the core city is important. Inner and outer suburbs tend to be of different types. Finally, it should be noted that despite all the historical, cultural and economic differences between the Czech Republic and many Western countries such as the United States, the majority of suburban types found in the Czech context are analogous to the "model types", and thus caution should be exercised when used in international comparisons.

2. Political Participation

2.1 General trends

After more than forty years of Communist government, during which elections were a tool for social control by the rulers rather than a manifestation of the will of the people, the citizens of the Czech Republic were absolutely amazed by the political freedom they received. People were generally very much interested in participating in the building of the new democratic regime. The first free election (parliamentary election in June 1990) thus became a referendum on Communism rather than a regular election. As the Communist Party was allowed to participate in the electoral contest, both sides – regime opponents and its supporters – had good reasons to participate in the event. Consequently, the June 1990 election witnessed almost 100% turnout, a number that has never been repeated. Several months later, in November of the same year, when the first free post-Communist elections to the reestablished municipal councils were organized, interest in participating had already flagged, though this was quite natural as many people did not consider the municipal political representation to be of the same importance as the national one.

The first years after the founding elections were generally the most difficult. People still had to bear the painful consequences of the economic reforms rather than benefiting from the fruits. This created some disillusionment about the capacities of the democratic regime to provide for the well-being of its citizens. Some people react to their disillusionment by voting for the opposition party, but those substantially more disillusioned usually abstain from further elections (Vajdová, Kostelecký 1997). A relatively stable party system of several relevant political parties was developed quite early (Kostelecký 2002), and it proved to be functional in terms of democratic governance, but was quite oligopolistic in nature. The media uncovered several corruption cases and the dark side of party financing, but the parties and politicians involved went basically unpunished. Among the population, this lessened the already quite weak confidence in the political parties and top politicians. As a consequence, the Czech Republic witnessed a further fall in the electoral turnout. Even in parliamentary elections, traditionally considered to be the most important by the Czech citizens, turnout has been gradually falling. In the last parliamentary election in 2002, the turnout was only 58% (for details about participation in the parliamentary elections, see Table 2).

Table 2. Participation of political parties and voters in the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Total number of electoral parties	13	19	16	13	29
Total number of eligible voters (abs.)	7553477	7738981	7990770	8116836	8264484
Number of participating voters (abs.)	7303620	6576026	6059215	6008926	4793706
The participation rate (%)	96.69	84.97	75.83	74.03	58.00

Source: Czech Statistical Office.

Political participation in the municipal elections, always considered elections of "secondary importance" (together with the Senate and regional elections), basically followed the same trend. Starting from a lower base turnout of 73% in 1990, the drop was not as dramatic as in the parliamentary elections, but was still very steep (see Table 3).

Table 3. Participation of local political actors and voters in the local elections in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

|	1990	1994	1998	2002
Total number of electoral parties*)	791	278	159	166
Total number of eligible voters (abs.)	7468498	7788145	8093016	8229264
Number of participating voters (abs.)	5493009	4849049	3782568	3738968
The participation rate (%)	73.55	62.26	46.74	45.44

Source: Czech Statistical Office.
*) Note: Although the term "electoral parties" as specified by electoral law includes nationally registered political parties, political movements, their coalitions as well as the independent candidates and the associations of independent candidates, figures in the table include neither individual independent candidates nor associations of independent candidates.

What was the participation of the population living in the metropolitan areas in the elections? Can any trends specific to the metropolitan population be seen? Is there any difference between turnout in the core cities and the respective suburbs? Did the process of suburbanization itself influence political participation? In the following text we would like to answer these questions.

Analyses of electoral turnout in the metropolitan areas showed that turnout in the metropolitan areas basically followed the national trends and displayed a gradual decline. (It should be noted that in the Czech case this claim is not self-evident, as the population living in the four studied metropolitan areas represents less than 30% of the total population of the country). The turnout in parliamentary elections in metropolitan areas is consistently higher than that in the respective municipal

elections. Charts 1 and 2 provide a more detailed picture of electoral turnout in the four core cities and the suburban areas adjacent to them in parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2002. The following pair of charts (Charts 3 and 4) provides the analogous information for the electoral turnout in the municipal elections.

Chart 1. Electoral turnout in the parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in %)


Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 2. Turnout in the four largest Czech metropolitan areas and its relation to the national average in the respective parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002

*Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.*

Chart 3. Electoral turnout in the municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in %)

Source: Author's calculations based on the data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 4. Turnout in the four largest Czech metropolitan areas and its relation to the national average in the respective municipal elections in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Several things can be seen in the charts. It is clear that political participation in the suburbs in the Czech Republic is higher than participation in the core cities. It is true both as a general statement (i.e. "suburbs generally have a higher voter turnout than large cities") and as a statement concerning the relationship between core cities and their specific suburbs (i.e. "suburbs generally have a higher voter turnout than their respective core cities"). The only exception to this general rule can be seen in the Ostrava metropolitan area suburbs, in which political participation is similar to the average turnout in the core cities rather than the turnout in the suburban areas of the other metropolitan areas. Moreover, in the case of the parliamentary elections (but not the municipal), the low participation in the Ostrava suburbs was similar to that in its core city (in the case of the 2002 parliamentary election, it was even lower).

It is also evident from the charts that in terms of voter turnout, differences between core cities and suburbs are larger in municipal elections and smaller in parliamentary elections. While in local elections voter turnout in the suburbs is on average about 20 to 25 percentage points higher than in their respective core cities (about 5% higher in the case of the Ostrava metropolitan area), the participation rate in suburban communities is only about 5 to 10 percentage points higher in parliamentary elections (practically identical in the case of Ostrava). Once the differences came into existence in the early 1990s they tend to persist (like in local elections) or only slightly diminish (as in the case of national elections). The only changes that can be found are at the level of the individual metropo-

litan cores. It can be noted that compared to the national average and to voter turnout in the sub-urbs, voter turnout in parliamentary election increased in Brno (since 1998), Prague, and Pilsen (in 2002). No such trend, however, can be found in the case of municipal elections.

2.2 Testing specific hypotheses about participation

A set of hypotheses about the relationship between the type of community and political participa-tion has already been generated by the scientific literature (for details see e.g. Hoffmann-Martinot, Sellers 2005). Some of the hypotheses are of a general nature, others are more specifically connected with the process of suburbanization and its effects. Due to the lack of necessary data, not all of the suggested hypotheses can be tested in the Czech case. For example, insufficient reliable and detailed data about the socioeconomic status of the inhabitants from the individual municipalities makes it impossible to test the hypothesis about the influence of social homogeneity on political participa-tion ("the more socially homogeneous the place, the lower the electoral turnout"). Similarly, it is very difficult to test the hypothesis about the influence that the administrative fragmenting of the metropolitan areas has had on political participation ("the more fragmented the metropolitan area, the lower the electoral turnout") when, as in the Czech Republic, there are only four cases available. Some other suggested hypotheses (for example the hypothesis that "demographic instability lowers participation") could theoretically be tested, but much preparatory work would need to be done to obtain reliable data about migration at the municipal level. Because of the resources available and time constraints, we have decided to concentrate on testing several hypotheses where the results could be obtained in "a realistic length of time". The hypotheses were as follows.

H1. The smaller the municipality, the higher the electoral turnout.
H2. The higher the socioeconomic status of the inhabitants of a municipality, the higher the electo-ral turnout.
H3. Different types of suburbs have different political participation.
H4. Differences in political participation are influenced by differences in the value structures that may be generated and sustained by mechanisms other than those related to metropolization and suburbanization (historical, religious, cultural…) – "the value system hypothesis".
H5. There are some systematic patterns in the differences between turnout in national and local elections.

2.2.1 Is participation in small municipalities higher?

It has been observed in many countries that people living in smaller municipalities tend to partici-pate more in elections than people who live in large municipalities (Hoffmann-Martinot, Sellers 2005). The same observation has been made in municipal elections in the Czech Republic (Koste-lecký 2005). It is not difficult to find arguments for why people in small communes participate in the local elections more than their counterparts who live in larger communes. They may be better infor-med about the municipal politics, they may have greater personal knowledge of the local politicians and have more ways, including very informal, to get in contact with them. Voters in a small munici-pality may also take into account a rational choice argument; because of the generally small number of voters, they calculate that they have a greater chance of influencing the voting results, compared

to voters in a large municipality where the vote of an individual carries less weight. For all that, and maybe also for other reasons, people in a small community may be more willing to participate.

Chart 5. Turnout in municipal elections in metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002, by size of municipality


Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

The data about voter turnout in municipal elections in municipalities in the metropolitan areas presented in Chart 5 generally confirms the hypothesis: the smaller community the higher the turnout. It is interesting to note that there is one exception to this: in three of four local elections, participation in local elections in the core cities (all over 100,000 inhabitants) was somewhat higher than participation in the large suburban communities (populations ranging from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants). This exception, however, is not specific to municipalities in the metropolitan areas, as the same relation was identified in the analysis of the whole set of Czech municipalities (Kostelecký 2005).

It is clear from the chart that the differences are quite substantial, and have even increased slightly in the observed period. In the smallest municipalities, average electoral turnout was over 30 percent higher than that in the largest cities at the beginning of the observed period, and the difference reached 40 percent after the year 2000.

The analogous numbers for electoral turnout in the parliamentary election can be seen in Chart 6.

Chart 6. Turnout in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002, by size of municipality

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

The data in the chart suggests that basically the same type of relations can be found when one studies the relationship between population size and voter turnout in parliamentary elections. From the very beginning, turnout in the smaller municipalities exceeded that of large ones (with the known exception of municipalities of the two largest categories). The difference, however, is generally smaller than in the case of local elections, ranging around 15 percent points in every election since 1992. A comparison with the results of the analogous calculation for the complete set of over 6000 municipalities in the Czech Republic confirms that in this respect the metropolitan municipalities are like any other municipalities. Yet, it is more difficult to explain why such differences exist in the case of parliamentary elections because neither of the arguments used to explain the differences in local election turnout is applicable. It is possible that, in general, the greater social interaction found in small communities supports greater political participation. In the case of national elections, people in small municipalities have no greater insight into the election than those living in large municipalities, nor do they have better access to politicians nor do their votes "count for relatively more". It is also possible that participation in local elections makes people in small municipalities accustomed to voting, and such "voting habits" also affect their participation in the national elections. We would need to have data at the level of the individual to be able to test such a hypothesis. Finally, it is probable that higher electoral participation in small municipalities is caused partly by the fact that social control there is tighter. Participation in the elections is considered a "civic duty", or at least as the "responsible behavior of citizen" in the Czech Republic. Consequently, the greater social control in the small municipalities prevents some of their inhabitants from abstaining.

2.2.2 Is participation greater in municipalities with a higher socio-economic status?

The answer to this question depends very much on the level of analysis used. While the answer of the researchers using data at the individual level is affirmative, the situation is not clear when the analysis at the ecological and contextual level is performed. Indeed, when using data aggregated at the municipal level to calculate a simple correlation between electoral turnout and various indicators of socio-economic status, the results indicate that there is either no relation between the two groups of variables, or it is negative. One of the obvious explanations for such results is, in our opinion, the intervening role of the size of the municipality.

In the Czech context, the smaller the municipality the lower the average socio-economic status of its inhabitants. This is the legacy of the long history of increasingly intensive urbanization, during which cities attracted the more educated people. Also, it has long been easier to become wealthy in the cities, especially the large ones, so even when using other indicators (apart from education) to measure socio-economic status, results are biased positively for the cities. The Communist planning system that distinguished different types of settlements in the countryside, favoring the "forward-looking" "central communities" (larger in population as a rule) from the "non-central communities" (practically all in the smallest size categories) that were stripped of investment and doomed to underdevelopment in the long run. This, of course, increased the motivation of the relative well-educated and skilled inhabitants of such abandoned small communities to migrate to larger villages. When taking into account that suburbanization was practically unknown during the Communist time, and of its still quite limited scope after 1989, it is not surprising that the relationship between the size of the municipality and its overall socio-economic status is still negative in the Czech Republic.

We therefore decided to control the influence size had by analyzing not the electoral turnout per se but the difference between electoral turnout in metropolitan municipalities and the average electoral turnout in municipalities of the same size category in the Czech Republic. Thus, a positive number means that voter turnout in the respective election was higher in the observed municipality than the average voter turnout in the respective election in municipalities of approximately the same size, and vice versa. We then computed the Pearson correlation coefficient between our indicator and a set of indicators measuring socio-economic status. We used the percentage of university-educated inhabitants in 1991 as the measure of the early post-Communist (and also pre-suburbanization) differences in the social status. The increase in the proportion of university educated (which is highly correlated in the university graduates in 2001) captures the dynamic of social change at the municipal level. The municipal tax revenue from personal income tax per capita in 1997 may serve as an approximate indicator of the financial health of the community, while both the percentage of poor households in 2003 and number of small businessmen per capita in 2003 provides additional information about the results of the economic transformation as observed at the municipal level. The results of the turnout, in the municipal and the parliamentary elections, are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficient between indicators of social status and participation in the municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002
(electoral participation in municipalities "size standardized" by relating it to the average participation in the municipality of the respective population size)

	1990	1994	1998	1998
University educated 1991 (%)	.027	.133**	.169**	.132**
Increase in proportion of university educated between 1991 and 2002	-.046	.026	.040	.121
Poor households 2003 (%)	.043	.107*	.060	-.020
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	-.054	-.033	.022	-.030
Small businessmen per inhabitants 2003	.045	-.035	-.021	-.009

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficient between indicators of social status and participation in the parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002
(electoral participation in municipalities "size standardized" by relating it to the average participation in the municipality of the respective population size)

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
University educated 1991 (%)	-.076	.073	.132**	.285**	.395**
Increase in proportion of university educated between 1991 and 2002	-.011	.025	.038	.154**	.259**
Poor households 2003 (%)	.071	.023	.007	-.178**	-.099*
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	-.019	-.055	-.013	.090	.134**
Small businessmen per inhabitants 2003	.025	.098*	-.076	.197**	.168**

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The data presented gives a completely different picture than the results of the previous analyses, where municipality size was not a controlled variable. When the effect of size is controlled, in only a single case (the percentage of poor households and the local election results in 1994) did the correlation coefficient suggest a significant negative relation between the level of socio-economic status and voter turnout. In all other cases, quite the reverse is true: the relation is either positive or not significant. In fact, there are reasonable differences between the local and national elections. Socio-economic status influences the turnout in local elections less than it does in national elections. In fact, in both types of elections, the turnout that correlates most closely with the turnout of other

municipalities of similar size was among the university-educated population in the municipality. One can note that the correlation coefficients more often suggest a positive relation between the socio-economic status and participation in the elections in 1998 and 2002 than in earlier ones. Although to some extent this could be an artificial relation caused by the fact that most of the socio-economic variables used relate to the end of the observed period, it could also be interpreted as meaning that the socio-economic status of the community is of growing importance. In any case, it seems that the socio-economic hypothesis could also be proven.

