

# The Internal Sense(s) in Early Jesuit Scholasticism<sup>1</sup>

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## 1. Introduction

Although the cognitive operations and functions of particular internal senses in the theories of representatives of medieval scholasticism differ to the extent that it is difficult to detect common features in them,<sup>2</sup> a topic can be found in the early Jesuit community of enquiry that can be regarded as *the* issue in the domain of internal senses. It is the question of the number or, more precisely, the query about the (ir)reducibility, or reciprocal (ir)reducibility of the internal senses. This question is important for, at least, two reasons. From the systematic viewpoint, it is a version of the perennial philosophical problem of the One and the Many. Second, from the historical perspective, the early Jesuits' theories are characterized by the reductionist tendency typical of early modern philosophy. This trend ultimately led to abandoning psychology of the faculties, which was a common topic in medieval and post-medieval scholasticism.<sup>3</sup> Despite differences in descriptions of the function of particular senses and different answers given to the question concerning the number of the internal senses, ranging from six faculties<sup>4</sup> to one, the theoretical approach to the scholastic topic of the higher perceptual powers was largely determined by Avicenna and by Aquinas's

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1 This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 14-37038G "Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context".

2 For this conclusion see Black, D. L., *Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations*. *Topoi*, 19, 2000, pp. 59–75.

3 For Descartes's and Locke's critiques of the scholastic theory of really distinct accidents, i.e., powers interceding between the soul and its acts cf. Perler, D., *Faculties in Medieval Philosophy*. In: Perler, D. (ed.), *The Faculties. A History*. Oxford, Oxford University Press 2015, pp. 97–139, esp. 97–100. For the elimination of the real distinction between the soul and its powers in early Jesuit scholasticism, exemplified by Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza cf. also forthcoming Heider, D., *Psychology and Theory of Knowledge*, forthcoming in: Casalini, C. (ed.), *Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity*. Leiden, Brill 2017.

4 It was Guy de Chauliac (ca. 1300–1368) who in his surgical text *Chirurgia Magna* (1363) suggested six internal senses, two for each of the three ventricles of the brain. Cf. Kemp, S. – Fletcher, J.

adoption of the Arab philosopher's teaching. In this connection, Avicenna's standpoint bears upon the establishment of the criteria of multiplication of "the senses of the brain", as they were called by Gregory of the Great.<sup>5</sup> Anachronically speaking, employing Kantian *façon de parler*, any possible "deduction" of the internal senses is to be based on principles formulated by *Ibn-Sinā*. Generically speaking, his shibboleth is twofold. The first kind is physiological or anatomical; this standard amounts to the localizability of the interior senses in the different ventricles. The allocation of a particular power is also correlated with a particular qualitative disposition of an individual ventricle. The second principle was purely philosophical; it is based on distinct sensible objects and different ways of apprehension. If applied (at least partially), one obtained what can be called "the Pluralist View"; if not applied, "the Unicity View", i.e., the theory of the unique internal sense, is the logical outcome.

The fully reductionist approach to the issue of the number of the interior senses and the partially reductionist one can be noticed in the *De anima Commentaries* of three leading representatives of the early Society of Jesus. They are Francisco de Toledo (1534–1596), Manuel de Gois (1543–1597) – one of the Coimbra authors who wrote the famous scholastic manual *Cursus Conimbricensis* –, and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617).<sup>6</sup> Each of these Jesuits states a different number in the reply to the query "How many internal senses there are". Consequently, their theories give us evidence of considerable doctrinal plurality in the early Jesuit philosophy. In the following, I restrict myself to the present issue of the number of the internal senses. I leave aside all the other (no doubt, interesting) enquiries into the topics, such as the interface of sensory and intellectual powers or the issue of the comparison of human and beastly internal powers. Accordingly, I will largely have in mind human internal senses as the model case.

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O., The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses. *American Journal of Psychology*, 106, 1993, No. 4, pp. 559–576, 562.

5 Wolfson, H. A., The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts. *Harvard Theological Review*, XXVIII, 1935, No. 2, pp. 69–133, esp. 71.

6 The following sequence does not correspond to the chronological order in which the commentaries of the three Jesuits were published. While Toletus and Suárez wrote them at more or less the same time (the former published it in 1574; Suárez's text was composed in the first half of the 1570s, though it was published as late as in 1621), the *Commentary* of the Coimbra authors was finished and published in 1598. The present ordering is primarily systematically-driven. It aims to show the surge in reductionism of the internal senses.

## 2. Criteria for the multiplication of the internal senses

For the majority of medieval scholastics the point of departure was Avicenna's theory of the internal senses. In his *Kitāb al-shifā': De anima*, first part, chapter 5, Avicenna formulates three epistemological principles, resulting in his fivefold conception of post-sensory faculties.<sup>7</sup>

- 1) For every different type of sensible object, there must be a distinct internal sense to apprehend this object. If we get typologically distinct objects, these objects must be attributed to really distinct powers.
- 2) Receptive powers differ from retentive powers. Reception substantially differs from retention.
- 3) Active powers differ from passive powers. Active powers and passive powers are mutually exclusive capacities.

