Nadcházející semináře

  • Berta Grimau (UTIA CAS): The instability of plural scepticism towards superplural logic

    12.12.2018 16:00 @ Applied Mathematical Logic

    Plural Logic is an extension of First-Order Logic which has, as well as singular terms and quanti ers, their plural counterparts. Analogously, Superplural Logic is an extension of Plural Logic which has, as well as plural terms and quanti ers, superplural ones. The basic idea is that superplurals stand to plurals like plurals stand to singulars (they are pluralized plurals). Allegedly, Superplural Logic enjoys the expressive power of a simple type theory while committing us to nothing more than the austere ontology of First-Order Logic. Were this true, Superplural Logic would be a useful tool, with various applications in the philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics and formal semantics. However, while the notions of plural reference and quanti cation enjoy widespread acceptance today, their superplural counterparts have been received with a lot of scepticism. In this talk, I will argue for the legitimacy of a face value interpretation of Superplural Logic by showing that some ordinary languages display clear cases of superplural reference and that they do so in an indispensable manner. Since the arguments I will put forward are of the same sort friends of Plural Logic have employed to defend their position, I will conclude that the (commonly held) view that Plural Logic is legitimately interpreted at face value but not so its superplural extensions is likely to su er from internal tensions.