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# Forced migration, staying minorities, and new societies: Evidence from post-war Czechoslovakia\*

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## Abstract

Forced migration traumatizes millions displaced from their homes, but little is known about the few who manage to stay and become a minority in a new society. We study the case of German stayers in *Sudetenland*, a region from which Czechoslovakia expelled ethnic Germans after World War Two. The unexpected presence of the US Army in parts of 1945 Czechoslovakia resulted in more anti-fascist Germans avoiding displacement compared to regions liberated by the Red Army. We study the long-run impacts of this local variation in the presence of left-leaning stayers and find that Communist party support and local party cell frequencies, as well as far-left values and social policies are more pronounced today where anti-fascist Germans stayed in larger numbers. Our findings also suggest that political identity supplanted German ethnic identity among anti-fascist stayers. The German staying minority shaped the political identity of newly formed local societies after ethnic cleansing by providing the ‘small seed’ of political development.

*JEL-Classification:* J15, F22, D72, D74, N34

*Keywords:* Forced migration, displacement, ethnic cleansing, stayers, minorities, identity, Communist party, Czechoslovakia, *Sudetenland*

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# 1 Introduction

The global number of displaced people is at new record highs, with violent conflict and wars at the root of most forced migration.<sup>1</sup> A large literature documents the consequences of forced migration for displaced individuals and their new homes (for surveys, see Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013; Becker and Ferrara, 2019). A handful of studies investigates the places left behind by forced migrants, and shows lasting differences between ethnically cleansed areas and neighboring regions (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Arbatli and Gokmen, 2018; Becker et al., 2020; Testa, 2020).<sup>2</sup> However, little is known about those who manage to escape ethnic cleansing and stay to become a minority in a new society. Do stayers assimilate into the new majority or do they segregate and cultivate their ethnic identity? Can they take an active role in forming the political identity of their new re-settled communities, the way that migrants entering established societies sometimes do?<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, we study the footprint of the staying German minority that escaped Czechoslovakia’s expulsions after World War Two.<sup>4</sup> Three million ethnic Germans were forced to leave *Sudetenland*, a region in the Czech borderlands that was predominantly German-populated prior to the war (see, Figure 1). However, some 200,000 mainly industrial workers and anti-fascists avoided deportations and stayed. We exploit quasi-experimental local variation in the extent and structure of forced migration that allowed more anti-fascist Germans to stay in some regions. This variation was the result of the US Army liberating parts of Czechoslovakia, which in turn was the consequence of the unexpected military progress of the US Army through Germany in the spring of 1945. The line of contact with the Red Army (Figure 1), which divided *Sudetenland* between May and December 1945, did not coincide with any pre-existing geographic, administrative, or

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<sup>1</sup>Of the 70 million displaced people worldwide today, over 20 million were forced to leave their country (UNHCR data as of March 2020).

<sup>2</sup>There is related evidence on the local economic impacts of the expulsion of Jews on Nazi Germany (Waldinger, 2010, 2012; Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2015; Huber et al., 2020) and of slave trade on affected African countries (Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).

<sup>3</sup>Ochsner and Roesel (2020) and Giuliano and Tabellini (2020) show that migrants can affect the long-term political identity of their new residence communities. In related research, it has been shown that traumatic war experiences have lasting effects on the political identity of local communities (for example, Blattman, 2009; Rozenas et al., 2017; Fontana et al., 2017).

<sup>4</sup>Ethnic cleansing in post-war Europe uprooted a total of 20 million Belarusians, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians, and many more (Schechtman, 1953).

ethnic boundaries. The straight line was drawn to connect US troops in Germany and Austria.

[Figure 1 about here]

The natural experiment we study corresponds to the only place in post-war Europe where forced migration was at least temporarily controlled by the US Army, i.e., not by the Red Army.<sup>5</sup> The US Army locked its zone in May 1945 and prevented early (‘wild’) expulsions of ethnic Germans. On the other side of the demarcation line, Czech officials started expelling Germans immediately after liberation—supported by the Red Army, which recruited thousands of anti-fascist *Sudeten* Germans for Communist party building in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, as anti-fascists were typically strongly aligned with the Communist party (Pecka, 1995; Gerlach, 2007; Řeháček, 2011). This opened a gap across the demarcation line in the share of deported Germans, and anti-fascist Germans in particular. When mass organized deportations started in early 1946, anti-fascists became entitled to stay in Czechoslovakia. At that moment, the Red Army had already cleared its zone of a large number of anti-fascist Germans. Thus, the 1945 demarcation line in *Sudetenland* corresponds to a natural experiment varying the local presence of anti-fascist Germans staying in post-war Czechoslovakia.

This quasi-random variation in the presence of left-leaning German stayers in post-war *Sudetenland* allows us to ask two novel, related questions: Do stayers who escape forced migration influence their re-settled communities? And do they assimilate into the new majority or do they uphold their minority ethnic identity? We investigate these questions by contrasting neighboring regions within *Sudetenland*, separated by the 1945 demarcation line between the US and the Red Army. We use a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) framework and study ethnic identity, political attitudes, social policies, and election outcomes using both individual-level data and new community-level data hand-collected from German and Czech archives.

Our results imply a lasting political legacy of staying anti-fascist Germans. Today’s Communist party vote shares, density of local Communist party cells, as well as Communist

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<sup>5</sup>Our analysis is thus the first to directly contrast ethnic cleansing consequences in areas under US as opposed to Red Army control.

party membership rates are higher where the presence of US forces led to more anti-fascist Germans avoiding deportation. The effects are sizable. Ten anti-fascist German stayers after World War Two lead to three to four Communist votes in Czech national elections today. The Czech Communist party is one of the least reformed of the formerly ruling Communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, our main findings, together with the absence of any effects for central-left parties, signal the long-term persistence of far-left political preferences. Geocoded survey data eliciting political values corroborate our main findings and show stronger preferences for redistribution, planned economies, and authoritarianism in places where more anti-fascist Germans stayed. German surnames among local Communist elites in the 1950s and among local-election Communist-party candidates today allow us to trace our main findings to the post-war presence of anti-fascist German stayers.

While we uncover strong evidence of the political legacy of stayers, we do not find any spatial discontinuity across the demarcation line in self-declared German ethnicity. Post-war Czechoslovakia eliminated the use of German in public life (in schools, administration, employment) and, according to our findings, the outcome of this forced assimilation did not interact with the size of the stayer community.<sup>7</sup> Our findings thus suggest that staying anti-fascist Germans transmitted their political identity across three generations, but not their German identity. Their far-left political identity may have supplanted their German ethnic identity. The expression of political identity by the offspring of the stayers is not merely an opportunistic survival strategy within the Czechoslovak communist regime, because the far-left political values we measure correspond to free and democratic elections in modern Czech Republic until 2018, long after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Stayer parents deciding on which of the two main identities (German or far-left) to inculcate in their children reflected the environment that supported one, but suppressed the other identity.

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<sup>6</sup>Along with the Moldovan Communist party, it is the only former ruling party in post-Communist Europe, which has not dropped ‘Communism’ from its name. It has never been part of a governing coalition in the Czech Republic. The party’s program is close to its original agenda, its youth organisation was banned from 2006 to 2010, and there have been repeated calls from other parties to outlaw the party.

<sup>7</sup>Such interactions are a feature of models of cultural identity (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2001), in which parental and peer socialization are substitutes. Language restrictions can heighten the sense of cultural identity, as observed by Fouka (2020) for the German minority in the US after World War One.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence implying that a small minority of stayers can affect attitudes and values of societies after ethnic cleansing. Only a handful of studies exploit local variation in the intensity of ethnic cleansing. Arbatli and Gomtsyan (2019) uncover ethnic-cleansing origins of a current nationalist party identification in Armenia, i.e., origins that survived seven decades of Soviet rule. In Poland, preferences for public goods and redistribution increase in cultural diversity measured as the share of staying Germans not expelled after World War Two, a finding similar to ours (Charnysh, 2019).<sup>8</sup> In our study, we are able to trace today’s place-based political outcomes to the small group of stayers exempted from displacement over 70 years ago. Furthermore, while the extent of forced displacement analyzed in existing studies may be endogenous, a key feature of our research design is the exogenous variation in the local intensity of forced migration induced by the quasi-random line of contact between US and Red Army forces in 1945 Czechoslovakia. This enables us to ask whether non-displaced individuals from an ethnic minority can have *causal* long-term effects on the political identity of their newly resettled communities. Our findings provide support for the ‘small seed’ theory of political development (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020).

Our results also contribute new aspects to other strands of the literature. In related work, Ochsner and Roesel (2020) find that far-right voting is more pronounced today in Austrian regions that have absorbed more Nazis fleeing the Red Army, i.e., that a small number of arriving migrants with radical political values can shape long-term local political equilibria in *established* communities. Existing minorities in the US have been shown to influence the integration of arriving migrants (Fouka et al., 2011). In comparison, our evidence suggests that a small group of stayers, i.e., non-migrants, with strong political values is also sufficiently powerful to influence political outcomes in *newly formed* societies. The findings by Ochsner and Roesel (2020) and by Arbatli and Gomtsyan (2019) are consistent with the transmission of far-right and nationalist political values, respectively, across several generations, in line with a growing body of research highlighting the persistence of far-right political values (for example, Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Cantoni et al., 2020;

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<sup>8</sup>Becker et al. (2020) also study Poland, but focus on values of forced migrants, not on stayers and sending regions.

Jurajda and Kovač, 2021).<sup>9</sup> Our study supports the notion that *far-left* political values are similarly strongly transmitted across generations, and can survive transitions across political and economic systems as well as ethnic cleansing episodes. This is a new insight in the growing literature discussing the historical roots of populism and extremism (e.g., Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Ochsner and Roesel, 2017; Avdeenko, 2018).