2.2.3 Does participation vary in the different types of suburbs?

In this part we use the typology of suburbs to test whether there are any significant differences in terms of political participation among suburbs of different types. To some extent, using suburban types instead of individual continuous variables to describe the municipalities is methodologically problematic, as we then limit the variability of potentially explanatory factors. It is, however, a useful exercise as the results could suggest whether the typology of suburbs can be applied with respect to distinguishing places with different political behavior. Any relation revealed (if any) could be useful in conducting international comparisons, where the same types of individual variables are often not available while similar types of suburbs (albeit created with the help of variables that are not exactly the same) could be comparable. We present here the initial results of such an analysis, keeping in mind that much can be done to improve and refine the methods used.

First we performed a series of analyses of variance aimed at testing whether the electoral turnout in the individual elections differed significantly among the suburban types.

Chart 7. Turnout in the municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002, by type of municipality

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 8. Turnout in the parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002, by type of municipality


Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

The charts illustrate what the analyses of variance proved more rigorously: with the exemption of the satellite working class edge cities (in which turnout in all elections is significantly lower than in suburbs of the other types), there were no significant differences among the types of suburbs. There was no difference between municipal elections and the parliamentary elections in this respect.

Thinking that municipality size could have an effect on electoral turnout, we repeated the same analysis after controlling the size of the communes. Again, for each municipality we calculated the difference between the voter turnout there and the average voter turnout in municipalities in the same size category across the Czech Republic. The results of the analyses are displayed in Charts 9 and 10. Both charts provide us with basically the same information. Voter turnout in the satellite working class edge cities is consistently lower than in other types of suburbs, so the relation illustrated in the previous pair of chart is not just a by-product of their larger population. However, there were also some trends that were not identifiable in the previous charts. First, it is clear that differences among different types of suburbs tend to increase. Second, and maybe of primary importance for our project, in those suburban communities that are developing most rapidly into classical residential suburbs of the well-to-do, political participation is gradually increasing; participation is not decreasing, as we would have expected according to our theory.

Chart 9. Average difference between voter turnout in the metropolitan municipalities in the four largest Czech metropolitan areas and the average turnout of the municipalities of the same size in the Czech Republic – the municipal elections between 1990 and 2002, by the type of municipality

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 10. Average difference between voter turnout in metropolitan municipalities in the four largest Czech metropolitan areas and the average turnout of the municipalities of the same size in the Czech Republic – the parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2002, by the type of municipality

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

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This paradox is probably caused by the fact that in the Czech context the rapid growth of suburban residential communities is accompanied by a substantial increase in the average social status of the affected communities. The rapidly rising social status of the inhabitants of such municipalities leads, as we know, to an increase in electoral participation in the municipalities. Those who used to be the most active voters in the core cities are moving to suburbs where they eventually outnumber the less politically active "indigenous" population, thus increasing the overall level of electoral participation in their new home communities. This does not necessarily refute the hypothesis that suburban development tends to decrease political participation. Political participation among the most educated and the most well-to-do may decrease when they are able to create socially homogeneous communities isolated from other populations by municipal boundaries, but in the Czech Republic this has thus far not been the case. Also, political participation among the new suburban residents may already be lower in their new place of residence than it was in their previous one. Without information about electoral behavior at the level of individual voters, we cannot know the answer.

2.2.4 Which other factors may be relevant?

From the analyses of political behavior in post-Communist Czech Republic conducted so far (for details see Kostelecký 2002), we know that there are many factors influencing voter decisions. Therefore we attempted to perform some exploratory analyses to help us identify other potentially important explanatory factors that may be relevant. We used a multiple regression technique on the aggregate level of municipalities. As we wanted to control the strong role that municipality size plays, we again worked with differences between turnout in the municipality and the average participation rates in municipalities of similar size as the dependent variables. To determine which independent variables should be used in regression, we first performed a cluster analysis with all the potential independent variables that we were able to collect at the level of the municipality (variables were clustered, not cases). This allowed us to identify clusters of variables that tend to be not only mutually correlated (and thus display a similar spatial distribution of their values), but also that are related as far as their substantive meaning is concerned. For each individual regression analysis, we then chose the independent variables that represent clusters. When we had the same data from different time periods at our disposal, we used the data that was closest in time to the date of the analyzed electoral results in a specific regression analysis. In all cases we also checked the potential multi-colinearity problem, and eventually removed independent variables that would be too closely correlated with other independent variables. The final set of independent variables used in the regression analyses included variables that described the percentage of university educated, the unemployment rate, home ownership, the percentage of pensioners, overcrowded housing conditions, the percentage of Roman Catholics, the percentage of poor households (the correlation between this and the unemployment rate is not high in the Czech context), employment in farming, and employment in industry and the construction sectors. The last three of these independent variables were not used in the analyses concerning elections before the year 1998, as they were not available to us at the necessary level of individual municipalities.

The results of the regression analyses are summarized in Tables 6 and 7, with separate tables for the results of the municipal and parliamentary elections. It should be noted that generally the quality of the regression models is not extraordinarily high. The percentage of explained variability

is relatively low, particularly in the case of municipal elections. Even the inclusion of the additional independent variable after 1998 did not substantially add to the explanatory power of the models. Nevertheless, that the percentage of explained variability continued to increase in both parliamentary and municipal election models is indicative of the growing explanatory power of independent variables.

Table 6. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining turnout in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002
(electoral participation in municipalities "size standardized" by relating it to the average participation in municipalities of respective population size)

Independent variables	1990	1994	1998	2002
University educated (%)		+ +	+ +	+
Unemployment rate (%)	–	–	–	–
Share of homeowners (%)				
Share of pensioners (%)		+	+	+
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)				–
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	+ +	+ +	+	+ +
Poor households (%)				
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)				+
Employees in industry and construction (%)			+ +	+
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.14	0.15	0.17

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

Table 7. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining turnout in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

(electoral participation in municipalities "size standardized" by relating it to the average participation in municipalities of respective population size)

Independent variables	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
University educated (%)		+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +
Unemployment rate (%)	– –	– –	– –	– –	–
Share of homeowners (%)					
Share of pensioners (%)		+	+	+ +	+ +
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)	– –	– –	–		–
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	+ +	+ +	+ +	+	+ +
Poor households (%)					
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)					–
Employees in industry and construction (%)					
Adjusted R^2	0.14	0.18	0.19	0.25	0.40

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

As far as the effects of the individual independent variables are concerned, the analyses of both types of elections basically present a very similar picture. In both cases, there are consistent patterns indicating the influence that the independent variables had on voter turnout. The two most important independent variables are the percentage of Catholics in the local population and the percentage of university-educated inhabitants. Both these indicators are positively related to voter turnout. While the positive relationship between education and participation was expected, some explanation is necessary to explain why municipalities with a higher percentage of Catholics among the population tended to have higher turnouts than other municipalities. Readers here should be aware of the specific situation in the Czech Republic, where the percentage of Catholics basically means the percentage of believers. Non-Catholics, who dominate in the Czech population, are neither Protestants nor Orthodox nor Moslems, and the absolute majority of them declare themselves as non-religious. As some of the political parties are of Christian Democratic orientation, Catholics may be mobilized to vote for them (and other voters may be mobilized to vote against them) and thus increase the overall level of participation. It is true, however, that the percentage of Catholics is still substantially higher than the percentage of those who vote for Christian Democratic parties, so not all Catholics vote for the Christian Democrats. The Catholic Church serves in the Czech context as an institution that generally supports non-private and communal activities. Bearing in mind the history of decades of oppression under the Communist regime (and the fact that Catholics are in fact a minority within the Czech atheist nation), the Catholic Church values political freedoms highly, and actively urges its members to take advantage of the democratic process and to participate in public life.

The unemployment rate, not surprisingly, consistently displayed a negative relation to voter turnout, though not as strong as the previously mentioned variables. This is in accordance with the hypothesis concerning the socio-economic status effect on voter participation. It is interesting to note that as an independent variable, the rate of unemployment has a greater effect than the percentage of poor households. This is probably because among the poor households there are many pensioner households. The percentage of pensioners, which has been used as a separate independent variable, was consistently positively related to electoral turnout. From population surveys, it is known that pensioners vote more often than younger people, despite their lower education and (on average) lower socio-economic status. Here, again there are other possible explanations. It is possible that the pensioners, who lived most of their productive lives during the Communist regime, became accustomed to voting (because it was required); thus, even after the collapse of the regime they continue to vote out of habit. However, it is more probable that they place a higher value on the political freedom they now have, whereas the younger generations may take such freedom for granted. The other variables used are not as important as those mentioned. Overcrowded housing conditions tended to decrease participation, but only in parliamentary elections. The percentage of those employed in industry and construction has been positively related to voter turnout in municipal elections. It is more interesting to note that the percentage of homeowners was insignificant in all cases. This is probably because in the Czech context the indicator itself does not distinguish between rich and poor homeowners. In suburban areas, the relatively poor "indigenous" population living in their own (mostly older) houses are mixed together with the wealthy newcomers living in their large, expensive, newly constructed houses. Similarly, in core cities, the rich and poor are still very much intermixed, as rent regulation enables the poor to live in the more desirable parts of the cities.

## 2.3 Local versus national participation

This chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the differences between voter turnout in parliamentary municipal election. As already mentioned, the average turnout in parliamentary elections is consistently higher than turnout in municipal elections. As an average can conceal important differences in variation, we decided to examine the inter-municipal variations in the electoral turnout in the individual elections in greater detail (see Chart 11). Looking at the chart, two trends are immediately visible: inter-municipal variation in voter turnout is generally higher in the case of local elections than in national ones, and the variation is generally increasing. It seems that the general decrease in participation may be driven by the particularly strong fall in turnout in some municipalities. At the moment, of greater importance is the fact that similar claims can be made about differences between the electoral turnout in parliamentary and municipal elections. The difference may primarily be the consequence of different political behavior in some of the municipalities, where turnout in local elections is particularly low compared to the turnout in national elections. What kind of municipalities are we speaking of? Is there a consistent pattern? In attempting to answer such questions, we made some initial exploratory analyses of our data. First we checked the relevance of the size factor. We only compared elections in the years 1990, 1998 and 2002, years when national and local elections were both organized within one calendar year. The results of the analysis are provided in Chart 12.

Chart 11. Inter-municipal variation in electoral turnout in both local and national elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 12. Average difference between turnout in municipal and parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002, by size of municipality (% local turnout – % national turnout)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

The data summarized in the chart suggests that the difference between turnout in local and national elections is primarily caused by the low participation in the municipal elections in the large communities, where the rate of participation at the national level exceeds that at the local level by 20 to 40 percentage points. The smaller the commune, the smaller the difference in turnout. In all three observed election years, we can identify the size of the municipality as having the same general effect. In fact, in 2002, in the smallest municipalities, participation in the local elections was no longer lower than participation in the national elections. Here, the social interaction hypothesis can probably be used to explain why size affected participation. People in small communes are not as alienated from the local politics as are inhabitants of large municipalities, so even "second tier" elections (such as municipal elections) attract sufficient interested voters.

We also searched for potential factors other than municipality size that could help us to explain the differences in local and national turnout. After controlling for the effect of municipality size, we conducted a series of regression analyses with the same set of independent variables described in the previous chapter. The dependent variables were differences between the participation in national and local elections. The higher the national turnout (relative to municipalities of the same size) compared to the local turnout (also relative to municipalities of the same size), the higher the value of the dependent variable. The summary of the results can be found in Table 8.

Table 8. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining differences in turnout between parliamentary and municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the years 1990, 1998 and 2002
(electoral participation in municipalities "size standardized" by relating to the average participation in municipalities of respective population size)

Independent variables	1990	1998	2002
University educated (%)	+	+	
Unemployment rate (%)	– –		
Share of homeowners (%)			
Share of pensioners (%)	+		
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)			–
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	+		
Poor households (%)		+	
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)			+
Employees in industry and construction (%)		+	+
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.08	0.07

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by „–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

The results summarized in the table suggest that in this case the regression analyses did not provide any new insight into potential reasons for dissimilarities in local and national turnouts. The quality of the regression models was generally very low, the adjusted R square, ranging between 0.09 and 0.07, even decreased. The measured effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable was mostly weak, inconsistent or wholly absent. The only exception was the share of employees in industry and construction, which had a slight positive effect on the dependent variable in both observed electoral years. It is possible that the effect of the size of the municipality is so dominant that no other factor remains important. It is also possible, however, that there are other explanatory variables that did not occur to us.

3. Party Voting

The study of party voting in the context of metropolization and suburbanization processes has the potential to be even more useful than the study of voter participation itself in terms of revealing potentially important changes in political behavior and its relation to socio-spatial developments in metropolitan areas. Participation and party preferences are both important characteristics of political behavior. While participation is basically a dummy variable at the individual level (participation – non-participation), providing information about only one feature of the political behavior of the observed citizen, actual party preference is always the result of multiple choices and therefore provides researchers with more than just one-dimensional information about the political behavior of the observed citizen. Party preferences may indicate deeply rooted value structures of the citizens and adherence to various political ideologies, but they also can be used as a measure indicating popular reactions to actual political and economic situations.

The potential wealth of the information that can be provided by party preferences, and its practical usability as an analytical indicator is, however, somewhat lessened in that very different motivations can lead to the same party being chosen. Some voters may vote for Party A because they are long-time proponents of that party's ideology, other voters may make the choice because they are attracted by the charismatic personality of the party leader. Other voters may choose that party because they were told to do so by their parents (spouse, friend), and still other voters may opt for Party A just because they want incumbent Party B to be replaced. Consequently, one has to exercise caution when interpreting voters' electoral choices so as to avoid making far-reaching conclusions based solely on the observation of party preferences. In a sense, party preferences are no more than a large-scale political opinion poll, one where the question is somewhat vague.

Disregarding the potential dangers of using party preferences as input data when analyzing political behavior, the great advantage to studying voting patterns is that it provides researchers with territorially specific information about political behavior. As the confidentiality of the electoral procedure must be assured, electoral data is, of course, available only at the aggregate level. The level of spatial aggregation of the data can vary, but their availability at the level of municipalities is usually a minimum standard. In any case, this is a spatial detail that cannot be achieved through the use of surveys or opinion polls, even those with the greatest numbers of respondents. The aggregation of data, however, implies the problem of ecological fallacy – the relation between political and social variables at the aggregate and individual level may not correspond. The reader should thus be aware that in the following chapter we use aggregate data not individual data. Any revealed relation thus basically concerns the observed territorial units (districts and municipalities in our case) and not necessarily individuals.

3.1 Structure of the post-Communist party system in the Czech Republic

At this point, some time must be devoted to providing readers with some basic insight into the post-Communist party system in the Czech Republic.[5] Although the Czech Republic had some pre-Communist democratic traditions that also included a functioning party system, after over forty years of Communist rule the party system had to be almost completely rebuilt. At the beginning of the 1990s, three types of institutionalized political actors could be found in the country.

The Communist Party itself represents the first type. The Party was stripped of its monopoly on power, but it was not banned (unlike the fascist parties following WWII), and it was allowed to participate in the free political contest. Although the Communist Party lost a substantial number of its members after 1989, the hardcore membership that remained loyal to the party is still politically active both at the national and local levels. In sharp contrast to the development in most other post-Communist countries in Central-East Europe, the Communist Party did not reform itself substantially and remains quite ideologically orthodox. It did change its name slightly, to the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), but refused to remove the word "Communist" from its name. It draws its political strength from the nostalgia of its followers, the attractiveness of its social-oriented policies to the losers of the economic transformation, a vital network of local organizations and a still relatively large membership.