In applying the first principle Avicenna distinguishes between two kinds of sensibles. The first object corresponds to the sensible forms perceived by the external senses. Various sensible aspects of the objects, apprehended by the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile faculties, are processed by internal apprehension. The principle, recruited from the external senses, that triggers the corresponding operations is what Aquinas later names the sensed species (*species sensata*).<sup>8</sup> Avicenna gives the example of a sheep which perceives a greyish oval spot emitting horrible noises, namely a wolf. The wolf is apprehended by the sheep by means of its visual, auditory (and perhaps also olfactory) sensory modalities. The data coming from these modalities are received, discriminated, and synthetically elaborated by the first internal sense, namely the common sense. Then they are conveyed to

7 For these criteria cf. Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus I–II–III*. Ed. S. van Riet. Louvain, E. Peeters – Leiden, E. J. Brill 1972, pars prima, cap. 5, pp. 85–90. Description of these principles is a set agenda in the secondary literature devoted to the topic of the internal senses. Among others, see Black, D. L., *Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations*, op. cit., pp. 59–60; Toivanen, J., *Perception and the Internal Senses. Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul*. Leiden, Boston, Brill 2013, pp. 231–245; Hasse, D. N., *The Soul's Faculties*. In: Pasnau, R. – Van Dyke, Ch. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*. Vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 305–319, 308–309; Kemp, S. – Fletcher, G. J. O., *The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses*, op. cit., pp. 561–565; Casini, L., *Cognitive and Moral Psychology in Renaissance Philosophy. A Study of Juan Luis Vives' "De anima et vita"*. Uppsala, Universitetstryckeriet 2006, pp. 100–102; Harvey, E. R., *The Inward Wits. Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*. London, The Warburg Institute, University of London 1975, pp. 43–46.

8 For Aquinas see Sanctus Thomas Aquinas, *STh*. I, q. 78, a. 4. *Opera omnia*, t. 5. Rome, ed. Leoni-na 1889, pp. 255–257.

the retentive sense, the imagination. Imagination, as a kind of memory, is what conserves these forms. The second kind of object is completely different, though. Unlike the object cognized by the sensed species, this object is, sort of, “hidden” behind the images. Although it is more abstract, it can still be detected by a corporeal power. In order to explain the sheep’s reaction and behaviour on encountering the wolf, its fear and flight, a special kind of object, called “intention” by Avicenna (*ma’ānī*), must be posited. This object, which is the intention of the wolf’s hostility, cannot be perceived by any of the external senses. It can be detected only by a power making instinctual judgments, which is more perfect than a faculty restricted to the apprehension of sensible forms. Avicenna calls this capacity “the estimative faculty”.<sup>9</sup>

In line with the second criterion the Arab philosopher says that a power cognizant of an object *in praesentia* and one knowing its object *in absentia* must be two separate faculties. Obviously, a power cognizing its object abstractively, in its absence, is more perfect than one apprehending it intuitively, in its presence. The capacities to receive and to retain require distinct material dispositions. What is good for reception commonly is not convenient for retention. While water, as a malleable subject, is suitable for the reception of an impression made by a signet ring, it is entirely unfitting for its retention. On the contrary, what is not fitting for reception is usually fitted for retention. While wax or stone, as a stable substrate, is well suited for retaining that impression, it is not suitable for receiving it. This organic difference goes back to a difference in the prevalence of the quality of Moisture, or the dominance of Dryness. While the quality convenient for reception is Moisture, the quality of Dryness is good for retention.

For Avicenna (less explicitly so for Aquinas<sup>10</sup>) the layering of Moisture and Dryness is connected with Galen’s ventricular theory. Accordingly, the brain is divided into three ventricles, i.e., the front, the middle and the rear

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9 For a famous critique of these intentions as distinct objects cf. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 62, ed. Vatican, vol. 3, pp. 43–44. Scotus says that a lamb would flee from a sheep miraculously changed to a wolf with all its sensible qualities. However, it would not do that if it had estimation of the agreeability of the object.