Although we primarily contribute to the literature on the political and ethnic identity consequences of forced migration,<sup>10</sup> our analysis also brings novel findings to the research exploring various effects of the line of contact between Red Army troops and US and British forces in 1945 Europe (Fontana et al., 2017; Ochsner, 2017; Eder and Halla, 2018; Martinez et al., 2020). While the demarcation line in Austria and Germany divided homogeneous societies, the line of contact in Czechoslovakia cut through both the Czech-populated lands of the Nazi-occupied *Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia* (hereafter, the ‘Czech main lands’) and *Sudetenland*—the German-populated region of Czechoslovakia incorporated into Nazi Germany between 1938 and 1945. Our analysis is the first to investigate the demarcation line in Czechoslovakia, which was divided among US and Red Army forces between May and December 1945.<sup>11</sup> This allows us to contrast the effects of US versus Red Army liberation across two qualitatively different settings. We find short-term population declines in German-inhabited regions liberated by the Red Army (similar to findings from Austria and Germany, where such declines were long-term, Ochsner, 2017; Eder and Halla, 2018), but no population declines in the Czech-populated regions initially under Red Army control. This is in line with anecdotal evidence that Red Army soldiers treated Slavic people and Germans differently (for example, Řeháček, 2011; Glassheim, 2016, among others) and suggests that a faster progress of US and British forces in 1944/1945 Europe may have reduced post-war violence and revenge.

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<sup>9</sup>Other papers have documented persistence in socioeconomic outcomes beyond political values, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2001); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Nunn (2008); Dell (2010); Brosig-Koch et al. (2011); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Becker et al. (2016); Valencia Caicedo (2018).

<sup>10</sup>We study the effects on sending regions of *Sudetenland* while Bauer et al. (2013) and Braun and Dwenger (2020) explore the economic and political impacts of arriving displaced Germans on their destinations in Germany; Semrad (2015) studies similar questions and focuses on expellees from Czechoslovakia.

<sup>11</sup>Guzi et al. (2019) and Testa (2020) compare the evolution of social capital, population, and economic outcomes across the border *between* the former *Sudetenland* and the neighboring Czech main lands. We study differences in outcomes *within* the formerly German-populated part of Czechoslovakia as well as within the Czech-populated main lands.



## 2 Historical background

### 2.1 *Sudeten* Germans in the Czech lands

Prior to World War Two, Czechoslovakia hosted one of the largest German-speaking minorities outside Germany. The borderlands of Czechoslovakia, *Sudetenland*, were home to three million ethnic Germans representing about 30% of the population of the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) in 1930.<sup>12</sup> Ethnic Germans began settling in *Sudetenland* during the rule of Ottokar I of Bohemia at around 1200. By 1930, German and Czech communities were sharply divided: in three of four counties of the Czech lands in 1930, either self-declared German or Czech ethnicity accounted for more than 90% of the population.<sup>13</sup> Tensions between Czechs and Germans surfaced after Czechoslovakia broke away from the Habsburg Empire in 1918. There were separate political parties for both ethnic communities along the entire political spectrum, with the exception of the ethnicity-bridging Czechoslovak Communist Party (*Komunistická strana Československa*, KSČ). Nationalism among *Sudeten* Germans accelerated after Adolf Hitler seized power in Germany in 1933. The Sudeten German Party (*Sudetendeutsche Partei*) supported to annex *Sudetenland* to Germany and won two thirds of the *Sudeten* German vote in the 1935 Czechoslovak election.

Nazi Germany annexed *Sudetenland* in September 1938 as a result of the Munich Agreement, followed by a first wave of ethnic cleansing. About 175,000 Czechs, including 25,000 Jews, were forced to leave *Sudetenland* (Němeček, 2002). When Nazi Germany launched World War Two in September 1939, *Sudetenland* was fully incorporated into the *Reich* and the remaining Czech lands became the Nazi-administered territory of the ‘Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia’. After Germany’s surrender in May 1945, national boundaries as of 1937 were restored immediately, and *Sudetenland* returned to Czechoslovakia. In a second wave of ethnic cleansing, almost the entire German population was expelled from *Sudetenland* during 1945 and 1946 and replaced by about two million Czechs, Slovaks, and other nationals. However, some 200,000 Germans stayed, corresponding to about

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<sup>12</sup>Figure A1 in the Online Appendix shows population in the Czech lands between 1921 and 2011.

<sup>13</sup>Section B.2 in the Online Appendix reports our sources for census statistics.

6% of the pre-war population. After decades of continuous assimilation, some 39,000 citizens—less than 0.4% of present-day Czech Republic’s 10 million population—declared German ethnicity in 2001.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.2 Demarcation line in 1945 Czechoslovakia

It was neither intended nor foreseeable that US forces and the Red Army would meet in Czechoslovakia in May 1945. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 had already informally allocated Czechoslovakia to the Soviet post-war sphere of influence. However, military developments in the final weeks of World War Two altered the original plan. The German Western front collapsed after British and American forces crossed the Rhine river in March 1945. In the East, by contrast, the German resistance against the Red Army was still substantial. During March and April, the Soviets gradually agreed to the further eastward progress of the US forces, but they stressed their ambition to liberate the Vltava valley including the Czech capital of Prague. In the heavy battles of April 1945, the Red Army prioritized Germany’s and Austria’s symbolic capitals of Berlin and Vienna, and did not make significant progress into the Czech lands in between. The US Army, by contrast, had already liberated large parts of East Germany and East Austria, and demanded to connect their troops standing at the German Elbe and Mulde rivers with US troops along the Danube river in Austria (see, Franzel, 1967, and Figure 1). The Soviets accepted General Eisenhower’s proposal for a more or less straight demarcation line formed by the Czech cities of Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad), Plzeň (Pilsen), and České Budějovice (Budweis). US troops approached the Czech part of the demarcation line on May 5 and stopped there.<sup>15</sup> When Nazi Germany ultimately surrendered on May 8, the US Army controlled a strip of around 10,000 square kilometers in western Czechoslovakia and was waiting for the Red Army, which stood some 200 kilometers east of Prague and arrived a few days later. The red line in Figure 1 shows the final position of the demarcation line as reported by Pecka (1995). The line cut through *Sudetenland* as well as the Czech-populated former

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<sup>14</sup>In 2001, 31,000 (1.0%) of the 3.1 million residents in *Sudetenland* declare German ethnicity.

<sup>15</sup>Eisenhower attempted to shift the line of contact eastward to include Prague. This time, however, Soviet General Antonov rejected the plan. General Patton, who commanded the US forces in the region, was then not allowed to progress towards Prague in early May (Mendelsohn, 2010, p. 14).

‘Protectorate’. It followed roads and railways<sup>16</sup> and it did not coincide with any pre-existing geographic, administrative, or ethnic boundaries. The exception was its southernmost part (south of the village of Žernovice, see Figure A3 in the Online Appendix), where the line overlapped with the border of *Sudetenland*, i.e., with ethnic divisions. In all of our analysis, we thus omit this southernmost part of the line. Both the Red Army and the US Army locked up their zone’s borders as of May 1945 (Pogue, 1954; Dickerson, 2006). *Sudeten* Germans thus had a very limited opportunity to self-select into fleeing either zone.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.3 Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia

In regions controlled by the Red Army, the expulsion of *Sudeten* Germans from Czechoslovakia began immediately after Germany’s surrender (Brandes, 2001). At least 700,000 *Sudeten* Germans were displaced in ‘wild expulsions’ in the Red-Army zone between May and July 1945, and thousands were killed (Suppan, 2006; Glassheim, 2016). The US forces, by contrast, prevented any displacement of Germans at this stage (Slapnicka, 2000). Therefore, the number of staying Germans was substantially larger in the US zone by December 1945 when both US and Red Army forces left Czechoslovakia. Figure 2 traces the German population in % of the 1930 population in US and Red Army-liberated counties along the northern half of the demarcation line in *Sudetenland*, where we have collected rare monthly population data during the expulsions. There is no difference in population dynamics before 1945. At the end of 1945, around 90% of the German population as of 1930 was still living on the US side, while in the Red Army-controlled areas approximately one of three Germans had already been expelled.

[Figure 2 about here]

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<sup>16</sup>The line overlaps with main roads and railways, 27% and 45% respectively in a 500 meter buffer. See Figure A2 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>17</sup>Crossing the demarcation line was possible only with permits from both Soviets and Americans and one had to return by the end of the day (Fischer and Kodet, 2013) The Red Army frequently opened fire on those crossing the line illegally (Řeháček, 2011). The US Army as well as the Red Army implemented similar restrictions to the re-installed Czech-German border. US soldiers burnt all belongings of illegal migrants from *Sudetenland* at the German border and sent them back (Brandes, 2001). After December 1945, all borders to Germany and Austria were under strict Czechoslovak control.

The second stage of expulsions occurred between February and October 1946. These organized (regular) mass deportations covered 2 million *Sudeten* Germans from both the formerly US and Red Army zone (Řeháček, 2011; Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1957). Figure 2 shows that these organized expulsions never fully closed the initial gap across the demarcation line in the extent of displacement. A total of around 240,000 Germans lived in Czechoslovakia when the last mass transports left in October 1946 (Luža, 1964), though another few thousand Germans left during 1947 and 1948. In post-war Czechoslovakia, the remaining 200,000 Germans were not allowed to practice their language, their movement was restricted, and inter-ethnicity marriages required government approval (Kučera, 1992). German identity faded. The 1950 Czech census counted 160,000 self-reported Germans (Reindl-Mommsen, 1967), a substantial decrease despite very little out-migration. After decades of assimilation, less than 40,000 Czech citizens reported German ethnicity by 2011.

## 2.4 Anti-fascist Germans

The German stayer community in post-war Czechoslovakia consisted chiefly of indispensable industrial workers and anti-fascists.<sup>18</sup> *Sudetenland* was a highly industrialized region with mining, heavy industries, and manufacturing. A considerable number of indispensable German specialists and their families were allowed (often forced) to stay where significant industries were present. The second main group of German stayers were anti-fascists, who were certified by local authorities.<sup>19</sup> This group included (pre-war) members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as well as Germans active in the anti-Nazi resistance.

Three mechanisms gave rise to a local over-representation of anti-fascist German stayers in regions liberated by US forces. First, in the ‘wild expulsions’ in the Red Army zone in the summer of 1945, ethnicity was often the only selection criterion and so Nazi Germans and anti-fascist Germans were often equally treated (Turnwald, 1951; Schneider, 1995; Klepsch, 2013). The absence of ‘wild expulsions’ in the US zone thus opened a gap in the number

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<sup>18</sup>German Jews, a small number of Germans married to Czechs, and a number of individuals granted mercy were also allowed to stay.

