Konuray Mutluer

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CURRENT POSITION

PhD Candidate in Economics   2023 (Expected)

European University Institute, Florence

Advisors: David K. Levine, Andrea Mattozzi

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Economics, Collective Action, Social Learning, Communication

REFERENCES

David K. Levine	**Andrea Mattozzi**	**Giacomo Calzolari**
European University Institute	University of Bologna	European University Institute
david@dklevine.com	andrea.mattozzi@unibo.it	giacomo.calzolari@eui.eu

EDUCATION

European University Institute   2018

MRes in Economics

University of Vienna   2017

MSc (with distinction) in Economics

University of Vienna   2015

BSc in Economics

JOB MARKET PAPER

Leading by Example Among Equals (Latest Version)

I examine the factors that determine whether a grassroots social movement reaches the necessary size to achieve its goal. I study a coordination game where identical individuals who value the common goal sequentially decide whether to join the movement. The model has two key properties: (i) The movement is facing a free-riding problem (i.e. while individuals want the movement to succeed, they would rather have others bear the cost of joining) and (ii) The necessary number of members to achieve success is ex-ante unknown but it can be revealed as

the movement grows in size. The central insight is that a small change in the environment surrounding the collective action problem can trigger a surge in membership, drastically increasing the chances of success. Surprisingly, a higher cost of membership, such as harsher and more likely punishment for members of the movement or more effort intensive tasks, can trigger this surge.

WORKING PAPERS

Tacit Collusion and Dynamic Reference Prices [(Latest Version)]

This paper examines the extent of tacit collusion in an oligopoly market where consumers are affected by past prices. In particular, we study an infinite horizon Bertrand competition between two identical firms where today's demand for the good at a given price is higher if it is a discount relative to past prices and lower if the price has been raised. First, we find that history dependent demand leads to overpricing (relative to the myopic profit maximizing price), as the firms consider it an investment in future demand which they can take advantage of through discounts. Second, the firms are able to coordinate on monopoly behavior as long as an upper bound is not crossed. Prices that are too high are followed by very large discounts, after which the firms gradually raise it until a steady state is reached. Above this upper bound, a higher price today leads to a larger discount tomorrow and lower lifetime profits for the firms.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Volunteer's Dilemma with Social Learning

Review versus Recommendation by an Influence Motivated Expert

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Course Instructor:

Mathematics Boot Camp (Master in Transnational Governance, EUI)	Fall 2020

Teaching Assistant:

Microeconomics 2: Decision and Game Theory (PhD Core Course, EUI)	Fall 2018
Instructor: David K. Levine	
Microeconomics 1 (Master in Transnational Governance, EUI)	Fall 2020
Instructor: Daniela Iorio	

EXTERNAL PRESENTATIONS

European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society	2022

OTHER

Research Assistant to David K. Levine and Andrea Mattozzi	2021

Refereeing: The European Economic Review

GRANTS

EUI PhD Grant	2020-2021
PhD Grant, OeAD, Austrian Agency for Education and Internationalization	2017-2020

LANGUAGES

Turkish (native), English (fluent), German (fluent)
Software: Matlab, LaTeX