10 Despite Aquinas’s reluctance to explicitly correlate the internal senses with the individual ventricles, in his *Opera omnia* we can find the following statements locating the cogitative power in the middle ventricle: “Et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam sensitivae partis componens et dividens intentiones individuales quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis.” Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. Opera omnia*, t. 22, vol. 2, fasc. 1. Rome, ed. Leonina 1970, q. 10, a. 5, corp., p. 309; “Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa... Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis...”, Thomas Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, corp., *Opera omnia*, t. 5. Rome, ed. Leonina 1889, p. 256.

ventricle.<sup>11</sup> According to Galen, these cavities are the seats of three interior senses, which are phantasy *sive* the common sense, the cogitative power *alias* reason (Galen conceived reason as a corporeal power) and memory. The main rationale for this localization lies in Galen's experimental medical knowledge concerning the correlation of the physical damages of particular cavities and corresponding cognitive disorders. Lesion of the front ventricle is said to cause error in apprehension. Injury in the middle ventricle results in incorrect judgment. Damage of the rear ventricle eventuates in bad memory.<sup>12</sup> All the ventricles are interconnected by means of fluid animal spirits leading from the organs of the external senses to the front part and through a narrow passage called the *vermis* to the middle ventricle and then up to the back occipital cell. Adding two bisections in the front and in the middle ventricles Avicenna arrived at a fivefold division of the brain. The common sense, apprehending its object intuitively, and the retentive imagination, cognizing its object abstractively, were located in the front ventricle. The back ventricle, possessing the driest disposition, became the seat of the memory. Unlike the retentive imagination, its function was to conserve first of all unsensed intentions.

Besides the first two criteria, employed by Aquinas, Avicenna also adopted a third criterion based on the mutual exclusivity of active and passive powers. According to this criterion it is necessary to distinguish between the retentive imagination and the compositive (active) imagination. The compositive imagination, composing and dividing both forms and intentions, cannot be identical with the retentive imagination since this power is nothing more than a storehouse of sensible forms. Unlike brutes, compositive imagination in human animals can be controlled and harnessed by the intellect. If controlled, it is called the cogitative faculty by Avicenna. The incessant activity of the compositive imagination is the reason why it differs from the estimative power, which is substantially passive. Accordingly, this distinction is also the reason why the middle ventricle is to be "bisected".

In sum, Avicenna endorses five post-sensory faculties. Two of them are in the front ventricle, the receptive common sense and the retentive imagination. The two are situated in qualitatively distinct parts of this ventricle. In the middle ventricle the active cogitative faculty, or active compositive imagination, is located. Besides, the middle ventricle contains the passive estimative power, which is *of* unsensed intentions. The memory is placed in

11 Unlike Aristotle, for Galen and for the majority of later authors the seat of the interior senses is not the heart but the brain.

12 *Galen De symptomatum differentiis*. Ed. B. Gundert. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 2009, cap. 3, pp. 225–227.

the back (not bisected) ventricle, called cerebellum. Unlike retentive imagination, a treasury for images received by the common sense, the memory is a storehouse for both the intentions received by the estimative power and the complex forms composed both of intentions and the sensible forms produced by the compositive imagination.

However closely Aquinas follows the Avicennian model, the Angelic Doctor made two important modifications.<sup>13</sup> First, and for our purpose most importantly, in line with Averroes, Aquinas denies the validity of the above-mentioned third criterion based on the distinction between passive and active powers. The retentive imagination and the compositive imagination are one and the same power called *imagination sive phantasia*. Although very brief in his justification of this identification Aquinas seems to give us a clue in *STh*. 1, 78, 4, c., where he indicates the criterion similar to that employed later by Suárez (see Section 5). Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas makes clear that the compositive imagination called by him fantasy occurs only in humans and not in brutes. However, if it holds that we do not have to posit the cogitative power (the so-called particular reason that deals discursively with individual intentions) and reminiscence (the memory that syllogistically seeks for a recollection of the past by individual intentions) as two additional capacities to the (instinctive) estimative power and (associative) memory of perfect brutes, we do not have to posit in humans a new capacity of phantasia either. The higher perfection of the cogitative power, memory and imagination is not the reason for the introduction of the new faculties. This higher perfection can well be explained by their participation in the intellectual power.<sup>14</sup> Second, more explicitly than Avicenna, Aquinas explicitly associates the abstract intentions with the individual intentions perceivable by the so-called incidental perception.<sup>15</sup> In this way Aquinas substantially revises the cognitive function of Avicenna's cogitative faculty. In his rendering it becomes the human (more perfect) counterpart of the beastly estimative power. He also designates this power as "ratio particularis" since

13 For these modifications see Black, D. L., *Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations*, op. cit., pp. 66–68.

14 "Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentis mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas, ut patet cum ex forma imaginat auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginative." Thomas Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ed. Leonina, p. 256.

15 In a white object standing on the opposite side of the street I recognize my friend Peter. For the most detailed analysis of the cogitative power in Aquinas see Klubertanz, G. P., *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the vis cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas*. St. Louis, Modern Schoolman 1952; as regards the crucial role of the cogitative faculty in Aquinas's system of internal apprehension cf. also the recent Lisska, A. J., *Aquinas's Theory of Perception. An Analytic Reconstruction*. Oxford, Oxford University Press 2016.

it is capable of reasoning proto-syllogistically with particular objects as its terms. All in all, Aquinas advocates a theory of four human internal senses, which are the common sense, the cogitative power, the imagination *alias* phantasy, and the memory *alias* reminiscence proceeding discursively from the known to the yet unknown.<sup>16</sup>

### 3. Francisco de Toledo: Three internal senses

In the sixth question *Whether phantasy differs from the common sense* of the third chapter in his Commentary on the third book of Aristotle's *De anima*, Toletus presents as the most probable view a theory of only three internal senses, which are the common sense, the estimative power *alias* the imagination, and the memory.<sup>17</sup> The background of this theory, given by the theories, which are to be reduced in the number of the internal senses, are the above presented doctrines of Avicenna and Aquinas.