<sup>19</sup>For a description of the certification process, see, for example, ‘Směrnice pro ověřování antifašistů’, published in newspapers in Liberec on 25 July 1945 (Hoffmann et al. (2010, p. 673–674)).

of Nazi Germans but also anti-fascist Germans across the demarcation line. Second, an agreement between the Soviet administration in Germany and the Czechoslovak government increased this gap for anti-fascist Germans.<sup>20</sup> The Soviets aimed at rolling out Communist party cells in its East German zone as fast as possible. Communist party membership was high in many parts of *Sudetenland*, but almost no party structures existed in the rural north of the Soviet zone in Germany. As a result, some 30,000 anti-fascist Germans left Czechoslovakia for East Germany in prioritized transfers in 1945 (Foitzik, 1983), and these early leavers came from the Red Army-controlled part of *Sudetenland*. Third, when organized mass displacement started in 1946, anti-fascist Germans became entitled to stay. Because of the two processes discussed above, more anti-fascist Germans were still present at this point (and thus could stay) in the US-liberated parts of *Sudetenland*. Wilde (2015) notices a remarkably high number of anti-fascist Germans in the county of Sokolov located on the US side of the demarcation line.

To directly explore the nature of the gap in staying Germans, we went to local archives on both sides of the demarcation line, and collected data from hand-written lists at the municipality level on the total number of Germans in late 1946 when mass transfers were completed. These lists count Germans by the reason they were allowed to stay. We were able to gather data for three counties divided by or in close proximity to the demarcation line (Karlovy Vary, Kraslice, Locket). The lists distinguish anti-fascists and industrial specialists.<sup>21</sup> We relate their counts to the 1930 local German population and compute averages for 76 US-liberated and Red Army-liberated municipalities. Figure 3 shows the results. Corroborating Figure 2, we find that more Germans stayed on the US side (12% of the 1930 population) than on the Red Army side (9%).<sup>22</sup> A similar share of 6% of the former German population stayed as industrial specialists on either side of the demarcation line. By contrast, we observe a higher share of German certified anti-fascists on the US side of the demarcation line: 6% in terms of the 1930 population as opposed to 3% on the Red

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<sup>20</sup>See, Schneider (1995) and the documents in Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (1957, p. 343-355).

<sup>21</sup>We add the small number of Germans in mixed marriages, German Jews, and other exceptions to industrial specialists. Anti-fascists include Germans subject to potential later deportation and Germans with a ‘special treatment’ or granted citizenship as these are likely to be anti-fascists as of late 1946.

<sup>22</sup>Figure 2 reports 15% and 9% of the German population staying in December 1946 in the US and the Red Army part of our North *Sudetenland* sub-sample, respectively, consistent with the municipalities covered in Figure 3 being representative of the entire North sub-sample.

Army side. Thus, the entire gap in the share of the staying German population between US and Red Army-liberated regions can be explained by anti-fascists. This additional evidence supports the notion that the initial presence of US and Red Army forces created different local trajectories of German displacement, particularly so for the anti-fascists.

[Figure 3 about here]

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the staying anti-fascist Germans were powerful and prominent actors in the Communist regime. Urban (1964, p. 36) reports that ‘a considerable share of the Germans are senior Communists who are allowed to stay’, some of them being ‘even more fanatic Communists than Czechs’.<sup>23</sup> In 1948, the Czechoslovak Communist party (KSČ) took control of the government of Czechoslovakia and introduced a Stalin-style regime lasting until 1989. Anti-fascist Germans, such as the violin maker Josef Pötzl living in US-liberated *Sudetenland*, made it to the Czech parliament in the 1950s as Communist MPs.<sup>24</sup> Table A1 in the Online Appendix compares the names of around 400 Communist county-level party leaders in 1959 on both sides of the demarcation line, hand-collected from local archives. We find that the share of German surnames among these leaders on the US side of the line is 3 percentage points higher than on the Red-Army side.<sup>25</sup> This is consistent with the gap in the share of staying anti-fascists reported above. Staying anti-fascist Germans actively contributed to building Communism in Czechoslovakia. We investigate how deep and lasting their impact is.

Summing up, both the presence of US forces in Czechoslovakia and the location of the demarcation line were the result of unexpected military events. The line of contact did not follow any previous boundaries and it corresponded to separate governance of the two zones until the end of 1945. It induced a quasi-experimental difference in ethnic cleansing and in the presence of left-leaning German stayers in post-war Czechoslovakia.

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<sup>23</sup>Original in German, translation by the authors.

<sup>24</sup>Other examples of KSČ MPs of German ethnicity are Jan Jungbauer and Rudolf Müller.

<sup>25</sup>The methodology for identifying German as opposed to Slavic names is discussed in Section 6.

### 3 Data

We compile a new dataset of Czech municipalities covering the interwar period and the era after World War Two. It includes information on the last national election in the interwar period (1935) and on democratic national elections in Czechoslovakia (1946, 1990, 1992) and in the Czech Republic (1996 to 2017). We combine the election data with information on the location of the 1945 demarcation line, which we reconstruct based on Pecka (1995). This information is then translated to the territorial status of the present-day 6,244 Czech municipalities. After excluding the capital city of Prague, the average Czech municipality has a population of about 1,500. As some of the municipality-level information is not available prior to World War Two, we rely on information at the level of the 330 Czech counties as of 1947 with an average population of about 25,000.<sup>26</sup> We also use the 2010 and 2016 waves of the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), for which we are able to geo-code the residence of the respondent. The LITS asks respondents in Central and Eastern European countries about their political values and attitudes.

The Online Appendix B describes in detail how we retrieved and processed data from digitized hardcover copies and local and national archives, from both hand-collected and administrative sources. Election data are obtained from the Czech Statistical Office, including local (municipal) election outcomes between 1994 and 2018 with the corresponding candidate names.<sup>27</sup> We digitize population data from 1930 and 1950 census hardcover publications. In addition, we collect data on the German population from local archives in Sokolov and Karlovy Vary, from the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from various monographs. Further population data come from the Czech Statistical Office and from the German Statistical Office for *Sudetenland* counties annexed by Nazi Germany between 1938 and 1945. Data on local monuments and memorials and on German names are retrieved from various websites listed in the appendix. Finally, we rely on several publications for information on the deportation of Germans after the war, the names of

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<sup>26</sup>We use historical GIS information on boundaries of former Czech counties and regions, and on the national boundaries of 1930 Europe.

<sup>27</sup>The exception are data for the 1946 election which we retrieve from hardcover copies.

local Communist party elites in the 1950s, and the *Sudetenland* bombings during World War Two.

## 4 Identification

Differences in expulsion policies across the demarcation line in *Sudetenland* (discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4) led to quasi-experimental variation in the local presence of staying anti-fascist Germans. Our main goal is to rely on this variation within a regression discontinuity design to estimate its causal effects on political identity and ethnicity. In this section, we outline our econometric approach and test the exogeneity of the demarcation line location. Our two main outcomes of interest are the extent of self-declared German ethnicity and the vote share of the Czech Communist party (KSČ, KSČM since 1990). The latter is a natural choice of a political identity measure since anti-fascist German stayers were closely aligned with the Communist party and generally likely to support left-wing values (see Section 2.4). The Communist party was the ruling party between 1948 and 1989 and its direct successor is the leading far-left party in the Czech Republic.<sup>28</sup>

### 4.1 Regression discontinuity design

Our identification strategy is to exploit the natural experiment of the demarcation line and to compare areas close to the line, assuming that neighboring US and Red Army-liberated areas share similar trends and unobserved characteristics prior to the mass expulsion of Germans. We test this assumption in the next section. Adjacent areas under Red Army control thus provide a counterfactual for US-liberated regions where displacement took place later, was less extensive, and displaced fewer anti-fascist Germans.<sup>29</sup>

We apply a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) to the most granular data available—municipalities. Our preferred specification corresponds to a

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<sup>28</sup>Figure A4 in the Online Appendix depicts Communist national vote shares separately for the (former-Protectorate) Czech main lands and for *Sudetenland*; since 1990 they vary between 10% and 20% in both parts of the Czech Republic.

<sup>29</sup>In our main analysis we focus on the demarcation line within *Sudetenland*, but we perform a similar analysis also for the demarcation line within the Czech main lands.



local-linear RD strategy (Calonico et al., 2017), but we use a parsimonious polynomial RD regression model as a reference and a starting point, following the suggestion of Gelman and Imbens (2019). This model is estimated with OLS and allows for standard errors robust to spatial correlation (Conley, 1999, 2010):

$$\begin{aligned} Communist_i = \alpha + \beta_1 US_i + \beta_2 Distance_i + \beta_3 Distance_i^2 + \\ \beta_3 Distance_i \times US_i + \beta_4 Distance_i^2 \times US_i + X_i' \gamma + \epsilon_i. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Here,  $Communist_i$  denotes the vote share for the Communist party in a national election in Czech municipality  $i$ . We also use other political outcomes as dependent variables later. The vector of  $\beta$  coefficients refers to a quadratic RD polynomial interacted with a dummy variable  $US_i$  taking on the value one if a municipality was liberated by US forces in 1945 (zero otherwise).  $Distance_i$  measures the great circle distance of a municipality to the demarcation line in kilometers. Distances are positive on the Red Army side and negative on the US side.  $X_i$  is a vector of municipality-level geography controls (distance to the German border, distance to the next main road, distance to the next railway line, mean altitude and slope as the difference between maximum and minimum altitude) and population controls (logged pre-war population and logged present-day population). We restrict this least-squares estimation to municipalities  $\pm 25$  kilometers around the demarcation line; the rationale for this bandwidth choice is provided in Section 4.2. We exclude the few municipalities divided by the demarcation line, so our dataset covers four types of municipalities: *Sudetenland* and former-Protectorate (Czech main lands) municipalities which were allocated either to the US or the Red Army zone in 1945.<sup>30</sup>

Most of our RD analysis is then based on flexible RD specifications corresponding to the local-linear procedure with a data-driven optimal bandwidth choice proposed by Calonico et al. (2017). We report RD standard errors robust to optimal bandwidth choice (Calonico et al., 2014; Hyytinen et al., 2018). In these specifications, we do not pre-define any maximum bandwidth around the demarcation line. However, the optimal bandwidth ends up being close to that used in our reference polynomial specification.

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<sup>30</sup>We exclude municipalities divided by the border between *Sudetenland* and the Czech main lands (former Protectorate) as well as municipalities south of the village of Žernovice, where the demarcation line corresponded with ethnic divisions. See the maps in Figures A3 and A5 in the Online Appendix.