The so-called satellite parties represent the second type of political parties found in the political sphere immediately after the regime change. During the Communist regime, the Czech Republic (a part of the federative Czechoslovakia of the time) was not *de jure* a single-party country; in addition to the Communist Party, two other political parties were allowed to exist within the framework of the Communist-led National Front. These two parties – the Czechoslovak Peoples Party and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party – were the remnants of the pre-Communist political parties that, together with the Communists, formed the provisional governments of national unity after WWII. These satellite parties were only used by the Communists to mask the undemocratic nature of their regime. In practice they were fully subject to the Communist party and were not allowed to compete with the Communists in elections. During and after the Velvet Revolution in 1989, when the Communist monopoly on power was crushed, the parties became independent *de facto* and began to participate in rebuilding the democracy. While the political fortune of the Socialist Party soon ended, the Czechoslovak Peoples Party became a firmly-established party on the Czech political scene under a somewhat transformed name: the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak Peoples Party (KDU-ČSL). The party derives its support mainly from the Catholic population, although it often declares its non-denominational character.

At the time of the Velvet Revolution, the parties that dominated the political scene were not the parties that exist today. At that time, the key political player was the broad anti-Communist umbrella movement called the Civic Forum. In 1989 the Civic Forum was established as a political institution for the opposition groups in order to increase their negotiating power vis-a-vis the still powerful Communists. The movement was basically an amalgam of the different dissident groups, newly established political parties, interest groups and non-political organizations. It was led by

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5   Readers more interested in the topic can get more detailed information from Kitchelt et al. (1999), Lewis (2000) or Kostelecký (2002).

a group of dissidents, among whom Václav Havel held the prominent position. The Civic Forum pressed the Communist Party to replace the most discredited leaders, to create a provisionary government with the non-Communist majority, to elect Václav Havel as the new president of the country, and, finally, to open the space for political competition. Despite its loose organizational ties and vague political program, the Civic Forum participated in the first free post-Communist elections in June 1990 as one of the "electoral parties". It obtained the majority of votes and created the first post-Communist government with a democratic mandate. Soon after the election, the movement started to split along ideological cleavages. There were various possible strategies for advancing the economic transformation, and among Civic Forum representatives in the parliament there were also differing opinions about non-economic matters (e.g. whether the Communist Party should be banned). As a consequence, the movement began to disintegrate. The Civic Forum activists who pushed for a more free-market solution to the economic and social problems formed the Civic Democratic Party (ODS); this party became a major right-wing party in the post-Communist Czech Republic. The Civic Forum activists who believed that the state should retain a greater regulatory role in the economy and valued social solidarity more highly, scattered among the different left-oriented parties in the beginning of 1990s. Later, however, most of them finally joined the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), a party with a long history and which had been banned by the Communists in 1948 and re-established in 1989. Under the leadership of the former Civic Forum activists, the Social Democratic Party became the key political party on the left side of the political spectrum.

Thus, for most of the period after 1989, politics in the Czech Republic was dominated by the four aforementioned political parties: the Communist Party (KSČM), the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL). So far, we have explained the origin of these parties but only slightly touched upon the question of their position in the ideological spectrum. Before we delve further into the analysis of actual party preferences found in Czech metropolitan areas, we need to provide some more detailed information about the political and ideological differences between these parties. This is not an easy task, as simply placing the parties into the traditional left-right scale does not adequately convey the colorful reality of the different meanings of "left" and "right" in the Czech context. Although political parties are traditionally classified along the one-dimensional left-right axis, the majority of the empirical studies conducted in the post-Communist countries[6] suggest that the one-dimensional division of political space should be replaced with one that has at least two-dimensions. In most countries, the two dimensions of the political conflicts that seem to be the most important are the economic and the non-economic dimensions. For the most part, the economic dimension captures the cleavage between greater support for economic liberalism and less for the state (often called the "right" stance), and greater support for state intervention in the economy (often called the "left" attitude). The non-economic dimension also distinguishes parties that push the idea of social libertarianism (often called the "left" position) from the parties that are more supportive of socially conservative policies (often called the "right" position). Parties vary in their opinions regarding economic matters (e.g. how high should taxes be for the rich, or how generous unemployment benefits should be), as well as in their policies towards non-economic matters (e.g. whether religious education should be provided in the public schools or to what extent the use of marihuana should be tolerated). The policies and principles that a party supports in the economic sphere may (but not necessarily) correspond to those which that party supports in the non-economic sphere, and vice versa. Thus, in reality, the political

6   For a detailed discussion about literature on the topic see Kostelecký (2002).

space consists of at least four different mutually different sub-spaces that correspond to the four quadrants in the following chart.

Chart 13. Basic structure of the political space in post-Communist countries in the 1990s

Source: Kostelecký (2002).

     Readers should note two particular features of this scheme. The first is that in one of the quadrants (lower right), there are two different labels, making a distinction between "Conservative" and "Christian Democratic" parties. In fact, the label "Conservative" is a more general term, as the Christian Democrats can be considered a special type of conservative party that tends to promote conservative religious values. In most Western countries, this is typical for conservative parties in general; in a post-Communist world, where the societies are generally more secular than elsewhere, there are lot of conservatives that are not and do not want to be affiliated in any way with any religious values. This is why in the scheme these two political groups are distinct, despite their ideological similarities. The second particular feature to be mentioned here concerns the fact that the "right" and "left" are not unambiguously connected with support for individual freedom and individual decisions on one side, and collective decisions on the other. While the "left", in the economic sense of the word, tends to promote greater regulation and less individual freedom of economic subjects on the market, the non-economic sense of the "left" advocates the freedom of individuals to make decisions in non-economic matters (e.g. marriage, abortion, education, etc.). Similarly, the economic

3. Party Voting

"right" pushes for greater individual freedoms for economic subjects, while the non-economic "right" endorses more collective decisions about values, private life, education, etc.

## Chart 14. Position of main Czech political parties in the ideological space

Chart 14 positions the four major Czech political parties in the above-described ideological space. As the political and economic reality is somewhat fluid, and the positions of the individual parties may change over time for tactical and ideological reasons, this scheme should not be taken as a precise and definite depiction of the orientation of the political parties. Nevertheless, if we look at political development in the 15 years since the collapse of the Communist regime, the positions of the individual parties has remained relatively stable.

Of course, many other parties have come into existence during the observed period, but most have disappeared or lost their political relevance. Thus far, there has not been a strong liberal-democratic party in the Czech Republic to occupy the upper right quadrant of the scheme. Similarly, extreme right parties that would occupy the very bottom of the scheme, in the same quadrant as the Communist Party, have thus far not achieved much success in the Czech Republic. The regional parties that were successful in the beginning of the 1990s and which are hard to position in the scheme lost their relevance after the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993. The Greens, which to some extent cannot be positioned in the scheme, have not been able to gain a single seat in the post-Communist parliaments. The most relevant parties in the 1990s and which are not specified in the scheme were in

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fact those that competed with the four established parties for the same position within the ideological space. Several smaller parties tried to contest (with some success) the position of ODS in the conservative quadrant, but all of them failed in the long run. In the beginning of the 1990s, when the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) was still quite weak, there were several parties that sought hegemony in the Social-Democratic quadrant of the scheme. Between the 1992 and 1996 elections, however, they were all either amalgamated or pushed into oblivion by ČSSD, which was able to skillfully combine its long tradition and branded name with the political skills of the former Civic Forum activists, already well known to the public.

3.2 Party voting – consistent patterns or chaos?

3.2.1 Party voting in the Czech Republic

Before we pursue an analysis of party voting in metropolitan areas, we will provide readers with a brief overview of the general development of party preferences in the Czech Republic after 1989. Table 9 summarizes the electoral results of the four most relevant political parties in parliamentary elections since 1990. The numbers in 1990 and 1992 (before the split of the Czechoslovakia) refer to the results of parliamentary elections in the Czech part of the former Czechoslovak federation. The system of proportional representation was used in all of the referenced elections. Although there were slight changes to the form of the electoral system within the observed period, its basic features remained unchanged; of these, we should specifically mention the existence of a 5% legal threshold and the use of party lists.

Table 9. Popular support for the most relevant electoral parties in parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic – the lower chamber of Parliament (% of total votes)

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
ODS – Civic Democratic Party	–	29.7	29.6	27.7	24.5
ČSSD – Social Democratic Party	4.1	6.5	26.4	32.3	30.2
KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	13.6	14.1	10.3	11.0	18.5
KDU-ČSL – Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party	8.7	6.3	8.1	9.0	9.6*

Source: Czech Statistical Office.
Note: *) KDU-ČSL participated in the 2002 election in a coalition with the liberal Union of Freedom. This coalition, named "The Coalition", received altogether 14.3% of the vote. It is not possible to distinguish the share of votes for the individual coalition partners. The percentage 9.6% as displayed in the table corresponds to the percentage of seats gained by KDU-ČSL candidates in the parliament (21 out of the total 31 seats obtained by "The Coalition").

As is clear from the table, the first parliamentary election in 1990 was quite unique in that the Civic Democratic Party, as the representative of the economic right, was not yet constituted. The Civic Forum, the broad anti-Communist movement, received the majority of the votes. Both the Communist Party as well as the former satellite People's Party, now renamed the Christian Democratic Union, were relatively successful in the founding election, safely passing the legal threshold and assuring their presence on the Czech political scene in the entire post-Communist period. Electoral support for the Communist Party seemed to fall slightly, from about 14% in the early 1990s to about 11% in the late 1990s. In the 2002 elections, however, there was a quite substantial increase in popular support for the Communist Party. This was partly caused by the rising popularity of the party as "the only true opposition" (the only relevant party not participating in any national government after 1990), and partly from the combination of very low voter turnout and the renowned discipline among the core Communist Party voters. The Christian Democrats were always somewhat weaker in terms of the obtained percentage of votes they received. In contrast, owing to their high coalition potential, the Communists were present in all but one Czech post-Communist government after 1989. The Civic Democratic Party, which was established in 1991, witnessed great electoral success in 1992, which catapulted the party to the position of senior coalition partner in the right-oriented coalition. The party was able to repeat its success in the 1996 election. After the collapse of the coalition government in the fall of 1997, and the lost early elections in 1998, the party stayed in opposition. The Social Democrats saw the most spectacular increase in its popularity in the first half of the 1990s. The party did not managed to get into Parliament in 1990, and only barely passed the legal threshold in the subsequent election in 1992. In between the 1992 and 1996 elections, the party quadrupled the percentage of votes and became the leading opposition party in the country. After their victory in the early election in 1998, the Social Democrats formed a government; this was repeated after victorious elections in 2002. In general, the figures in the table show that support for the main political parties has been relatively stable since 1996.

Taking into account the mess connected with the foundations, disintegration, splits, and mergers of the individual parties in the 1990s, we decided to also analyze electoral support for groups of parties with the same political orientation rather than preferences for individual parties. For that purpose, each political party that participated in the parliamentary elections in the respective years has been classified according to their political ideology into one of nine different groups: Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Fiscally Conservative,[7] Communist, New Left, New Right, Regional, Independent and Others. Parties with a Social Democratic orientation include the Social Democrats, but also several other parties with similar political programs. Analogously, the group of parties with a Christian Democratic orientation is comprised of the Christian Democrats and other similar parties; the group of "Fiscally Conservative" parties includes the Civic Democratic Party and other similar parties. The Communist Party establishes a special type of its own. The New Left includes the Greens and various minority parties, the New Right is comprised of extreme right, racist, and xenophobic parties, and the Regional Parties include the various forms of Moravian and Silesian autonomist movements and parties. Although the electoral system of proportional representation does not allow independent candidates to participate in the electoral race, it cannot prevent groups and associations of independent candidates from establishing and registering "national parties" of independents. The label Indepen-

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7   The term "fiscally conservative" parties was preferred over the simple term "conservative" parties in order to emphasize the fact that parties belonging to this group tend to be conservative in terms of economic policies but not necessarily in other issues.

dent in our typology is denoted to such parties. Finally, some parties are simply unclassifiable, e.g. the Independent Erotic Initiative, the Friends of Beer Party, the Radio-Helax Party or Balbin's Poetic Party. Such parties usually promote only their founders and their business interests, or are simply the result of a joke by some rich jokers. Unclassifiable parties were labeled as "Others".

Chart 15 provides the alternative picture of the development of electoral support for the groups of parties with similar ideological orientations between 1992 and 2002. For practical reason related to the problem of classifying so many parties, including the most relevant (the Civic Forum) in the 1990 election, the election results of the first post-Communist election are not included in the chart.

Chart 15. Changes in the relative strengths of groups of ideologically similar parties in the Czech Republic parliamentary elections between 1992 and 2002

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

The results displayed in the chart suggest an even higher level of stability in voters' political orientation than can be seen when observing the electoral records of the individual political parties. While regional and New Right parties lost much of their support during the 1990s, support for the New Left, Independent, and "Others" remained weak in the national elections. The key portion of the votes was obtained by the parties belonging to the four types: Social Democrats, Fiscally Conservative, Christian Democrats, and Communist; together these types regularly received around 80% of the votes. The decisive electoral battle over the control over the government has always been a battle between the adherents of the Fiscally Conservative type and the Social Democratic type.

Thus far we have only dealt with results of the national elections. The results of municipal elections show that the principles around which the political life and electoral contests at the local level are organized are quite different from those at the national level. The key role in this respect can be attributed to the electoral law used in the municipal elections. The law allows independent candidates to participate in municipal elections, and independent and non-partisan candidates have been very effective in taking advantage of this, especially in small municipalities (Kostelecký 2005). Thus, independent non-partisan politicians basically dominate politics in municipalities with less than 1000 inhabitants, which represents about 80% of the approximately 6000 Czech municipalities. Political parties were even gradually losing their ability to participate in local elections in smaller municipalities as they were losing the local activists instead of the activists building a more solid network of the local organizations. In large cities, however, even local politics remained basically dominated by the national political parties. This is why the overall share of votes received by independent candidates in municipal elections was not as high as one would expect (see Table 10).

Table 10. Popular support for the most relevant electoral parties and independent candidates in municipal elections in the Czech Republic in the period from 1990 to 2002 (% of total votes)

	1990	1994	1998	2002
ODS – Civic Democratic Party	–	29.4	22.7	23.1
ČSSD – Social Democratic Party	5.2	8.7	17.1	15.2
KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	16.8	14.7	14.4	14.9
KDU-ČSL – Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party	10.9	8.6	11.7	10.4
Independents	9.7	11.5	20.5	19.7

Source: Czech Statistical Office.

The numbers in the table show that in the observed period the share of votes received by independents increased from about 10% to double digits. However, leaving independents aside, the general trend in party preferences in the local elections tends to follow the trend observed in national elections. The most relevant departure from the rule concerns the Social Democrats who, despite an increase in support, obtained a substantially lower share of the popular votes in local elections than in national ones. Their especially sparse network of local organizations is partially responsible for this. The two other largest parties – the Civic Democratic Party and the Communist Party – obtained about the same share of votes in both national and local elections, while the Christian Democratic Union was always more successful at the local level than the national.