Toletus warrants Aquinas's theory, which he considers (in the typically Jesuit verbal reverence to Aquinas's authority) to be the probable view, not only by means of the aforesaid (philosophical) principles but also by the anatomical theory of the four cavities (*sinus*). Referring to Galen, Toletus says that the front ventricle is divided into two cavities of equal size. By means of nerves the two concur in the middle part of the brain, which is in itself undivided, to continue to the occipital part. All the concavities are interconnected by the animal spirits, in which species are transmitted. Since there are four such parts we have a good reason, based on anatomical experience, to claim that there are also four internal senses.<sup>18</sup>

Despite that Toletus does not take that medical experience to be of crucial authority in the issue of determining the number of the senses. On the contrary, he aims to show that there are only three integral organs. Since the number of the internal senses is not to be increased beyond the number of the organs, there must be only three powers. The right and the left parts of the front ventricle are not to be regarded as different organs of two senses since no passage leads from one to the other and thus there is no way how the species could be transmitted. In analogy to the single visual power with two organs, one interior power, the common sense, must be situated in both cavities. Since a power must have an integral organ, the middle ventricle cannot be divided either. It cannot become an organ for two faculties but only for

16 Aquinas, *STh.* 1, q. 78, art. 4.

17 Francisco de Toledo, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis de Anima*. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag 1985, In lib. De anima 3, cap. 3, q. 6, p. 126: "...prima Conclusio probabilis. Sensus interiores tantum sunt tres."

18 Toletus, In lib. De anima 3, cap. 3, q. 6, pp. 125–126.

one, which is the estimative power *alias* the imagination. It is one and the same power, which retains the sensible forms in the absence of its objects, combines them, and elicits the unsensed intentions from the sensibles. The overall emphasis on cognitive activism – a general feature of early Jesuit cognitive psychology<sup>19</sup> – leads him to attribute acts with the unsensed intentions to the imagination. The indivisible connection between the perception of the sensed forms and the unsensed intentions is confirmed by his reference to Aristotle's third chapter of the third book in *De anima*. There the Stagirite says that brutes behave according to the images of the phantasy.<sup>20</sup> But if brutes act according to the estimative faculty, Aristotle had to assume that the power of phantasy also covers the function of the estimative power. It cannot be assumed that Aristotle neglected the estimative power since such assumption would be unworthy of him.<sup>21</sup>

While Toletus is clear about the fusion of the imaginative faculty and the estimative power, he is no less confident about the distinction between the common sense and the imagination. As said, due to the fusion of the estimative power and the imagination the new capacity, namely the imagination *alias* the estimative power is said to perceive both the sensed form and the unsensed intentions. However, perception of the unsensed intentions cannot be conceded to the common sense, which stands closest to the external senses. Although the common sense can perceive its object even in a brief absence,<sup>22</sup> Toletus is sure that the cognition of the imagination *alias* the estimative power is substantially distinct from the apprehension of the common sense. In his reasoning for a real distinction between these powers he comes to combine the two abovementioned standards, which are based on the distinction between intuition and abstraction, and on the difference between sensed and unsensed objects. Embracing the theory of three ventricles, the Jesuit also argues for the really distinct memory. As the common sense is located in the first cavity, the imagination resides in the second cavity, the third power, i.e., the memory, has its seat in the third ventricle. While the first part is humid, fitted for reception, the second is more tempered, suited both for reception and retention, the third cavity, the driest one, is convenient only for retention.<sup>23</sup>

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19 For this see Heider, D., Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez, Manuel de Góis and Antonio Rubio on the Activity and Passivity of the External Senses. In: Heider, D. (ed.), *Cognitive Psychology in Early Jesuit Scholasticism*. Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, Editiones Scholasticae 2016, pp. 38–66.

20 See Aristotle, *On the Soul*. Transl. by W. S. Hett. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 2000, Book 3, ch. 3, 429a4–7, p. 163.

