Mind, Body, and Bodily Awareness Workshop with Frédérique de Vignemont

Organized by the Department of Analytic Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Science

Further information

Invitation pdf

The workshop will be dedicated to the work of Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris) who focuses on bodily awareness, self-consciousness, and social cognition. The workshop will have two parts. In the morning part, Frédérique de Vignemont will give a lecture on the feeling of fear. In the afternoon, we will discuss Frédérique de Vignemont’s book Mind the Body: An Exploration of Bodily Self-Awareness (Oxford UP, 2018) as well as more recent works by the author.

Online participation is possible. Please contact the event coordinator: Tomáš Koblížek, koblizek [at] flu.cas.cz

 

Programme:

10h – 12h
Fear beyond Danger
Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris)

12h – 13h30
Lunch 

13h30 – 14h10
On the Social Origins of the Sense of Body Ownership: A Caregiver Hypothesis
Anna Karczmarczyk (Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun)
Przemysław Nowakowski (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw)

14h10 – 14h50
What Is It like to Experience One’s Body as Being One’s Own? A Commentary on Frédérique de Vignemont’s Approach
Jakub Mihálik (Institute of Philosophy, Prague)

14h50 – 15h30
Consciousness and Bodily Experience
Juraj Hvorecký (Institute of Philosophy, Prague)

15h30 – 15h50
Coffee break

15h50 – 16h30
Bodily Self-Awareness and Protective Behaviour
Petra Chudárková (University of Hradec Králové)

16h30 – 17h10
De Vignemont on Interoception
Przemysław Nowakowski (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw)

Abstracts

Fear beyond Danger

Frédérique de Vignemont

The objective of this paper is to analyse the triadic relationship between fear, danger, and the sense of control. Many agree that the more we feel that we can handle a given situation, the less afraid we are. But why? Here I argue that the sense of control does not extinguish our evaluation of danger. One can act in cold blood in the face of danger; it does not mean that one is blind to danger. This indicates that there is more to fear than being aware of danger, even in a non-conceptual manner. More precisely, I propose that the formal object of fear is not the dangerous, but the unsafe. It is typically when safety is at risk that fear can be said to be justified, or at least appropriate. The dangerous and the unsafe should not be taken as synonymous. The dangerous is part of what it takes for a situation to be unsafe, but it does not exhaust it. It also involves the negative assessment that the threat is not under control. 

On the Social Origins of the Sense of Body Ownership: A Caregiver Hypothesis

Anna Karczmarczyk, Przemysław Nowakowski

In our comment we would like to supplement de Vignemont's view on bodily ownership by proposing a 'caregiver hypothesis'. We believe (like de Vignemont) that experience of body ownership is an emotionally driven experience, that (contrary to de Vignemont’s approach) is born in networks of social interaction, primary through the tender and vigilant care of caregivers. We understand care nor as mere protecting the body from danger, but attending to it, nurturing it, being sensitive to its needs. We experience our body as our own because somebody cares about it and teaches us to care about it. We believe that together with gradually distinguishing oneself as distinct bodily subject that occurs in everyday coexistence with the caregiver, a child experiencesemotional tone connected to her own body.Therefore, we define the bodily ownership as developmentally shaped complex experience, that is bothintrinsically affective and social.

What is it Like to Experience One’s Body as Being One’s Own?

A Commentary on Frédérique de Vignemont’s Approach

Jakub Mihálik

A conscious subject’s experience of their own body and its parts radically differs from their experience of things – and other bodies – in their surroundings. While both external things and one’s body can normally be perceived by the classic five senses, one additionally experiences their body from the inside, via “bodily senses”, such as proprioception or nociception. As Frédérique de Vignemont, Christopher Peacocke, and others, have suggested, one, moreover, experiences their body as being one’s own – our bodily experiences thus involve a phenomenological “sense of ownership” as their component. I will examine de Vignemont’s construal of this “ownership phenomenology”, focusing on its relation to one’s self-ascriptive judgments concerning their body (e.g. “This body is my own”). I will try to argue that this construal faces a challenge – related to Peacocke’s objection to de Vignemont’s earlier approach – of accounting for how a “narcissistic”, or affective quality which, according to de Vignemont, constitutes our sense of ownership can ground such self-ascriptive judgments.

Consciousness and bodily experience

Juraj Hvorecký

While the forms and content of bodily experiences have received relatively wide attention in the literature on the philosophy of mind, relatively little has been said about what these kinds of experiences tell us about consciousness as such. Most of the models of consciousness were, unfortunately, built upon information and processes typical of the visual domain. Novel incursions into the field from other modalities (particularly olfactory experiences in the works of Ben Young and others) are offering a very different picture of what consciousness might be and how it is to be construed. I will analyze the contribution of de Vignemont in this regard and place bodily experiences as conceived by her within a larger frameworks of various theories of consciousness.

Bodily Self-Awareness and Protective Behaviour

Petra Chudárková

In her 2018 monography Mind the Body, de Vignemont proposes the so-called Bodyguard Hypothesis according to which a sense of bodily ownership stems from a specific type of body schema, namely a protective body schema. This hypothesis suggests that the sense of bodily ownership plays a motivational role in protective behaviour, as we perceive our bodies as a practical authority which commands us to protect a certain part, i.e., it motivates us to act in a self-protective way. The hypothesis therefore clarifies the special significance a body has for an individual. The aim of the paper is to explain de Vignemont’s approach and its strengths and weaknesses in comparison to alternative theories of bodily ownership. I will also focus on the relationship between bodily self-awareness and empathy.

De Vignemont on interoception

Przemysław Nowakowski

In her 2018 book, De Vignemont's treatment of interoception and interoceptive awareness is notably limited. This limitation might seem surprising were it not for the current state of philosophical research on interoceptive consciousness. In my presentation, I will draw upon De Vignemont's comprehensive body of work spanning 2018, 2019, and 2023, specifically focusing on interoceptive consciousness. Of particular interest is her thesis, proposed in 2023, suggesting that the need for protective agency is foundational to the genesis of interoceptive awareness (De Vignemont 2023, p. 27). Additionally, I will introduce alternative perspectives on interoceptive awareness, with a particular emphasis on the hypothesis concerning its social origins. This alternative view holds the potential to shed new light on our comprehension of the subjective experience of bodily ownership.