3.2.2 Party voting in the metropolitan areas

We now turn our attention to the analysis of party voting in the metropolitan areas. We calculated the average share of received votes in municipalities in the respective suburban areas and compared these numbers to the percentage of votes in the respective core cities. Taking into account the fact that there was a greater fluctuation in electoral support for individual parties than there was in the overall support for the groups of parties that were ideologically similar, we decided to work with the groups of parties. We dealt only with the four main groups of parties: Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Communist, and Fiscally Conservative. Electoral support for the other groups was not analyzed for the moment. The following series of charts displays voter support in the core metropolitan cities and their suburban areas in the parliamentary elections.

Chart 16. Electoral support for political parties of Social Democratic orientation in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

From the data displayed in Chart 16, we can note a few features about electoral support for parties of the Social Democratic type. The first is that party preferences in metropolitan areas basically followed the general trend, which was a noticeable increase in support for social democratic ideas in the first half of the 1990s. The negative consequences of the economic transformation managed by the right-wing parties in the early 1990s made the social democratic ideas of social protection and a larger welfare state more attractive in the eyes of voters, and gave voters the opportunity to vote "against" the post-Communist government without voting for the Communists themselves. The second feature observable from the chart concerns the fact that differences among metropolitan areas tend to be generally larger than that between core cities and their respective suburbs. Thus, in

the Ostrava metropolitan area, which of the four observed areas was the one most seriously affected by the negative side-effects of the transformation, noticeably more voters turned to supporting social democratic ideas than was seen in the other observed metropolitan areas. But electoral support for the Social Democratic parties increased substantially in the prosperous metropolises as well. The third feature is that in most elections, social democratic ideas tend to have relatively greater (or at least equal) support in the suburbs than in the respective core cities. The exception to this rule seems to be limited to the suburbs of Brno.

Chart 17 shows the electoral support for the Christian Democrats, which was generally quite stable both in the Czech Republic as a whole and in the metropolitan areas specifically. The departure from this rule seems to be the parliamentary election in 2002, where substantial deviations from the general trend can be observed in the Prague core city (rapid increase) and Brno suburbs (dramatic decrease). We suspect, however, that these fluctuations may to a great extent only be artifacts caused by the way the percentage of votes for the Christian Democratic parties were calculated in this specific election. The key party of Christian Democratic orientation (Christian Democratic Union) participated in the election in a coalition with a small party of the Fiscally Conservative type (Freedom Union). As there is no way to distinguish which votes for the coalition were given to Freedom Union and which were given to the Christian Democrats, we estimated the percentage of votes obtained by the individual parties in the coalition based on the ratio of seats obtained in the parliament. While this method can be considered relatively reliable at the national level, it may fail to show real party support in specific areas that are strongholds of either of the parties. The suburban municipalities of Brno belong to one of the Christian Democratic strongholds – their gains usually double that in other observed areas. Votes for coalitions in this area were very probably votes for the Christian Democrats. Therefore, it is very probable that the method we used underestimated the real electoral support for Christian Democratic-type parties in the area. Similarly, the percentage of votes obtained by the Christian Democrats in the Prague core city may be overestimated as the majority of the votes for the coalition could have actually been votes for the Freedom Union.

Chart 18 displays the results of the Communist Party in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic. Again, the pro-Communist votes in metropolitan areas basically correspond to the national trends. Similarly, the regional differences tend to be larger than the differences between core cites and the respective suburbs. As in the case of the Social Democratic parties, the Communist party generally obtained relatively more votes in the suburbs than in the core cities. There are, however, some other features of the development that should be noted. The popularity of the Communist party increased noticeably in the suburban areas around Brno. While the Communist party received only about 10% of votes in these areas in the beginning of the 1990s (well below the national average at the time), they obtained almost 18% of the votes in the 2002 elections (the national average). The reverse can be observed in the case of the Pilsen and Prague core cities, where in relative terms the Communists were losing the most substantively. Overall, one notices that the variability among the different metropolitan areas increased during the observed time period. Voters living in the Ostrava metropolitan area (both in the core city and the suburban area) turned to supporting the Communists more than the voters living in the Prague, Brno and Pilsen metropolitan areas.

Chart 17. Electoral support for political parties of Christian Democratic orientation in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

*Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.*

Chart 18. Electoral support for the Communist Party in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Finally, Chart 19 illustrates the electoral support for parties with a Fiscally Conservative orientation. Observing the support for Fiscally Conservative parties is of special interest to us, as one of the most remarkable consequences of the suburbanization process with respect to political behavior should be, at least theoretically, an increase in the Fiscally Conservative vote in areas affected by suburbanization. Before presenting the data from the Czech case in Chart 19, readers should bear in mind that the situation in the Czech Republic is different from that in the US, namely because the speed and scope of suburbanization is still relatively limited. After the 1990 elections, when there were still practically no relevant Fiscally Conservative parties, the overall percentage of votes for the Fiscally Conservative parties skyrocketed (in 1992). Since then, however, electoral support for this type of party has been gradually but steadily falling. The data also shows that the percentage of votes for the Fiscally Conservative parties was generally lower in the suburbs than in the core cities during the period between 1990 and 2002. This is not so surprising because during the time of the Communist rule the suburban municipalities were rather neglected peripheries of the large cities than the areas of the most vital development. The regional differences tended to be larger than the differences between the core cities and their respective suburbs.

Chart 19. Electoral support for Fiscally Conservative political parties in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)


Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

From the presented data about the potential effect of the suburbanization process, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on a greater inclination among suburban inhabitants to vote for Fiscally Conservative parties. There are some signs, at least in the three more economically advanced metropolitan areas where the suburbanization process is more visible, that suburbanization could increase the probability of support for Fiscally Conservative parties, but not in absolute terms. Rather, it can

be said that the fall in support for Fiscally Conservative parties in suburban areas is slower (relatively) than in the core cities. Or, in other words, there is a convergence trend between the core cities and suburbs with respect to electoral support for Fiscally Conservative parties.

The following series of charts should provide readers with the basic information about the results of the municipal elections in both the cores and the suburban zones in the four observed metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic. Included are votes for the independent candidates and the cumulative voting support for the parties of the four main ideological streams in Czech national politics. As is clear from Chart 20, in terms of the development path, the support for the independent candidates dramatically differ when one compares local elections and national elections. While independents practically disappeared from local politics in the core cites (mostly due to barriers erected against them by the electoral law legislation – for details see Kostelecký 2005), during the same period independents increased their popularity substantially in suburban areas. In fact, in the Prague and Pilsen suburban zones, independents have totally dominated the local political scene since the 1994 local elections, regularly receiving about two thirds of the total available votes. In the Brno suburbs, the dominance of the independents is not so absolute, but the percentage of received votes still exceeds 40%. The Ostrava suburbs are the least typical in that respect, specifically because quite a few of the suburbs are relatively large cities where the average percentage of votes for independents is in the range of approximately 25%.

Chart 20. Electoral support for independents in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

*Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.*

   The percentage of votes given to the parties of Social Democratic orientation in the municipal elections is displayed in Chart 21. It is clear that substantial differences exist between the suburbs, where Social Democratic parties received only about 5% of the total votes (15% in the case of the Ostrava suburbs), and the cities, where support for the Social Democratic parties increased substantially. Naturally, the reason for the difference is very easy to locate: in most suburban municipalities there were no parties of Social Democratic orientation in the observed period, and, consequently, they could not receive any votes. In the Ostrava metropolitan area, where the suburbs also include larger municipalities and working class edge cities, the participation of the Social Democratic parties in the electoral races and their ability to attract voter support was higher.

Chart 21. Electoral support for political parties of Social Democratic orientation in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 22. Electoral support for political parties of Christian Democratic orientation in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)


Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Chart 22, which summarizes the results of the Christian Democratic parties in the municipal elections, provides a somewhat different picture. Owing to their relatively dense network of local organizations, the Christian Democrats were able to secure a quite substantial portion of the popular vote in two suburban areas, that of Brno and Ostrava. In contrast, in the Prague and Pilsen suburban areas, parties with this orientation were extremely weak. Though the differences among the core cities were not so important in this respect, the Christian Democratic supporters were nevertheless more active in the local elections in Brno than in any of the other large cities observed.

The Communist Party represents the only political party in the Czech Republic that can claim to have a fully functional network of local organizations. Though even the Communist were gradually losing their membership and grassroot activists (Kostelecký, Kroupa 1996), their presence in the individual municipalities and ability to actively participate in local elections greatly exceeded the capacities of the other relevant parties. This is the most important reason why the difference between the total percentage of votes obtained by the Communists in the suburban areas and in the core cities was not as dramatic as in the case of the other parties. However, as can be seen in the chart, the trend towards de-partisanship in the local politics also affected the Communist Party. The most remarkable example is that documented in the Prague suburbs.

Chart 23. Electoral support for the Communist Party in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

The last chart from this series (Chart 24) shows the average electoral support for the Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal elections. In 1990, there were practically no parties that could be labeled Fiscally Conservative. Most of them were founded in the period between 1991 and 1992, and obtained great popular support in the following municipal elections in 1994. They dominated in the core cities of the metropolitan areas, while receiving a relatively high percentage of 15-20% of the votes in suburban areas. It is interesting to note that while the level of support for Fiscally Conservative parties in parliamentary elections gradually fell, support for such parties in the local elections remained quite stable.

Chart 24. Electoral support for the Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2002 (in % of votes)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

One can conclude that it is quite difficult to make any general conclusions about the development of party voting in the metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic after 1989 without more carefully distinguishing about what exactly we speak. The most remarkable feature of the development seems to be the growing gap between the strong role of parties in parliamentary and local elections in the large core cities on one side, and the weak role of parties in municipal elections in the (mostly small) suburban municipalities. The other remarkable feature of the development of party voting is that inter-metropolitan (i.e. basically regional) differences in the support for different types of parties are more important than intra-metropolitan differences (i.e. differences between the core cities and the suburbs).

So far, we have only been dealing with the average numbers that characterized the electoral support for individual parties or for groups of ideologically similar parties in the respective suburban areas. We already know, however, that suburbs in the Czech Republic are not all the same. Thus, the general trends valid for the whole sample of suburban communes may hide variations among municipalities within the suburban areas. Therefore, we looked for the inter-municipal variability in the electoral results in suburban areas. In each election, the variability of electoral support for groups of ideologically similar parties was measured separately by variation coefficients (defined as standard deviation/mean*100). We discovered that while we can find substantial differences in the variability of the support for the observed groups of parties between national and local elections, over time there were only minimal changes in variability. In other words, the level of variability among the suburban communes in terms of electoral support for different groups of parties was quite stable in the observed period. We therefore decided to display only the average values of the variation coeffi-

cients (Table 11), separated according to the suburban areas in the individual metropolitan areas, and broken down according to national and municipal elections and the observed groups of parties.

Table 11. Inter-municipal variability in electoral support for selected groups of ideologically similar parties in the suburban areas of the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in national and local elections in the period 1990-2002
(displayed are average values of respective variation coefficients = standard deviation/mean*100).

	Social Democratic parties		Christian Democratic parties		The Communist Party		Fiscally Conservative Parties	
	National elections	Local elections	National elections	Local elections	National elections	Local elections	National elections	Local elections
Prague suburbs	24	282	54	335	43	291	18	177
Pilsen suburbs	27	210	56	354	38	180	24	162
Brno suburbs	29	254	49	93	39	161	25	149
Ostrava suburbs	18	117	49	90	40	103	21	90

Source: Author's calculations.

Two rather general trends are observable from the figures in the table. Firstly, the inter-municipal variability of the national election results is substantially lower than that of the local elections. This is understandable: extremely high variations of electoral results in local elections can be attributed mostly to the fact that in many small municipalities the parties are not present at all. If a party is not represented in the elections, naturally, they cannot receive any votes. The high percentage of municipalities where some parties received no votes, contrasted with the relatively high level of popular support in electoral contests in other municipalities where the parties did take part, increased the overall level of variation substantially. Conversely, in national elections voters in all municipalities choose from basically the same party list and, without the "party non-presence effect", inter-municipal variation is lower.

Secondly, variation among electoral results in suburban communes is generally higher in the case of the Prague and Pilsen metropolitan areas and lower in the Brno and Ostrava metropolitan areas. But it is important to note that the difference holds only for the municipal elections, not the national elections. As in the previous case, it is not easy to explain this difference. In the Prague metropolitan area, one explanation could be the greater scope of the suburbanization process in 1990s, which gave birth to wealthy "new suburbs" in which political behavior may differ from that in other suburban communes, resulting in a greater variability of electoral results. But this hypothesis explains neither the difference between the national and local elections, nor the high level of variability in the Pilsen metropolitan area where the scope of suburbanization was limited.

3.2.3 Relation between local and national party voting

The previous text raised the question of the relation between the voter behavior in national and local elections. Are voters' decisions in parliamentary and in local elections connected? How are electoral results in the parliamentary and municipal elections related? Answering these questions at the level of individual voters is not possible from the aggregate data at our disposal. One has to analyze the survey results to be able to reliably assess such links at the individual level. We can, however, look at what the aggregate data says about the electoral results at the municipal level. Therefore, we conducted a simple correlation analysis comparing the electoral results in parliamentary and municipal elections. As the parliamentary and municipal elections are not organized simultaneously, we decided to include into the analysis only the electoral results from years 1990, 1998, and 2002, when both types of elections were held in the same year. The results are summarized in Table 12.

Table 12. Relation of voting patterns of different types of parties in national and local elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in 1990, 1998 and 2002 (when both types of elections were held in the same years) – Person correlation between % of obtained votes in municipalities

	1990	1998	2002
Parties of Social Democratic orientation	.386**	.187**	.289**
Parties of Christian Democratic orientation	.771**	.734**	.660**
The Communist Party	.542**	.397**	.397**
Parties of Fiscally Conservative orientation	.144**	.149**	.061

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Generally, it is clear that there is a positive correlation in all cases, which is statistically significant at a high probability level in all but one case. This is not so surprising: municipalities that tend to support some party types in the parliamentary elections do the same in the municipal elections as well. In this respect, it is more interesting to take a more detailed look at the differences among the groups of parties. The highest level of correlation was found in the case of parties with a Christian Democratic orientation. Not only do Christian Democrats have a more stable network of local organizations than the other parties, but it seems that their supporters are also more loyal, and vote "ideologically", i.e. "on principle", more often than the others, supporting the parties close to their ideological orientation, regardless of the type of election. The correlation between the national and local election results of the Communist Party were also found to be quite high. The explanation for this is probably similar to the explanation for the Christian Democratic vote: Communist voters tend to be ideological supporters of their favorite party.