21 Toletus, In lib. De anima 3, cap. 3, q. 6, pp. 125–126.

22 Toletus, In lib. De anima 3, cap. 2, q. 5, p. 122.

23 Toletus, In lib. De anima 3, cap. 3, q. 6, p. 126.



#### 4. Manuel de Góis: Two internal senses

In the first question *Whether the number of the internal senses is rightly established by philosophers* of the third chapter of the *Commentary* on the third book of *De anima*, Manuel de Góis, in contrast to Toletus, articulates his certain scepticism to the ventricular theory conceived as the decisive criterion for determining the number of the internal senses.<sup>24</sup> At the beginning of the question he alludes to the numeral variability in the ventricular theory, noticed also by Toletus. Once three, at another time four, or even five ventricles are embraced by those who employed the theory as the abovementioned standard. Beside that it is not entirely clear what exactly the function of the ventricles is – do they produce the animal spirits, or do they assist in the evacuation of the dross? The Coimbra argues that if we assume that the common sense is localized in the front ventricle, which is composed of two cells, we must face the difficulty associated with its centrality. The duplication of its organ does not square with the central standing, which the common sense is supposed to take in respect to the external senses. Even if the theory of only three ventricles were espoused, referring to Andreas Vesalius's *De humani corporis fabrica* (1543),<sup>25</sup> the nerves leading from the external senses do not lead to the place where the common sense is seated. Góis also notes that the argument based on the correlations of the damages of particular ventricles and cognitive disorders does not stand either. In each part the cerebral disposition (*temperamentum*) can be damaged in various ways causing once this, at other times a different cognitive disorder. A certain lesion of the same ventricle can cause disorders in apprehension, not in judgment and memory, or error in judgment, not in apprehension and memory, or it can give rise to a dysfunction in memory, not in apprehension and judgment.<sup>26</sup> Concluding, Góis, laying emphasis on the fact that the internal senses are first of all qualities and not corporeal organs, does not regard medieval anatomical teaching, in its clarity impugned by Vesalius, to be a fully reliable source for a philosophical conclusion concerning the determination of the number of the internal senses.

What is typical of Góis's procedure is the “probability scaling” of the views. This quadrates with his assessment of the issue as the “res abdita” and the “res ambigua”.<sup>27</sup> As the first probable view, Góis introduces Aquinas's theory.

24 Collegium Conimbricense, *In tres libros de Anima*. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag 2006, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 1, p. 387: “... ex cerebri ventriculis ... Sed hoc argumentum aliis parum efficax videtur...”

25 Vesalius, Andreas, *De humani corporis fabrica libri septem*. Basel 1543, lib. 7, cap. 6, pp. 633–636.

26 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 1, pp. 387–390.

27 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 2, p. 391.

Even though he evaluates his theory as “verisimilior”, Góis is not reluctant to add that the doctrine of three internal senses is equally probable. The cogitative power can be reduced to the phantasy *alias* the imagination, as Toletus had already done. Like the intellect, exercising various more or less perfect operations, the phantasy can exercise operations connected with both the sensed and the unsensed intentions.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, besides these views Góis comes with a third theory, more parsimonious than the previous two. It is this theory that he assesses as the most probable view. As he notes, this theory is not new in the texts of early Jesuit philosophers. Already Pedro Fonseca defended it.<sup>29</sup> On this teaching, there are only two internal senses, the common sense and the phantasy.<sup>30</sup> The fact that the common sense is to be posited – based on the following notorious functions: synthesis of the perceptual manifold; perception of external perception; discernment between the sensibles of the external senses – is a conclusion Góis establishes already in the second question of the previous (second) chapter of the *Commentary*.<sup>31</sup> However, beside the common sense there is only the phantasy. All the operations attributed by most scholastics to more than one internal sense are to be related, according to Góis, only to the “universal” faculty. Providing the (human) phantasy with a rather broad and robust set of cognitive functions including the formation of singular propositions and those of discursive reasoning, this power can take over the functions exercised otherwise by the memory and the *aestimativa*. As already stated, the phantasy can elicit the unsensed intentions from the sensed images. It can combine them, and it can discursively proceed from the unsensed intentions to the sensed images, or vice versa. There is nothing to prevent the identification of the phantasy with the cogitative power and the memory either. There can be a temperament of the qualities in the ventricle of such mediocrity, which will be fitting for both reception and retention. Moreover, if there is one faculty eliciting the unsensed from the sensed species, which also combines them, it is superfluous to distinguish phantasy storing the sensed species from memory conserving the unsensed species as well.<sup>32</sup>

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28 *Ibid.*, pp. 391–393.

29 Fonseca, P., *Commentariorum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros*, t. 2, lib. 5, cap. 28, q. 7, sect. 4. Coloniae, S. Lazari Zetzneri 1615, pp. 1011–1016. The first edition of this second volume of Fonseca's *Commentary* was published already in 1589 (Rome).

30 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 3, p. 394: “Caeterum alia quaedam est opinio, etsi non antiquitati, ut quibus videtur, certe veritati magis consentanae, quam praeter alios nostrae aetatis nobiles Philosophos ... asserens duas tantum esse potentias sensitivas internas; sensum communem & phantasiam.”

31 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 2, q. 2, art. 1, pp. 373–375.

32 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 3, pp. 394–395.