## 4.2 Exogeneity of the demarcation line

Geographical RD estimates have a meaningful causal interpretation only if the cut-off location is set quasi-randomly and if self-selection is ruled out. Self-selection of Germans into the US or the Red Army zone was prevented by the fact that the ultimate location of the line was not known to the public as it was the result of unforeseen military developments in the last few weeks of World War Two, and by the severe restrictions on individual mobility applied by both liberating forces upon their arrival (see Section 2.2 for details).

To provide statistical evidence on the absence of pre-war differences across the demarcation line formed in May 1945, we test for discontinuities using the local-linear RD method proposed by Calonico et al. (2017). In Table 1, we provide such a test for *Sudetenland* and the Czech main lands separately in columns (1) and (2), respectively, and then combining both areas in column (3). All pre-war characteristics balance well at the later demarcation line, including 1930 ethnicity, religion, population density and growth, including geographical features as well as the extent of bombing during the war. The only exception is the distance to the external border with Germany, which is somewhat higher on the US side within *Sudetenland* municipalities. The maximum optimal bandwidths across the three geographic areas (columns) in Table 1 are 14, 20, and 28 kilometers. We therefore set 25 kilometers on either side of the demarcation line as our bandwidth choice in the few specifications where the optimal bandwidth procedure is not available.

[Table 1 about here]

Table A2 in the Online Appendix further shows no significant pre-1930 differences across the demarcation line in municipality population and housing (relative to 1930 levels). However, we do find a discontinuity in total population directly after the expulsions (in 1950), which is in line with less extensive deportations, and thus less depopulation in the US zone. Finally, in Table A3 in the Online Appendix we use county-level data on Communist election outcomes in 1935. We compare Communist vote shares in counties with a maximum distance of 25 kilometers of the county capital to the eventual demarcation line. We find no significant differences in election outcomes before displacement; if anything, Communist vote shares were slightly lower in the later US zone. Given the empirical

support for the quasi-random location of the RD line and the likely absence of self-selection, we conclude that our RD strategy allows for a causal interpretation.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Communist party vote shares

Our baseline results in Table 2 provide robust evidence of long-run effects of the presence of US forces in 1945 *Sudetenland* on the electoral success of the Czech Communist party. Applying a quadratic-interacted RD polynomial in column (1), we find the vote share of the Czech Communist party in the 2017 national election to be about 9 percentage points higher as one steps across the demarcation line from the most western Red Army-liberated *Sudetenland* municipalities to adjacent municipalities under US control.<sup>31</sup> Point estimates do not change and effects become more precisely estimated when we control for local geography and for pre-war and present-day population in column (2). These findings are confirmed in our preferred RD specification, where we allow for flexible local-linear polynomials and rely on an optimal data-driven bandwidth: In column (3) of Table 2, we find a statistically significant effect of 8 percentage points in the Communist vote share at the demarcation line within *Sudetenland*. Since the local-linear RD specification is the most flexible of the four alternatives, we use it as a baseline in what follows.

[Table 2 about here]

Within *Sudetenland*, the different expulsion policies in the US and Red Army zones led to a higher share of anti-fascist Germans on the US side of the demarcation line. In the Czech main lands, however, there were almost no Germans as of 1947 and thus no meaningful difference in the share of staying Germans across the demarcation line.<sup>32</sup> If the presence of US forces affects present-day Communist vote shares via the anti-fascist German channel, one would expect no effects within the Czech main lands. This is indeed born out in columns (4) to (6) of Table 2, where we uncover precisely estimated zero effects for the

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<sup>31</sup>Figure A6 in the Online Appendix shows the corresponding RD plot.

<sup>32</sup>Figure 1 and Figures A3 and A5 in the Online Appendix show how the demarcation line cut through both the German-populated areas and the Czech main lands.

part of the demarcation line cutting through the Czech main lands, consistent with effects operating through German stayers. The Czech main lands here provide a placebo test of our interpretation of the *Sudetenland* effects. We return to discussing the mechanisms underlying our baseline findings in Section 6.

## 5.2 Other election outcomes

The baseline findings are fully robust to various sensitivity and sub-sample checks (all based on the local-linear RD approach). First, in Table A4 in the Online Appendix we split the *Sudetenland* municipalities near the demarcation line to a north and a south sub-sample (based on the latitude of the village of Bezvřrov, see Figure A3 in the Online Appendix). The two estimated effects are both similar to the baseline effect from column (3) of Table 2 and they are not statistically distinguishable. Second, we estimate the effects of various pseudo treatments, for which we expect to find no effects if our identification and inference strategy is valid. Table A5 in the Appendix (columns (1) and (2) as well as (4) and (5)) show precisely estimated zero effects when we move the demarcation line 25 kilometers eastwards or westwards. We also use the Ohře river as a pseudo demarcation line. Unlike the North-South demarcation line, the river cuts *Sudetenland* from east to west. Again, we find no significant change in the Communist vote at this alternative pseudo cut-off.

Third, we extend our analysis from the 2017 Czech national election to all national elections since the Czech independence. Table A6 in the Online Appendix implies that the 2017 effects are very similar to those in all other national elections since Czech independence in 1993. In columns (1) and (6), we uncover strong effects on the Communist party vote shares within *Sudetenland* and precisely estimated zero effects in the Czech main lands. The only exception is the 1998 *Sudetenland* effect (p-value of 0.103). However, once we add other fringe far-left parties to account for the fragmented far-left camp in the 1990s, we find, in column (2), a highly significant 7-percentage-points effect of the US zone in

*Sudetenland*. The Communist vote share effects are largest in 2002 and 2013 when the party received its best and second-best results after Czech independence.<sup>33</sup>

In the remaining columns of Table A6, we extend our analysis beyond the Communist party. We divide the party spectrum into far-left, centrist parties (mainstream), and far-right. Column (3) implies that the higher Communist (far-left) vote share within *Sudetenland* comes at the cost of electoral success of mainstream parties, where we find mirrored decreases at the demarcation line. Far-right vote shares and voter turnout are not affected in most observed elections. We consistently obtain no statistically significant or sizeable estimates within the Czech main lands (columns (6) to (10)). We also zoom in on the election results of the Social democratic party (ČSSD). Both Communist and Social democratic Germans were certified as anti-fascists. Early transports of anti-fascist Germans to the Soviet zone, however, mainly targeted Communists (see Section 2.4). We would therefore expect a difference in radical far-left but not in moderate left-wing votes across the former demarcation line. Column (1) of Table A7 in the Online Appendix confirms our expectation in that there are no effects of the presence of US versus Red Army troops in *Sudetenland* on the vote shares of the Social democratic party.

Finally, we ask about the effect of the line on the presence of local Communist party cells. We collect data on all local (municipal) elections in the Czech Republic between 1994 and 2018 and code whether the Communist party stands in a given municipality. We pool all local elections to measure long-term Communist party structures. Table A8 in the Online Appendix reports the results of RD estimations. Municipalities on the US side of the demarcation line are about 12% more likely to host a local Communist party cell. Thus, we find not only more Communist voters but also more active Communist party

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<sup>33</sup>We have also attempted to study the three free Czechoslovak elections in 1946, 1990 and 1992, but faced two fundamental obstacles. First, municipality boundaries in 1990 and 1992 do not coincide with the territorial status of municipalities we use in our main analysis. This is due to heavy consolidation of municipalities during the Communist era, which obscures allocation of municipalities to either *Sudetenland* or the Czech main lands as well as allocation across the demarcation line. It took several years after the Velvet Revolution to dissolve and split thousands of municipalities again. Therefore, the 1996 election data are the first offering reliable municipality territorial status information. Second, the 1946 election is an exceptional case in that the deportation of Germans was in full swing, Czech parties competed on an anti-German platform, and Germans including anti-fascists were not eligible to vote. All of the estimated Czechoslovak elections coefficients were statistically insignificant.

structures where anti-fascist Germans stayed in larger numbers after 1945 thanks to the presence of the US Army.

We conclude that vote share effects for the Communist party are persistent and robust, and that they are related to the activity of local party structures. The presence of US troops does not *per se* increase far-left votes—we find no effects at the demarcation line in the Czech main lands. A prime explanation for the pattern of our findings is that the staying anti-fascist Germans transmitted their political identity across three generations. We discuss evidence supporting this hypothesis in Section 6, which is devoted to exploring possible mechanisms underpinning our main findings. At the end of Section 6 we also return to the issue of the overall magnitude and interpretation of the estimated vote share effects. But first, in the next section we extend our analysis beyond voting behavior as we study political values and party membership on either side of the demarcation line.

### 5.3 Communist party membership and political values

Given the absence of free elections during the Communist regime, our main analysis studies election outcomes after the Velvet Revolution. However, household surveys allow us to study also the Communist era before 1989. Specifically, we employ waves II (2010) and III (2016) of the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), which asks respondents in Eastern and Central Europe about their values and attitudes. Importantly for our analysis, respondents were also asked about their membership in the Communist party before 1989. Both waves include information on the location of the respondents, which enables us to geocode the data. However, the municipality-clustered sampling of respondents limits the extent of variation in the distance to the demarcation line. We therefore use a simplified RD approach. Instead of controlling for an RD polynomial, we control for latitude and longitude and again manually limit observations to a bandwidth of 25 kilometers around the demarcation line.<sup>34</sup> Of the 2,500 observations for the entire Czech Republic, we use 126 observations in *Sudetenland* and 197 in the Czech main lands. We control for age and

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<sup>34</sup>Again, we use only observations north of the municipality of Žernovice.

gender of the respondents, and for survey years, and compare conditional outcome means across the line in probit and ordered probit specifications.

Table 3 shows the LITS results for *Sudetenland* in column (1) and for the Czech main lands in column (2). Respondents or their relatives living on the formerly US side of the line in *Sudetenland* were statistically significantly more likely to be members of the Communist party prior to 1989.<sup>35</sup> During the Communist regime, party membership did not always imply full conviction. Mareš (2008) reports that ordinary Communist party members often joined the party for career rather than ideological reasons. However, our results imply not only higher Communist party membership on the US side of the demarcation line, but also stronger left-wing values. Respondents in US-liberated regions of *Sudetenland* are significantly more likely to be in favor of redistribution in order to close the gap between the rich and the poor, prefer planned economies over markets, and accept authoritarianism replacing democracy.<sup>36</sup> By contrast, we find no effects of the demarcation line within the Czech main lands on any of the LITS outcomes in line with our main findings, see column (2).<sup>37</sup> Again, the absence of any effects across the line outside of *Sudetenland* is consistent with the *Sudetenland* effects being driven by the difference in expulsion policies and the presence of anti-fascist German stayers. In sum, survey-data evidence on party membership and values are fully in line with our baseline Communist-party vote share estimates.