Quite surprisingly, in the case of parties with a Social Democratic orientation the correlation is also quite high, though it is well known that loyalty is low among supporters of the Social Democra-

tic Party and the party has weak local organizations. Here we should be aware, however, that we are observing the total support for the political parties with a Social Democratic orientation, not the stability of votes for the Social Democratic Party. It seems that support for social democratic ideals is more stable in space and time than the party preferences for an individual party, however strong such party might appear at the time. The lowest correlation was found in the case of electoral support for Fiscally Conservative parties. It seems to be true that support for Fiscal Conservatives at the national level may not necessarily translate into support for Fiscal Conservatives at the local level. It is also possible that many of the independents that regularly receive large numbers of votes in local elections are Fiscal Conservatives, but we do not have enough information about the political orientation of the independent candidates to allow us to test such a hypothesis.

3.2.4 Time-space stability of party voting

Before we start testing specific hypotheses about the potential influence that suburbanization and socio-spatial polarization in the metropolitan areas may have on the voting behavior of its inhabitants, one more question must be asked. The question concerns the time-space stability of voting patterns in metropolitan areas. A high time-space volatility with respect to election results may indicate either political instability or poorly developed links between social cleavages and the party system, but could also be an indicator of substantial changes in the social structures of the suburban communes. If voting patterns changed substantially from one election to another it would be much more difficult to search for general relations between social and political developments in metropolitan areas. It has been shown that at the national level spatial patterns of electoral support for the major political parties are surprisingly stable in the Czech Republic (Jehlička, Sýkora 1991; Kostelecký 2001). Is the same true at the level of municipalities in the metropolitan areas? To answer the question we computed simple correlation coefficients between the electoral results for each pair of subsequent elections, for parliamentary and municipal elections. The summary of the results is presented in Table 13 and Table 14. We are not interested in the stability of the party system itself or the stability of electoral support for individual parties, but rather about the development of ideological and political preferences among the suburban population. Therefore, instead of the electoral results of individual political parties, we used the electoral support for the groups of parties with the same political orientation as the indicator.

Table 13. Time-space stability of support for different types of parties in municipalities in the four largest Czech metropolitan areas – parliamentary elections (Person correlation between % of obtained votes in pairs of subsequent elections)

	1990/1992	1992/1996	1996/1998	1998/2002
Parties of Social Democratic orientation	.600**	.425**	.750**	.633**
Parties of Christian Democratic orientation	.932**	.940**	.947**	.811**
The Communist Party	.896**	.794**	.874**	.809**
Parties of Fiscally Conservative orientation	.582**	.888**	.931**	.869**

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 14. Time-space stability of support for different types of parties in municipalities in the four largest Czech metropolitan areas – municipal elections (Person correlation between % of obtained votes in pairs of subsequent elections)

	1990/1994	1994/1998	1998/2002
Parties of Social Democratic orientation	.567**	.606**	.779**
Parties of Christian Democratic orientation	.801**	.855**	.895**
The Communist Party	.538**	.777**	.826**
Parties of Fiscally Conservative orientation	.015	.797**	.559**

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The overall level of time-stability of voting patterns is quite high – all the correlation coefficients but one were found to be statistically significant at a high significance level. The only exception represents the substantial shift in voting patterns of the Fiscally Conservative parties between municipal elections in 1990 and 1994, mainly caused by the fact that practically no Fiscally Conservative parties participated in the 1990 local elections. The highest level of time-space stability can be seen in the pro-Christian Democratic votes, but the other correlation coefficients suggest a high level of stability with respect to support for other political ideologies as well. The time-space stability of the results of national elections is somewhat higher than that of the municipal election, but both are reasonably high. To sum up, the data in the table proved the stability of voting patterns is quite high, and eventual changes are not radical, but rather evolutionary.

3.3 Testing specific hypotheses

The socio-spatial changes connected with metropolization and, more specifically, with suburbanization, are believed to have political consequences as well. Many of the potential relations between socio-spatial development and political behavior have already been studied elsewhere (Fischel 2001, Huckfeldt 1986, Wright 1977; Giles and Butler 1993). Some of these consequences are well documented and seem to be quite general (like increasing conservatism of the wealthier suburban areas contrasting with the more left-leaning political orientation of inhabitants living in the poorer inner cities of the metropolises). Other consequences were observed only in specific countries, but were not identified in other countries. Yet, there is also a set of anticipated or potential political consequences of the socio-spatial development of the large cities and their suburbs that have thus far not been systematically analyzed. In the following part of the text, we focus our attention on testing several hypotheses that were formulated under the framework of the IMO project: specifically, that wealthy communes tend to vote more Fiscally Conservative, as do communes with a higher percentage of homeowners, small businessmen and self-employed, and municipalities with better-educated inhabitants and the more distant suburban communes. Other hypotheses postulate that poor suburbs tend to support either traditional Left or New Right parties. The first step will be to test each hypothesis by calculating correlation coefficients between the different social and economic characteristics of municipalities on the one side, and voter support for the respective groups of parties on the other.

3.3.1 Wealthy communes more Fiscally Conservative?

People with higher incomes usually support the Fiscally Conservative parties at the polls more than poorer people do. This is quite natural – Fiscally Conservative parties tend to keep the level of taxation lower and are usually less willing to spend public money on welfare programs, which benefit the wealthy little or not at all. It is therefore possible to anticipate that the same relation will be observable at the level of municipalities – the wealthier the commune, the more electoral support for the Fiscally Conservative parties may be expected. While it is relatively easy to distinguish wealthy and poor people at the level of individuals or households, it is not so clear what the indicators of "wealth" should be when used to describe the communities. In the absence of data on household incomes at the municipal level in the Czech Republic, we could not use the most common measure: average household income. We therefore used several different indicators: the percentage of poor households in 2003, revenue from income tax in 1997 and 2003 (as approximate measure of income levels) and the unemployment rate in 1991 and 2001. Then we calculated the Pearson correlation coefficients between the set of indicators and the percentage of votes for Fiscally Conservative parties in all parliamentary and municipal elections in the municipalities in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic. The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 15 and 16.

The data in the tables suggests that the hypothesis can generally be confirmed, but the relation between the overall economic status of the municipality and the share of votes for the Fiscally Conservative parties is much stronger in national elections than in municipal ones. In the case of national elections, four of the five indicators used were found to be strongly and highly significantly correlated with the percentage of the Fiscally Conservative vote. Dissimilarly, in the case of municipal elections, only one indicator correlated significantly with the election record of the Fiscally

Conservative parties, and even this correlation was substantially weaker than the ones previously mentioned.

Table 15. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship and voting for Fiscally Conservative parties in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	-.321**	-.271**	-.283**	-.327**	-.333**
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	.173**	.307**	.325**	.317**	.280**
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	.250**	.136**	.255**	.218**	.178**
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	.034	-.048	-.043	-.063	-.074
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	-.230**	-.391**	-.477**	-.551**	-.516**

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 16. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship and voting for Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	-.041	-.046	-.021	-.034
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	.096*	.127**	.135**	.116*
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	.018	-.012	-.004	-.006
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	.037	-.045	-.011	.026
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	.076	-.079	-.059	.051

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The level of unemployment in 1991 was not correlated with any of the Fiscally Conservative voting patterns. The untypical spatial distribution of unemployment in 1991, caused most probably by the very low overall level of unemployment in the respective year, is the main reason for this. However, of all the indicators used, the highest level of correlation with the Fiscally Conservative vote in the parliamentary elections in 1998 and 2002 was when using the unemployment rate in 2002 as an indicator.

It is worth mentioning that the values of the correlation coefficient between the Fiscally Conservative vote and the individual indicators usually do not change much over time. One could expect that the correlation between, e.g. the share of poor households in 2003 and the vote for the Fiscal Conservatives in 2002 would tend to be much closer than, e.g. the correlation between the share of poor households in 2003 and the vote for Fiscally Conservative parties in 1990 or 1992, because in the former example both indicators refer to approximately the same time period, while in the latter they refer to a more distant time period. The only plausible explanation for the relatively small changes in correlation coefficients is the high time-space stability of the socio-economic and political characteristics of the municipalities.

3.3.2 Small businessmen and homeowners communes more Fiscally Conservative?

Other distinct groups of voters that are believed to lean toward voting Fiscally Conservative more than other voters are members of the "petit bourgeoisie", i.e. small businessmen and the self-employed, and also homeowners. Although both these groups usually have above-average incomes, and thus to some extent overlap with the group of "wealthy voters", the overlap is not complete, and the rationale behind voting for the Fiscally Conservative parties may also be somewhat different than in the previous case. Generally, regardless of their real incomes, owners of small companies and the self-employed tend to prefer lower corporate taxes and less administrative control over business. More than any of the other types of parties, the Fiscally Conservative parties push these policies. Similarly, people who became homeowners may want to protect their ownership rights against the "excessive" intrusion of both local and municipal governments, prefer a low property tax and are generally not happy to see any plans for social housing projects in their municipality. Thus, voting for Fiscally Conservative parties would seem to be the rational choice for homeowners.

As in the previous case, we conducted a series of correlation analyses at the municipal level between the share of votes for the Fiscally Conservative parties on the one side and the various indicators describing the socio-economic structure of the communes and the housing ownership structure. Unfortunately, data about the socio-economic structure of the inhabitants that would enable us to distinguish the small businessmen at the level of individual municipalities is not available in the Czech Republic. We therefore used only the share of self-employed in the municipality and supplemented this indicator with two others: the percentage of farmers and employees in agriculture and the percentage of employees in industry and construction. While these two additional indicators do not measure exactly the data we would most like to have, it does provide us with some more information about the socio-economic structure of the inhabitants in the individual municipalities. A high percentage of farmers and employees in agriculture (which cannot be separated from each other in the statistical data) indicates the agrarian character of those villages that became part of the suburban area but that to some extent still retain their "pre-suburbanization" character. A high percentage of employees in industry and construction indicates (albeit rather imperfectly) the traditional industrial character of the "old working class suburbs". Both indicators are negatively correlated with the percentage of self-employed and are expected to have a negative correlation with the percentage of small businessmen.

As far as homeownership is concerned, no problem with data exists. Every ten years the general censuses survey the tenure structure in great territorial detail. We used the percentage of home-

owners in the last two censuses in 1991 and 2001. It should be noted that vast economic changes occurred in the Czech Republic in the inter-censal period, which included the process of restitution to return nationalized rental houses to the former owners as well as the privatization of part of the public rental stock. Thus, a simple increase in the number of homeowners in some municipalities between 1991 and 2001 could be the consequence of very different causes. Examples could include the local politicians launching an excessive program of rental flat privatization, leading to a change in the tenure structure but not necessarily the change of the inhabitants; or new home construction may be located in the municipality, which might change not only the tenure structure but also be linked with a substantial influx of new inhabitants, most of them socially and economically different from the indigenous population. However, new housing construction, and the consequent influx of new suburban upper and upper-middle classes, might not necessarily change the percentage of homeowners when most or nearly all of the former residents of the municipality were already homeowners. In such cases, a considerable change might be underway (poor homeowners replaced by wealthy homeowners), but the homeownership statistics would not give any indication. We have therefore supplemented two of the aforementioned homeownership indicators with a third: the index showing the increase in the number of family houses in each municipality between 1991 and 2001. A high value indicates the scope of new housing construction in the municipality in the period 1991-2001 relative to the situation in the beginning of the observed period. The correlation coefficients between the above-described indicators and the percentage of votes that were received by parties with a Fiscally Conservative orientation are displayed in Tables 17 and 18, for parliamentary and municipal elections.

Table 17. Pearson correlation coefficient between indicators of social-economic structure of communes and voting for Fiscally Conservative parties in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Farmers and employees in agriculture 2001 (%)	-.199**	-.438**	-.400**	-.392**	-.341**
Employees in industry and construction 2001 (%)	-.413**	-.549**	-.583**	-.577**	-.577**
Self-employed 2003 (%)	.338	.515**	.575**	.612**	.611**
Homeowners 1991 (%)	-.199**	-.085	-.031	-.005	.089
Homeowners 2001 (%)	-.172**	-.070	-.033	-.006	.081
Number of family houses 2001/1991	.171**	.233**	.117*	.113*	.162**

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 18. Pearson correlation coefficient between indicators of social-economic structure of communes and voting for Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Farmers and employees in agriculture 2001 (%)	-.116*	-.247**	-.249**	-.217**
Employees in industry and construction 2001 (%)	-.142**	-.063	-.066	-.021
Self-employed 2003 (%)	.089	.068	.049	.034
Homeowners 1991 (%)	-.057	-.132**	-.171**	-.204**
Homeowners 2001 (%)	-.045	-.143**	-.182**	-.215**
Increase in number of family homes 2001/1991	.009	-.025	-.054	-.054

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results of the correlation analysis only partially support the hypothesis. In parliamentary and municipal elections, municipalities with a more agrarian population were less eager to support the Fiscally Conservative parties. The same negative correlation could be found with respect to the percentage of the industrial and construction labor force in the commune, albeit only in the case of parliamentary elections. In national elections, it seems to also be true that the higher the percentage of self-employed in the municipality, the higher the electoral record of the Fiscally Conservative parties (but basically no such relationship exists in local elections). Each of these three characteristics basically indicate that higher percentages of self-employed (and non-agricultural and non-industrial workforce) tend to increase the votes received by Fiscally Conservatives parties, at least in the national elections.

The observed relation between home ownership and Fiscal Conservatism, however, does not much support the theoretical assumptions. While there is generally no significant relation between the percentage of homeowners in a municipality and the pro-Fiscally Conservative vote among the population in parliamentary elections, there is a negative correlation with electoral support for Fiscal Conservatives in municipal elections. Having at our disposal only this statistical data, one could easily conclude that home ownership in the Czech Republic decrease the propensity to vote Fiscally Conservative. In the Czech context, however, a more accurate interpretation of the results would be that there is no connection between home ownership and a Fiscally Conservative political orientation. There is basically no significant correlation between home ownership and Fiscally Conservative voting in parliamentary elections. The negative correlation coefficients that are found in the case of municipal election results are rather the consequence of the population size effect: the smaller the municipality, the lower the percentage of (collective) rental housing available. In the smallest (but highly numerous) municipalities, practically no collective rental housing was ever built and, consequently, nearly all inhabitants are homeowners. As we already know, local politics is dominated by the independents in the smallest communes, and political parties of all sorts (including Fiscally Conservative) are practically absent on the local political scene. The extremely low support for Fiscal Conservatives in small municipalities, combined with a home ownership rate of almost 100%,

is responsible for the negative values of the correlation coefficients. It is interesting to note, however, that the correlation indexes between Fiscally Conservative votes and the last indicator used (the index of the growth in the number of family houses between 1991 and 2001) were different. While no statistically significant relation was identified in municipal elections, a statistically significant (albeit not too strong) positive correlation was found in the case of parliamentary elections. In other words: the greater the increase in new family houses constructed in suburban municipalities after 1991, the higher the probability that voters in such municipalities would vote Fiscally Conservative. This suggests that "new homeowners", who are the typical products of the post-Communist suburbanization process in the Czech Republic, are more inclined to support Fiscally Conservative parties than are "old homeowners". It seems that thus far home ownership itself is not an important factor fueling Fiscal Conservatism at the polls, but it might be an important factor in the future, especially if the suburbanization tendencies continue and the migration from the core cities to the suburbs becomes a mass movement.