Considering Góis's reception of the really distinct common sense and phantasy, how does he argue for their distinction? Why does he still adhere to the Plurality View? Why does he not replace it with the Unicity View? Despite his scepticism to the relevance of the ventricular theory for the issue of the number of the internal senses, in this context he employs the argument "from the more humid and the drier parts of brain". The disjunction of the internal powers requires the corresponding disjunction in the organ. Góis distinguishes between the front part characterized by the prevalence of humidity, and the remaining part of the brain, the seat of the phantasy, which is of a more tempered composition.<sup>33</sup> Referring to Aristotle, considered by Góis (how else?) to be the proponent of the theory of the double sense, he recurs to the abovementioned principles of multiplication. Since the common sense apprehends its object intuitively, it is immediately affected by the external senses, cognizes only the sensed forms, and since the phantasy apprehends its objects abstractively, it is affected by the external sensibles only by means of the common sense, discerns the unsensed intentions, they must be two really distinct powers.<sup>34</sup>

## 5. Francisco Suárez: One internal sense

Although, like Toletus and Góis, Suárez regards Aquinas's theory of the four-fold sense as a probable view, the most likely tenet for him is the theory of only one internal sense.<sup>35</sup> Before refusing the standard for the multiplication of the internal senses based on the correlation of the tripartite division of the brain and the individual senses, in the first question of Disputation 8 of his Commentary, Suárez premises two main *fundamenta* of his reductionist procedure. In the first one he asserts that the senses are not to be multiplied if one sense can perform more than another. They are to be differentiated only if one cannot exercise the act of the other. Only if the acts of the powers are incompatible in the way that one cannot do what the other can is one allowed to posit a plurality of the senses. As Suárez shows, this criterion can be applied, e.g., to the distinction between the external and the internal senses. The external senses can do what the internal senses cannot do, namely they can be intentionally affected immediately by external objects.<sup>36</sup> In the second *fundamentum*, Suárez states an equality in

33 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 4, p. 397.

34 Conimbricenses, In lib. 3 de Anima, cap. 3, q. 1, art. 3, p. 395.

35 For Suárez's theory, conceived from the viewpoint of comparison with the theory of Aquinas, cf. South, J., Suárez on Imagination. *Vivarium*, 39, 2001, pp. 119–158.

36 Suárez, F., *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*. Ed. S. Castellote. Tomo 3. Madrid, Fundación Xavier Zubiri 1991, disp. 8, q. 1, n. 15, p. 32 (hereafter referred to as DA 8, 1, 15, p. 32).

the number of human and beastly senses. The (perfect) brutes are endowed by the sensory nature with all its perfection proper to its order. If there is any act in humans that is more perfect than the corresponding animal operation, this is not to be taken as a reason for adding a new (human) internal sense. The higher perfection of this operation comes from its “rootedness” in the more perfect (rational) soul. Consequently, this second foundation is the reason why Suárez refuses to add the active (compositional) imagination, which creates fictitious images such as a flying man or a golden mountain, and the discursive memory *alias* reminiscence that discursively proceeds from the known to the unknown as two additional senses in the equipment of human internal apprehension.<sup>37</sup>

It is the first premise that is the crucial guide for Suárez in his argumentation for the identity of the common sense and the phantasy (first conclusion), and for the sameness of the estimative power and the memory (second conclusion).<sup>38</sup> Regarding the first fusion, unlike his Jesuit predecessors who still operated with the principle differentiating the powers with the operations of intuitive and abstractive cognition, Suárez shows that the power cognizant in the absence of its object can and must first apprehend its object in its presence. Abstractive cognition is not incompatible with intuitive cognition. On the contrary, the latter actually precedes the first. The fact that one power apprehends intuitively and another cognizes intuitively and abstractively is not a reason to distinguish between them. A power that can render more perfect cognition, i.e., that of abstractive knowledge, can also exercise a less perfect act, i.e., an operation bound to cognition of its object existing *hic et nunc*. Once the external senses as active potencies cognizing intuitively are affected by the extramental objects, the interior sense is immediately also affected by the same object. The mediation between the less perfect and the more perfect capacities is in Suárez's *De anima* justified by the theory of the sympathy of powers according to which once the lower power is operative, the higher, due to its “sympathy” with the lower one, is cognitively active in the same way as well.<sup>39</sup>

Like Góis, Suárez takes a reserved stance to the criterion founded on the qualitative distinction of the ventricles. One and the same material, as the instance of lead shows, can be both receptive and retentive. Moreover, in harmony with Góis, affection by the sensibles is not purely material; it is first of all intentional. The sensible species are not received in the organ but in the

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37 Suárez, DA 8, 1, 16, pp. 32–34.