[Table 3 about here]

## 5.4 Social policies

Locally embedded left-wing values and preferences are likely to give rise to stronger social and redistribution-related policies. To study the issue, we collected data on local public infrastructure in Czech municipalities. We consider the presence of health facilities and kindergartens as a signal of stronger social policies, while water mains and schools are

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<sup>35</sup>Present-day party membership is not available in the LITS data.

<sup>36</sup>We have also tested for differences in trust towards institutions and groups. Table A9 in the Online Appendix reveals hardly any statistically significant effects. Trust towards the government and foreigners tends to be lower on the US side of the demarcation line in *Sudetenland*.

<sup>37</sup>The exception is a somewhat higher probability to prefer authoritarianism, statistically significant at the 10% level ( $p=0.08$ ).

somewhat less likely to be associated with a left-wing agenda. On average, only one of two Czech municipalities provides a health facility or a kindergarten. We use a dummy variable indicating the presence of a given type of public infrastructure and again apply our preferred local-linear RD approach. Table 4 shows the results. We find a large and statistically significant positive increase in the presence of local health facilities and kindergartens in US-liberated regions where anti-fascist Germans stayed in *Sudetenland*. Again, the estimated effects are smaller and at best marginally statistically significant in the Czech main lands. We find no effects on the presence of water mains or schools. Overall, these findings suggest that the legacy of US Army liberation manifests itself not only in stronger left-leaning political values but also in real-world outcomes in more redistribution policies.

[Table 4 about here]

## 6 Mechanisms

More Germans, anti-fascists in particular, stayed in post-war *Sudetenland* on the US side of the demarcation line (Section 2.3). The US side also features stronger Communist vote shares (Section 5.1), far-left political values (Section 5.3), and social policies (Section 5.4). And these effects are conditional on the presence of German stayers as we consistently find no effects in the Czech main lands. This suggests that these effects operate through anti-fascist German stayers. In this section, we present additional evidence supporting the importance of this channel and discuss its magnitude. We also explore four other potential mechanisms that may explain differences at the demarcation line in Communist vote shares today. We find that the legacy of anti-fascist Germans is the only compelling channel through which the events of 1945 impact far-left attitudes in the present-day Czech Republic.



## 6.1 Germans

To provide further evidence on the importance of the German-stayer channel for the Communist vote-share effects, one would ideally study family backgrounds and social linkages of Communist voters. Although such information is not available, we can check for the presence of descendants of German stayers among Communist-party candidates running for municipality-council seats. Standing in local elections indicates a strong party affiliation; Communist candidates can be considered leading local far-left politicians. Candidates are not asked to disclose their ethnicity, but we can rely on a unique feature of non-anonymized election data: family names of candidates. Germanic and Slavic languages (German and Czech in our case) are highly distinguishable in terms of family names. Further, in the Czech context, German surnames, which indicate German ancestry, were not dropped with German ethnic identity (Beneš, 1998).<sup>38</sup> We thus collect surnames, residence, and party affiliation of all 1.3 million candidates standing in Czech local elections between 1994 and 2018. We then consult the family history research website *Forebears.io* to identify German names among candidates. Names most frequent to Germany and Austria are coded as German.<sup>39</sup> Quality checks confirm that this simple algorithm correctly classifies 9 in 10 names, with no accuracy gap between Communist and other candidates.<sup>40</sup> A total of 16% of all candidate names in our sample are found to be of German origin. We distinguish Communist-party candidates from those of all other parties.

There were more anti-fascist German stayers on the US side of the demarcation line in post-war *Sudetenland*. If they and their offspring were not disproportionately geographically mobile, and if far-left values were transferred across generations within their families,

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<sup>38</sup>Some of the German names on local-election candidate lists likely correspond to Czech post-war settlers of *Sudetenland* who also have German ancestors, but whose German identity had been abandoned long before World War Two. Given the evenly structured resettlement populations at the demarcation line (documented in Section 6.3), however, it is plausible that there is no discontinuity at the line in the share of Czech settlers with German family names.

<sup>39</sup>The spelling of some German names changed. For example, *Fischer* often became the homophonous *Fišer*. We account for such changes and use both the ‘Czechified’ surname and its German version. Names are classified as German if either the original or its homophonous match appears in the *Forebears.io* list.

<sup>40</sup>Typical German names are *Schneider*, *Meier* or *Süßner*; Czech names are, for example, *Novák*, *Svoboda*, or *Černý*. The Online Appendix provides details of the coding procedure. Four Czech- and German-speaking research assistants independently double-checked the outcomes for a subsample of around 780,000 names, i.e., more than half of our candidate data-set. In 87.8% of all candidates and in 86.7% of Communist candidates, the majority of research assistants confirmed the coding of our algorithm.

one would expect a higher share of German surnames on Communist-party slates in the US-liberated municipalities. We therefore apply our local-linear RD procedure to test whether the frequency of German names differs across the demarcation line. Column (1) of Table 5 presents evidence, which is fully in line with our hypothesis. The share of German names among Communist party candidates is around 15% higher where US troops were located in 1945, compared to adjacent Red Army-liberated municipalities (within the set of municipalities where the Communist party ran in local elections). This difference across the line is unique to the Communist party. German names on candidate lists of all other parties (irrespective of whether they ran in municipalities with or without a Communist party cell) are equally distributed across the former demarcation line, see column (2). Again, we find no effects of the demarcation line in the Czech main lands (columns (3) and (4)). We present results based on the most recent 2018 local elections to avoid inflating our data-set (many candidates run in more than one election), but all results hold when we pool all elections between 1994 and 2018.

[Table 5 about here]

We conclude that the different expulsion policies across the demarcation line are a prime channel to explain why we observe stronger Communist voting preferences, party cell presence, and left-wing values and policies where more left-leaning Germans stayed after the presence of the US Army. While we fall short of providing direct evidence on inter-generational transmission of political values,<sup>41</sup> our findings are strongly consistent with German stayers inculcating their political values in their offspring. It is also plausible that anti-fascist Germans were able to spread their values within the newly re-settled communities after ethnic cleansing was over. We return to the issue of spillovers within the discussion of the magnitude of the estimated effects in Section 7.2.

## 6.2 Ethnic legacy

One may argue that our results are driven by the *German* and not by the *anti-fascist* identity of anti-fascist German stayers. In this section, we ask whether the political

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<sup>41</sup>Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides suggestive evidence for Communist county-level party leaders in 1959.

legacy of the demarcation line that we have uncovered corresponds to an expression of ethnic identity. German ethnic identity was systematically suppressed in post-war Czechoslovakia, where staying Germans experienced various types of discrimination. They were not allowed to practise their language and were initially subject to movement and inter-ethnicity marriage restrictions. At the aggregate level, homogenization policies during the Communist era resulted in low levels of self-reported German identity today (see Section 2.3). The share of German names in the Czech Republic is considerably above its share of citizens self-declaring German ethnicity. Perhaps families of German stayers kept their German name but discarded their German past. This would be consistent with a literature suggesting that integration decisions by minorities respond to incentives (Algan et al., 2020; Fouka, 2019; Atkin et al., 2020). On the other hand, there are also studies of assimilation policies suggesting that in the face of discrimination, immigrants may invest less in assimilation and retreat into their ethnic enclaves.<sup>42</sup> Ethnic polarization can in turn spur conflict, political polarization, and segregated voting (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Segura and Fraga, 2008).

We do not observe variation in the extent of German ethnicity assimilation or suppression across the demarcation line, but we know that there were more Germans stayers on the US side and that the anti-fascist German stayers were more easily integrated into the post-war Czech Communist regime.<sup>43</sup> Fouka (2019) suggests that initially more integrated minority sub-groups assimilate faster when exposed to a wave of discrimination. More generally, outcomes of forced assimilation interact with the size of the minority community in models of cultural transmission (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Our research design based on the quasi-random location of the demarcation line allows us to ask whether assimilation outcomes vary by the size of the German stayer community, where a larger community corresponds to higher ex ante integration potential. However, in Table 6, we find no discontinuity in self-declared German ethnicity across the demarcation line today, despite the differing initial share of German (anti-fascist) stayers after World War Two. One possible explanation is that the Communist take-over in 1948 facilitated the

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<sup>42</sup>For example, Fouka (2020) finds that language restrictions at school directed at second-generation German Americans strengthened their sense of ethnic identity.

<sup>43</sup>Section 2.4 discusses the cases of German Communist MPs in the Czechoslovakian parliament.

expression of far-left political values, such that political identity (through all stages of inter-generational transmission) may have fully supplanted ethnic identity for the group of anti-fascist Germans. Our research design provides no information on the ethnic identity cultivation among staying German industrial workers as there was no discontinuity in their presence across the demarcation line (Figure 3).

[Table 6 about here]

### 6.3 Resettlement by Czechs

Selective re-settlement of *Sudetenland* on either side of the demarcation line provides another plausible explanation for our main findings. Were settlers more likely to be Communists on the US side of the line? Most of the resettlement process was centrally organized by the Czech government and the Czech Communist party, and it is not clear why the party would aim to strengthen the share of Communists in areas that already had a higher share of anti-fascists. If anything, an ex ante plausible settler selection strategy would operate against our findings. However, several pieces of evidence suggest that the resettlement process was evenly structured across the demarcation line, and thus speak against the selective re-settlement hypothesis. First, the resettlement process did not result in differently sized populations on either side of the line, and it distributed re-settler nationalities evenly as well. Resettlement quotas were applied to level out any initial local population differences.<sup>44</sup> This is confirmed in Table A2 in the Online Appendix, which shows no long-run population effects of the demarcation line. Further, in Table 6, we do not observe any significant discontinuity in self-declared ethnicity of re-settlers. Second, and most importantly, we do not find that Czech settlers in US-liberated regions were more likely to come from pre-war Communist ‘hotspots’ within the Czech main lands. We combine information on the origin of the new settlers from 1947 county-level migration matrices with pre-war voting results from 1935 to uncover equal pre-war Communist

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<sup>44</sup>The government aimed at a minimum of 75% of the pre-war population. See, Wiedemann (2016).

support for re-settler sending areas on either side of the line.<sup>45</sup> We conclude that settlers to *Sudetenland* are unlikely to drive the results.