3.3.3 Better-educated communes more Fiscally Conservative?

Another factor that is known to increase the probability of a political orientation towards Fiscally Conservative parties is the voters' education. Obviously, there is also some overlap with the previously observed categories, as the better-educated voters usually have a higher income. Voters with a higher education may not support the Fiscal Conservatives exclusively for fiscal reasons, but may be attracted by their emphasis on self-reliance, the reduced economic dependence of municipalities on the state, and the general promotion of meritocratic principles.

The following tables display the results of the correlation analyses. As indicators of the education level in the municipality we used the percentage of inhabitants in the municipality with only elementary education from the 1991 and 2001 censuses, and the percentage of university educated in the same two years. Moreover, we also used an index describing the relative change in the percentage of inhabitants with a university education between 1991 and 2001 as a measure of the dynamism of local social change in the observed period.

Table 19. Pearson correlation coefficient between indicators of the level of education in communes and voting for Fiscally Conservative parties in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Inhabitants with primary education 1991 (%)	-.189**	-.389**	-.449**	-.445**	-.402**
Inhabitants with primary education 2001 (%)	-.309**	-.549**	-.600**	-.609**	-.559**
Inhabitants with university education 1991 (%)	.188**	.338**	.411**	.395**	.352**
Inhabitants with university education 2001 (%)	.243**	.471**	.558**	.550**	.512**
Relative change in the share of inhabitants with university education 2001/1991 (Index)	.204**	.405**	.468**	.473**	.460**

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 20. Pearson correlation coefficient between indicators of the level of education in communes and voting for Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Inhabitants with primary education 1991 (%)	-.048	-.307**	-.283**	-.209**
Inhabitants with primary education 2001 (%)	-.053	-.262**	-.242**	-.175**
Inhabitants with university education 1991 (%)	.076	.272**	.281**	.181**
Inhabitants with university education 2001 (%)	.069	.217**	.215**	.125**
Relative change in the share of inhabitants with university education 2001/1991 (Index)	.031	.053	.037	.001

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Practically all correlation coefficients presented in the tables are statistically significant at a high level of significance. The observed relations suggest that the hypothesis is verified by the data. The higher the percentage of university educated among the inhabitants of the municipality and the lower the percentage of the least educated, the higher is the propensity to vote for the Fiscally Conservative parties. Generally higher values of the correlation coefficients can be found when one

analyzes the results of the parliamentary elections; education has a greater impact on the decisions that are made when national issues are at stake, and less so if the issues to be solved are local. That the values of the correlation coefficients are quite high overall also suggests that education is probably a more important factor than the income or socio-economic structure of the local inhabitants. It is also interesting to note that there is a significant positive correlation between the Fiscally Conservative vote and the index describing the relative change (increase, in almost all cases) in the percentage of university educated living in the municipalities. The more rapid the growth of the percentage of university-educated inhabitants in the municipality between 1991 and 2001, the higher the probability that in the entire observed period the vote of the inhabitants can be expected to be pro-Fiscally Conservative. In fact, it is a quite interesting observation. While the high correlation between the indicator of the dynamism of social change and the electoral results in elections, e.g., the 1998 or 2002 elections, can be easily attributed to the fact that the new university-educated inhabitants of the community increased the pool of Fiscally Conservative voters; this cannot be used to explain support for Fiscal Conservatives in the elections in 1990, 1992, or 1994, as these elections were held before the main wave of highly-educated migrants moving to the suburban municipalities occurred. An explanation that could account for the data is that highly-educated migrants tend to choose suburban communes whose inhabitants are more Fiscally Conservative over other municipalities in the suburban areas where the inhabitants are less Fiscally Conservative. This might be possible, but it remains only a hypothesis that cannot be tested due to the lack of information about the political orientation of the inhabitants in the years prior to the fall of the Communist rule.

3.3.4 More distant suburbs more Fiscally Conservative?

The last hypothesis concerning electoral support for the Fiscally Conservative parties to be tested here claims that the more distant suburbs tend to be more Fiscally Conservative. The hypothesis is derived from the observations made in many states in the West where the older, closer suburbs emerged as the place of residence of the poorer working class, while the younger, more distant suburbs were built by and for the wealthier middle class families, which were seeking bigger houses and lots, owned car(s) and were not dependent on public transport. To test the hypothesis we used a method that is somewhat different than that used in the previous cases. In all four suburban areas under observation, we distinguished the inner and outer suburban ring on the basis of distance from the core city and the commuting patterns. We then tested, separately for each metropolitan area, whether in the average electoral results of the Fiscally Conservative parties there are significant differences between the inner and outer suburbs. The results of the analysis are displayed in the following tables.

Table 21. Electoral support for Fiscally Conservative parties in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002, by distance of suburbs from the respective core cities (% of obtained votes)

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Prague					
Closer suburbs	2.3	53.3	50.1	48.7	40.5
More distant suburbs	2.3	50.2	45.7	44.3	38.6
Pilsen					
Closer suburbs	1.8	41.4*	37.8*	37.2*	32.3*
More distant suburbs	2.3	34.8*	30.0*	27.9*	24.1*
Brno					
Closer suburbs	0.6	27.2	30.7	30.6*	30.4*
More distant suburbs	0.7	23.1	27.2	25.7*	26.2*
Ostrava					
Closer suburbs	1.5	36.2	33.2	26.9	26.5
More distant suburbs	1.0	34.1	27.5	23.0	22.9

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: *) Mean differences between closer and more distant suburbs within respective metropolitan areas significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 22. Electoral support for Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002, by distance of suburbs from the respective core cities (% of obtained votes)

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Prague				
Closer suburbs	0.6	18.3	14.6	14.8
More distant suburbs	0.0	11.4	8.0	14.0
Pilsen				
Closer suburbs	0.0	23.8	15.0	14.0
More distant suburbs	0.0	7.2	6.7	15.0
Brno				
Closer suburbs	0.2	22.2	19.0	20.1
More distant suburbs	0.0	12.6	6.6	8.2
Ostrava				
Closer suburbs	0.3	23.6	17.4	20.8
More distant suburbs	0.0	19.1	18.3	24.8

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: No mean difference between closer and more distant suburbs within respective metropolitan areas significant at the 0.05 level.

The figures in the tables suggest that the differences are not statistically significant in most observed cases. The only significant (though not very strong) differences in electoral results were found in parliamentary elections in the Pilsen metropolitan area since 1992, and in the Brno metropolitan area since 1998. However, in both of these metropolitan areas the difference was opposite that suggested by the hypothesis: the inner suburbs tend to be more Fiscally Conservative than the more distant suburbs. It is clear that this hypothesis must be deemed untrue in the Czech Republic. The reason for this is evidently that the patterns of suburbanization did not follow the same patterns as in many western countries. To put it simply: the scope of the suburbanization is not so big, the suburbanized areas not so large, and (probably most important) the expansion of the core cities gradually incorporated the former pre-Communist working class suburbs into the core city itself.

3.3.5 Poor suburbs traditional Left or New Right?

If the wealthy communities tend to support Fiscally Conservative political parties in the elections, which parties do the inhabitants of the poorer suburbs support? Traditionally, the poorer working class suburbs tended to support the parties of the Left. In recent decades we can observe more votes being cast for the xenophobic, nationalistic, and anti-immigration parties, parties which used to be labeled "New Right". Are the same tendencies also visible in Czech metropolitan areas? The correlation analysis will help us answer such questions. To distinguish between rich and poor communities we have used the same set of indicators as in one of the previous analyses: the percentage of poor households, revenue from income tax per capita and the unemployment rate. It is not clear what should be considered "traditional Left" in the Czech Republic context. We therefore decided to conduct the same set of analyses separately for the parties of Social Democratic orientation and for the Communist Party. The Communist Party also belongs to the traditional Left political camp, but is too specific to be simply included in the same group as the other Left parties.

Table 23. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship in communes and voting for parties of Social Democratic orientation in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic areas in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	-.410**	-.023	.120*	.283**	.221**
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	.138**	-.074	-.129**	-.179**	-.129**
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	.214**	.033	-.131**	-.190**	-.116*
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	-.074	.101*	.080	.076	-.023
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	-.315**	-.094*	.368**	.505**	.271**

Source: Author's calculations.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Table 24. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hard-
ship and voting for parties of Social Democratic orientation in municipal
elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in
the period 1990 to 2002**

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	.012	.073	.014	.087
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	.061	.013	.095*	.054
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	.010	-.018	-.022	-.017
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	-.068	-.048	-.007	-.040
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	.025	.094*	.145*	.102*

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results of the analysis summarized in Tables 23 and 24 show that the hypothesis that poorer suburban municipalities would be inclined to vote for parties with a Social Democratic orientation can be more or less rejected when the results of local elections are studied, but when looking at the voting results in parliamentary elections the hypothesis is verified. To be precise, we can see some changes in the relation between social hardship and support for Social Democratic-oriented parties during the observed period. The results of the 1990 parliamentary election were negatively, not positively, related to the electoral success of the Social Democratic parties. One reason is probably the fact that the level of social hardship was not very high at the time of the election in 1990, or social problems were not perceived as very serious at the time of the first free post-Communist elections. Voting decisions at that time were mostly directed by feelings, images and hopes, and little reflected the economic reality (Kostelecký 2002). When the second parliamentary election were organized in 1992, the negative consequences of the process of economic restructuring was already well known and perceived by the population. The economic transformation already had its winners and losers. The dissatisfaction of the less successful, however, did not materialize as political support for the traditional left-oriented parties, as the experience under Communism was still too vivid in the minds of voters. Four more years of economic transformation under the guidance of the right-oriented government, and the ability of the Social Democratic party to distance itself from Communism while still offering leftist alternatives to frustrated voters, changed the situation completely. Since the 1996 parliamentary elections, the correlation between the level of hardship in the municipalities and the inclination of the voters to support parties of a Social Democratic orientation has been both positive and highly significant. From the indicators used, the indicator that correlated most closely with political orientation was the rate of unemployment.

Tables 25 and 26 show the pro-Communist vote in the suburban areas around the four largest core cities in the Czech Republic in both parliamentary and municipal elections.

Table 25. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship in communes and voting for the Communist Party in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	-.064	-.015	.014	.061	.104*
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	-.067	-.078	-.154**	-.200	-.191**
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	-.045	-.078	-.112*	-.095*	-.165**
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	.050	.047	.121**	.109*	.133**
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	.113*	.208*	.117**	.282**	.407**

Source: Author's calculations.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 26. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship and voting for the Communist Party in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	.052	.015	.059	.082
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	-.056	-.034	-.028	-.035
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	-.39	-.041	-.043	-.041
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	.051	.028	.057	.048
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	.281**	.202**	.224**	.290**

Source: Author's calculations.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

To a great extent, the figures in the tables resemble those in the previous pair of tables. The correlation coefficients are for the most part not significant in the case of municipal elections, only the pro-Communist vote is somewhat related to unemployment. When analyzing the results of the national elections, the relationship between the results of the national elections and the various indicators of social hardship is generally closer. While the inclination to vote for the Communist Party seems to not be very closely related to the percentage of poor households in the municipality, the revenue of the commune from income taxes, as well as the rate of unemployment, are both related to the level of electoral support for the Communists. The logic of the relation is as one would expect: the lower the income from income taxes (i.e. lower incomes) and the higher the unemployment, the more willing are the inhabitants of the respective municipalities to vote for the Communist Party. It is interesting that the correlation coefficients between the unemployment rate and the Communist Party electoral achievements were both positive and statistically significant from the very beginning

of the observed period. Although the relationship was not especially close in the beginning of the 1990s, the rising value of the coefficients signals the increasing importance of unemployment as a factor leading some voters to give their votes to the party that assured full employment during its forty-year monopoly on power.

It seems clear from the results of the analyses that the hypothesis about the inclination of inhabitants of the poorer suburbs to vote for the traditional Left parties can be confirmed. In this respect, the historical, institutional, and to some extent also ideological split between the Communist Party on one side and the whole group of Social Democratic-oriented parties on the other, is not so great. The direction of the statistical relations was found to be basically the same in both cases. The Communist Party thus played the role of alternative electoral option for the more radical and least satisfied adherents of left-wing ideologies.

Finally, Tables 27 and 28 provide insight into the relationship between the various indicators of social hardship and the electoral fortunes of the parties of the New Right. The results of the analyses presented in the tables should be interpreted carefully, as the overall low electoral score of the New Right parties in the elections make the figures in the tables more vulnerable to accidental effects of the specific situation in the relatively low number of municipalities in the observed areas.

Table 27. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship in communes and voting for the New Right parties in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic areas in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	-.147**	.103*	.159*	.040	.040
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	.052	-.119*	-.163**	-.111*	-.075
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	.107*	-.051	-.134**	-.035	-.078
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	.022	.042	.082	.112*	.052
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	-.139**	.161**	.310**	.339**	.219**

Source: Author's calculations.
Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 28. Pearson correlation coefficient between selected indicators of social hardship and voting for the New Right parties in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

	1990	1994	1998	2002
Poor households 2003 (%)	-.002	.088	.027	-.004
Revenue from income tax per capita 1997	.090	.042	-.004	-.002
Revenue from income tax per capita 2003	.011	.004	-.004	-.003
Unemployment rate 1991 (%)	-.008	.030	-.004	-.028
Unemployment rate 2001 (%)	.009	.193**	.075	.003

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Not surprisingly, analysis did not reveal any significant relationships between support for the New Right parties and the level of social hardship in the local elections. In the case of the parliamentary elections, some of the correlation coefficients were found to be significant. Higher unemployment in the municipality generally increased the probability that the population would vote for New Right parties. Similarly, the poorer the municipality in terms of its average per capita revenue from income taxes, the greater the inclination to vote for parties of the New Right. While the first of the observed relationships was relatively stable over the observed period, the second was observable less regularly, and most clearly only in the mid-1990s, when New Right parties were relatively strongest and were even able to get some parliamentary seats. The direction of the revealed relationships, however, fits in quite well with the theoretical assumptions.

3.4 Multifactorial ecological analysis of the voting patterns

Thus far we have tested the individual hypotheses about the relationship between voting behavior and various indicators of the socio-economic situation in suburban municipalities. We then went a step further and used a multiple regression technique on the aggregate level of municipalities using the same set of independent variables as used in the regression models explaining variations in turnout: the percentage of university educated, the unemployment rate, home ownership, percentage of pensioners, overcrowded housing conditions, percentage of Roman Catholics, the percentage of poor households, employment in farming, and employment in the industry and construction sectors.

We analyzed the potential effects of the selected set of independent variables on the electoral results of the parties with similar political orientations. We distinguished parties with a Social Democratic orientation, Christian Democratic parties, the Communist Party as a separate category, and the Fiscally Conservative parties. We conducted analyses separately for municipal and parliamentary elections. In all cases, we used the percentage of votes for the respective group of ideologically similar parties as the dependent variable. Table 29 summarizes the results of the regression

analyses aimed at explaining the territorial variation of the votes for Social Democratic-oriented parties in the parliamentary elections.