38 DA 8, 1, 17, p. 34.

39 DA 8, 1, 17, p. 36. For the theory of the harmony of the powers cf. the old but still valid Ludwig, J., *Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suarez*. München, Ludwig-Verlag 1929.

power,<sup>40</sup> even though, of course, the organ's disposition significantly contributes to the affection. Further, the distribution of the qualities of Moisture and Dryness in the individual cavities is not as clear as the older scholastics supposed.<sup>41</sup> In line with Góis, Suárez asserts that excessive emphasis on the tripartite cerebral division conceived as *the* criterion for determining the number of the internal senses should be avoided. Following Galen's *De usu partium*,<sup>42</sup> i.e., a text of the view different from the above quoted *De differentiis symptomatum*, in which the (classical) doctrine of three ventricles is formulated, Suárez proposes a different "reading" of the ventricle theory. While the front ventricle – being also the organ of the olfactory power – elaborates the animal spirits, by which the organs of the external senses are "irrigated",<sup>43</sup> the middle cavity serves as the passage (*meatus*) through which these spirits with the species as well are conveyed to the third ventricle; it is only the rear ventricle where (according to Suárez) the organ of the interior sense is to be located. In line with Góis, Suárez goes on to say that various kinds of disorders can be explained by different kinds of lesion of the very same organ. One and the same ventricle and its *temperamentum* can be damaged in so many different and unknown ways, which can cause the dysfunction of one and not of another kind of cognitive operation.<sup>44</sup>

Aside from the aforesaid denial of the criterion between intuitive and abstractive cognition, Suárez declines also that based on the diversity between the sensed and the unsensed species. Rejection of this distinction leads him to identify the estimative power and the memory with the phantasy. Two arguments impugning the existence of two really distinct species are presented. First, the implementation of the unsensed species is redundant. The sheep comes to know the intention of the wolf's hostility by the same species that represents the wolf's sensible qualities. By the same species the sheep can judge that it is a wolf, elicits the emotion of fear and flees from the wolf. Second, the unsensed species is not only a redundant entity but even an impossible entity. If the sensed and the unsensed species are two distinct entities, then according to the criterion of real distinction they must be separable. However, can there be an intentional species representing the wolf *sub ratione inimici* without representing it *sub hac figura, hoc*

40 Suárez, F., *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*. Ed. S. Castellote. Tomo 2. Madrid, Editorial Labor 1981, DA 5, 1, 6, p. 292: "Quando obiectum unitur potentiae media specie, necesse est ipsam speciem esse intrinsece in potentia cognoscente."

41 DA 8, 1, 18, pp. 36–38.

42 Claudius Galen, *De usu partium corporis humani libri XVII*. Lugduni, apud Gulielmum Rouillium 1550, book 8, ch. 10–11, pp. 479–484.

43 For this issue cf. also DA 6, 6, 10, p. 540.

44 DA 8, 1, 2, 8, p. 58: "... quarum laesiones diversae causae sunt ignotae."

*colore*, etc.? Apparently, it cannot. The unsensed “ratio” cannot be conceived as a feature abstracted from the sensed species. At most it can be regarded as its mode.<sup>45</sup> However, if this intention is only a mode, then since the phantasy can obviously cognize both the sensible forms and their modes – by analogy, the external senses can also apprehend both the proper sensibles and their modifications, namely the common sensibles –,<sup>46</sup> it is not necessary to posit extra internal senses such as the estimative power and memory.<sup>47</sup>

Rejecting even formal distinctions between the powers, Suárez articulates his final conclusion about the most probable view, which (how else?) he detects in Aristotle’s texts,<sup>48</sup> as follows: There is really and formally only one internal sense.<sup>49</sup> The only distinction(s) that can be considered in this unique sense are conceptual distinctions, which nevertheless have their *fundamenta in re*. What are these *fundamenta*? They are not intrinsic but rather extrinsic to the power. They are its different operations. The unique internal sense is conceived by different names and concepts such as the common sense, the imagination, the phantasy, the cogitative power, the estimative power, the memory, the reminiscence only on the basis of comparing it to its distinct functions and operations.<sup>50</sup>

## 6. Conclusion

Against the backdrop of what can be regarded as the traditional concept of the internal senses we have observed growing reductionism in the issue of the overall number of the internal senses in the theories of all the Jesuits of the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. More or less thoroughly, all three philosophers applied the reductionist strategy. In the philosophical narration, starting from Avicenna up to early modern philosophers who largely dismissed the faculty psychology of the scholastics, all these Jesuits seem to do justice to their *Zeitgeist*. All contributed to the progressive dissolution of the Pluralist view of the internal senses. Indeed, all articulated a libation to Thomism

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45 DA 6, 2, 15, p. 492.

46 DA 6, 1, 10, pp. 462–466.

47 Referring to Aristotle (like Toletus and Góis), Suárez states that also in the Stagiritic texts it was the phantasy, which moves sensory appetite.

48 He refers to the first chapter of his *De memoria et reminiscencia*, in which Aristotle identifies the common sense and the phantasy since he says that phantasm is the “affectum” of the common sense. Cf. Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection*. Transl. by W. S. Hett. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 2000, ch. 1, 450a10–11, pp. 292–293.

