This book addresses the hasty development of modern logic, especially its introducing and embracing various kinds of artificial languages and moving from the study of natural languages to that of artificial ones. This shift seemed extremely helpful and managed to elevate logic to a new level of rigor and clarity. However, the change that logic underwent in this way was in no way insignificant, and it is also far from an insignificant matter to determine to what extent the "new logic" only engaged new and more powerful instruments to answer the questions posed by the "old" one, and to what extent it replaced these questions with new ones. Hence, this movement has generated brand new kinds of philosophical problems that have still not been dealt with systematically. Philosophy of Logical Systems addresses these new kinds of philosophical problems that are intertwined with the development of modern logic. Jaroslav Peregrin analyzes the rationale behind the introduction of the artificial languages of logic; classifies the various tools which were adopted to build such languages; gives an overview of the various kinds of languages introduced in the course of modern logic and the motifs of their employment; discusses what can actually be achieved by relocating the problems of logic from natural language into them; and reaches certain conclusions with respect to the possibilities and limitations of this "formal turn" of logic.

The book From Rules to Meaning brings together new essays that systematically develop, compare, assess and critically react to some of the most pertinent recent trends in inferentialism. The book's four thematic sections seek to apply inferentialism to a number of core issues, including the nature of meaning and content, reconstructing semantics, rule-oriented models and explanations of social practices and inferentialism's historical influence and dialogue with other philosophical traditions. With contributions from a number of distinguished philosophers - including Robert Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin - this volume is a major contribution to the philosophical literature on the foundations of logic and language.

This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning, and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing “the laws of thought”. In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as “inferential landscapes” and logicians as “geographers” who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language.

The term "inferentialism", coined by Robert Brandom, has become a trademark of a certain position in the philosophy of language which claims that meanings identify with inferential roles - a radical departure from more traditional semantic approaches. Independently of this, the term is now cropping up in logic, in connection with positions prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms. The book brings these two strands together: it reviews and critically assesses the foundations of Brandomian inferentialism, it proposes upgrades, and it clarifies its relationship to inferentialism in logic. Emphasis is laid on clearly articulating the general assumptions on which inferentialism rests, thus elucidating its foundations, followed by discussing the consequences of this standpoint, and then dealing with the most intensive objections raised against the standpoint.

This volume sets out the foundations of Transparent Intensional Logic, together with many applications to a wide range of topics including formal semantics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. Special attention is devoted to some topics that generally tend to be dealt with only in passing. They include, inter alia, notional attitudes, knowing whether, concepts (understood rigorously and non-mentalistically),attitudes de re, and anaphora in hyperintensional contexts.

The volume contains complete collection of papers by Pavel Tichý – a well known Czech logician and philosopher who belongs among the most original and controversial figures of modern philosophical logic. The book shows the development of Tichý’s views that lead to formation of the system of Transparent Intensional Logic. It also contains number of his polemic papers published in distinguish international journals.

Notions of concept and conceptual system are explicated from the viewpoint of transparent intensional logic. This viewpoint is realistic, hostile to anti-realistic and relativist tendencies in some works of post-analytic philosophy. The logical analysis is inspired by the typed lambda-calculus.

In this book (which is a reworked English version of my Czech 'Význam a struktura') I argue that recent and contemporary (post)analytic philosophy, as developed by Quine, Davidson, Sellars and Brandom, is largely structuralistic in the very sense in which structuralism was originally tabled by de Saussure. I reconstruct de Saussure's view of language, link it to modern formal logic and mathematics and reveal close analogies between its constitutive principles and the principles informing the holistic and neopragmatistic view of language put forward by Quine & comp. I also indicate that this view of language is not incompatible with formal approaches to semantics.