Table 29. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the parties of Social Democratic orientation in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
University educated (%)		– –	– –	– –	–
Unemployment rate (%)		+		+ +	+
Share of homeowners (%)					
Share of pensioners (%)		+ +	+ +		+
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)			+ +		
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	– –	– –	– –	– –	–
Poor households (%)				+	+
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)					–
Employees in industry and construction (%)				+ +	+ +
Adjusted R²	0.46	0.41	0.15	0.41	0.17

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

It is clear from the table that the quality of the regression models fluctuated somewhat from one election to another, with the explained variability ranging from 15% in 1996 to 46% in 1990. The addition of three more variables in the 1998 and 2002 models did not improve the quality of the model significantly. The most useful independent variables in the model were the percentage of Catholics in the population, the percentage of university educated and the percentage of those employed in industry and construction. The observed relationships were in line with the theoretical expectations. In terms of expectations, the lower the percentage of Catholics and of the university educated, and the higher the employment in industry and construction, the higher the percentage of votes in the municipality would be for the parties with a Social Democratic orientation. Other independent variables were also found to be relevant, though not in such a consistent way as the previous ones. In some elections, the electoral achievements of the Social Democrats were greater in municipalities with higher unemployment. A similar effect was identifiable in the case of the percentage of pensioners. Holding the other independent variables constant, the larger the population of pensioners, the greater the support for the Social Democratic parties in some (but not all) electoral years. The percentage of poor households also positively affected the pro-Social Democratic vote in elections when this independent variable was included in the regression models, although the influence was not particularly strong. On the other hand, the percentage of homeowners, the percentage of people employed in agriculture and the indicator of housing overcrowding were not relevant in the models at all, or only

occasionally. Generally, the interpretation of the regression analyses results is relatively easy. Since 1992, the percentage of votes for the parties of Social Democratic orientation in suburban communities is predictable by basically the same set of independent variables. Social democratic ideology received support from the non-Catholic population, from people who worked in industrial branches of the economy, the generally less educated, the less well-to-do and the elderly.

The same set of multiple regression analyses were conducted in order to explain the territorial variation of the pro-Social Democratic vote in municipal elections as well. The outcomes of the analyses are summarized in Table 30.

Table 30. Summary of the results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the parties of Social Democratic orientation in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1994	1998	2002
University educated (%)		+		
Unemployment rate (%)			+	
Share of homeowners (%)			– –	– –
Share of pensioners (%)			+	+
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)		+		
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	–	–		
Poor households (%)				
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)			–	–
Employees in industry and construction (%)				
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.09

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

The first thing that should be mentioned is the very low quality of the regression models – in all cases, the percentage of explained variability is generally very low. Therefore, it is not surprising that relationships between independent and dependent variables in different regression models are neither strong nor consistent. The only exception is the relatively strong negative relation of the percentage of homeowners to the electoral results of the Social Democratic parties in the 1998 and 2002 local elections. This is most probably related to the fact that Social Democratic parties were able participate in elections in larger municipalities where the percentage of homeowners is lower due to the presence of collective rental houses. But, generally, it can be concluded that the set of independent variables used cannot provide much of an explanation for the spatial variation of electoral support for parties with a Social Democratic orientation in municipal elections. It seems that such territorial variability is more dependent on the ability of the Social Democratic parties to orga-

nize themselves in the individual municipalities than on any other factor, and that it is not related to the socio-economic characteristics of the individual communes.

The results of the regression analyses aimed at explaining the territorial variation of the support for the group of Christian Democratic parties in parliamentary elections are displayed in Table 31.

Table 31. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the parties of Christian Democratic orientation in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
University educated (%)	+ +	+	+	+	+ +
Unemployment rate (%)	–	–	– –	– –	– –
Share of homeowners (%)				+	+
Share of pensioners (%)					
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)		+	+	+	+
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +
Poor households (%)					
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)				+ +	
Employees in industry and construction (%)				+	–
Adjusted R^2	0.66	0.70	0.64	0.74	0.60

Source: Author's calculations based on the data from Czech Statistical Office.
Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

Unlike the previous case, the regression models are able to explain the Christian Democratic voting patterns quite well. The value of adjusted R square is consistently high in all the observed cases – ranging between 0.60 and 0.74. Also, the set of independent variables that proved to have a significant effect on the dependent variable is quite consistent and relatively easy to interpret. The far most important independent variable is the percentage of Catholics in the local population – the more Catholics, the higher the electoral results of the Christian Democrats. Although there are more Catholics than there are Christian Democratic voters in most of the municipalities, i.e. not all Catholics necessarily vote for the same type of political parties, the statistical relationship between these two variables is very close. Apart from that, some of the other independent variables seem to consistently increase the predictive power of the regression models. Controlling the religious structure of the population, the Christian Democratic parties tend to get more support in municipalities with higher education and lower unemployment rates, i.e. in the relatively more well-to-do communities. The positive albeit not strong relation to the indicator of overcrowded housing (the greater the overcrowding, the more Christian Democratic voters) is not inconsistent with the previous claim. Devoted Catholics tend to have more children and, therefore, their households tend to have somewhat less living space than other households of comparable social status. It is also probable that

devoted Catholics are more politically active than the "nominal Catholics" who declare their religious affiliation only during the censuses but who are not active in the local religious community.

Unlike the Social Democrats, the Christian Democratic Union (as the most important representative of the parties of Christian Democratic orientation) has had a relatively large membership and a relatively dense network of local organizations since the beginning of the 1990s. They were able to actively take part in local elections in many more suburban municipalities than most of their political rivals. This is probably the most important reason why the regression models explaining the local election voting patterns were much more successful in terms of the percentage of explained variability (see adjusted R squares in Table 32). As the results of the regression equations suggest, the electoral success of the Christian Democratic parties in the local elections were in fact most influenced by one dominant independent variable: the percentage of Catholics. Apart from that, two other variables entered the regression: the percentage of university educated and overcrowded housing. The higher the levels of education and overcrowded housing in the suburban municipality, the greater the expectation of the electoral success of the Christian Democrats.

Table 32. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the parties of the Christian Democratic orientation in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1994	1998	2002
University educated (%)	+ +	+	+	+
Unemployment rate (%)				
Share of homeowners (%)				
Share of pensioners (%)				
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)	+		+	+
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	+ +	+ +	+ +	+ +
Poor households (%)				
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)				
Employees in industry and construction (%)				
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.38	0.48	0.43

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

It is interesting to note that the regression models explaining the electoral success of the Christian Democrats in the parliamentary and municipal elections are generally very similar. This suggests the idea that Christian Democratic supporters tend to behave similarly at the poll in both types of elections. The local activity of politically active Catholics assuring the presence of some Christian Democratic party in the municipal electoral contests enables their core voters to follow the same electoral strategy. This builds and strengthens their already high level of party loyalty.

The Communist Party voting patterns in the metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic were also analyzed by the same methodology. The results of regression analyses describing the relation of the percentage of votes obtained by the Communist Party to the set of independent variables are displayed, for parliamentary and local elections, in Tables 33 and 34. It is immediately clear that the results are more similar to those explaining the Social Democratic vote than those explaining the vote for Christian Democrats. The overall quality of the regression models is not particularly high, but there are still differences in the ability to predict parliamentary and municipal election results. If the models explain 15-38% of the inter-municipal variability in the case of parliamentary elections, they can explain only 3-14% in the case of local electoral contests. In models describing the parliamentary election variations, the most useful independent variables in the regression equations are the percentage of Roman Catholics (the fewer Catholics, the more votes for the Communists), overcrowded housing conditions (the more overcrowding, the more pro-Communist votes), the level of education (the more university educated, the less support for the Communist Party), and the percentage of pensioners (the more pensioners, the more pro-Communist votes). After 1998, when unemployment rose substantially, the probability of Communist Party success in the parliamentary elections became higher in municipalities with higher unemployment rates. Popular support for the Communist Party tends to be higher in municipalities with a higher percentage of people employed in agriculture and industry. To make a long story short, apart from the well-known antipathy of the Catholics towards the Communist ideology, it seems obvious that willingness to vote for the Communist Party in the parliamentary elections clearly fell as the socio-economic status of the municipality grew, especially at the end of the 1990s. The interpretation of the regression models concerning the municipal elections is not so easy. Taking into account the very low explanatory power of the respective regression models and the fact that no independent variable proved to have a consistent effect on the dependent variable during the observed period, it can be concluded that Communist voting patterns in municipal elections is not a "product" of spatial differences of the observed underlying factors.

Table 33. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the Communist Party in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
University educated (%)	– –	–	– –		– –
Unemployment rate (%)			+	+ +	+ +
Share of homeowners (%)					
Share of pensioners (%)	+ +	+	+	+	+
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)	+ +	+ +	+ +	+	+ +
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –
Poor households (%)					–
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)				+ +	+ +
Employees in industry and construction (%)				+	+
Adjusted R^2	0.33	0.19	0.15	0.22	0.38

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

Table 34. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the Communist Party in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1994	1998	2002
University educated (%)				
Unemployment rate (%)			+ +	+ +
Share of homeowners (%)			–	–
Share of pensioners (%)			+	
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)	+ +	+ +	+	
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	– –	–		
Poor households (%)				
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)				
Employees in industry and construction (%)			+	+
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.03	0.12	0.14

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

The last group of parties we look at is that of the Fiscally Conservative parties. Regression models were relatively successful in explaining the inter-municipal variation of the parliamentary election results of the Fiscal Conservatives – adjusted R square increased from 0,36 in 1990 to over 0,53 in the other observed elections (see Table 35).

Table 35. Summary of the results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the parties of Fiscally Conservative orientation in parliamentary elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002
University educated (%)		+ +	+ +	+	+
Unemployment rate (%)				– –	– –
Share of homeowners (%)					
Share of pensioners (%)	–	– –	– –	– –	– –
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)	–	– –	– –	– –	– –
Share of Roman Catholics (%)	– –	– –	– –	– –	
Poor households (%)					
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)				– –	– –
Employees in industry and construction (%)				– –	– –
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.54	0.53	0.69	0.57

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

The influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable was quite stable and consistent. The Fiscal Conservatives were more popular in municipalities with populations of above-average education. Also, the lower the percentage of Catholics, the lower the percentage of people employed in agriculture, industry and construction, and the lower the percentage of retired, the higher would be the expectations predicting better results for the Fiscally Conservative parties in parliamentary elections. In the last two elections, in 1998 and 2002, the negative effect of the unemployment rate on the ability of Fiscal Conservatives to gain popular support was quite clear and strong.

As in all the other analyzed cases (with the exception of the Christian Democratic parties), the models were basically not able to explain the spatial variation of electoral support in municipal elections for parties with a Fiscally Conservative orientation. The overall quality of the models was very low, and no consistent patterns relating dependent and independent variables were identified (apart from the fact that in both cases where the percentage of people employed in agriculture was used, a strong negative relationship was found – see Table 36). It is clear that the decision to vote for Fiscally Conservative parties in municipal election is not a function of the socio-economic and religious structure of the respective municipalities. The ability (or rather inability) of Fiscally Conservative-oriented parties to participate in local electoral contests, which is a crucial condition for their eventual success in the elections, is evidently not related to structural socio-economic and cultural preconditions.

Table 36. Summary of results of regression analyses explaining the vote for the parties of Fiscally Conservative orientation in municipal elections in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic in the period 1990 to 2002

Independent variables	1990	1994	1998	2002
University educated (%)		+ +	+	
Unemployment rate (%)				
Share of homeowners (%)	+		–	–
Share of pensioners (%)				
Overcrowded housing (living space in m2 per capita)				
Share of Roman Catholics (%)				
Poor households (%)				
Farmers and employees in agriculture (%)			– –	– –
Employees in industry and construction (%)				
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.09	0.11	0.09

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Note: Positive effect of the independent variable significant at the 0.05 level indicated by a sign "+", negative by "–". Double signs indicate effects significant at 0.001 level.

Conclusion

The presented paper had three aims. First, it attempted to discover whether socio-economic differences between various suburban municipalities could be used to identify distinct types of suburbs. The analysis of the data at the level of suburban municipalities proved that such a typology could be created. Moreover, it was shown that even though the situation in post-Communist Czech Republic is quite different from that in most developed industrialized countries (where most of the observations of the suburbanization processes had thus far been conducted), the majority of the identified types are quite comparable to those found in most developed countries. Thus, the identification of the types of suburbs could be potentially useful in future comparative work, as the types can be used as a substitute for missing individual continuous data, or can be used in cases where individual indicators are not comparable internationally.

The second aim was to analyze in greater detail electoral turnout in metropolitan areas. Several existing hypotheses about political participation were tested. It was shown that the smaller communes do have higher participation and also that the size of the municipality is the dominant explanatory factor as far as political participation is concerned. Analyses also proved that the smaller the commune, the smaller the difference between turnout in national elections and local elections. The socio-economic hypothesis, which states that electoral turnout increases as the social status increases, can be confirmed at the municipal level only if the size of the municipality is controlled. Conducting multivariate regression analyses revealed that there was at least one more potentially important independent factor influencing the level of political participation in the municipality: turnout tended to increase together with the percentage of the Catholic population and the percentage of pensioners. Here we present the "voting as religious/civic duty hypothesis" that suggests that some of the variation in electoral participation in metropolitan areas may be connected with differences in the value structures that may not be related to the processes of metropolization and suburbanization themselves. A typical example of such a difference is religious affiliation, but there may be other similar factors. Analysis also showed that there was a relationship between the typology of suburban places and political behavior, although the relationship was not as strong as might be expected.

The third aim of the paper was to analyze the voting patterns of the main political parties in the metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic. As the party system was undergoing many important changes during the observed period after the collapse of Communism, we decided to analyze voters' inclination to vote for parties with the same ideological orientation rather than the individual parties themselves. The four most relevant groups of parties were analyzed in great detail: Social Democratic parties, Christian Democratic parties, Fiscally Conservative parties, and the Communist

Party (as its own category). The other party groups (New Left, New Right, Regional, Independents) were not analyzed in detail. Several individual hypotheses capturing the potential effects of the sub-urbanization process on electoral behavior in the metropolitan population were tested by different statistical methods.

The results of analyses proved that development in the Czech Republic metropolises did not differ substantially from that observed in most developed countries. Wealthy suburban communities are more Fiscally Conservative than other suburban communities. Municipalities with higher levels of education are inclined toward Fiscal Conservatism as well. Finally, growth in the percentage of self-employed leads to better electoral results for Fiscally Conservative parties. Conversely, it was found that there is a greater tendency in poor suburbs to vote for both the traditional Left and the New Right. All these findings are well in line with what has been observed in many west-European and North American metropolitan areas. Some other features of metropolitan electoral behavior in post-Communist Czech Republic after the 1989, however, are more difficult to align with the trends observed in other countries. The way the housing market was controlled during Communism, and the lasting effect this has had on housing market regulation since then, has led to weaker relationships between socio-economic status and home ownership. Being a homeowner did not necessarily imply wealth, especially in the villages surrounding the largest cities in the Czech Republic. On the other hand, many relatively wealthy people in the cities and larger suburban communities lived in rental flats during the Communist time, and continued to do so after the change in the regime. This is why home ownership was not identified as a relevant factor that significantly influenced voting decisions among the population. Similarly, suburban communities that were more distant were not found to be more Fiscally Conservative than less distant communities. A possible explanation for this is the expansion of the large territories of the core cities, absorbing a substantial part of the former poorer working class suburbs, together with the limited scope of the suburbanization process leading to most new housing construction being concentrated in the inner suburban ring.