## 6.4 Industrial structure

*Sudeten* Germans were well known for their crafts and industrial production (Semrad, 2015). The German displacement after World War Two thus could have led to substantial economic consequences, as not all specialized pre-war jobs could easily be filled by Czech workers. A stronger decline of formerly German-staffed industries on the Red Army side of the line, where fewer Germans were allowed to stay, could have lowered the attraction of Communist ideas. However, the share of stayers who are designated as industrial workers is equal across the demarcation line where we can measure it (Figure 3). Further, there is no evidence that labor shortages affected industrial structures differently across the line. Table A10 in the Online Appendix shows no significant discontinuity in sectoral employment shares as of 1950 based on applying our RD strategy to census data. Long-run population and housing figures also do not diverge between the US and Red Army-liberated regions, as shown in Table A2. Bombings during the war, and hence, presumably, industrial destruction, also did not differ across the demarcation line (Table 1). Altogether, we see little reason to believe that changes in the structure of the economy drive our main results.

## 6.5 Memories of war and liberation

Thus far, our analyses of population, industry-structure, ethnicity, and political identity have not uncovered significant differences across the demarcation line within Czechoslovakia, with the exception of political identity discontinuities within *Sudetenland*. We focused on the presence of anti-fascist German stayers in *Sudetenland*, but local memories of violent acts of liberating troops against civilians are also likely to be limited to the historically German-settled regions. In particular, anecdotal evidence suggests that Red Army rapes and shootings were less extensive when liberating Slavic populations (Řeháček,

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<sup>45</sup>See, Online Appendix B for data sources. The county average vote share for the Communist party in the 1935 national elections (weighted by the number of settlers entering *Sudetenland*) was about 11% for both the origins of settlers on the US side and the origins of settlers on the Red Army side.

2011; Glassheim, 2016), suggesting limited differences in negative memories across the demarcation line within the Czech main lands. In *Sudetenland*, by contrast, many sources report that the liberating US Army forces treated Germans much less violently than Red Army forces did (Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1957). Extensive Red Army violence towards Germans may have depressed the attraction of Communism among German stayers, and this could contribute towards the voting and values pattern we uncover.<sup>46</sup> To shed more light on the issue, we employ the LITS micro-data previously used in Table 3. The survey includes questions about violence during World War Two. Table A11 in the Online Appendix does not show any significant differences in war violence memories across the demarcation line.<sup>47</sup>

This evidence is limited by the small share of the German stayers in the population and the size of the LITS survey. We therefore additionally investigate collective memories. Liberation experiences may manifest in the presence of memorials, which are frequent all over Europe. We were able to collect data on local memorials commemorating World War Two, the liberating forces specifically, but also those related to the German history for the sub-sample of municipalities along the northern half of the *Sudetenland* demarcation line depicted in Figure 2. We employ the same strategy as for the LITS survey and compare mean differences within a 25 kilometer bandwidth on both sides of the demarcation line. Estimates listed in Table A12 in the Online Appendix show no statistically significant discontinuities in the presence of any of the memorial types we analyze.

Finally, the memories of the Allied forces could also have been shaped by Communist propaganda in the 1950s and 1960s, which could downplay the role of US troops in 1945 or demonize them.<sup>48</sup> It is not clear how such propaganda interacts with direct experiences of the liberating forces. Anecdotal evidence from the Czech main lands suggests the local population still remembers US forces fondly (see, for example, Mišterová, 2013).<sup>49</sup> However,

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<sup>46</sup>A growing literature (e.g., Fontana et al., 2017) implies that traumatic war events can have long-term effects on political identity. Furthermore, Ochsner (2017) shows that long-forgotten local historical events can be reactivated to affect voting preferences.

<sup>47</sup>Bombings during the war also do not vary across the line (Table 1).

<sup>48</sup>One famous example is the anti-US propaganda by Bartošek and Pichlík (1951). Some brochures and books show US soldiers aiming to shoot at Czech girls.

<sup>49</sup>For example, since 1990 the city of Plzeň (Pilsen), located just south of the demarcation line, celebrates an annual festival commemorating the liberation by the US Army.

if the memories of the US forces are fonder than those of the Red Army, or if anti-US propaganda back-fired in the former US zone, one may expect lower rather than higher Communist vote shares in US-liberated municipalities. Altogether, we find no evidence suggesting that different memories of the US or Red Army troops help explain our results.

## 6.6 Mobility

Selective mobility out of *Sudetenland* after the end of displacement may also be related to the (size of the) effects we uncover. We have already discussed the issue of selective re-settlement. For instance, if more fanatic Communists among the anti-fascist stayers move out of their ancestral homes, they may take their radical values to new places in Czechoslovakia (Ochsner and Roesel, 2020), which would imply our baseline estimates correspond to fewer stayers than we assume. Generally, the more mobility in and out of *Sudetenland*, the more dilution of political identity one might expect. However, our combined evidence on German names among local Communist leaders in 1959 (Table A1), on Communist party membership before 1989 (Table 3), and on the stable discontinuities across the demarcation line in the Communist vote share spanning almost two decades of Czech democratic elections (Table A6) suggest a continuous presence of German-ancestry Communist affiliation in the US-liberated regions, from post-war times to the Communist era, stretching to both the early 1990s after the Velvet Revolution and the present day. Finally, Table A13 in the Online Appendix corroborates the notion that mobility did not systematically vary across the former demarcation line. About 40% of *Sudetenland* residents as of 2001 are born in their residence municipality; the corresponding share is 10% for those born before 1945. Again, RD estimates do not show any significant difference between US and Red Army liberated regions.<sup>50</sup> In sum, we do not find evidence that effects fade or that migration differed across the demarcation line.

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<sup>50</sup>The share of residents born prior to the war is about 2 percentage points higher on the US side in line with our historical evidence on German stayers.

## 7 Discussion

The evidence on mechanisms presented above implies that anti-fascist German stayers are a prime channel behind our baseline causal effects. To complete the interpretation of our main findings, we now discuss whether our local RD estimates speak to broader tendencies in post-war Czechoslovakia, and we ask whether our findings suggest that anti-fascist German stayers had a significant spillover effect in their newly re-settled local communities, beyond transmitting their values to their offspring.

### 7.1 Cross-sectional evidence

Our baseline estimates of the effect of staying anti-fascist Germans on present-day Communist vote shares are based on a well-defined identification strategy. However, as a consequence of the RD design we use, they correspond to local comparisons, which raises the question of whether they can be generalized. To provide a tentative insight into this issue, we present two pieces of descriptive cross-sectional evidence on the long-run relationship between the presence of staying German anti-fascists and election outcomes, one based on the entire Czech Republic, the other based on the entire *Sudetenland*.

We regress regional Communist party vote shares today on the corresponding population shares of staying anti-fascist Germans.<sup>51</sup> The most granular country-wide data on anti-fascist German stayers as of late 1946 covers 13 Czech regions. We also form estimates of staying anti-fascists for 67 *Sudetenland* counties; county-level data is not available for the Czech main lands.<sup>52</sup> This allows us to estimate cross-sectional least-squares specifications of the following form:

$$Communist_i = \alpha + \beta AntiFascist_i + \gamma Industry_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (2)$$

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<sup>51</sup>We use the same definition for anti-fascists as in Figure 3.

<sup>52</sup>Anti-fascist stayer population shares at the regional level are based on Luža (1964). The German stayer data sources at the county level do not distinguish between indispensable industrial workers and anti-fascists. We therefore proxy the anti-fascist county shares as residuals from a regression of the population share of all staying Germans from Urban (1964) on the employment share of industry in 1930; these residuals correspond to the part of the variation in staying Germans unexplained by industry, and hence should reflect the share of anti-fascist stayers.



where  $Communist_i$  is the vote share of the Communist party (KSČM) in 2017 in region or county  $i$ .  $Antifascist_i$  is the corresponding population share of anti-fascist Germans, either directly measured or estimated. Finally,  $Industry_i$  is the employment share in the industrial sector in 1930, which is related to Germans staying as specialized industrial workers. The coefficient  $\beta$  captures the cross-area relationship between the presence of anti-fascist German stayers and today’s Communist vote shares, controlling for the post-war industrial structure.

[Table 7 about here]

The estimates presented in Table 7 are in line with our baseline local causal estimates in that they confirm a positive relationship between staying anti-fascist Germans and Communist vote shares today. There are, of course, two major potential issues with the specifications corresponding to Equation 2. First, regional regressions are based on a small number of observations, and county-level regressions are affected by measurement error concerns. Thus, it is not surprising that estimates in column (3) differ from those in column (1). Second, and more importantly, the presence of non-displaced anti-fascist Germans may be endogenous with respect to permanent differences in local Communist voting preferences—for example, strong Czech Communist elites might have been better able to protect their ethnic German party fellows. Notwithstanding these reservations, the magnitude of the nation-wide cross-sectional relationship in column (1) is significant as it implies that a 1% increase in the population share of anti-fascist German stayers after the war comes with a 0.5% increase in today’s Communist vote share. The results in column (3) are qualitatively similar, but not quantitatively comparable due to the approximation procedure and the presence of measurement error.<sup>53</sup>

## 7.2 Multiplier effect

The final step of our analysis is to consider whether left-leaning German stayers had a significant multiplier (spillover) effect, as reflected in today’s election outcomes, on their newly re-settled local communities. We thus ask whether the effects we estimate can be

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<sup>53</sup>The standardized beta coefficients for the population share of anti-fascist Germans are 0.6 in column (1) and 0.2 in column (3).

reasonably explained by the offspring of stayers (inter-generational transmission of values) alone, or whether they require spillovers of values into the non-stayer population.