49 DA 8, 1, 21, p. 40: “Probabilissimum videtur sensum interiolem tantum esse realiter unum”; DA 8, 1, 23, p. 44: “Sensus interior est una potentia realiter et formaliter, solum quod distinguatur ratione, secundum quod ad diversos actus comparatur, et inadaequatis conceptibus concipitur.”

50 DA 8, 1, 24, pp. 44–46.

in their evaluation of Aquinas's theory as highly probable but in fact all regarded his theory as second rank. Considering Suárez's theory of the single internal sense, which is in charge of a broad scale of operations, associated by past authors with a plurality of capacities, I cannot share Harry Wolfson's assessment that it was as late as Eustachius a S. Paulo (ca. 1573–1640) who reduced the manifold of the internal senses to the unique sense of phantasy and who set the tone for the early modern discussion.<sup>51</sup> Eustachius's three page exposition of the issue in his *Summa philosophiae quadripartita* (1609)<sup>52</sup> is nothing but a brief extract from Suárez's presentation in his *De anima commentary*, which (even though it was not published yet at that time) may have circulated at the universities since 1570s.

Given Suárez's notorious excellent knowledge of his predecessors' doctrines not only in psychology but actually in all philosophical and theological disciplines, it is striking that the Jesuit did not allude to any partisan of the Unicity View. The most parsimonious doctrine mentioned by him was the theory of a twofold internal sense, the common sense and the phantasy, which was later defended by Pedro Fonseca and even later by Manuel de Góis. Does it mean that Suárez's theory of the single internal sense does not have a medieval predecessor? By no means. Leaving aside Augustine and the Hebrew medieval philosophical literature, in the Latin medieval tradition it was above all the Franciscan Peter John Olivi (1248–1298) who in many respects anticipated Suárez's view.<sup>53</sup> Despite some differences, in rejecting the Pluralist view Olivi proceeds analogously to Suárez. Like Suárez, Olivi formulates the abovementioned epistemological criteria of multiplication, which he rejects by arguments very similar to the Jesuit's: There are no distinct unsensed intentions; a power cognizant abstractively must apprehend intuitively as well; the corporeal criterion of qualitative difference in the organs, namely their humidity and dryness, is not as easily applicable in the issue of differentiation of the capacities as some scholastics suppose.

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51 Wolfson, H. A., *The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts*, op. cit., p. 126.

52 Eustachius a S. Paulo, *Tertia pars Summa Philosophicae*, tomus posterior. Paris, C. Chastellain 1609, tract. III., disp. III, q. 1, pp. 391–394. As is well-known, it was Eustachius who was read and highly appreciated by Descartes who in his letter to Marine Mersenne said about his *Summa* the following: "I have bought the Philosophy of Father Eustache of St. Paul, which seems to me the best book of its kind ever made." Descartes, R., To Mersenne, 11 November 1640. In: *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. Transl. by J. Cottingham et al. Vol. 3: The Correspondence. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1991, p. 156. It is not thus surprising that, like Suárez and Eustach, Descartes identified imagination with the common sense as well. Cf. Descartes, R., *Meditationes de prima philosophia*. In: Adam, Ch. – Tannery, P. (ed.), *Œuvres de Descartes* VII. Paris, Léopold Cerf 1904, II. 13–19.

53 Simo Knuutila points out their similarity as well. Cf. Knuutila, S., Suárez's Psychology. In: Salas, V. – Fastiggí, R. (eds.), *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden, Brill 2014, pp. 192–220, 208–209.

Both scholastics accept the principle of parsimony as an important regulative idea.<sup>54</sup> In light of their well-known similarity, consisting in broad application of the theory of the sympathy of powers underpinning a-causal mediation between the cognitive faculties (and between the cognitive faculties and the affective capacities), also related to their shared cognitive activism, it would be highly advisable for future research to devote a special study to comparison of Olivi's and Suárez's theories.

## ABSTRACT

Against the background of the medieval theory of internal senses of Avicenna and Aquinas the author presents a survey of the theories of internal senses as advocated by the early Jesuits, namely by Francisco de Toledo (1534–1596), Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), one of the so-called *Conimbricenses*, and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Although all these Jesuits consider Aquinas's tenet of the four really distinct interior senses to be the probable view, each of them takes a more or less reductionist stance against it. In Suárez this eliminativist approach even results in the theory of the single interior sense called phantasy. In conclusion, this Jesuit reductionism is compared to the *Zeitgeist* of the classical early modern philosophy exemplified by the names of Descartes and Locke.

**Keywords:** internal senses, reduction, Avicenna, Aquinas, Francisco de Toledo, Manuel de Góis, Francisco Suárez

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54 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*. Ed. B. Jansen. Quaracchi, Collegium S. Bonaventurae 1924, q. 63–66, pp. 596–606; for Olivi's theory see Toivanen, J., *Perception and the Internal Senses. Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul*, op. cit., pp. 247–265.