Multivariate regression analyses searching for the most relevant factors underlying voting patterns in the metropolitan areas showed that the relevant factors were not limited to socio-economic ones. In fact, two of the five most important independent variables in the regression models – the percentage of Catholics and the percentage of pensioners – were not socio-economic variables. The religious affiliation of the population, measured by the percentage of Roman Catholics, proved to be a very good predictor of voting behavior. Municipalities with a higher percentage of Catholic population tended to vote for Christian Democratic parties, regardless of the socio-economic status of their population. Other characteristics of the municipalities being controlled, communities with a higher percentage of pensioners were more inclined to vote pro-Communist and anti-Fiscally Conservative than other municipalities. The same result was seen in those communities with a higher percentage of the remaining agrarian population, indicative of the strength of the pre-suburban character in the many municipalities that became suburbanized in the last 10-20 years. It is also worth noting that during the observed period, indicators of economic hardship increased in importance with respect to explaining the voting behavior of the metropolitan population. In this respect, voters are more sensitive to unemployment than poverty. Also, overcrowded housing conditions proved to be factor that somewhat increased the probability of pro-Communist and anti-Fiscally Conservative voting.

Finally, it should be stressed that it is generally much easier to explain national election voting patterns than municipal election voting patterns. The weak organization of most of the political par-

ties, and the general disgust among voters towards party politics, has led to the gradual disappea-rance of the political parties from local politics in many municipalities, in particular those with small populations. While voters in the different municipalities choose from basically the same set of political parties in parliamentary elections (regional party lists are used in the electoral system of proportional representation in the Czech Republic), the "political menu" in municipal elections is local. Thus, voting patterns in municipal elections are influenced not so much by the socio-econo-mic and cultural differences of the municipalities (as in the case of parliamentary elections) as they are by inconsistencies with respect to the political parties being present in the municipality, recrui-ting candidates and taking part in the local elections, as well as other factors that cannot be easily analyzed by using aggregate statistical data about the municipalities.

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Summary

This study had three aims. First, it attempted to find out whether the socio-economic differences among the various suburban municipalities located in the four largest metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic could be used for identification of the distinguished types of suburbs. The analysis of the data on the level of suburban municipalities proved that such a typology could be cleated. Moreover, it has been showed that even if the situation in the post-Communist Czech Republic is quite different from that in the most developed industrialized countries (where most observations of suburbanization processes had been conducted so far) the majority of identified types are quite comparable to that found in the most developed countries.

The second aim was to analyze more specifically the electoral turnout in the metropolitan areas. It was shown that the smaller places have higher participation and also that the municipal size is the dominant explanatory factor as far as the political participation is concerned. Analyses also proved that the smaller the place, the smaller the difference between turnout in national and local elections. The socio-economic hypothesis stating that electoral turnout rises with the increase in social status can be confirmed on the municipal level only if the size of the municipality is controlled. Multivariate regression analyses that were conducted revealed at least one more potentially important independent factor influencing the level of political participation in the municipality. Turnout tends to increase together with the share of Catholic population and the share of pensioners. Here we present the "voting as religious/civic duty hypothesis" that suggests that some of the variation in electoral participation in metropolitan areas may be connected with the differences in the value structures that may not be related to the processes of metropolization and suburbanization themselves.

The third aim of the paper was to analyze the voting patterns of the four most relevant groups of parties – Socially Democratic parties, Christian Democratic parties, Fiscally Conservative parties, and the Communist Party (as a separate category). The results of analyses proved that the development in the Czech Republic metropolises did not differ substantially from that observed in the most developed countries. Rich suburban communes are more Fiscally Conservative than other suburban communes. Municipalities with higher education incline to Fiscal Conservatism as well. Finally, the rising share of self-employed leads to better electoral results of Fiscally Conservative parties. On the other side it has been found that poor suburbs tend to vote more for both the traditional Left and the New Right. However, homeownership itself was not identified as the relevant factor significantly influencing the voting decisions of the population. Similarly, more distant suburban communities were not found to be more Fiscally Conservative than the less distant ones. Multivariate regression analyses searching for the most relevant factors underlying the voting patterns in the metropolitan areas showed the relevance of other factors, namely the religious affiliation of the population and the share of pensioners.

Finally it should be stressed that it is generally much easier to explain the national election voting patterns than the municipal election voting patterns. While the voters in different municipalities choose from basically the same set of political parties in the parliamentary elections (as the electoral system of proportional representation uses regional party lists), the "political menu" at the municipal elections is local. Thus the voting patterns in municipal elections are not influenced too much by the socio-economic and cultural differences among the municipalities (as in the case of parliamentary elections) but rather by the territorially uneven ability of political parties to be present in the municipality, to recruit candidates and to take part in the local elections, and other factors that cannot easily be analyzed using aggregate statistical data about the municipalities.

Shrnutí

Předložená studie má tři hlavní cíle. Za prvé se snaží zjistit, jestli je možné na základě sociálních a ekonomických rozdílů vytvořit typologii suburbánních obcí nacházejících se v zázemí čtyř největších měst v České republice. Výsledky analýzy ukazují, že vytvoření takové typologie možné je. Navzdory tomu, že se situace v postkomunistické České republice značně liší od situace v nejvyspělejších zemích (odkud pocházejí doposud vytvořené typologie), je z výsledků analýzy zřejmé, že většina identifikovaných typů je v zásadě srovnatelná.

Druhým cílem práce bylo provedení analýzy volební účasti v českých metropolitních oblastech. Bylo prokázáno, že dominantním faktorem ovlivňujícím míru volební účasti je populační velikost obce, přičemž platí, že volební účast se zvětšuje spolu se snižující se velikostí obce. V menších obcích je také méně významný rozdíl mezi mírou volební účasti v parlamentních a komunálních volbách. Socioekonomický status obyvatel obce je významným faktorem ovlivňujícím politickou participaci jenom tehdy, pokud je kontrolován vliv velikosti obce. Za tohoto předpokladu platí, že s rostoucím statusem obyvatel se volební participace zvyšuje. Dalšími významnými faktory, které mají vliv na volební účast nezávisle na ostatních faktorech, jsou podíl obyvatel katolického vyznání a podíl důchodců v populaci, které oba zvyšují volební účast. V souvislosti s tímto zjištěním byla formulována hypotéza o „účasti ve volbách coby náboženské/občanské povinnosti“, která předpokládá, že část meziobecní variability ve volební účasti lze připsat vlivu rozdílů v hodnotových orientacích, které nemají souvislost se samotnými procesy metropolizace a suburbanizace.

Konečně třetím cílem studie byla analýza teritoriální variability volebních výsledků čtyř nejvýznamnějších skupin politických stran – stran sociálně demokratické orientace, křesťansko-demokratických stran, fiskálně konzervativních stran a samotné komunistické strany (jako zvláštní kategorie). Výsledky analýzy ukazují, že se politický vývoj v českých metropolitních oblastech neliší od toho, co bylo již dříve pozorováno v nejvyspělejších zemích. Obyvatelé bohatých příměstských obcí mají tendenci podporovat fiskálně konzervativní strany více než populace v ostatních obcích v okolí měst. S růstem vzdělání obyvatel rovněž roste podpora fiskálně konzervativním stranám, stejně jako se zvyšujícím se podílem drobných podnikatelů a živnostníků. Příměstské obce s chudším obyvatelstvem mají naopak tendenci podporovat buď tradiční levicové strany nebo vyjadřují sympatie k „nové pravici“. Na rozdíl od situace v jiných zemích se však ukazuje, že vyšší podíl vlastníků nemovitosti (zpravidla rodinných domů) v obci sám pravděpodobnost podpory fiskálně konzervativních stran nezvětšuje. Vícenásobné regrese rovněž ukázaly, že, stejně jako v případě volební účasti, i volební preference obyvatel příměstských obcí významně ovlivňuje podíl obyvatel hlásících se ke katolické církvi a podíl důchodců.

Nakonec by mělo být zdůrazněno, že je obecně mnohem jednodušší vysvětlovat meziobecní rozdíly ve výsledcích parlamentních voleb než voleb komunálních. Zatímco v parlamentních volbách

voliči ve všech suburbánních obcích příslušné metropole vybírají ze stejných kandidátních listin, „politické menu" v komunálních volbách je lokální. Rozdíly v podpoře stranám různé politické orientace mezi obcemi tak v případě komunálních voleb záleží spíše na teritoriálně nerovnoměrné schopnosti politických stran být v obci aktivní, rekrutovat kandidáty a účastnit se komunálních voleb než na sociálních a ekonomických rozdílech mezi obcemi. Proto je jen velmi obtížné výsledky komunálních voleb analyzovat zpracováním dostupných agregátních dat statistickými metodami.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Studie hat drei Hauptziele. Als erstes wird versucht herauszufinden, ob es auf der Grundlage sozialer und ökonomischer Unterschiede möglich ist, eine Typologie der suburbanen Gemeinden im Umland der vier größten Städte Tschechiens herauszubilden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine solche Typologie erstellt werden kann. Obwohl sich die Situation im postkommunistischen Tschechien stark von der Situation in den weiter entwickelten Ländern (aus denen die bisher erstellten Typologien stammen) unterscheidet, ist aus den Ergebnissen der Analyse ersichtlich, dass die meisten identifizierbaren Typen im Grunde vergleichbar sind.

Das zweite Ziel der Arbeit war es, die Wahlbeteiligung in den tschechischen metropolitanen Gebieten zu untersuchen. Es wurde nachgewiesen, dass der dominante Faktor, der die Wahlbeteiligung beeinflusst, die Populationsgröße der Gemeinde ist, wobei gilt, dass die Wahlbeteiligung mit sinkender Gemeindegröße steigt. In kleineren Gemeinden ist auch der Unterschied zwischen der Wahlbeteiligung an Parlaments- und Kommunalwahlen weniger markant. Der sozio-ökonomische Status der Einwohner einer Gemeinde ist nur dann ein bedeutender Faktor, der die politische Partizipation beeinflusst, wenn der Einfluss der Gemeindegröße kontrolliert wird. Unter dieser Voraussetzung gilt, dass die Wahlbeteiligung sich mit dem zunehmenden Status der Einwohner erhöht. Andere bedeutende Faktoren, die die Wahlbeteiligung unabhängig von den übrigen Faktoren beeinflussen, sind der Anteil der Bevölkerung katholischen Glaubens und der Anteil der Rentner an der Bevölkerung – beides erhöht die Wahlbeteiligung. Im Zusammenhang mit dieser Feststellung wurde die Hypothese von der „Wahlbeteiligung als religiöse Pflicht/Bürgerpflicht" formuliert, die voraussetzt, dass ein Teil der Variabilität zwischen den Gemeinden dem Einfluss der unterschiedlichen Werteorientierungen zuzuschreiben ist, die von den Metropolisierungs- und Suburbanisierungsprozessen als solchen unabhängig sind.

Das dritte Ziel der Studie war schließlich die Analyse der territorialen Variabilität der Wahlergebnisse der vier bedeutendsten Gruppen politischer Parteien – sozialdemokratisch ausgerichtete Parteien, christlich-demokratische Parteien, steuerlich konservative Parteien und kommunistische Parteien (als besondere Kategorie). Die Ergebnisse der Analyse zeigen, dass sich die politische Entwicklung in den tschechischen metropolitanen Gebieten nicht von der Entwicklung unterscheidet, die früher in den weiter entwickelten Ländern beobachtet wurde. Die Einwohner der reichen Vorort-Gemeinden tendieren stärker dazu, die steuerlich konservativen Parteien zu unterstützen, als die Bevölkerung in den übrigen Gemeinden im Umland der Städte. Mit steigender Bildung der Einwohner wächst die Unterstützung steuerlich konservativer Parteien ebenfalls, genau so wie mit einem steigenden Anteil von Kleinunternehmern und Gewerbetreibenden. Die Vorort-Gemeinden mit einer ärmeren Bevölkerung unterstützen dagegen eher entweder traditionell linke Parteien oder sympathisieren mit der „neuen Rechten" (Neokonservativen). Im Gegensatz zur Situation in anderen Ländern zeigt sich jedoch, dass ein höherer Anteil von Immobilien- (in der Regel Eigenheim-) Besitzern

in der Gemeinde nicht von sich aus die Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Unterstützung steuerlich konservativer Parteien erhöht. Mehrfache Regressionen zeigten auch, dass, ebenso wie bei der Wahlbeteiligung, auch die Wahlpräferenzen der Einwohner von Vororten vom Anteil der Bevölkerung mit katholischem Glauben und dem Anteil der Rentner beeinflusst werden.

Schließlich sollte betont werden, dass es allgemein wesentlich einfacher ist, die Unterschiede zwischen den Gemeinden in den Ergebnissen der Parlamentswahlen zu erklären, als in den Kommunalwahlen. Während die Wähler bei Parlamentswahlen in allen suburbanen Gemeinden der entsprechenden Metropole über die gleichen Kandidaten abstimmen, ist die „politische Speisekarte" in den Kommunalwahlen lokal. Die Unterstützung für Parteien mit verschiedener politischer Orientierung zwischen den Gemeinden liegt so im Fall der Kommunalwahlen eher in den territorial unausgeglichenen Fähigkeiten der politischen Parteien, wie aktiv sie in einer Gemeinde sind, welche Kandidaten sie aufstellen und wie sie an den Kommunalwahlen teilnehmen, als in sozialen und ökonomischen Unterschieden zwischen den Gemeinden begründet. Daher ist es sehr schwierig, die Ergebnisse der Kommunalwahlen durch die Verarbeitung der zugänglichen gesammelten Daten mit statistischen Methoden zu analysieren.

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Where to find us?

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SOCIOLOGICAL DATA ARCHIVE

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SDA collects computerised data files from sociological surveys. Its main objective is to make Czech sociological data publicly available for academic, educational and other non-commercial purposes. Other activities of the Archive include the promotion of data dissemination and secondary analysis, and support for special research projects. SDA is a member of the CESSDA (Council of European Social Science Data Archives). An electronic data catalogue and access to services is provided via the Internet: **http://archiv.soc.cas.cz**

Central European Parliaments: First Decade of Democratic Experience and the Future Prospective

Zdenka Mansfeldová, David M.Olson, Petra Rakušanová (eds.)

The contributions included in this edited volume are based on contributions presented at the international workshop "Central European Parliaments: First Decade of Democratic Experience and the Future Prospective" held in Prague 6 – 8 November 2003 and a concluding paper by D. M. Olson, summarising the ideas and results of the round table titled Possibilities of Cooperation and Co-ordination of Comparative Research.

The main objective of the workshop was to gather scholars engaged in field research, and to go beyond the isolated research studies on national parliaments and their actors that dominated the past decade of research by launching international co-operative investigations in the next decade and to assess priorities in parliamentary research for the forthcoming years. Based on the current trends in the Czech Parliament and on existing research, attenarliaments: First Decade of Democratic Experience and the Future Prospective. Prague: Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

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