Approaching this issue requires several simplifying assumptions. We assume no mobility differences and no differences in inter-ethnic marriages and in fertility of post-war anti-fascist stayers relative to their newly settled neighbours and their offspring. Table 8 provides two back-of-the-envelope calculations of such simplified multipliers based on our regression results; it relates counts of anti-fascists to counts of Communist votes. Column (1) relies on the cross-sectional nation-wide relationship presented in Table 7, where we find that a one percentage point increase share of anti-fascist German stayers relative to the 2017 population across 13 regions of the Czech Republic corresponds to a 0.5 percentage point increase in the 2017 Communist vote share (line (a) in Table 8). However, only around one of two residents of the Czech Republic turned out to vote in 2017. We assume uniform turnout rates (Table A6 shows no discontinuity in voter turnout across the demarcation line) and translate the population share-vote share coefficient from Table 7 into a stayer count-vote count multiplier by dividing the coefficient with the vote turnout rate. This gives a multiplier of about 0.3 (line (j)), which says that ten anti-fascist German stayers in 1946 come with approximately three Communist votes in the 2017 election. Given the total count of anti-fascist German stayers reported by Luža (1964), this would imply that some 6 to 7% of the 2017 Czech Communist votes had these German specific roots.<sup>54</sup>

[Table 8 about here]

Our second back-of-the-envelope calculation is based on our causal RD estimates; it confirms the tentative magnitude of the cross-sectional multiplier. In column (2), we refer to the sub-sample of municipalities along the northern half of the *Sudetenland* demarcation line, for which we observe the number of anti-fascist German stayers in local archives. A total of 43,406 Germans lived in these US-liberated municipalities as of 1930 (line (d)). Figure 3 focuses on these municipalities and shows a surplus of anti-fascist German stayers across the demarcation line of 2.8% in terms of the 1930 population (line (e)); this implies

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<sup>54</sup>In total, 393,100 votes were cast for the Communist party in 2017; the number of post-war anti-fascist Germans is reported at 104,880 (anti-fascists, provisional citizenship/‘special treatment’ and Germans subject to potential future transfer).

1,215 additional anti-fascist German stayers who were able to stay thanks to the presence of the US Army (f). Within this sample of municipalities, a total of 7,290 valid votes were cast in the 2017 Czech national election (g). We know from our RD estimates in Table 2 that Communist vote shares increase by about 8 percentage points of valid votes at the demarcation line (h). Thus, the US liberation comes with some 576 additional Communist votes (i). When we relate the absolute number of ‘excess’ anti-fascist Germans to ‘excess’ Communist votes, we derive a multiplier of 0.47 (j), which again implies that ten staying anti-fascist Germans in 1946 come with four to five Communist votes in 2017.

These are sizeable effects, but they do not necessitate that German stayers were able to spread their values among their new neighbours as these effects are consistent with the post-war political value structure of the population being preserved through the generations until today. This could be achieved by full transmission of values within the families of stayers or by a combination of imperfect within-family transmission and oblique society-wide transmission. Given that at least three generations bridge the seven decades between treatment and effect, including five decades of the Communist regime and two decades of transition to democracy, we find the preservation of these far-left values strongly supportive of the notion that extremism has historical origins that often begin with a ‘small seed’ of political development (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020).

## 8 Conclusion

We provide the first causal evidence on the long-term impacts of stayers exempted from ethnic cleansing. Three million *Sudeten* Germans were expelled from the Czech borderlands after World War Two. However, some 200,000 Germans were allowed to stay, many of whom because they were liberated by the US Army and not by the Red Army. We trace the legacy of anti-fascist Germans in post-war Czechoslovakia to provide novel evidence on stayers exempted from ethnic cleansing. We use quasi-experimental variation and find a substantial and lasting political-value footprint of this left-leaning minority in today’s Czech Republic. Communist vote shares, active Communist party cells, far-left values, and social policies are more pronounced in *Sudetenland* today where more anti-fascist Germans

stayed after the war. Our evidence on mechanisms, through which far-left political values take hold in local re-settled communities, extends the literature documenting long-lasting Communist preferences (see Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020, for a survey).

Our evidence implies that a small number of stayers exempt from forced migration, even Germans in a Slavic country following World War Two atrocities, are able to affect political landscapes in newly formed societies after ethnic cleansing. The effects we measure go beyond the Communist regime where state ideology was aligned with the far-left values of German anti-fascists. They imply strong persistence based on within-family inter-generational transmission of far-left values among the anti-fascist German stayers, and they do not rule out spillovers from anti-fascist stayers to their new re-settled neighbors. Our finding that stayers who avoid forced displacement can have long-lasting effects on the political values and voting behavior of newly settled populations complements the literature suggesting that immigrant political values act similarly upon native populations thanks to cultural transmission (e.g., Dippel and Heblich, 2020; Ochsner and Roesel, 2020; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020). Our findings thus provide new support for the ‘small seed’ theory of political development.

More broadly, our results have implications for the literature on the inter-generational transmission of political and ethnic identity. Evidence that ethnic-identity choices respond to incentives is well-established (e.g., Algan et al., 2020; Fouka, 2019; Atkin et al., 2020). In our case, however, German stayers had two identities: an ethnic and a political one. We find more active Communists today with German family roots where more anti-fascists avoided displacement but underwent a similar extent of ethnic assimilation. Among anti-fascist Germans, political identity may have supplanted the suppressed ethnic identity and persisted when ethnic roots were no longer salient.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Declining German identity of distinguished anti-fascists is in line with theoretical models which predict well-connected representatives of a minority to assimilate faster to the major culture (Verdier and Zenou, 2017). Future research can investigate how assimilation policies affect the joint identity choice across ethnic and political dimensions. Such choices are made within the interaction between stayers and re-settlers of ethnically cleansed areas as well as between migrants and their host societies. Abdelgadir and Fouka (2020) explore the effect of suppression of immigrant religious expression on both their nationality and religious identity.

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
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Figure 1: Line of contact in the final days of World War Two in Europe (May 1945)




*Notes:* The red line is the line of contact where the Western Allies (mainly British and US forces) and the Red Army met in May 1945. The gray lines correspond to national boundaries as of 1930. The gray shaded area in Czechoslovakia represents *Sudetenland*—a region settled by around three million Germans, which was annexed by Nazi Germany in October 1938. The US-liberated part of *Sudetenland* is in dark gray, the Red Army-liberated part in light gray.

Figure 2: Germans in US- and Red Army-liberated regions (in % of 1930 population)



*Notes:* The graph on the left compares the share of staying Germans in % of the 1930 population in the US and Red Army-liberated counties corresponding to the northern half of the *Sudetenland* demarcation line. The corresponding map on the right shows the primarily US-liberated counties in dark gray, while the Red Army-liberated counties are in light gray. The 1947 counties of Aš, Cheb, Kraslice, Loket, Sokolov, and Vildštejn sum up to the US region, the Red Army-liberated region is the sum of the counties of Horní Blatná, Jáchymov, Karlovy Vary and Nejdek. The red line in the map represents the demarcation line between US and Red Army forces between May 1945 and December 1945. The first two dashed vertical lines in the graph bracket the period from the annexation of *Sudetenland* by Nazi Germany in October 1938 to Germany's surrender in May 1945. The second set of vertical lines corresponds to the presence of US forces in western Czechoslovakia (April/May 1945 to December 1945) and 'wild expulsions' in Red Army-liberated *Sudetenland*. The period of organized mass displacement of Germans from *Sudetenland* (February to October 1946) corresponds to the third bracketed period. For sources, see Section B.2 in the Online Appendix.

Figure 3: Staying Germans after expulsions by entitlement (in % of 1930 population)



*Notes:* The figure shows how the staying German population in neighboring US- and Red Army-liberated regions of *Sudetenland* after the end of organized mass transports in late 1946 (in % of 1930 population) breaks down into different legal entitlements. Data were hand collected from local archives in Karlovy Vary and Sokolov. The sample consists of 76 municipalities (US Army: 22, Red Army: 54) in the counties of Karlovy Vary, Kraslice and Locket. Industrial workers also include the few Germans exempt from displacement based on Jewish origin, high age, and mixed marriage. The anti-fascist group includes certified anti-fascists and Germans subject to potential future deportation, who are likely to be anti-fascists as of late 1946).

Table 1: Balancing of pre-displacement covariates at the US–Red Army demarcation line

	<i>Sudetenland</i>	Czech main lands	Full line
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Census 1930</i>			
Population (log)	0.103 (0.488)	0.090 (0.302)	-0.108 (0.232)
Population growth 1921–1930	-0.578 (0.744)	0.328 (0.446)	-0.034 (0.301)
Population density	-0.632 (0.679)	0.217 (0.237)	-0.061 (0.189)
Czechs %	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.091 (0.098)
Germans %	0.024 (0.028)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.093 (0.099)
Foreigners %	0.006 (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Catholics %	0.041 (0.056)	0.012 (0.071)	-0.011 (0.065)
Protestants %	0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.024)	0.011 (0.020)
<i>Geography</i>			
Distance to external border	10.875* (5.988)	0.647 (3.614)	3.269 (4.069)
Minimum altitude	21.250 (54.231)	3.557 (21.589)	-2.342 (19.238)
Mean altitude	30.543 (74.391)	-7.369 (22.633)	-18.155 (27.966)
Maximum altitude	-3.943 (86.227)	-24.277 (27.527)	-43.275 (35.966)
Slope (altitude range)	-35.325 (55.221)	-22.746 (18.360)	-33.913 (22.596)
<i>Military events</i>			
War bombings	0.061 (0.046)	0.051 (0.073)	0.047 (0.059)
Controls	No	No	No
Max. bandwidth	28.412	14.839	20.393
Max. obs.	211	347	624

*Notes:* The table shows the effect for US-liberated regions (RD estimates) at the demarcation line between US- and Red Army-liberated regions in 1945 Czechoslovakia. We use a local-linear RD procedure including a data-driven optimal bandwidth choice (Calonico et al., 2017). The unit of observation are municipalities, the dependent variables are pre-war characteristics (1930 census), geographical characteristics, and military operations during World War Two. Column (1) shows estimates for *Sudetenland*, i.e., for the regions historically settled by ethnic Germans, column (2) refers to the Czech main lands, while column (3) pools both parts of Czechoslovakia. We exclude municipalities south of Žernovice, where ethnic divides corresponded with the demarcation line. Population growth 1921–1930 refers to the average annual growth rate. Significance levels (robust RD standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.



Table 2: Communist votes in national election

	Communist vote share 2017					
	<i>Sudetenland</i>			Czech main lands		
	Para-metr. RD	Para-metr. RD	Local-lin. RD	Para-metr. RD	Para-metr. RD	Local-lin. RD
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
US zone 1945	0.094*** (0.026)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.026)	0.002 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.004 (0.017)
Geography controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Population controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Mean dep. var.	0.107	0.108	0.107	0.107	0.107	0.105
RD bandwidth	25.000	25.000	17.739	25.000	25.000	13.346
Eff. obs.	186	185	125	572	572	313
$R^2$	0.798	0.832	–	0.800	0.814	–

*Notes:* The table shows the effect for US-liberated regions (RD estimates) at the demarcation line between US- and Red Army-liberated regions in 1945 Czechoslovakia based on a parametric (quadratic-interacted) polynomial approach without/with control variables (columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), bandwidth: 25 km) and a local-linear RD specification including a data-driven optimal bandwidth choice (Calonico et al., 2017). The units of observation are municipalities, the dependent variable is the vote share of the Communist party (KSČM) in the 2017 Czech national elections. Columns (1) to (3) show estimates for regions originally settled by ethnic Germans (*Sudetenland*), columns (4) to (6) refer to the Czech main lands. We exclude municipalities south of Žernovice, where ethnicity divides corresponded with the demarcation line. Geography controls are the distance to the external (German) border, distance to the nearest main road, distance to the nearest railway line, mean altitude and slope (difference between maximum and minimum altitude). Population controls are logged population in 1930 and logged present-day population. Significance levels (Conley (2010) standard errors/robust RD standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.

Table 3: Communist party membership and values (LITS micro data)

	<i>Sudetenland</i>	Czech main lands
	(1)	(2)
<i>Were you or any member of your family a member of the Communist Party prior to 1989?</i>		
Respondent, parents or other family member	0.690** (0.288)	-0.045 (0.098)
<i>Economic values</i>		
Gap between rich and poor should be reduced	1.712** (0.694)	-0.020 (0.193)
<i>Preferred economic system</i>		
Market economy	-0.958*** (0.277)	-0.015 (0.101)
Sometimes planned economies	0.870*** (0.330)	0.013 (0.074)
Does not matter	0.251 (0.326)	0.015 (0.097)
<i>Preferred government system</i>		
Democracy	-0.728** (0.284)	-0.002 (0.097)
Sometimes authoritarianism	0.479 (0.309)	0.137* (0.078)
Does not matter	0.265 (0.271)	-0.148 (0.092)
Geography controls	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographic controls	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Bandwidth	25.000	25.000
Max. obs.	126	197

*Notes:* The table shows the marginal effects for US-liberated regions from probit specifications estimated at the demarcation line between US- and Red Army-liberated regions in 1945 Czechoslovakia (Exception: Gap between rich and poor should be reduced: ordered probit, table shows the estimated coefficient). The units of observation are individual respondents in the Life in Transition Survey, the dependent variables are answers to survey questions. We pool survey II (2010) and III (2016) and include year fixed effects. Geography controls are longitude and latitude of the respondent. Socio-demographic controls are age and gender. We impose a 25 km bandwidth around the demarcation line. Column (1) shows estimates for regions originally settled by ethnic Germans (*Sudetenland*), column (2) refers to the Czech main lands. We exclude residents from municipalities south of Žernovice, where ethnic divides corresponded with the demarcation line. Significance levels (robust standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.

Table 4: Presence of public infrastructure

	Infrastructure (yes = 1)							
	<i>Sudetenland</i>				Czech main lands			
	Health facility	Kinder-garten	Water main	School	Health facility	Kinder-garten	Water main	School
US zone 1945	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	0.516** (0.246)	0.596** (0.271)	0.027 (0.185)	0.118 (0.224)	0.312* (0.169)	0.104 (0.168)	-0.089 (0.148)	0.068 (0.104)
Geography controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Population controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mean dep. var.	0.418	0.488	0.863	0.265	0.225	0.334	0.714	0.119
RD bandwidth	21.370	18.013	24.695	19.117	10.650	14.200	13.080	13.638
Eff. obs.	158	127	183	136	267	338	308	319

*Notes:* The table shows the effects for US-liberated regions (RD estimates) at the demarcation line between US- and Red Army-liberated regions in 1945 Czechoslovakia. We use a local-linear RD procedure with a data-driven optimal bandwidth choice (Calonico et al., 2017). The units of observation are municipalities, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a given type of local public infrastructure. Health facilities and schools measured as of 2016, kindergartens as of 2017, and water mains as of 2018. Columns (1) to (4) show estimates for regions originally settled by ethnic Germans (*Sudetenland*), columns (5) to (8) refer to the Czech main lands. We exclude municipalities south of Žernovice, where ethnic divides corresponded with the demarcation line. Significance levels (robust RD standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.

Table 5: German names in local elections

	% German candidate names 2018			
	<i>Sudetenland</i>		Czech main lands	
	Communist party	Other parties	Communist party	Other parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
US zone 1945	0.152** (0.077)	0.024 (0.077)	-0.114 (0.126)	-0.002 (0.036)
Mean dep. var.	0.158	0.155	0.160	0.168
RD bandwidth	27.400	14.691	19.271	17.152
Eff. obs.	49	95	43	400

*Notes:* The table shows the effect for US-liberated regions (RD estimates) at the demarcation line between US- and Red Army-liberated regions in 1945 Czechoslovakia. We use a local-linear RD procedure with a data-driven optimal bandwidth choice (Calonico et al., 2017). The units of observation are municipalities, the dependent variable is share of German names on candidate lists in the 2018 local elections. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates for regions originally settled by ethnic Germans (*Sudetenland*), columns (3) and (4) refers to the Czech main lands. We exclude municipalities south of Žernovice, where ethnic divides corresponded with the demarcation line. Significance levels (robust RD standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.

Table 6: Ethnicity in the 2001 census

	Population share declaring an ethnicity			
	German	Czech	Moravian	Slovak
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
US zone 1945	-0.022 (0.027)	0.003 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.024 (0.021)
Mean of dep. var.	0.032	0.886	0.001	0.042
RD bandwidth	21.597	19.806	21.93	15.01
Eff. obs.	160	143	160	99

*Notes:* The table shows RD estimates at the demarcation line between US- and Red Army-liberated regions in 1945 Czechoslovakia. We use a local-linear RD procedure with a data-driven optimal bandwidth choice (Calonico et al., 2017). The units of observation are municipalities, the dependent variables are the population shares self-declaring a given ethnicity in the 2001 Czech census. We present evidence for regions historically settled by ethnic Germans (*Sudetenland*). We exclude municipalities south of Žernovice, where ethnic divides corresponded with the demarcation line. Significance levels (robust RD standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.

Table 7: Anti-fascist Germans and Communist vote shares: Cross-sectional evidence

	Czech Republic (13 regions)	<i>Sudetenland</i> (67 counties)	
	Communist vote share 2017	Germans %	Communist vote share 2017
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-fascist Germans %	0.540* (0.271)		0.027** (0.011)
Industry %	-0.115** (0.044)	0.509*** (0.186)	-0.076*** (0.027)
Mean dep. var.	0.082	0.084	0.095
Obs	13	67	67
$R^2$	0.316	0.160	0.175

*Notes:* The table shows OLS regressions. In columns (1) and (3), the Communist vote share in the 2017 Czech elections serves as the dependent variable. Column (1) relies on the latest available (late 1946) regional data on staying anti-fascist Germans (certified anti-fascists or Germans subject to potential future transports and therefore likely anti-fascists; Luža, 1964) in % of 2017 population. The units of observations are the 13 regions (*kraje*) as of 1950 covering the entire Czech Republic. Columns (2) and (3) use data on the number of staying Germans as of late 1946 from Urban (1964) for 67 *Sudetenland* counties. Since this data source does not separately show German anti-fascists as opposed to German indispensable industrial workers, we attempt to estimate the number of anti-fascists as the residual of the regression presented in Column (2), where we regress the share of staying Germans (in % of 2017 population) on the share of industry on county employment in 1930. In column (3), we use the residuals from the model in column (2) (i.e., variation in staying Germans unexplained by industry structure) as a proxy for anti-fascist Germans. Significance levels (robust standard errors): \*\*\* 0.01, \*\* 0.05, \* 0.1.

Table 8: Multiplier estimates

	All Czech lands	<i>Sudetenland</i> subsample
	(1)	(2)
(a) Estimate from Table 7	0.540	
(b) Valid votes in national election 2017	5,050,251	
(c) Population 2017	10,578,820	
(d) German population 1930		43,406
(e) Discontinuity in anti-fascist Germans from Figure 3		0.028
(f) “Excess” anti-fascist Germans 1946		1,215
(g) Valid votes 2017		7,290
(h) Discontinuity in Communist vote shares from Table 2		0.079
(i) “Excess” Communist votes 2017		576
(j) Multiplier <i>Communist votes 2017 per anti-fascist German 1946</i>	0.258	0.474

*Notes:* The table reports back-of-the-envelope calculations of the multiplier effect of anti-fascist Germans staying in Czechoslovakia after 1946 on Communist votes in the most recent 2017 Czech national election. Column (1) refers to the cross-sectional estimate from Table 7, column (1). The multiplier in line (j) equals (a) multiplied by (b) divided by (c). Column (2) combines information from Figure 3 and Table 2 and corresponds to an RD causal effect. The multiplier now equals (i) divided by (f), where (i) and (f) are in turn the products of rows (d) and (e), and (g) and (h), respectively.

## **Abstrakt**

Rozsáhlý výzkum dokládá, jak masové deportace a vysídlení traumatizují miliony, které jsou nuceny opustit své domovy, ale velmi málo se ví o těch, kteří se deportacím vyhnou a stanou se minoritou v nově ustavených společnostech. V tomto článku se věnujeme sudetským Němcům, kteří nebyli vysídleni z Československa v letech 1945–1946. Vysídlování mělo jiný průběh v té části Sudet, kterou osvobodila americká armáda, než v oblastech osvobozených Rudou armádou: na americké straně se vysídlení nedotklo větší skupiny německých antifašistů. Ukazujeme, že přítomnost těchto levicově zaměřených ne-vysídlenců dnes ovlivňuje volební úspěšnost KSČM a levicové postoje. Naše analýza také naznačuje, že politická identita převážila u ne-vysídlenců identitu etnickou. Malá skupina původního obyvatelstva, které se podařilo vyhnout se masovým deportacím, tak ovlivňuje lokální politickou identitu přes tři a více generací.



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